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INTRODUCTION 
 
As a milestone in the twentieth century World War 2 (WW2) led various changes in the world 
order. Parallel to the shift to a bipolar world order, colonial powers of the pre-WW2 era lost 
their domination over their colonies to a great extent. As an inevitable consequence, the post-
WW2 era indicated a new beginning for the center and periphery in the world politics. There 
were two important changes in the center. The first was the shift of gravity from the United 
Kingdom (UK) to the United States of America (USA).  The second was the bipolarization of 
the world order that could be formulated as “free world” versus “communist” bloc. While the 
“free world” bloc was led by the capitalist USA, the superpower of the latter was the USSR. 
The new international environment shaped by strategies and endeavors to expand the scope of 
influence of each superpower was labeled as the Cold War. In the midst of this bipolarity the 
periphery turned into an area of interplay of the superpowers’ strategies and mechanisms for 
domination or institutionalization of domination. 
 
One of the basic premises that the superpowers relied on in the Cold War context was foreign 
aid. Due to her shortages and problems the USSR fell behind the USA in this policy, at least, 
at the very beginning. As the leading superpower, the USA began to allocate funds first to the 
war-stricken center countries to enable their economic recovery, which was a must for the 
sound functioning of the capitalist system and to locations where the real and assumed 
ideological confrontation of two blocs was intensified. Yet by defining the scope of 
ideological “battle” as the globe, in the process the foreign aid policy was expanded to 
peripheral countries, which were distinguished by their underdevelopment.        
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Expansion of foreign aid was possible by the responsiveness of the peripheral countries. 
Though policymakers of the peripheral countries had reservations about foreign aid mainly by 
the idea of “aid with strings”, their optimism regarding attainment of the ultimate national 
objectives by the availability of huge amounts of foreign exchange increased their 
responsiveness. There were hardly any peripheral countries in the ‘free world’ bloc and 
among nonaligned countries, which regarded foreign aid as unappealing. Main assumption 
beneath this high responsiveness was to overcome the fundamental structural problems, 
namely the foreign exchange shortage as well as low domestic savings that impeded 
development.  
 
The process, however, proved to be just the opposite of this assumption. The flow of huge 
amounts of foreign exchange to the peripheral countries did not lead to a high level of socio-
economic development. Outcomes of the process could be summarized as economic growth, 
increased injustice in income distribution, intensified dual structure and regional disparities. 
 
Examination of factors that led to this outcome indicated the prevalence of structural 
problems of the underdeveloped countries, widely known as the Third World, such as low 
domestic savings, inefficient taxation system, huge deficit financing and deficit in the balance 
of payments. In most cases the dilemma of the periphery regarding these problems was the 
discrepancy between the announced determination to solve these structural problems and 
unsatisfactory implementation of policies aiming to solve them.  
 
As countries in the framework of foreign aid policy of the USA, Turkey and India suffered 
from this deficiency also. Analysis of the theory (texts) and practice (implementation and 
outcomes) of the development policies of Turkey and India has reflected a considerable 
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discrepancy among these. Questioning of the factors that caused this discrepancy reveals 
technical and strategic dimensions. While the first is related to available human, financial, 
natural and technical resources, the latter indicates a dual mechanism comprised of inner 
(ruling elite coalition) and external (center countries) dynamics.  
 
In Turkish and Indian context, inner dynamics were distinguished by the capacity to prevent 
and/or emasculate programs/projects challenging the related interests. This reaction of the 
inner dynamics, however, represented only one facet of impact on development policies that 
could be formulized as the counter positions of the ruling elite and the mass. In addition to 
this, there were some issues that led to confrontations between the components of the ruling 
elite coalition. Then the struggle changed into a ruling elite-versus-ruling elite type, during 
which one component also attempted to manipulate the mass for its own interests.  
 
In the last category of interactions, the confrontation was between that peculiar country (the 
mass and ruling elite coalition) and the center countries that manipulated and shaped the 
global setting for their own interests. The last category also reflected divergences, as there 
were cases when the peripheral country stood in a counter position to the center and also there 
were cases when all or some components of the ruling elite coalition acted together with the 
center against the mass or against the mass and other components of the ruling elite coalition. 
 
Despite these divergences, however, in most case contribution of the center countries to the 
failure of the LDCs’ development endeavors was by avoidance of transferring recent 
technology and contribution to the deviation of the priority sectors, particularly in 
industrialization. Creating synergies with the national capitalists (bourgeoisie), the center 
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countries led to the concentration of sectors with easy and quick profit returns without leading 
to a genuine industrialization.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The concept of development economics, foreign aid and political economy forms the 
backbone of this study at hand. Thus, at this point, it would be wise to glance at the literature 
covering these concepts. The literature review covering the period 1960-2002 reveals the wide 
variety of works parallel to the evolution of development economics. In contrast to the 1950s 
when the official documents and works on the principles of economic development and 
economic growth inundate the development literature, in the 1960s a diversification of the 
issues is observed. W.W. Rostow inaugurated the decade by publishing The Stages of 
Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960). This is regarded as the masterpiece 
of the growth-oriented modernization theory mainly due to the immense influence that 
Rostow enjoyed over the donors and policymakers of the Third World countries. 
 
The Non-Communist Manifesto is distinguished by its ethno- and Euro-centric approach. 
Arguing that underdevelopment is an original state, Rostow advocates a linear historical 
process. He defines five stages of growth, which are based on the experience of the 
industrialized West. During the era under analysis, this work had a considerable impact on 
development and foreign aid policy despite its serious defections. These defections can be 
summarized as disregard of the examination of the actual structure of underdevelopment, 
denial of the historical process of European colonialism and failure to explain the reason why 
the underdeveloped countries have to pass through the growth stages.  
 
It was Paul Baran and Eric Hobsbawm who thoroughly criticized Rostow’s work in their “The 
Stages of Growth” (1961). Identifying the defections, Baran and Hobsbawm conclude that 
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Rostow’s ‘manifesto’ is worthless as a model for economic development. In Monopoly 
Capital (1966) Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, by referring to the monopolization of capital, 
argue that genuine development could be achieved only through the reconstruction of 
economy and society on a socialist basis. Rejecting the world capitalist system, Baran and 
Sweezy underline two major flow mechanisms which prevent sustained economic growth. 
First of these is the trade flow distinguished by unequal and dependent exchange in favor of 
the developed countries. The second is the surplus flow from the underdeveloped to the 
developed countries mainly through multinational corporations. By this examination of the 
relations between developed and underdeveloped Baran has a considerable impact on 
dependency theory.             
 
Before Baran, Celso Furtado in his Economic Growth of Brazil (1963), Development of 
Underdevelopment (1964), and Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis (1965) formulates the role of 
colonialism and foreign capital on underdevelopment. By referring to the consumption 
patterns in the periphery and effects of the developed countries on the industrialization 
process of the latecomers, Furtado introduces the concept of peripheral capitalism. By this, he 
describes the unique pattern of the Third World development distinguished by import-
substituting industrialization (ISI), based on the western consumption patterns, inability to 
generate productive innovations and socio-economic development shaped by the priorities of 
‘outsiders’. In his context, ‘outsiders’ means industrial countries and multinational 
corporations. According to Furtado, apart from colonialism, the developed countries manifest 
dependence initially on the cultural area. By transplanting their lifestyles to the periphery 
under the name of ‘modernization’ the developed countries internationalize their consumption 
patterns and distort the national priorities of the periphery.     
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While Furtado represents the first main current of the dependency school in Latin America, A. 
G. Frank has launched the second current widely known as development of 
underdevelopment. Frank is a leading critic of the development economics and modernization 
theory. In Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile 
and Brazil (1967), Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (1969) he rejects the 
growth models that claim a linear historical process.  He also rejects the definition of 
underdevelopment only in terms of internal structures and forces. Instead, he formulates 
underdevelopment as the product of external structures that have commenced by colonialism.  
 
Frank argues about an indirect proportion between the development level of the satellite 
countries and intensity of the relations between the satellite and metropolis countries. 
According to him the satellites experience their greatest development when their ties to the 
metropolis countries are the weakest. This is due to the nature of relations between the 
satellite and metropolis countries.  The latter developed by exploiting the world’s hinterland, 
‘siphoning of the surplus’. As development of the metropolis has been conditioned by the 
underdevelopment of the satellite countries, development and underdevelopment are defined 
as two sides of one coin.     
 
Though the 1960s witnessed the emergence of the dependency school, it is a fact that the USA 
and its sphere under the US influence undermined the works of the dependency school 
theoreticians for a long time. Leys explains this restrain to confront the dependency school 
due to its anti-imperialist notion. Though these circles avoided confronting with dependency 
theory, at the same time, major strives emerged to enable a consolidation in the mainstream 
development theory.1 For instance, Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in the Changing 
                                                 
1Colin Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory, (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1996), p.64.     
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Societies (1968) has emerged in the midst of this chaotic atmosphere. Huntington’s work has 
been regarded as a path-breaking one since he has revitalized modernization theory by 
underlying social classes as well as social unrest in the development process, as crucial but 
‘forgotten’ components in the mainstream development thinking obsessed with economic 
growth.  
 
In Political Order in the Changing Societies (1968) Huntington argues that development and 
modernization are not necessarily progressive forces. Moving from the statistical data   he 
concludes that there is a direct correlation between stability and low per capita income. While 
countries with the lowest per capita income are more stable, countries which attain economic 
growth are distinguished by increased social instability. Huntington explains the core of the 
problem in the Third World as the inconsistency between the rapid social change and political 
institutions. According to him, increased inequalities and political participation of the masses 
in these modernizing societies contradict with the gradual development of political 
institutions. As these societies lack institutionalized political institutions, the outcome, in most 
cases, is chaos. Due to this reason, Huntington argues the obligation of any institutionalized 
institutions or group that could cope with the factors causing political instability. Obsessed 
with the necessity of authority, he defines creation of effective states as the solution. 
Huntington’s work, which is regarded as a controversial classic, indicates the end of classical 
modernization theory distinguished by an understanding of an overoptimistic linear historical 
development.   
 
While the 1960s witnessed the shaping of opposing development theories, the literature of the 
1970s portrays a more diversified nature. The diversification is not only among different but 
also within the same development schools. Moving from the empirical data on intensifying 
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dualism, inequality and unemployment, some theoreticians within the growth-oriented 
modernization paradigm have published works which have called for redistribution with 
equity. In Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries (1973), Irma 
Adelman and C.T. Morris abandon their previous equation of development with growth. 
Discussion of the extent of the benefits of economic growth in underdeveloped countries to 
the most needy in the 1950s and the 1960s ‘shocked them’. They refer to the asymmetry 
between the growth and income distribution with respect to the lower income groups. Another 
important work of this sort is H. B. Chenery’s Redistribution with Growth (1974). In this 
Chenery states that rapid growth in underdeveloped countries have little or no benefit for at 
least one-third of the population.           
 
Though they diagnose the same asymmetry, Adelman & Morris (1973) and Chenery (1974) 
have different perceptions on the nature of the relation between the income distribution and 
economic growth. While Adelman & Morris (1973) define the relationship between economic 
growth and income equality as conflicting, Chenery  (1974) accepts the worsening of relative 
inequalities while refusing correlation with the worsening of absolute inequalities.   
 
The diagnosis of the relation between economic growth and increased inequalities has 
reinforced the assumption regarding state’s competence with economic development. Though 
agreeing with the diagnosis, Paul Streeten is the leading theoretician who has challenged the 
redistribution with equity approach. In his “The Distinctive Features of A Basic Needs 
Approach to Development” (1977) Streeten argues that the redistribution with equity 
approach gives much place to chance. Rather than income policies, Streeten claims the 
necessity of direct governmental provision of basic services, including minimum levels of 
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material needs such as food, shelter, clothing and access to such essential public services as 
pure water, sanitation, public transport, health and education. 
 
Yet various scholars, a majority of whom represent political economy current, have 
questioned the compatibility of this formula by referring to the existing complex power 
relations in societies. It was Gunnar Myrdal who pioneered the debate concerning the state’s 
equal competence for economic development. In his Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the 
Poverty of Nations (1968) where he examines the prevailing backwardness in Asia, Myrdal 
classifies states as “soft” and “hard” to reflect differing institutional capacities. Empirical 
evidence regarding the ‘irrational’ implementations and policies of the governments in the 
LDCs, on the other hand, has led to an increased interest on political economy current. 
Analyzing the society in a holistic approach, scholars of this current focus on interest group 
analysis. They emphasize the self-interested manner of human beings who seek the available 
opportunities to maximize their gains. Related to the interest groups, they conclude that a 
small group with a common interest would be more effective than the mass.    
 
Thomas Kersteins’ The New Elite in Asia and Africa: A Comparative Study of Indonesia and 
Ghanna (1966), Guillermo O’Dennell’s Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: 
Studies in South American Politics (1973), James Petras’ Politics and Social Structure in 
Latin America (1970) and Class State and Power in the Third World (1981), A.K. Lal’s Elite 
and Development (1980), Olson Mancur’s The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic 
Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities (1982), David C. Korten and Felipe Alfonso’s (eds.) 
Bureaucracy and the Poor: Closing the Gap (1983), and Sanjoy Banerjee’s Dominant Classes 
and the State in Development (1984) are some of the works representing political economy 
current.  
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As another rising current in late the 1960s and the 1970s the neo-classical resurgence in 
development literature also examines the irrational behavior of the governments in the 
underdeveloped countries. Accepting the self-interested manner of human beings, 
theoreticians argue that the self-interested people have opportunities in a large and 
interventionist state. Under these conditions, people would neglect the private sector and 
engage in activities that challenge the welfare of the society such as corruption, rent-seeking 
and nepotism. They conclude that the possible solution for this is the reduction of the size of 
the state and its role in the economy. Jagdish Bhagwati’s The Economics of the 
Underdeveloped Countries (1966), Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities (1982), 
Anne Krueger’s The Political Economy of Rent Seeking Society (1974), Foreign Trade 
Regimes and Development: Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (1978) are some of the 
important works representing neo-classical resurgence. 
 
Both the redistribution with equity and neo-classical resurgence were attempts to provide an 
analysis for the emerging realities in the Third World for which the growth-oriented 
modernization paradigm failed to provide. The general decline in the modernization theory 
has led to the reconsideration and restructuring of development theory by the theoreticians of 
this school. The reconsidered development paradigm calls for a dialogue between the North 
and South. Proponents of this call rely on the idea of a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) the main premises of which are cooperation, free trade, debt relief and technology 
transfer. As an ambitious program, NIEO argues about the upgradation of the economies of 
Third World and integration of these countries as equal partners.  Jyoti Shankar Singh’s New 
International Economic Order: Toward A Fair Redistribution of the World’s Resources 
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(1977), and Worm Kirsten’s Industrialization, Development and the Demands for A New 
International Economic Order (1978) are some examples of this literature.  
 
While NIEO is the orthodox response to the dilemmas in development economics, the 
heterodox development school’s response is an advanced dependency theory that aims to 
improve the existing defects of dependency and the world systems theory of Immanuel 
Wallerstein. The first important name aiming to correct the defection of dependency theory is 
Fernando Cardoso. In contrast to Frank’s terminology, Cardoso argues that metropolis 
countries are interested in at least some prosperity of the satellite countries. This prosperity is 
crucial as the latter function as markets for the metropolis countries. Yet Cardoso underlines 
that a certain level of prosperity does not ensure independence; instead it creates a 
dependence of the satellite on metropolis countries. In addition to this, Cardoso criticizes 
Frank’s universalism which undermines the variations in the metropolis-satellite relations. He 
argues about the obligation of close examination at specific local situations.  
 
In the 1970s, African economist Samir Amin has contributed to the dependency theory 
through various important works, namely Accumulation on A World Scale: A Critique of the 
Theory of Underdevelopment (1974), Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social 
Formations on Peripheral Capitalism (1976) and Imperialism and Unequal Development 
(1977). Amin argues that the distinguishing feature of the peripheral capitalism is its being 
extraverted accumulation which indicates ‘outward-looking’ nature of underdevelopment 
economies. Explaining this in relation with the export activities, Amin points out the shaping 
of the export activities by the center countries. This leads to a number of structural distortions. 
An important form of this distortion is the disarticulation in economic activities and social 
capacities. As the periphery forms potential markets and is the provider of low-cost 
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production, these distortions are required by the center. The unequal exchange between the 
center and periphery blocks the sustained economic growth of the periphery while serving the 
expansion of the center’s capitalism.        
 
Immanuel Wallerstein in his The Modern World System (1974) defines the world system as a 
social entity with a single division of labor. In this, all areas are dependent on the others via 
interchanges of essential goods. He defines three main economic zones as core, semiperiphery 
and periphery. Defining the spatial relations in this system as exploitative,  Wallerstein refers 
to the flow of surplus from the periphery to the core. While this surplus leads to capital 
accumulation in the core, this means unavailability of the capital required for modernization 
for the periphery. In short, in contrast to the orthodox school’s  emphasis on the mutual 
interests of ‘components’ in the global order, heterodox school underlines the exploitative 
nature of relations.  
 
In addition to the above mentioned works Arghiri Emmanuel’s Unequal Exchange: A Study of 
Imperialism of Trade (1972), Andre Gunder Frank’s World System in Crisis (1979), 
Development of Crisis and Crisis of Development: Living in the Real World (1979), Economic 
Crisis and the State in the Third World (1979), Rhetoric and Reality of the New International 
Economic Order (1983) and Dept Bondage and Exploitation of the Third World (1983) are 
important works of heterodox development literature in this decade. 
 
Literature review of the 1980s indicates the new definition of “growth” within the orthodox 
school after a decade’s search for such a redefinition. This new growth theory conceptualizes 
the economic growth process concerning endogenous dynamics. The most important of these 
dynamics is technological innovation and change. In its reference to the role and impact of 
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knowledge and ideas, the main argument of the new growth theory is the possible positive 
impact of investment in scientific knowledge, research and development on technological 
development in large, which could influence economic expansion and growth. Moving from 
these, proponents of this theory have regarded scientific knowledge and technological 
innovation as engines of growth. These engines necessitate human capital development. 
 
In contrast to the appraisal of the advantages of technological development and diffusion as a 
means for the development of the Third World, heterodox development literature, on the other 
hand, refers to the dependency link that this technology transfer creates. John McIntyre and 
Daniel S. Papp’s The Political Economy of International Technology (1986), and Bart 
Verspagen’s Uneven Growth Between Interdependent Economies: An Evolutionary View on 
Technology Gaps, Trade and Growth (1993) are some studies related to this issue. 
 
Along with these mainstream development theories, the 1990s and the 2000s are distinguished 
by an increasing literature on globalization and alternative measures of development which 
pays greater attention to the relation between economic growth, increased poverty, 
degradation of environment and depletion of natural resources. The concept of sustainable 
development covers these fields while enabling feminization of the development literature, as 
the development economics has become more sensitive to the gender relations.    
 
While literature on development have undergone through these evolutionary stages, another 
important issue that represents one of the main pillars of development economics in post-
WW2, namely foreign aid, is also frequently referred in this study. However, in contrast to the 
development economics, the clashing views on the issue of foreign aid have not evolved. 
Instead they have remained unchanged as reflected by general, pro- and con-foreign aid 
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scholars. In addition to these three main categories of studies on foreign aid, there are various 
themes within the last two main categories.  
 
General studies on foreign aid present information concerning general principles of foreign 
aid. Thematic categorization of studies in the pro-foreign aid literature, on the other hand, 
indicates scholars’ preference for a correlation between foreign aid and economic 
development. An important study among the general ones is Limber Charles Pearce’s Rostow, 
Kennedy and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid (2001) that sheds light on W.W. Rostow’s impact 
on the foreign aid policy of Kennedy administration. Pearce argues that by advocating the 
notion of alliance for progress, Rostow acts as the impetus in the adoption of the rhetoric of 
‘peaceful revolution’.   
 
Scholars supporting foreign aid policy argue about the positive impact of foreign aid on the 
economic development while highlighting possible outcomes in the absence of foreign aid. 
The humanitarian motive behind foreign aid policy is another theme particularly mentioned in 
the advocacy of food aid. Those who argue that aid was a humanitarian resource transfer from 
the advanced countries to the LDCs define the fundamental principle behind the foreign aid as 
international welfare. Ronald  Robinson’s International Cooperation in Aid (1966), T.A. 
Sumberg’s Foreign Aid As A Moral Obligation (1973), H.B. Chenery and A. Strout’s Foreign 
Assistance and Economic Development (1965) and W. Moomaw’s Challenge of Hunger: A 
Program for More Effective Foreign Aid (1966) are some examples in this category. 
 
Studies, which have a critical approach towards foreign aid, on the other hand, can be 
categorized into two. While the first category raises the possibility of some positive 
implications behind the foreign aid policy, the second rejects such a possibility. The first 
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category of critical literature on foreign aid argues the discrepancies between the ‘desire’ and 
implementation of the foreign aid policy. While pointing out the possibility of donor’s desire 
to contribute to the solution of the economic problems of the aid recipient, its practice proved 
inefficient as an instrument. More than reducing the problems or contributing to the economic 
wellbeing of the recipient the foreign aid actually has aggravated the recipient’s problems by 
its negative impact on savings, creating debt problems and diversions from the national 
priorities of the recipient. In this literature, while some refer to the Cold War context, which 
militarizes the aid policy, others argue the conflicts between the local dynamics and priorities 
of the donors. In the process the latter has become more clarified by the argument that more 
than the objective needs of the aid recipients, donors’ domestic political forces have 
dominated the foreign aid policy formulation. Paul Bauer’s Dissent on Development (1971) 
and Vernon W. Ruttan’s U.S. Development Assistance Policy: The Domestic Politics of 
Foreign Economic Aid  (1996) are two good examples of this category.  
  
The second category of critical literature on foreign aid rejects that foreign aid policy of the 
donor can have, and in fact had, positive notions related to the aid recipient countries. 
Defining the foreign aid as completely ‘exploitative’ this literature focuses on the ‘buying 
power’ notion as the fundamental motive behind the foreign aid policy. Goran Ohlin’s Aid 
and Indebtedness of Developing Countries (1966), Jim Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign 
Policy (1968), Harry Magdoff’s The Age of Imperialism (1969), Pierre. Jales’ The Pillage of 
the Third World (1969), Teresa Hayter’s Aid as Imperialism (1970), Robin Jenkins’ 
Exploitation: The World Power Structure and the Inequality of Nations (1970), Denis Goulet 
and Michael. Hudson’s The Myth of Aid (1971), C.R. Hensman, Rich Against the Poor: The 
Reality of Aid (1971), Klaus Knorr’s Power and Wealth (1973), Stephen Weissman’s The 
Trojan War: A Radical Look At Foreign Aid (1973), Mitchel B.Wallerstein’s Food for War-
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Food for Peace: United States Food Aid in a Global Context (1980), Srinivas C. Mudumbai’s 
US Foreign Policy Towards India, 1947-54 (1980), Robert Wood’s Development and 
Functioning of the Foreign Aid Regimes (1986), Earl Contleh-Morgan’s American Food Aid 
and Global Power Projection: The Geopolitics of Resource Allocation (1990), Patricia Adams 
and Lawrence Solomon’s In the Name of Aid: The Underside of Foreign Aid (1991) and  
Sarah Tisch and Miccel B. Wallace’s Dilemmas of Development Assistance: To What, Why 
and Who of Foreign Aid (1994) are some of the works representing the critical viewpoint 
concerning foreign aid. 
 
In his Development and Functioning of the Foreign Aid, Wood traces back to the origins of 
the foreign aid regime down to the Marshall Plan, analyzes the crisis of the dependent 
development with respect to the inegalitarian nature of the ‘development’ promoted by the 
foreign aid regime, indebtedness of the aid recipient countries and possible outcomes of IMF 
adjustment policies.  
 
While Wood analyzes the creation and institutionalization of the general setting for foreign 
aid in the post-WW2 era by the superpower of the capitalist bloc, there are numerous works 
that refer to the identical motives in the Soviet or other countries’ aid policies. While Thomas 
Andersson and Hakan Hellstrom in their Links between Development Assistance and Donor 
Country Exports: The Case of Sweden (1994) refer to trade-arrangement aspects of aid 
allocation, David Arase’s Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan’s Foreign Aid 
(1995) provides a thorough examination that reveals the universality of the objective of 
foreign aid by the donors. An important book of this sort is about India. In his India’s Aid 
Diplomacy in the Third World (1980) Dewan C. Vohra discusses the practice, rationale, 
impact and future prospects of India’s aid diplomacy. Vohra examines the political economy 
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of Indian foreign aid granted to her neighbor countries, how this policy is developed as a 
means to peripherize these neighbors while ensuring India’s ‘center’ position in the periphery 
with special reference to the interests of Indian capitalists in search of markets.  
 
Due to its initial challenge, size, availability of resources and its potentials there is a very 
large amount of literature about India on a variety of issues including its planning model, 
development programs, industrialization, failure of the programs, political economy and 
foreign policy. Scholars supporting the Indian development process refer to the difficulty of 
governing a sub-continent with a high population growth rate and a highly diversified ethnic 
structure. Critics of the process, on the other hand, refer to the increased inequalities, 
intensified duality, regional disparity, and the immense indebtedness of the country which has 
been far from the announced ultimate objective of self-reliance.  
 
Notion of self-reliance is highly debated in the case of India. In his “Self-Reliance in A 
Changing World” (1982) Amarya Kumar Bagchi argues about the difficulty of what is aimed 
by the concept of self-reliance. Yet, there are basic macroeconomic conditions for this 
concept such as the ability to pursue policies without having to depend on borrowing from 
abroad or on “an uncertain flow of foreign aid”. In this context, Bagchi refers to the direct 
proportion between the ability of self-sufficient production of technology that the economy 
requires and the notion of self-reliance. Though accepting the disadvantage of the Third 
World countries in this respect vis-à-vis the center countries, Bagchi rejects the argument that 
the Third World misses the chance for self-reliance. For the latter, Bagchi, while referring to 
the detrimental effects of country’s importation level, defines these countries’ ability to 
import, adapt, absorb as well as develop technologies when they are needed as an 
approximate criterion. Supporting and appraising India’s concerns to indogenize the imported 
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technology, Bagchi argues for the obligation of the continuity of efforts related to this concern 
by referring to the examples of South Korea and Japan.       
 
Literature on Turkey also reflects a wide variety of studies covering Turkey’s development 
process and its failure with respect to attained outcomes, politics, economic reform acts and 
foreign policy. Yet, literature on the political economy of the country is scarce when 
compared to India. Ergun Ozbudun and Aydin Ulusan (eds.) Political Economy of Income 
Distribution in Turkey (1980) provides detailed contextual analyses regarding the inequality 
of income distribution. The key hypothesis of the study is the divergence of the declared 
intent and impact of redistributive policies, which is confirmed by the contextual analyses.     
 
Another important work in this category is Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul A. Tonak (eds.) 
Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives (1987) in which various aspect of the economic 
development problems are analyzed through a historical perspective. An important essay in 
the book is Caglar Keyder’s “Economic Development and Crisis: 1950-80” where Keyder 
examines the state policies’ impact on capital accumulation and empowerment of various 
groups parallel to the examination of implemented development policies in rural and urban 
economy. Another essay of Keyder in the same book is “Political Economy of Turkish 
Democracy”. Here he discusses the distinctive position of Turkey within the Third World 
with respect to a lack of colonial experience and a possession of a rich political tradition from 
its imperial predecessor. Despite this difference, however, the outcomes of the development 
process indicate similarity as the underdeveloped peripheral character of Turkish economy 
remains unaltered.       
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Though these essays form important analyzes of Turkey’s political economy, leading scholars 
in the field of development economics and political economy regard Bent Hansen’s The 
Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: Egypt and Turkey (1991) as the first 
comprehensive study of the political economy of development in modern Egypt and Turkey. 
Pairing these two countries because of such similarities as being a part of the Ottoman 
Empire, similarities in population, income and development levels in early 1920s, common 
patterns in their ISI strategy as well as same unsatisfactory outcomes with respect to increased 
inequality and poverty, Hansen defines protectionist policies as the main reason which 
constraint the growth of productivity. While focusing on the economic policies and their 
implementation, in Turkey section, impact of the interest groups is not a primary concern for 
Hansen. Instead, he prefers to provide some snapshots regarding the dynamics among some 
interest groups.  
 
Examination of the literature with respect to comparative studies reveals that although there is 
a relatively immense amount of comparative studies on India, there is hardly any comparative 
study on Turkey and India. For the era studied, Berch Berberoglu’s The Political Economy of 
Development: Development Theory and the Prospect for Change in the Third World (1992) 
can be identified. Following the examination of development paradigms, Berberoglu along 
with Tanzania and Peru provides a brief comparison of Turkey and India as case studies of 
state capitalism. In this comparison he focuses on the role of the state in the economy, its 
dealing with the elite groups, particularly the national capitalists, and the role of foreign 
capital in Turkey and India. In the case of Turkey, state-interest group relations are examined 
from the 1920s to the 1940s, while in India the particular concern is the power of capitalists 
and their monopolization under the Indian rule.  While Berberoglu defines the role of foreign 
capital in Turkey as her ‘reintegration’ into the world economy, in the Indian case the foreign 
 26
capital is regarded as the mechanism for India’s transition to neocolonialism from state 
capitalism.  
 
This brief comparative work on Turkey and India excludes the analysis of public resource 
flow from public to private sector, except the credit issue, growth and inner conflicts of the 
elite groups and direct or indirect impact of the superpower on the resource allocation in these 
two peripheral countries. Though Berberoglu mentions the role of foreign capital, he does not 
raise the role of the USA in promoting this favorable environment. The study also excludes 
the political economy of foreign policy of both Turkey and India. 
 
The present study entitled as The US Foreign Aid Policy and Institutionalization of 
Dependency in the Periphery in the Post-WW2 Era: Turkey and India Compared (1947-73) 
qualitatively differs from the previous studies. In the study, Turkey and India are compared 
with respect to their differences, regardless of the initial resemblances. In contrast to Turkey, 
whose integration to the world economy was as a semi-colony, with colonization in economic 
terms not in political terms, India integrated into the world economy as the colony of the 
superpower of the era. As the first country in the twentieth century who gained her 
independence after a War of Independence against the imperialist powers, Turkey was a 
model country for the countries under the colonial powers in the pre-WW2 era, including 
India. “Obsessed” by the idea of self-reliance, Turkey rejected the country’s participation in 
the international division of labor as an agricultural country in the 1930s. Equating 
agricultural economy with economic dependence on industrialized countries, Turkish 
policymakers adopted ISI in the 1930s since, like many other policymakers of 
underdeveloped countries, industrialization has been the precondition for attaining self-
reliance for them.      
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By this stance, until the end of WW2, Turkey was a model country for the ones who were 
under the dominion of the colonial powers. India’s stance in the international arena following 
her independence resembles the pre-WW2 Turkish nation building process. Like the Turkish 
rhetoric of pre-WW2, Indian policymakers challenged the center countries for the sake of full 
political and economic independence.  Yet these similarities in national priorities have 
disappeared in the post-WW2 era by Turkey’s inclusion in the capitalist “free world” bloc. In 
the meantime, India based her foreign policy on becoming the leader of a ‘non-aligned’ 
movement by the challenge of becoming a free bloc away from power politics. Due to this 
challenge, while the USA endeavored to prevent India’s leadership among the non-aligned 
countries, she promoted an appropriate environment for Turkey’s regional leadership for her 
own strategic hegemonic concerns.   
 
In addition to this differentiation in international arena, Turkey and India represent two 
typologies within the Third World with respect to their industrialization level, natural 
resources and class dynamics. While Turkey hardly had any industrial establishments by the 
time of her Independence, India was the eighth industrialized country in the world by 1947, 
though lacking a self-sustaining industrial basis. Another difference is related to the 
availability of natural resources, an important factor that raises the attractiveness of the 
countries for the center. In contrast to Turkey, India was highly attractive by her abundant 
natural resources. Last but not least, while Turkish nation builders complained of absence of 
class dynamics in the society, India had a highly dynamic class structure.     
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Despite these differences in potentials and industrialization levels, at the end of the studied era 
both Turkey and India suffered from the same structural and economic problems such as 
intensified dual social structure, increased inequalities, widespread underemployment and 
unemployment along with poverty and increased regional disparities.  The study aims to 
diagnose the factors that led to the same deficiencies in the development process of each 
country. As India becomes independent and each country start to be differentiated in the 
international arena in the post-WW2 era, the study commences in 1947. It covers twenty-six 
years and ends in 1973 before the oil crisis. As both countries had to face the belated crisis in 
their system in late the 1970s I believe that symptoms of the systems can best be diagnosed in 
1947-73 era. 
 
Moving from this rationale, the key hypothesis of the dissertation is that the unsatisfying 
outcomes of the development endeavors are due to the interplay of inner and external 
dynamics. As the problematic aspect of this contribution is related to resource allocation and 
capital accumulation, inner dynamics are limited to ruling elite coalition and external 
dynamics are to center countries, particularly the superpower of the capitalist bloc. Inner and 
external dynamics of Turkey and India are compared according to this definition. As 
mentioned above, though there is a huge body of literature on the development of Turkey and 
India, comparative studies focusing on Turkey and India hardly exist. In the case of Turkey 
comparisons are made with other ‘devoted allies’ of the USA or some success stories in 
economic development such as South Korea. In the case of India, on the other hand, the 
comparative studies predominantly focus on India and China. These two Asian giants with 
respect to population, size and potentials are compared on various grounds. Yet the most 
favored topic in these comparative studies is their development endeavors. In addition to 
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China, India is also frequently compared with either the newly emerged Asian giants or the 
USSR. 
 
The originality of the present study lies from the fact that it attempts to compare two different 
typologies in the Third World by a holistic approach. The extensive use of the accessed 
primary resources has also proven crucial as they shed significant light on various dynamics 
in the process most of which are relatively disguised. The study is conducted by the 
examination of large amounts of primary and secondary resources. In the case of Turkey, a 
considerable amount of archival documents from the American national archives in Maryland, 
Washington D.C. are available. In addition to these, Journals of the TBMM Records of the era 
are examined. In the case of India, however, the research conditions are not as favorable as 
Turkey. Disclosed archival documents in the American National Archives are limited due to 
“strategic reasons”. Still a considerable amount of documents are not disclosed. Though India 
has a huge national archive, the studied period is not open to the foreign researchers as 
announced by the archive authorities. In any case, examination of the journal of Lok Sabha 
Records is possible. In addition to these, various oral history manuscripts are examined and 
interviews are made by the high level ex-policymakers or relatives of the policymakers of 
Turkey. Consequently, the study intends to focus on the interplay of domestic and external 
dynamics that served to the unattained development objectives of each country. 
   
policy of the USA are analyzed (Chapter I). In the second chapter, development policies of 
Turkey and India are examined with respect to the divergences between the text and 
implementation as well as the degree of the attainment of the defined objectives. In the third 
chapter composition of the ruling elite coalition of each country is analyzed through 
examining the reactions and countervailing policies of the elite vis-a-vis these programs. In 
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the last chapter, interactions between the center countries, particularly the superpower, and the 
periphery are analyzed within the framework of an extraordinary environment, the Cold War. 
 
CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS 
 
In the study, there are some frequently used concepts that require explanation. First of these is 
‘self-sufficiency’. For the era under study, both in the Turkish and Indian contexts, the 
national ultimate objective was defined as attainment of self-sufficiency. Examination of texts 
and debates reveals that by the term self-sufficiency Turkish and Indian policymakers meant a 
self-reliant economy, which attains genuine industrialization without impoverishment with 
respect to economic resources and has the ability to develop alternatives when facing with 
various kinds of obstacles impeding full-capacity functioning of the sectors. In the study, self-
sufficiency and self-reliance are used interchangeably. When primary sources and quotations 
from the policymakers are used, the term self-sufficiency is preferred. 
 
In the study, the dichotomy between the inner dynamics is presented as ‘the ruling elite 
coalition’ and ‘the mass’. Elite theoreticians in their analysis of the social forces use these two 
terms. Yet these are not the sole options. Instead of ‘the ruling elite coalition’ these 
theoreticians variably use other terms while analyzing the social forces. Some of the 
frequently used concepts are ‘the ruling class’, ‘the elite’, ‘the elite coalition’, ‘the governing 
elite’, ‘the minority’, ‘the organized minority’ and ‘the rulers’. Similarly, instead of ‘the mass’ 
other concepts such as ‘the masses’, ‘the ruled’, ‘the majority’, ‘the unorganized majority’, 
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‘the many’, and  ‘the non-elite’ can be used. In the scope of the study, I prefer to use ‘the 
ruling elite coalition’ and ‘the mass’.2   
     
In the study components of the ruling elite coalition are defined as the political elite, the rural 
elite, the capitalists and the bureaucracy. The intelligentsia of both countries is not defined as 
a component of the ruling elite coalition. This exclusion of the intelligentsia is related to its 
peculiar stance in the society, as defined by the theoreticians. Though sometimes the terms 
intelligentsia and elite are used almost synonymously, this is not a universally agreed 
definition. Instead, owing to the changing criteria for elite status in different societies, 
definition of the intelligentsia as a component of the ruling elite coalition is accepted as the 
peculiarity of that particular society.  
 
The general exclusion of the intelligentsia is defined with respect to its in-between stance 
among the ruling elite coalition and the mass. The intelligentsia is in-between by its being the 
proprietor of specialized intellectual knowledge. As it does not possess capital or the power of 
capital in influencing the resource allocation, it is not regarded as an elite group. In addition, 
its less organized and less cohesive features are important factors for its exclusion from the 
ruling elite coalition. The intelligentsia’s class or elite group position is accepted only in 
societies where its intellectual knowledge by itself “confers the right of disposition over the 
surplus product”.3        
 
                                                 
2For the elite theory and relevant literature see Gaetono Mosca, The Ruling Class, (New York: McGraw Hill, 
1939); Robert Michels, Political Parties, (New York: Free Press, 1966); Vilfredo Pareto, The Rise and Fall of 
the Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology, (Totowa, New Jersey: Bedminster Press, 1968); Renzo 
Sereno, The Rulers: The Theory of the Ruling Class, (New York: Harper & Row, 1968);Vilfredo Pareto, The 
Mind and Society, (New York: Dover Press, 1973).       
3 For the debate on the issue see George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, eds. The Intellectuals on the Road to Class 
Power, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979); Eric Conton, The Few and the Many: Typology of Elites, 
(Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1996).     
 32
For the era under study, as the intelligentsia of Turkey and India was unable to act by group-
consciousness and lacked the power on resource allocation by ‘its property’ as a group, it is 
not defined as a component of the ruling elite coalition. Instead it is regarded as a potential 
pressure group. Yet in the fulfillment of this potentiality the intelligentsia of Turkey and India 
differ. It seems that in a freer environment the Indian intelligentsia had more chance to act by 
the intellectual responsibility. In contrast to the Indian case, the Turkish intellectuals failed to 
a great extent to develop a critical attitude and tradition of intellectuality. A convincing 
explanation of this failure can be that in a country under the illusion of communist ferment 
fostered by the literature of “coming of the communism” and various pressure politics the 
Turkish the intelligentsia was denied the privilege of acting as intellectuals. Consequently, 
they hardly acted even as a pressure group. 
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CHAPTER I 
DEVELOPMENT PARADIGMS & US FOREIGN AID POLICY IN 
POST-WW2 ERA  
 
World War II was one of the turning points in history. Its aftermath was distinguished by a bi-
faceted reorganizing of the world order. First facet was the competition between the 
superpowers for the expansion of their sphere of influence. Second facet was observed within 
the power blocs. The superpower of each bloc endeavored and developed strategies to put the 
countries in order so as to best serve its own interest. As the analysis of the era indicates, in 
the US-led “free world” bloc this reordering indicated arrangements which reinforced the aid 
recipient’s role in the international division of labor, which in essence called for the 
specialization of the economy. Justified by the prevailing development theory this endeavor’s 
main pillar was excessive foreign aid.4 In this Chapter, redefinition of development theory in 
the post-WW2 and the meaning and role of foreign aid policy in the post-WW2 era are 
examined with respect to its motives, stages and types.  
 
Redefinition of Development and Dominant Development Paradigms in The Post-WW2 
Era 
Development economics emerged in the post-WW2 era.  In this respect, WW2 was a 
watershed for the development theory. In the pre-WW2 era, as an issue, development was 
identified with the exploitation of the natural resources and opening of the markets of many 
                                                 
4The relevant literature includes Harry P. Price, The Marshall Plan & Its Meaning, (New York: Ithaca, 1955); 
Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain & the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-52, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1987); Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-80, 
(New York: John Waley and Sons, 1980); Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the 
Truman Administration and the Cold War, (California: Stanford University, 1992).  
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Asian and African countries "for the benefit of the mother country". This perception, 
however, changed considerably in rhetoric in the post-WW2 era parallel to the changes in the 
political map of colonial powers. Theoreticians and policymakers of the western countries 
defined economic development of the less developed countries (LDCs) as the most urgent 
problem. Commencing in nineteen forty-nine, a vast literature emerged on development. It 
has been accepted that Truman’s inaugural message of 1949 where he stressed the need for 
the countries of the modern world to solve the problems of the LDCs is the official 
announcement of the new era in development theory.5  
 
Development Paradigms in the Post-WW2 
i. Orthodox Development Thinking 
 
The dominant development paradigm until the early 1960s is known as the orthodox 
development thinking (known as diffusionism, developmentalism or modernization theory) 
distinguished by its growth orientation, diffusionist and modernization appeal. In the orthodox 
development thinking growth and development is defined as inevitable, natural and law-like 
which all countries are bound to attain. Precondition of this growth is the modernized elite’s 
ability to generate domestic sources and/or provision of required investment resources 
through foreign aid. It is assumed that by following this stage LDCs countries will attain 
development.6 
 
                                                 
5 H.W. Arndt, Economic Development: The History of An Idea, (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, [n.d.]), p.49; Ray Kiely, “The Last Refuge of the Noble Savage: A Critical Assessment of Post-
Development Theory?” in The European Journal of Development Research, 11:1 (June 1999), p. 31 
6Charles K. Wilber and Kenneth P. Jameson, “Paradigms of Economic Development and Beyond” in The 
Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, ed., Charles K. Wilber, (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Publishing Company, 1973), p.7; S.P. Varma, “Models of Development: Search for Alternatives” in 
Development, Politics and Social Theory:  Essays in Honor of Professor S.P. Varma, ed., Iqbal Narain, (Sterling 
Publishers Private Limited, 1989), p.20; Arndt, Economic Development: The History of An Idea, p.50-3.  
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Diffusionist feature of the paradigm is shaped by the so-called trickle down principle.  
According to the latter, concentration of the accumulated wealth in the hands of the upper 
segments of the population for the initial stages of the development is a necessity as this acts 
as an impetus. Main assumption of this principle is that in contrast to the poor segments’ 
tendency to spend their income on consumption goods, by saving and investing higher 
proportion of their incomes the upper income segments lead to greater savings and growth 
rates.  It is argued that parallel to the higher growth rates more income will be trickled down 
to lower income strata via the market mechanism. The means that enabling the concentration 
of accumulated capital into the hands of the upper segments are defined as tax arrangements 
and subsidies. This principle results in the orthodox development thinking’s abstention from 
the social concerns of development process such as egalitarian income distribution.7 
 
While this rationale represents one facet of the diffusionist approach, other facet is related to 
international diffusion according to which through diffusion of the technological advances 
from the developed countries to the LDCs, the first contributes to the development of the 
latter. The international dimension of the trickle down is frequently raised by the US 
administration particularly in justifying the foreign aid policy.8           
  
Modernization appeal of the orthodox development thinking, on the other hand, is its 
fundamental pillar. In the scope of orthodox development thinking development is defined as 
a process of modernization, that is "a structural change process whereby the traditional and 
backward Third World countries developed towards greater similarity with the Western, or 
rather, the North-Western world [italic is in the original text]." Theoreticians and donors 
                                                 
7Charles P. Oman and Ganeshan Wignaraja, The Postwar Evolution of Development Thinking, (London: 
Macmillan,1991), p.15; see also Kenneth E. Bauzon, ed., Development and Democratization in the Third World: 
Myths, Hopes and Realities, (London: Crane Russak, 1992). 
8See addresses of President Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy  
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defined the reproduction of the recent economic history of the industrialized countries as a 
“success model” for the LDCs.9 
 
Equation of development with modernization has tremendous impact in this field. 
Underdevelopment is defined as a common ground both for the developed and LDCs since 
the first also advanced from this stage.  It is argued that due to this common ground all 
societies progress in a linear fashion along the same path toward development.  This leads to a 
simplified development ‘recipe’ for the LDCs that undermines their inner dynamics. This 
recipe suggests the repetition of the stages that developed countries had passed in their move 
to development. End product of this process is defined as the transformation of simple and 
small-scale traditional agricultural societies to complex, organizationally integrated modern 
industrialized states which are distinguished by an increasing use of science and technology. 
The emphasis on industrialization is crucial as it perfectly matches with the objectives of the 
LDCs.  In a consensual manner both the policymakers in the LDCs and development 
economists defined industrialization as the most prominent feature of capitalist development, 
economic growth and alleviation of poverty.10  
 
This definition of industrialization by the paradigm, however, represented a departure from 
the classical economic rhetoric. In the immediate post-WW2 era the paradigm was 
                                                 
9UN Report entitled as "Measure for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries", 1951 quoted by 
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distinguished by its reliance on the comparative advantage principle. According to this, basic 
requirement of the LDCs was to specialize in the production of raw materials and primary 
exportable products to finance their imports and attain high economic growth. In this 
argument theoreticians referred to the development experiences of Denmark, Australia and 
New Zealand which attained high growth rates by specializing in the production of primary 
products. Some even attained this only with one agricultural commodity.11    
 
What led to this departure from comparative advantage principle was the low level of 
economic growth in the countries which shaped their development policies according to this 
principle.  In seeking ways and means of getting higher economic growth in LDCs some 
theoreticians concluded that industrialization was the fundamental end to resolve many 
problems of these countries those impeded their economic growth and industrialization. 
Responsive to the ultimate expectations of the LDCs the inter-industrial relations strand 
shaped the development policies of various LDCs. This strand served the acceleration of the 
set up of industrial establishments in the LDCs.12  
 
Consensus on industrialization, however, did not mean that theoreticians developed a single 
recipe regarding the development of LDCs. Instead they developed various strategies which 
they regarded as the most appropriate for the LDCs’ attainment of development. First of these 
was Rosenstein-Rodan’s big push theory. Referring to the high risks for investment in the 
LDCs, Rosenstein-Rodan argued for the necessity of adopting ‘big push’ development 
strategy by the governments of the LDCs to accelerate the process.  Main premise of the big 
push theory is the government’s planning to coordinate and provide incentives for 
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simultaneous investment in the infrastructure and several complementary industries that yield 
substantial increases in national production and simultaneous increases in the size of the 
domestic market.13  
 
As another important contributor of this strand, Ragnar Nurkse recommended balanced 
growth as the best strategy to attain rapid economic growth rate. Within the scope of this, he 
advocated the spread of investment over a wide field and expansion of the size and volume of 
the market. Basic premise of this principle is efficient use of the available scarce resources in 
limited but complementary industries which act as an impetus for economic growth.  In line 
with the trickle down principle, Nurkse argued for the necessity of a positive discrimination 
for the entrepreneurs in the growth industries in the redistribution of income.14    
 
Albert Hirschman, on the other hand, contributed to the development paradigm by developing 
the adverse of Nurke’s balanced growth strategy. Instead, he argued for the necessity of 
unbalanced growth and deliberate creation of disequlibria as the best way of achieving 
development. In this his main concern was inter-industry linkages. The more active sectors 
that led sub-branches and multi-activities had to pull the more passive ones forward. This 
disequlibria was recommended not only in industry but also between industry and agriculture. 
Hirschman’s analysis suggested a concentration of investments in key large-scale industrial 
projects which were likely to have the largest number of linkages. As the concern was large-
scale industrial establishments, Hirschman defined economic planning as an inevitable 
requirement for the governments. Following his strategy and recommendations, donors 
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conditioned development plans for foreign aid allocations. The LDCs, on the other hand, 
centered their plans on industrial sector while neglecting agriculture.15   
 
Among the theoreticians of the inter-industry relations strand Rostow had a peculiar stance 
owing to the ideological notion of his manifesto which had a tremendous impact on the US 
administration in its dealing with the recipients as well as its influence on the formulation of 
development strategies in some Third World countries. Entitling his manifesto as a “non-
communist’ one, Rostow portrayed development as an essentially linear historical process 
consisting of five consecutive stages. Like other theoreticians of this strand his focus was on 
industrialization and economic growth.16       
 
Developed as an international version of trickle down, Rostow supported a diffusionist model 
for the Third World. The model was based on the assumption that diffusion of capital, 
technology as well as culture from the advanced western countries to the underdeveloped 
countries led to economic growth.  Pillars of this diffusion process were economic and 
technical aid, capitalistic investment and trade. The criterion for success was the timely flow 
of these resources to the LDCs.  The envisioned outcome of this process was the economic 
growth of the LDCs which offered new markets for the advanced countries.17 
 
These theoreticians influenced the development economics at varying degrees. Their common 
point was industrialization’s being the fundamental means to get rid of underdevelopment. 
Critics of this strand, however, pointed out their neglect of the agriculture. In the endeavor to 
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find an answer for means that would serve rapid economic growth and development, these 
critics constituted the other strand in the orthodox development thinking, namely dual 
economy models that deal with inter-sectorial relations.  
 
The main premise of the dual economy models was the indirect proportion between the 
modern/capitalist and traditional/subsistence sectors. Disappearance of dualism in favor of the 
modern/capitalist sector was the basic criterion of development. This reasoning led to more 
emphasis on the modernization of agriculture which formed the traditional sector in the 
LDCs.18     
 
The first leading theoretician in this strand is Lewis with his model. In this model Lewis 
defined the modern/ capitalist sector as the one with hired labor and sale outputs and 
traditional/subsistence sector as the one distinguished by self or family-employment, and by 
low and marginal productivity of labor. Lewis assumed that by the expansion of the capitalist 
sector in the LDCs the traditional sector vanished. As the capitalist sector expanded by 
reinvesting capital surplus, labor would “migrate” from the subsistence sector to wage 
employment. The capitalist surplus would become larger and would further be used for 
investment. Expansion of the capitalist sector would continue until the absorption of surplus 
labor from the traditional sector was complete. This process would lead to increase in national 
income profits, incomes and capital formation. Lewis believed in the importance of capital 
accumulation and the capability of the capitalist class to save and invest their savings in 
industrialization.19   
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Another important model in this strand belongs to Ranis and Fei. They claimed that a process 
of excess labor transfer from the traditional sector to the modern sector resulted in the full 
development and commercialization of a developing country’s economy. They emphasized 
the role of capitalist accumulation in the promotion of industrialization and went further in 
stressing the interdependence of agriculture and industry in the evolution of the dual economy 
and recognized the dynamic impetus provided by technological change, particularly in 
agriculture. Consistent with its neoclassical approach, the logic of the model implied a rural 
structure with land owned or at least controlled largely by landlords and peasants providing 
wage labor.20 
 
As a result of dual economic models, as well as concrete unsatisfying outcomes in agricultural 
productivity in the early 1960s, literature on modernization of agriculture largely expanded. 
These two factors convinced the policymakers about the necessity of some policies to increase 
agricultural production. These led to the justification of Green Revolution which enabled 
higher production outputs. This agriculture-favoring literature, however, did not disregard the 
importance of industrialization. Instead it required a sound industrial basis as the intense 
agricultural activities increased the amount of surplus labor in agriculture.21 By its recognition 
of the importance of industrialization for less developed countries the dual economy model 
differs from the third strand, namely the neoclassical resurgence of the late 1960s.      
 
During the heyday in the 1950s and the 1960s in the development economics various 
theoreticians and economists criticized import-substitution industrialization (ISI). Critics 
pointed out that protectionist policies interfered with the natural process of economic growth. 
Emphasis of the critics was that LDCs had to remain as the producers and exporters of 
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primary products and had to encourage growth of their agricultural sectors and plantation 
economies. These criticisms were in line with the cornerstones of the classical and 
neoclassical theory, namely with comparative advantage principle and international trade in 
which the goods and capital flow freely. Parallel to the increased problems in the ISI, these 
criticisms grew intensified and led to a neoclassical resurgence. This, however, did not 
receive much response from the LDCs. In their refusal of the rationale of this neoclassical 
resurgence, policymakers in the LDCs pointed out the increasing discrepancies in the prices 
of the agricultural and industrial export goods and limited market opportunities for primary 
goods.22 
 
The last strand of the orthodox paradigm was reformist, the so-called ‘redistribution with 
equity’ school which departed extensively from the above-mentioned strands. The common 
feature of the above strands is their growth-orientation and restraint from the equity aspect of 
the attained growth level. None of them had a concern about the income distribution, mainly 
due to their reliance on the trickle down principle. Instead of equality in income distribution, 
theoreticians argued in support of the impetus-sort of role of inequality in the initial stages. 
This was acceptable for them as they were sure that at the end the benefits lead to an 
improvement in life standards of all segments of the population. The wide agreement they 
shared was that capitalist development had to have a stronger ground than just being nice. As 
Lewis wrote in 1955, growth of output was not synonymous with the growth of happiness or 
welfare. Instead he mentioned an antagonism between these two, though with some 
reservations.23     
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Empirical studies of the early 1960s revealed the “antagonism” of the two in the form of 
increased unemployment, increased inequality in income distribution, and widening dualism 
in LDCs as well as international dualism with respect to science and technology. In short, 
concrete proofs of the failure of the trickle down (diffusion) mechanism were obtained both 
nationally and internationally. Diagnosis of these outcomes as well as increased frustrations of 
the populations at large, led development literature to shift from the economic growth to a 
broader concept that covered reductions in poverty, unemployment and inequality. 
Accordingly, the reformist development thinking’s special attention was three major 
interrelated areas, namely employment; agriculture and rural development; poverty and 
redistribution with growth and basic human needs.24 
    
As a result of this strand, in the early 1970s the World Bank (WB) began to urge the 
governments of the LDCs to conduct a direct attack on poverty by re-orienting their 
development policies. It adopted redistribution with equity approach. As a strategy it sought 
to raise productivity and incomes sufficiently to allow all groups of the poor to meet their 
basic needs. Main pillars of the WB’s approach were employment generation, redirecting 
investments, meeting of basic needs, human resource development and focus on the 
distribution of the benefits of growth to the poor.25 
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ii. Heterodox Development Thinking   
Increased problems due to the pursued development strategies and requestioning of the 
dominant development paradigm led to the emergence of not only a reformist strand within 
the orthodox (diffusionism or modernization) development paradigm but also radical 
development paradigms such as dependency theory. Theoreticians who initially accepted 
assumptions of orthodox development paradigm developed dependency. Radical or 
heterogeneous aspect of the paradigm is related to its definition of the nature of interaction 
among the developed countries and LDCs. While heterodox development thinking portrays 
the world economy as the dichotomy between the ‘center’ advanced countries and 
‘peripheral’ less developed countries, orthodox development thinking does not accept the 
center-periphery dichotomy.26  
 
Though dependency paradigm is identified with the Third World, the first major development 
thought produced in the less developed countries is structuralism. Emerging in the late 1940s 
and 1950s, structuralism defined the problems in the less developed countries as structural 
rather than conjectural. For structuralists the problem was not unemployment but 
underdevelopment, which led to the emergence of these problems. The structuralists 
explained the problems of LDCs in the context of center-periphery dichotomy whose 
production structures were definitely different. The production structures of the periphery 
were heterogeneous with the coexistence of modern and traditional production techniques and 
specialization in very few crops. As a result of the latter exports were limited to a few primary 
products with little diversification. The center, on the other hand, was distinguished by its 
homogenous and diversified production structure. While modern techniques were used in 
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overall economic field, production covered a relatively broad range of capital, intermediate 
and consumer goods.27      
 
According to structuralists, heterogeneous and specialized production structures were shaped 
mostly during the period of outward-oriented growth. However, as seen in many countries the 
shift to inward-oriented growth and ISI did not lead to the disappearance of heterogeneity and 
specialized structure. Instead these were reproduced in new forms such as chronic 
unemployment, recurring external deficits and deteriorating terms of trade. Structuralists also 
opposed free international trade as they regarded it as a way of transferring income from the 
periphery to the center due to the technological superiority of the center.28  
 
Basic policy position of the structuralists was development via industrialization. They rejected 
a laissez-faire strategy based solely on comparative advantage and spontaneous market-
oriented industrialization, as both of these could not have overcome the problems in the 
production structures. Instead they asked for deliberate policy-supported industrialization as 
the necessary route. Principal policy instrument is defined as investment planning and 
coordination that was referred as ‘industrial programming’ to distinguish it from socialist 
planning. Though in the 1950s the structuralists defined industrialization as the sector to meet 
domestic needs in the 1960s they defined it as a means to provide foreign exchange. 
Diagnosing the detrimental effects of foreign exchange shortage, they argued in support of the 
need for non-traditional, particularly manufactured exports not only to the center but also to 
peripheral countries. In this they also suggested regional groupings among the peripheral 
countries. This view had a considerable impact on the Third World.29  
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As the second major development thought emerged in the Third World, dependency was a 
radical response to the diagnosed failing outcomes of the development policies that were 
prepared and implemented in the framework of orthodox development paradigm. Main point 
of the dependency theory is that basis of the exploitation was center/metropolis and 
periphery/satellite relationship. Theoreticians of dependency had the consensus that various 
efforts to build ‘bourgeoisie nationalist’ or ‘national capitalists’ or more recently ‘state 
capitalist’ solutions at the end fail since social classes on whom such solutions are based on 
one or more factions of the local bourgeoisie are themselves limited by their role in the 
international system. They might advocate an independent or nonaligned foreign policy but as 
long as they follow the capitalist road those countries will depend on foreign investment and 
thus, eventually would make their compromises with foreign interests. Regardless of their 
intentions to implement far-reaching domestic reforms, they are limited in practice by the 
legacy of dependency as institutionalized both within their own class interests and alliances 
and in the existing industrial base. Features of the latter is technological dependency, 
increased foreign control over the most dynamic and strategic industrial sectors via direct 
ownership, control of marketing and patterns of licenses, by an outflow of capital which was 
greater than the inflow derived from aid and direct foreign investment, by the absence of a 
domestic capital goods industry and hence by growing unemployment and marginalization.30      
 
Main point of attack was that modernization theory is an ahistorical and ethnocentric analysis. 
According to dependency theory, owing to the unequal exchange between the center and 
periphery, the first continue to extract huge sums of capital from the periphery. Initially, it 
was also argued that center countries did not want the periphery to develop heavy industries in 
general which was called as real industrialization. Later this argument was abandoned and 
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theoreticians concluded that what the center opposed was the transfer of the recent technology 
to the peripheral countries in order to preserve their dominance in industry. Plus, they 
abandoned what they initially regarded the “development conflict” as a zero-sum game. 
Instead of the previous definition of the impossibility of the LDCs gaining from their relation 
with the center, they mentioned the possibility of some economic gains.  Yet even these gains 
were not free from cost as the LDCs paid this back in terms of political dependence.31 
  
Importance of these development paradigms rose from the fact that they influenced 
policymaking processes of both the donors and underdevelopment countries. The LDCs 
prepared and implemented their development policies according to the dominant development 
paradigms. Later influenced by the dependency theory, there were various peripheral 
countries that attempted to develop a genuine Third World development model alternative 
without much success. Center countries, on the other hand, relied on the orthodox 
development thinking in justifying and shaping their policies and policy recommendations. It 
was the orthodox development thinking that provided the required theoretical setting for the 
foreign aid policy, or as some defined, the foreign aid regime.  
 
US Foreign Aid Policy in the Post-WW2 Era 
Beginning in mid-forties the USA commenced an extensive foreign aid program. By the 
rationale that formation of sufficient domestic capital was a distant possibility for any country 
until it reached a relatively advance level of industrialization, the American policymakers 
defined foreign aid as imperative for the development of the LDCs. As a factor foreign 
exchange shortage hindered the importation required inputs   or raw material, things that were 
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accepted as the prerequisites in the industrialization move of a developing country.32 It was in 
this context that the strategically important LDCs began to receive excessive amounts of 
foreign aid allocations from the USA or US-led international organizations, widely known as 
Bretton Woods organizations if they aligned themselves to “free world” bloc, such as Turkey, 
or even non-aligned, but regarded as a potential allied country, such as India.  
 
Foreign aid policy of the USA was based on three main pillars according to which its profile 
and guidelines were determined. Though in the process, programs under new names such as 
Mutual Security Assistance emerged owing to the evolutionary stages, pillars of the foreign 
aid policy remained unchanged. These were the Turkish-Greek Assistance Program of 1947, 
widely known as Truman Doctrine, the Economic Recovery Program, widely known as 
Marshall Plan and the Technical Assistance Program, widely known as Point Four Program.     
 
As a process, the foreign aid policy of the superpower commenced by lend-lease. This was the 
pioneer of the post-War aid policy. By lend-lease, the USA extended aid to countries that 
were engaged in the WW2. However, the episode of extensive foreign aid policy with a global 
appeal commenced by the Greek-Turkish Assistance Act, widely known as Truman Doctrine, 
which was announced on March 12, 1947. Truman Doctrine has been regarded as the 
forerunner of the Marshall Plan, the Point Four program and other programs undertaken by 
the Truman Administration to meet the new responsibilities that had been thrust upon the 
USA as the postwar leader of the “free world” bloc.33   
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As a declaration of an “ideological crusade”, Truman Doctrine became “an ideological shield 
behind which the US progressed to rebuild the western political- economic system and 
counter Communism.’’34 What made the program a milestone was its global appeal. This 
meant that scope of the program was not restricted to any country or region but was global in 
the struggle against totalitarianism. Truman announced that the U.S.A., from that time on 
would stand against “totalitarian regimes imposed on free people by direct or indirect 
aggression.’’ USA would also support ‘‘free people’’ who were resisting any attempted 
“subjugation”, whether by armed minorities, as in the case of Greece, or by outside pressure, 
as in the case of Turkey.35   
 
Following the Greek-Turkish Assistance Act, the European Recovery Program (ERP), widely 
known as the Marshall Plan was introduced as a second extensive foreign aid program.  Its 
scope was not limited to one country but covered all war-hit western European countries as 
well as countries regarded crucial for the recovery of these war-hit countries such as Turkey. 
ERP was enforced on March 13, 1948 by the margin of 67 to 17 and the Congress authorized 
$ 5.3 billion for the first year of ERP. On April 1, 1948 Truman signed the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1948, which was approved by the 80th Congress as Public Law 472. The U.S. 
committed $12.4 billion to European recovery for the next four years. To administer the ERP, 
the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) was established as an agency independent 
of the State Department.36   
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Conditioned by the ERP, aid recipient countries established the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) on April 16, 1948. Through the OEEC, sixteen European 
countries agreed on the coordination of their economic endeavors, including the exploitation 
of their natural resources and commercial capabilities, modernization of their industrial and 
agricultural equipment, reduction of trade obstacles, striving for full employment, and 
restoration and maintenance of economic stability. Finally, they agreed on working for a 
worldwide free flow of goods and capital. The OEEC demanded individual proposal and plan 
from each participating country compatible with their problems. It was assumed that these 
country programs led to the attainment of the ultimate objective of the ERP. Its ultimate 
objective was defined as having self-supporting Western European countries with viable 
economies by the program's termination in four or five years.37  
 
Since the battlefield was set globally the next action field was the underdeveloped areas 
which constituted two-thirds of the world population. The aid program aimed at these areas 
was the Technical Assistance Program, widely known as Point Four. In his inaugural address 
of 1949 Harry Truman announced the necessity of embarking on a bold new program that 
enabled the flow of the benefits of US scientific advances and industrial progress to the 
underdeveloped areas for their economic growth and development.  
 
Following the explanation of the misery of the underdeveloped areas, Truman underlined that 
in this “new bold program” of the US there would be no place for old imperialism and 
exploitation for foreign profit. Instead, the US envisaged a program of development based on 
the concepts of democratic fair dealing. Task of the USA in the process that would be initiated 
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by this program was defined as provision of the required assistance, particularly technical, as 
well as promotion of private investment until the LDCs raised their economic standards. The 
program was not considered as a stopgap plan, but a developmental one. This meant that it 
would be based upon development plans country-by-country and region-by-region. These 
plans had to be consistent with anticipated multilateral world trade patterns.38 
 
Truman’s particular emphasis on ‘old imperialism and exploitation’ was an appeal to the most 
sensitive issue for the ex-colonies. It was also a maneuver to differentiate the USA from the 
colonial powers against which there was a deep-rooted hatred in the ex-colonies. This appeal 
of the superpower, however, received the reaction of the ex-colonial powers. Observing the 
reluctance in the colonial offices of these ex-colonial powers, the American policymakers 
pointed out their interpretation of this initiative. According to them, through this new 
program, the USA, in fact, embarked upon a new program of ‘American imperialism’ to take 
over these colonies.39          
 
In the midst of raised expectations of the LDCs, Point 4 legislation was enacted as PL 435, in 
the 81st Congress with Title IV being the Act for International Development (AID). Objective 
of the Act was defined as aiding the developmental efforts of the economically 
underdeveloped areas. Means for this end was defined as the maximum utilization of the 
private and public resources of the USA.40 
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For the administration of the program an administrative agency, the Technical Cooperation 
Administration (TCA) was established in the Department of State on October 27, 1950. The 
Department of State was authorized as the implementing agency of the Program. Despite its 
encouraging notions, however, the allocated budget for this program’s implementation was 
very modest in comparison to the ERP. For this program, AID authorized a-thirty five 
million-dollar allocation for the first year, a twelve million of which was allotted to the United 
Nations.41 
 
Regardless of the devised aid programs in the successive years, these three aid programs 
constituted the basis of US foreign aid policy. Parallel to these programs, the center countries 
led by the USA created instruments of the capitalist economic order namely the IMF and the 
World Bank in which the foreign aid policy found its real setting.  These instruments were 
designed at a conference held at Bretton Woods, in the New Hampshire in 1944. Owing to its 
most powerful stance in the post-WW2 era, arch-shaper of these institutions was the USA. 
Though the center countries, in their dealing with the Third World countries later on, used 
both the IMF and the World Bank, in Bretton Woods the LDCs were not the issue. Main 
concern of the debate was the indebtedness process of the European nations.42 
  
Both the IMF and the World Bank were created by political and economic considerations. The 
famous American memorandum of 1942 put guidelines of the future action in terms of 
dealing with the crisis of the world capitalist system. According to this, various international 
organizations had to be established for the exchange stability, to deal with balance of 
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payments problems and long-term international investment as well as relief and 
reconstruction. In addition to these, necessity of adopting an international agreement on 
primary commodity price control as well as international measures for the reduction of trade 
barriers and maintenance of full employment was pointed out. These were the main policy 
lines consistent with the policies recommended by the IMF and the World Bank. Policies 
based on these policy lines were assumed to solve the problems of the country or countries 
that pursued a capitalist development policy.43 
 
In defining the importance of the IMF for the capitalist economic system, Payer pointed out 
the authority that was delegated to it by the governments and capital markets of the entire 
capitalist world. In the process parallel to the changes in the foreign aid policy, its importance 
in the system increased. IMF became a member of all aid consortiums in charge of decision-
making in deciding, whether the country in question was credit worthy and whether other 
countries which could extend aid should give aid or not. By this role the IMF became a super 
credit agency.44 
   
In the scope of this new setting, IMF began to be an increasingly known name for the Third 
World countries. Its structural adjustment programs famed the IMF. The standard 
prescriptions known as ‘the Washington consensus’ was a combination of devaluation with 
deflationary monetary and fiscal policies. This mechanical approach of these two fundamental 
means of the capitalist economic system was perceived as “iron and arsenic” to all, whatever 
the problem was. In IMF policy, rigorous credit control was regarded as an essential first step 
for curbing deficits in government budgets and in balances of payments. Consequently, in 
these sorts of ‘intervention’ the IMF’s immediate concern was to curtail the deficits by 
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imposing limits on domestic credit and money creation. IMF preferred to award the countries 
which pursued the IMF prescription seriously by extending new credits and if necessary 
rescheduling the previous ones.45    
 
As a general rule for the medium and long run periods following the stabilization, the IMF 
and the World Bank promoted structural adjustment. This adjustment was designed to 
integrate local financial markets with international ones and to alleviate the need for direct 
controls on credit, interest and foreign exchange rates. Another common feature of the IMF 
stabilization programs was their support of foreign investment and foreign aid to the particular 
country. The undesired but inevitable outcome of the latter was aggravating foreign 
indebtedness. As a reflection of the vicious circle of the developing countries with respect to 
the developed ones, the loans that benefit the balance of payments at the moment meant a rise 
of burden in the balance of payments in future. Only grants that were a very small part of the 
total foreign aid were completely free of repayment obligations. As an unchanging rule, the 
aid that was extended to the developing countries was conditioned to liberalization of foreign 
trade system.46    
 
Based on these pillars and instruments, the foreign aid policy of the center countries was 
justified on various grounds. Top among them was the development concept that promoted an 
appropriate environment for the center countries’ interference with the LDCs. Shaped by a 
rough “manifest destiny” idea, ideologues of these concepts propagated that only through 
pursuing the model of advanced countries the less developed countries could progress. 
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According to this, what led the center countries to share their experience and financial 
resources with the less developed countries were their humanitarian considerations.         
 
Though humanitarian considerations had their share to a point, claiming that earmarking of 
such huge amounts of foreign aid only due to the humanitarian considerations is 
oversimplification of the facts. In addition to humanitarian considerations, various motives 
such as ideological, economic, military and strategic were at force beneath the foreign aid 
policy.   
 
In explaining the first pillar of the foreign aid policy in the Congress, Truman declared an 
“ideological crusade”. He defined the Truman Doctrine as an ideological shield “behind 
which the US progressed to rebuild the western political- economic system and counter 
Communism.’’ The ideological crusade was defined as being between totalitarianism and free 
world. It was not in certain geography, but in a global arena. In this context, the Western 
Bloc, under the leadership of the US, stood as a guardian of the free world. It would support 
‘‘free people’’ who were resisting any attempted “subjugation”, whether by armed minorities 
or by outside pressure.47   
 
As this definition was meaningful in the Cold War context, this ideological motive began to 
be defined in a smoother manner as the long-range political objective of the aid programs in 
the process. Donors preferred to define the ideological motive as the promotion of a type of 
economic and political development in the aid recipient country harmonious with the long-
range interests of the donors.  While the harmonious structure in the economic field was 
constituted of institutions and establishments which relied on heavily private ownership and 
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private initiative, democratic institutions were defined as the harmonious structure in the 
political field.48  
  
Economic dimension of the foreign aid policy was fundamental in its justification. In the 
debates of the ERP, importance of the program was explained with respect to its role to revive 
a multilateral world trade. As trade was a “two-way” street, the program aimed to reconstruct 
such an economic order. The expected outcome was increased production and productivity 
and unrestricted flow of goods.49As the Western European countries had the potential to 
realize this order, the priority in the post-WW2 era was given to them.     
 
The relatively implicit economic considerations of the USA in foreign aid policy were left in 
the PL 480 program. It was explicitly equated with the welfare of the American farmers in 
particular and American public in general. Directly related to the American economy, the PL 
480 was introduced in the 1950s. It was about the usage of US surplus agricultural 
commodities in the foreign aid practice. By its enactment in 1954, a policy suggestion of 1951 
regarding the obligatory use of some portion of the aid allocations to acquire surplus 
agricultural products of the US was systematized.50  
 
PL 480 was one example out of many that reveals foreign aid policy’s economic implications 
on the USA. In addition to this, through bilateral agreements the USA redistribute dollars that 
enabled other countries to buy American goods.51 By creating the condition of the carriage of 
foreign aid items by American ships, and of obligatory purchase of the US machinery and all 
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sorts of equipment, even if they were more expensive than other countries’ goods, the US 
administration fostered its economy. This was why the aid receipts regarded center countries’ 
foreign aid as low-interest export credits.52   
 
Though some authors challenged the assumption that the developed countries extended aid to 
less developed countries to promote their trade by referring to the unsatisfactory and low 
amount of trade between these countries53, this argument is not very convincing. The 
unsatisfactory trade level invalidated one of the basic assumptions regarding the outcomes of 
foreign aid policy, namely aid recipient’s increased economic viability through increased 
productivity that led to surplus production and promotion of foreign trade. Low performance 
of the aid recipient countries regarding surplus exportable goods, however, did not change the 
motive beneath it.   
 
Strategic considerations of the donors had various connotations including preserving of their 
rank in the world hierarchy. However, for the US administration particularly during the 
intense Cold War years, strategic considerations were mostly related to supply and stockpile 
of strategic materials which were crucial for the defense and economy of the USA.  
Regardless of the trade potential of the aid recipient country, abundance of strategic materials 
was an important determinant for its inclusion to the foreign aid schemes. According to the 
interdependence theory54 that the American policy makers defined the LDCs were highly 
dependent to the center countries. As most of the LDCs were not self-sufficient in food, their 
fundamental dependence was in food. Besides as an inevitable outcome of the international 
division of labor, economies of the LDCs mostly depended on the imported machinery, spare 
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parts and other equipment. The center countries provided seventy-one percent of the imports 
of LDCs by early 1950s.55 
 
This comprised one dimension of interdependency between the center and LDCs. Other 
dimension was the dependency of the center on these underdeveloped ones with respect to 
strategic raw materials. In various documents, principal objectives of the foreign aid policy 
agencies in the ‘friendly countries’ were defined as helping the alleviation of shortages of 
strategic materials essential for efficient production and technological development in the US 
and other areas of the free world and provision of a base for future rapid expansion of 
alternate sources in event of another war and assistance to the stimulation of the private sector 
abroad.56  
    
Dependence of the USA on the LDCs was explained in terms of the great gap between its 
area, natural resources potential and its immense industrial output. Though the US roughly 
possessed six percent of the world’s population and seven percent of its area, it accounted for 
roughly half of the whole world’s industrial output. In terms of natural resources, which the 
USA necessitated for this industrial production, a high dependency on LDCs was observed. In 
a diagram of the report on materials, US’ dependence was shown in percentage terms. 
According to this, by 1953, US imported 40 % of copper, 51 % of zinc, 62 % of lead, 85 % of 
mercury, 92 % of cobalt, 96 % of manganese, 99 % of chromite and nickel, 100 % of natural 
rubber, tin, industrial diamonds, graphite and sisal.57   
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Evaluating the reserve level of some of the most critical and strategic materials that had been 
stockpiling against the risk of war, the International Development Advisory Board concluded 
their inadequacy and recommended the acceleration of their stockpiling. In this acceleration 
the criterion was again defined as the stability in the LDCs from where most of the materials 
were flowing. It was stressed that any subversion or economic or social collapse would be the 
equivalent of a grave military set back.58 
 
The Board also evaluated the impact of the expansion of the Iron Curtain countries that made 
the supply of strategic materials highly costly. Moving from this diagnosis the Board made 
several recommendations including containment of the socialist bloc, and determination of 
locations in the “free world” bloc from where important resources could be obtained instead 
of the Soviet-dominated places. According to this, manganese and tungsten deposits of Latin 
America, Africa and Asia, chrome ores of Turkey and the Philippines, timber stands of Chile 
and Brazil, pulpwoods of Lebrador were the places where these sources could be obtained 
more easily. From this analysis, the International Development Advisory Board concluded 
that interdependence theory was more of a “need and need alike” one. Neither the USA nor 
the LDCs could run their economies without the greatest distortions and hardships if the 
relation with each other was cut off.59 
 
A provision of the ERP reveals that in this interdependence, the US inevitably gave priority to 
its national interests. In addition to the propagated dimension of the ERP, which was 
restructuring of the multilateral world trade, the other dimension was related to the national 
strategic considerations of the USA. As a result of the proposal by the Department of State, 
provisions were put into enabling the legislation of the European Recovery Act for the 
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promotion of the production of materials in the territories, colonies and dependencies of the 
participating countries, which were required by the USA as a result of deficiencies or 
potential deficiencies in its natural resources.60 
 
In addition to these, military considerations represented another important motive in the US 
foreign aid policy. In the Cold War context, this was so crucial that it led to the periodization 
of the foreign aid policy as pre- and pro- Korean War. By this War, the US policymakers 
reassessed the US foreign aid policy. This reassessment led to a considerable decline in the 
non-military aid to foreign countries. It was explained as military containment of 
communism. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the US administrations decided to 
accelerate the rebuilding of its defense and increased the number of alliances and overseas 
bases. In the process, through bilateral agreements, the USA increasingly conditioned 
provision of military bases for assistance.61   
 
The above mentioned were the motives that shaped the USA’s foreign aid policy. They were 
distinguished by being under the control of the US policy makers to a great extent. Parallel to 
these controllable factors, there were, on the other hand, some uncontrollable factors that also 
shaped the foreign aid policy. These uncontrollable factors shed light on the evolutionary 
stages of the foreign aid policy. Though each donor shared these motives, in the scope of this 
research the US foreign aid policy will be analyzed due to its being the main source of foreign 
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aid for about twelve years following the end of WW2, as well as, late participation of other 
center countries to this policy level owing to their recovery from war destruction.  
 
Analysis of the foreign aid policy of the USA reveals the strong correlation between 
developments in world conjuncture and changes in priorities and type of foreign aid policy. 
While changes in geography and priorities were determined by the increased or decreased 
tension in the Cold War context, type of foreign aid was determined by the recovery of the 
war-stricken European countries which created a competitive environment. 
 
Main determinant of the geographical flow of the aid was related to the shifting tensions of 
the Cold War. In the immediate post-WW2 era, Europe was considered as the most strategic 
area in the global arena of the Cold War. Soon afterwards the gravity shifted to the countries 
neighboring the USSR. In the 1950s, newly independent countries of Asia which gained 
independence from colonial rule also became the focal point by the rationale that they were 
under the threat of radical ideologies and abject poverty. In the 1960s, the geographic center 
became Latin America and Africa. As revealed by these shifts, economic aid programs shifted 
geographically over the globe throughout the last twenty-five years in accordance with the 
relative political importance attached by the superpowers to various regions and specific 
countries. This mobility in the gravity shed light to the political motives and orientation of the 
foreign aid.62    
 
Accurate analysis of shifting priorities in the US foreign aid policy necessitated a 
periodization of pre- and post-Korean War. This War indicated an increasing militarization of 
the foreign aid policy in the process. After its outbreak, the US administration accelerated the 
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rebuilding of its defense and increased the number of alliances as well as overseas bases. This 
decision had direct consequences on the restoration of the defensive strength of the free 
world. Following this, almost ninety percent of American foreign aid went for armaments and 
other army support.63  
 
Concrete impact of this new orientation on aid recipient countries was an increase in the 
number of US military bases. Through bilateral agreements the USA increasingly conditioned 
aid to military bases. In many cases the donor countries set the maintenance of these military 
bases as the precondition for the continuity of foreign aid.64 This decision not only affected 
aid recipient countries but the non-aligned countries also. After this, the US administration 
adopted a harsher policy line against the non-aligned countries. Assistance to the non-aligned 
countries was criticized since some leading recipients of American aid were consistent 
opponents of US positions within the United Nations. Their opposition was revealed in every 
possible occurrence such as disarmament conferences or public statements. A good example 
of this restriction was the Indian case. Due to her opposition to the USA in the UN ballots, aid 
to India was jeopardized in various years.65 
 
As observed in the Turkish and Greek cases, before the Korean War there were separate 
military aid programs. Following the Korean War, coordination and modification of the 
existing foreign assistance programs in support of defense effort became essential. The 
principal objective of the foreign aid policy was defined as resistance to communist military 
aggression. Outcome of this modification was the Mutual Security Act, which had a military 
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and anti-Communist orientation. The rationale behind this Act was that military weakness 
rather than political, economic and moral weakness was the primary source of instability. The 
shift in priorities of the foreign aid policy was immediately reflected in the allocation of the 
Mutual Security Act of 1951. Out of total $ 8.5 billion aid authorized for the foreign countries 
for the FY 1951-52, while $ 7 billion was allocated for military aid, only $ 1.5 billion was 
earmarked for economic aid and technical assistance.66 
 
Consistent with this reorientation, by an amendment, Mutual Security Act of 1951 put 
military, economic and technical aid under one legislative authorization. Economic 
Cooperation Administration’s functions were transferred to the newly established Mutual 
Security Agency. By this arrangement, coordination of various aid programs was under the 
responsibility of the Director of Mutual Security who also administered the economic aid.67  
 
For the reassessment of the change in the foreign aid policy, a bipartisan Commission on 
foreign economic policy was appointed under the presidency of Clarence B. Randall. It was 
appointed to study all aspects of American foreign economic policy, including foreign aid. 
Examining the developments in the international order the Commission concluded that there 
was no need for further grants of economic aid. The quotation below clearly reflects what this 
Commission thought about the economic aid to the LDCs: 
 
At present, as the need for economic aid for postwar recovery disappears, demands are 
increasing for general economic aid unconnected with recovery from war or preparation 
for defense. Underdeveloped areas are claiming a right to economic aid from the US, in 
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proposals in the United Nations and the Inter-parliamentary Union. We recognize no such 
right.68 
 
The exceptional item in the economic aid was the so-called defense support. This term 
indicated aid directly related to military efforts which were designed to reinforce the security 
of the USA. This item was the byproduct of a predominant view in 1951 that pointed out the 
necessity of additional flow of foreign exchange to support LDCs’ heavy defense burden. In 
the defense support high priority was given to countries that gave important military base 
rights to the USA. Defense support was carried in the program as economic aid. However, in 
reality it was a sort of compensation for military alliance. In the terminology of Hans J. 
Morgenthau, a famous political science professor, this was “bribery”. By time, this support 
decreased mainly due to the increasing criticism in the Congress. However, the US 
administration continued to make this assistance in a camouflaged manner under other aid 
categories.69   
 
While the Commission recommended an expansion of the technical assistance program, 
especially that of the UN, in this expansion it suggested that the relative size of the US 
contribution to the UN for that purpose be reduced. More than state contribution, the 
Commission put considerable emphasis on increasing the flow of private US investment 
abroad. As the prerequisite of an appropriate environment for private initiative, adoption of 
certain tax incentives to foreign investment and a program of guarantees against 
expropriation, inconvertibility and risks of war or revolution were defined.70 
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Obsessed by national security and reinforcement of defense bastions, the US administration 
enacted not only Mutual Security Act but also the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, 
which was also known as the Battle Act. This Act was accepted as the most important pillar 
of the economic defense of the free world. It forbade the exportation of strategic materials to 
the Iron Curtain countries. List of these materials was determined by the Department of 
Defense and Department of State and was sent to all the diplomatic American posts. 71 
 
Following this, by the approval of the Kem Amendment in June 1951, as the superpower of 
the free world, the USA left no option for any leakage at least in legislation in which shipment 
of the strategic materials to the USSR and countries of Iron Curtain was announced as a 
reason which called for the mandatory cessation of US aid. Only when the American 
President regarded the particular shipment of strategic materials as an obligation of unusual 
circumstances did aid continue.72 Though this was revised in the following years, in content it 
did not change to a great extent.   
 
The next stage in the foreign aid policy of the USA commenced by the change in the Soviet 
strategy. When the Soviet administration abandoned the idea of frontal communist military 
attack and put high priority on development of economic relations with the LDCs in the late 
1950s,73 this led to several gradual changes in American foreign aid policy. First of all, 
technical aid gained priority. In explaining this prioritization US President stated that “our 
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skills, our knowledge, and at times our substance” had to be used in aiding to the 
underdeveloped areas.74          
 
Besides, the idea of development aid began to get more credit and support which it never 
obtained in previous years when defense support was in its heyday. Larger appropriations for 
development assistance and technical cooperation were the outcomes of this re-emphasizing. 
This emphasis on development aid concurrently brought underdeveloped areas to the agenda. 
Referring to their great potential due to their constituting two-thirds of the world population 
as well as rising expectations regarding improvement in their lots, the US administration 
justified any economic aid on the grounds that “the substantial expenditures made by our 
Government in recent years for economic assistance are justified on grounds both of 
enlightened self-interest and of our moral responsibility to ourselves to do what we can to 
help other peoples realize their legitimate aspirations [emphasis is added].”75   
 
The above-mentioned shifts occurred due to the changing tensions in the Cold War context. 
Another evolutionary stage in the foreign aid policy was observed in the nature of foreign aid.  
The evolution was due to the empowered position of other center countries. This indicated a 
challenge to the dominant position of the US as the main foreign aid supplier. In the initial 
years, the US foreign aid was ‘untied’. This meant that there was no requirement that aid 
allocation be spent on US goods. Main reason of this untiedness was the high demand for the 
US products, which made these goods purchasable anyway. During these years while 
European countries received most of the balance of payments support, aid to poor countries 
was conditioned for concrete projects.76 
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In the face of increasing competition, however, donors developed a new style of aid. This 
indicated a shift from untied to tied aid, from ‘project’ to ‘program’ aid and development of 
consortium technique. The tied aid practice best served to American economic interests. By 
this practice, the amount of aid allocation spent for American goods increased. While in the 
fiscal year 1960, only 41 % of American aid was spent on American goods, by the 
implementation of tied-aid this proportion rose to 79 % in 1963 and 94 % in early 1965.77   
 
As the other component in the foreign aid policy, donors shifted from ‘project’ to ‘program’ 
aid on the grounds that the aid recipient countries wasted the allocated resources. In the 
project aid, the donor had too little influence over the economic policies of the recipient 
country. Besides, the donor could not much interfere with the spending of the aid allocation as 
the recipient country spent the allocation to its budget items. In most cases the spent 
preference of the recipient countries were not regarded as very rational by the donor. In 
contrast to this, in program aid the donor had control over the entire economic program of the 
recipient. Despite this advantageous position that the latter provided to the donor, not all the 
aid was in the form of program aid. Project aid still continued to exist.78 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In conclusion, the foreign aid policy with its shifting priorities but lasting motives continued 
to exist. Inevitably there existed pro- and cons of foreign aid in donor and recipient countries. 
The cons had great suspicion and deep-rooted fear of colonialism and imperialism, while pros 
emphasized the necessity of such as an impetus. Though each tried to explain the foreign aid 
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policy from its own perspective, there were some common grounds regarding the functioning 
of foreign aid. It was undeniable that through foreign aid the superpower of the capitalist “free 
world” bloc attempted to shape the course of events mainly from its center considerations. It 
could be concluded that mainly relying on foreign aid as well as other mechanisms that it 
developed, the USA had an influential and powerful stance vis-à-vis the aid recipient 
countries.  
 
Despite its powerful stance, however, shaped by the inner dynamics of the recipient countries 
the donor had limitations in its influence. The complex relation networks among the dominant 
groups, in other words the ruling elite coalition, posed the greatest challenge to this influence. 
The interplay of these external and inner dynamics, on the other hand, was crucial as it paved 
the way for the crisis in the political economy of LDCs. The concern of the study is this 
interplay with reference to the unsatisfying, in most cases failing, outcomes of the 
development plans of Turkey and India, which were mainly financed by the US-led foreign 
aid or credits of the IMF and the World Bank. Their experience was crucial as they also 
challenged the fundamental premises of the foreign aid policy regarding the proportion of 
flow of foreign aid to capital scarce LDCs and attainment of a certain development level. 
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CHAPTER II 
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES OF TURKEY AND INDIA IN THE POST-
WW2 ERA: 1947-73 
 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES OF TURKEY IN THE POST-WW2 ERA (1947-73) 
 
An Introductory Glance at Turkey in the Post-WW2 Era 
In the post-WW2 era, the Cold War became the most important determinant for Turkey as a 
country which had a border with the superpower of the socialist bloc, the USSR with whom 
Turkey had centuries-long conflicts. This was a factor that deeply affected Turkish public 
opinion. Facing land demands of the Soviet administration challenging her national integrity, 
Turkey participated in the “free world” bloc, hence strengthening its ties with the Western 
world. This was, at least in appearance, attainment of one of the basic objectives of the 
Turkish modernization policy.  
 
Turkey participated in the “free world” bloc mainly via the foreign aid policy of the USA. 
Turkish policymakers did not hide their enthusiasm for the mechanism that the superpower 
created for the new world order. They began to propagate that the foreign aid was a necessity 
to attain economic development. When the US Congress approved the first aid package for 
Turkey, this received enthusiastic reactions from the Turkish policy makers. President Ismet 
Inonu regarded this approval as a new proof of the USA’s exceptional endeavors for the 
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creation of enduring peace. By defining GNA’s approval of this aid decision as the gratitude 
of the Turkish public in November 1947, he implied a consensus on the issue.79     
 
Due to the shared belief regarding the possibility of acceleration of Turkish industrialization-
led development drive via foreign aid allocations, Turkish policymakers enthusiastically 
welcomed Turkey’s inclusion into foreign aid policy. This willingness of Turkey to accept 
foreign financial resources was novelty in the Turkish context in comparison to the initial 
years of the Republic. Previously Turkish officials were skeptical about any foreign assistance 
due to deep-rooted memories of the Capitulations, the concessions granted to the foreign 
powers during the Ottoman era that turned out to be the main hindrance to economic 
independence and the most efficient means of foreign exploitation. The difficulty of the 
settlement of old debts during the Laussane negotiations in 1923-2480, remained fresh in their 
minds. However, these were not the issues in the post-WW2 era. Also influenced from the 
conjuncture, Turkish policymakers concluded in an optimistic manner that as a result of huge 
amounts of foreign aid the country could attain ‘self-sufficiency’ in a short span of time. In 
contrast to the initial objective of 1952 as the year for attainment of self-sufficiency, in the 
process, this date was determined as 1973 by which Turkey would no longer require 
additional foreign aid for her economic development.  
 
However, even though she received substantial aid allocations from the donors, in contrast to 
the expectations of economic viability by 1973, Turkey fell into the debt trap. In that respect, 
Turkish experiment was an example of many aid recipient countries which suffered from 
aggravating debt burden. Despite the provision of capital from external resources, like many 
                                                 
79Second Saka Government Program, 18 June 1948; Inaugural Address of  President İsmet İnönü, Journal of 
TBMM Records, Term VIII, Volume 7, Meeting 2, 1 November 1947, p. 4.  
80Merih Celasun, Sources of Industrial Growth and Structural Change, (Washington: World Bank,1983). 
 71
other aid recipient countries, at the end of the process Turkish economy was still in need of 
foreign aid from the center countries. This outcome invalidated the main assumption of the 
foreign aid policy regarding LDCs attainment of economic development when required 
capital for the take-off was provided from the advanced countries.  
 
The question what led to this outcome necessitates the examination of development policies 
as well as inner and external dynamics that affected the process at varying degrees. In the 
following pages Turkey’s development policies and their outcomes are examined.  
 
I. Development Strategies of Turkey in the Post-WW2 Era 
Turkey rescued herself from the physical destruction of the War, yet the prevailing conditions 
dissatisfied the public in general. Obligation of keeping the army mobilized led to a 
considerable decline in the size of cultivated land and production level since it meant 
withdrawal of a large amount of man and animal power from economic activities. The impact 
of this decline was felt more seriously in the urban areas. The overburdened transportation 
vehicles failed to make the required connection between production units and consumption 
centers.  On the other hand, impact of the general disruption of the world economy following 
the WW2 was also felt in Turkey. As the country could not import the required goods for 
industrial production her limited industrial production ceased to a great extent.  This in turn hit 
large segments of the population, both rural and urban.  In the midst of scarcity of even the 
basic necessities, the living cost increased tremendously and aggravated widespread poverty81 
that made life unbearable for the majority.  
                                                 
81Confidential “An Evaluation of the Development of Democratic Processes in Turkey since 1945”, Department of the State, 
Division of Research for Near East and Africa, 20 June 1949, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 
Records of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, 1947-50; Journal of TBMM Records, Term VIII, 
Meeting I, Volume 3, 19 December 1946, Budget of National Defense Ministry, p. 308; Bent Hansen, The 
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Along with other things, these prevailing factors increased the estrangement of the mass from 
the rulers of the country. Observing the enrichment of the tradesmen and big landowners the 
mass concluded that country’s rulers supported these segments and promoted an appropriate 
environment for their own enrichment at the expense of the mass. This was, however, totally 
an adverse interpretation of the nature of relations between the rulers and these enriching 
segments, at least for the immediate post-WW2 era. Owing to the top down approach of the 
rulers that created an unbridgeable gap between the rulers and the mass, criticisms of the 
rulers against the enriching segments due to their profiteering of the wartime conditions for 
their own benefit were not convincing for the mass. These enriching segments, on the other 
hand, confident due to their wartime capital accumulation, were in search of an alternative 
platform against the restrictive Republican People’s Party (RPP) that attempted to challenge 
their interests through various arrangements. The outcome was the establishment of the 
Democrat Party (DP), which was established in 1946 ascended to power in 1950. 
 
Claiming that Turkey needed a managed economic policy82, discourse of the new party relied 
on private capital in whose activities public interest would be the main concern. In this 
system, the state acted as the regulator of the economy without challenging the interests of 
private enterprises.83 DP claimed to be a party that stood for liberal values.  However, DP’s 
liberalism was not a genuine one; instead, it stood as the liberal version of the RPP in the 
Turkish context. Without leaving etatism principle, the DP claimed that its etatism version 
differed from the RPP’s with respect to the latter’s arbitrariness in policies and initiatives. 
Comparison of the RPP and DP with respect to their implementations indicated similarity as 
                                                                                                                                                        
Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: Egypt and Turkey, (Washington DC: Oxford University 
Press,1991), p.336; Hüseyin Şahin, Türkiye Ekonomisi, (Bursa: Ezgi Kitabevi Yayınları, 2000), p.92.   
82Celal Bayar’s Address on Turkish Economic System, Vatan, 25 January 1948.  
83Celal Bayar’s Address, Tasvir, 26 April 1946.  
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well as continuity in policy line including sectoral development strategies and foreign trade 
regime.84   
 
Emergence of the DP, on the other hand, coincided with the RPP’s claim for change and 
adjustment to the new conditions. 85This questioning of the party led to a redefinition of 
etatism. Main premises of the “new etatism” was constraint of state intervention in possible 
fields, increase in public support for private capital, more flexibility towards foreign capital 
and administrative reform of state enterprises.86      
 
An important dynamic that was in force in shaping the national policies was the superpower 
of the “free world” bloc as the only donor in the immediate aftermath of the WW2. Impact of 
the USA was apparent in the shift of the locomotive sector of economy. Parallel to its 
inclusion to the “free world” bloc, Turkey reoriented its development policy. Regardless of 
the ruling party, in this shift, Turkish policymakers failed to take the initiative since the 
foreign aid and Turkey’s participation in the European Recovery Program was conditioned to 
it. 
 
In Turkey’s case this shift represented a retreat from one of the basic premises of nation 
building. In the 1930s, despite all recommendations from the center countries, Turkey did not 
change the industrialization-led development strategy. While interpreting the 
recommendations of the center countries as a strategy that served Turkey’s lasting 
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dependency on advanced countries87, the Founding Fathers of Turkey shared the belief that 
only through industrialization LDCs had the opportunity to attain real economic 
independence, minimize their dependency on advanced countries as well as assuring their full 
political independence. The development strategy of the era until post-WW2 was shaped 
according to this highly accepted view. 
 
Until facing the condition of agriculture-led development strategy for foreign aid, Turkish 
policymakers preserved their over-optimism regarding the foreign aid. In their welcoming and 
propagation for foreign aid the policymakers stated that by the expected financial aid from the 
USA, Turkey would strengthen its industrial basis and attain its industrial development. They 
hoped that these aid allocations would be used for the acceleration of the industrialization 
attempts.88  
 
In contrast to this, the US administration urged for an urgent adoption of agriculture-led 
development strategy. In the framework of the ERP the Western Bloc defined the role of 
Turkey as cereal, especially wheat provider of the West European countries that faced basic 
foodstuff shortage in the post-WW2 era. Relying on the comparative advantage principle, the 
center countries regarded Turkey as the potential 'breadbasket' of West European countries. 
Among the ERP participants Turkey was the logical choice as it was the only country where 
land resources and climatic conditions offered the possibility of significant increases in 
agricultural production.89Defining Turkey’s pre-war development endeavors as “unfortunate” 
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resulting in ill-balanced economy since agriculture was ‘neglected’ the center countries 
regarded Turkey’s reorientation of her development strategy as the correction of a mistake.90 
Responsiveness of Turkey to this condition was immediate. In justifying the shift, Turkish 
policymakers not only referred to the take-off stage of the US development through 
agricultural boom but also pointed out the inappropriateness and artificiality of the 
industrialization where majority of the population involved in agriculture. Regarding 
industrial structure, Turkish policymakers, parallel to the Western experts, defined 
supplementary industrial enterprises as the best strategy for Turkey. Shaped by these 
considerations, Turkish policymakers pointed out that, in contrast to the past when allocations 
for agriculture was low, by the adopted development strategy highest priority was given to 
agriculture, “as all roads led to Rome.” Ultimate objective of the strategy was to make the 
peasants, who comprised majority of Turkish population, consumers.91 Despite the existence 
of some “dissenters”92, this was the opinion of the majority.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Relating to Technical Assistance Projects, 1948-53, Programs: Turkey, OEEC, April 1950, RG 469, Records of 
the US Foreign Assistance  Agencies, 1948-61, Mission to Turkey, Office of the Chief of Mission, Subject Files 
1948-56.  
90Economic and Commercial Conditions in Turkey (Muntz Report), British Embassy, Ankara, 1950; RG 286, 
Records of the Agency for International Development, Mission to Turkey, Office of the Chief of Mission, 
Subject Files (Central Files) 1948-56; Barker Mission to Turkey: Member Report No.9 on Turkish Agriculture by 
L.E. Kirk and William H. Nicholas, 15 October 1950, Confidential Barker Report, RG 286, Records of the 
Agency for International Development, Mission to Turkey, Office of the Chief of Mission, Classified Subject 
Files 1948-56. 
91Journal of TBMM Records, Term VIII, Meeting 3, Volume 16, 21 February 1949, p. 342; Journal of TBMM 
Records, Term VIII, Meeting 4, Volume 24, 23 February 1950, p.1111-1112; Secret Memo of Conversation 
between McGhee and President Bayar, 15 May 1952 from Ambassador McGhee to Department of State, RG 84, 
Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Turkey, Ankara Embassy, Classified General Records 1950-
52; Second Saka Government Program, 18 June 1948; Memo of the Meeting between Fevzi Lütfü 
Karaosmanoglu and Russell Dorr, 4 August 1950, RG 469, Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 
1948-61, Mission to Turkey, Technical Assistance  Division, Records Relating to Technical Assistance  Projects, 
1948-53. 
92Memo of the Meeting between Fevzi Lütfü Karaosmanoglu and Russell Dorr, 4 August 1950, RG 469, Records 
of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, Mission to Turkey, Technical Assistance Division, Records 
Relating to Technical Assistance Projects, 1948-53; Memo from Russell Dorr, Chief of Special ECA Mission to 
Turkey to Department of State about the Conversation with State Minister Nurullah Sumer in Charge of 
Coordination of Foreign Credits, 22 January 1949, RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State 
Turkey, Ankara Embassy, Classified General Records 1953-54. 
 76
In short, disregarding the governing party in the post-WW2 era the development strategy 
would be the agricultural-led one. The next concern is the implemented development policies 
in the era.    
 
Development Strategy of Turkey in 1947-60 Era  
a. Agricultural Development Policy of Turkey in 1947-60: 
Guidelines of the agricultural development policy of the 1950s were determined by the RPP 
and approved by the OEEC in 1948. Submitted to the OEEC as the long-term program of 
Turkey, the agricultural development policy relied on agricultural mechanization along with 
supporting activities such as irrigation and land reclaiming programs. As the main premise of 
the policy, agricultural mechanization was justified by the prevailing low productivity of 
cultivated lands. Though exhaustion of the land was defined as an important reason, 
cultivation made without using modern equipment and inputs such as fertilizers and irrigation 
networks, appropriate seed selection and efficient anti-disease campaigns were diagnosed as 
fundamental factors behind the low productivity.93  
 
Following the program’s approval, Turkish policymakers expressed their desire for a rapid 
agricultural mechanization. Regarding the USA’s provision of agricultural machinery as 
“constructive assistance” to Turkey, they asked for more and rapid machinery importation. In 
this demand, the main motive was to attain the production goals set by the Turkish 
government and OEEC.  While the goal for wheat production was 10,300,000 tons, it was set 
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as 100,000 tons for cotton fiber. Attainment of these by 1952 was defined as the success 
criterion of Turkey as a participating country.94As seen in the table, the US administration 
was responsive to this demand for rapid agricultural mechanization (Table I).      
Table I: Numbers of Selected Farm Machinery in Turkey, 1948-60  
 1948 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 
Tractors 1,756 31,415 37,743 43,727 42,527 42.136
Ploughs (T-
drawn) 
1,427 30,766 26,140 30,763 30,973 31 528
Disc 
Harrows 
680 9,623 14,097   17,357 18,178 18,268
Cultivations 401 4,028 5,076 6,502 5,248 6 134
Grain Drills 162 4,406 6,872 7,839 8,169 8.343
Cotton 
Planters 
2,570 13,909 8,437 10,530 9,359 11,147
Reapers 14,384 21,122 19,782 21,176 24,918 24,245
Combines 268 3,222 4,706 6,025 6,592 5,554
Threshers 430 959 1,219 1,375 2,180 2,536
Hay Mowers 612 1,553 3,159 3,840 3,600 3,600
Trailers 140 12,982 18,088 22,885 24,919 25,395
SOURCE: DIE, Summary of Agricultural Statistics (various years), Reşat Aktan, "Mechanization of Agriculture 
in Turkey," Land Economics, 33, no. 4 (November 1957), p. 276. 
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In the framework of this program, flow of agricultural machines to the country commenced in 
1949. The available tractors in the country before this flow were 3200 out of which 1200 were 
worn out.95 As of March 1951 more than 6000 tractors with accompanying equipment valued 
at $ 34.000.000 were imported directly from the Marshall Plan.96As seen in the Table, there 
was a continual increase in the number of these machines until the late 50s. By this date, 
though not tremendous, a slight decrease was observable. This could be explained by the 
prevailing conditions in the country. Foreign exchange shortage, difficulty of importation of 
required spare parts and a result, lack of many equipment in the country could be raised as 
reasons those caused to this slight decline.   
 
The imported machinery was delivered through ordinary commercial channels by taking the 
recommendations of the US Mission in Turkey. In order to prevent waste of resources, criteria 
of appropriate machinery, farmer and location were determined by the Turkish and American 
officials before the delivery. Raising their suspicions regarding the surveillance of these 
criteria, the American officials gave high priority to the Agricultural Bank, as it was the only 
credit resource for agricultural mechanization. Accordingly, the precondition for credit for 
agricultural machinery was the assurance given by the farmer that he was a competent 
owner.97  
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Criteria of suitability for agricultural machine ownership revealed that the program focused 
on the big landowners, which meant exclusion of the majority of households in rural Turkey 
who had dwarf size holdings. In 1948, there were 2.5 million holdings (owned, or partly or 
wholly rented) totaling up to 13 million hectares, ranging in size from less than 1 to 100 
hectares, with an average of about 5 hectares per holding. There were 5764 holdings of 
between 100 and 500 hectares and 418 estates of over 500 hectares. Particularly valid for the 
small size holdings was the fact that the farmers employed only the most primitive tools and 
methods.98This exclusion of the majority was, however, not coincidental as the program was 
shaped by the trickle down principle. Regarding the few as the core, the impetus for 
development was based on the assumption that by time the attained wealth and welfare would 
be trickled down to other segments of the population.  
 
In order to promote an appropriate environment for agricultural mechanization, Turkish 
governments pursued a tripartite supplementary policy line including expansion of cultivated 
land, bank credits and price incentives. As feasibility of mechanized agriculture was 
dependent upon large tracts of land, the 1950s was also distinguished by an expansion of 
cultivated land. In the initial years of the program the area under cultivation expanded more 
than 50 %. Between 1950-1956 annual expansion of the cultivated land exceeded a million 
hectares, with the exception of 1954 (Table II). Though the rate of expansion slowed down 
after 1956, this remained quite high during the few successive years. In the entire decade, 9.3 
million hectares of field crop area were added to the existing total, amounting to an increase 
of 67 %. Consistent with Turkey’s commitment to OEEC, the majority of the newly opened 
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land was diverted to wheat crop which served the purpose of increasing the wheat 
production.99   
Table II: Improvement in Number of Tractors and Cropland                                                                       
 Cultivated 
Land 
(000, ha) 
Ratio of cultivated land 
to total land  % 
Land operated by 
by tractors 
(000, ha) 
1948 13848 17.8 80
1950 14542 18.7 1244
1955 20998 27.0 3021
1960 23264 29.9 3160
Source: SIS; 50 Year of Turkey’s Social and Economic Development.  
 
This expansion was in full conformity with the recommendations of the American officials 
and technicians. Officials in charge of the program’s monitoring supported and encouraged 
this rapid expansion. In a confidential annual report of 1951 it was pointed out that the 
Mission was encouraging the government to develop new cropland, the size of which was 
probably between 5-10 million acre as rapidly as possible in order to attain the production 
goal by 1952. In explaining the importance of increase in cereal production, the Report 
referred to the world conjuncture giving a high priority to the Korean War that obligated such 
an increase.100 
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Credit was the other pillar that completed the required scheme for widespread mechanization. 
Special credit programs were developed to this end. The DP, whose discontent regarding the 
level of available credit amounts for the rural population was explicit even in its opposition 
years101, paid special attention to the issue and in three years time the proportion of increase in 
agriculture credits exceeded 300 %.102 As an inevitable outcome bank credits were mainly 
earmarked to the commercialized farmers who were regarded as the impetus for the initiation 
of the trickle down effect in rural Turkey. 
 
Price incentives as the last pillar of the tripartite policy began to be used widely in the 1950s. 
Covering various agricultural goods, Turkish governments served the institutionalization of 
commercialized farmers’ interests. In the purchases, the governments in general left a positive 
profit margin for the producer. While enriching the commercialized farmers, however, 
policymakers disregarded the policy’s destructive impact on the rural structure by intensifying 
differentiation among the upper and lower segments of rural population.103  
 
In sum, as a condition of Turkey’s participation in the “free world” bloc through including in 
the US foreign aid policy, Turkey shifted the locomotive sector of its development policy 
from industry to agriculture. In order to attain the production goals of the country as well as 
development of capitalist relations in rural Turkey, Turkish policymakers adopted agricultural 
mechanization as the basic policy in the agricultural development strategy. Consistent with 
the trickle down principle, the policy excluded the majority of the rural population. Its impact 
on rural social structure in the form of intensification of differentiation among various 
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segments in rural Turkey was reinforced by various policies which were adopted by Turkish 
policymakers to promote an appropriate environment for agricultural mechanization.      
 
b. Industrialization Development Policy of Turkey in 1947-60: 
In the era under study, Turkish governments earmarked resources to agriculture-related 
industrial sectors such as textile and food processing. This indicated a structural difference 
from the industrialization drive of the 1930s when the aim was to establish heavy industry at 
whatever cost to attain a self-reliant economy. As a result of these activities, Turkey began to 
exploit iron, coal, chrome, copper, zinc resources; construct an iron and steel plant; establish cement, 
glass, paper, textile and other light industries.104  
 
Assessment of the outcomes with respect to established industries’ meeting the needs indicated that the 
outcome was far from meeting even the basic needs of the country. According to the statistical data, 
Turkey provided only 35 % of the country’s needs in textiles, 60 % in cement, 40 % in paper, 65 % in 
sugar, 12 % in machinery and 11 % in steel.105 Awareness of the inadequacy led the policy makers to 
develop a Five Year Industrialization Plan, known widely as 1946 Industrialization Plan, aiming to attain 
economic development of the country through industrialization.  
 
Prepared by the active participation of some socialist of the days such as Ismail Husrev and 
Sevket Sureyya, the Industrialization Plan of 1946 envisaged modernization of the existing 
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industrial facilities and development of new ones. The Plan recognized a leading role for the 
State in development and industrialization drives of the country. It envisaged a balanced 
development, by giving high priority to the development of industry. Its defined ultimate 
objective was the repetition of the main principle that Turkey pursued in pre-WW2 era which 
was to establish industrial facilities to reduce the imports needs of the country as much as 
possible by the rationale that local production had to be the means of saving the country’s 
foreign exchange for more urgent or more vital needs.106 
 
Yet the Plan could not be implemented, as the Turkish governments were not able to find 
foreign resources for its implementation. In their search for a  $ 500 million the center 
countries refused to extend loans to Turkey on the grounds that it was a “too ambitious” plan 
as well as Turkey’s not having enough gold reserves for its implementation.  At the end of her 
appeal Turkey received a very modest loan, only $ 25 million.107  
 
By its inclusion into the US foreign aid schemes, Turkey left this sort of “ambitious plans” in 
industrialization. Instead of heavy industrialization, Turkey limited its endeavors to 
modernization and expansion of existing industry by importing suitable machinery and 
rationalization of production methods in order to reduce cost prices. Industrial branches 
within the framework of long-term country program of Turkey were textile, cellulose and 
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paper, cement, chemical, meat and fish, sugar industries and iron-steel industry though with a 
modest allocation. Ultimate objective of the industrialization drive was defined as Turkey’s 
self-sufficiency in these consumer goods branches.108 
  
Inheriting the industrial policy from its predecessor the governing party of the 1950s pursued 
these policies for the industrial drive of the country. Accepting industry as the supporter and 
complementary of agriculture, resources were diverted mainly to light and consumer 
industrial branches. In these endeavors the RPP, as the opposition party which differed from 
the DP governments only by its insistence on the necessity of planning, extended its full 
support. Disregarding suggestions of the opposition for planning, the governing party defined 
its achievement as a balanced development in which one sector did not endanger the 
development of others.109      
 
In the 1950-1958 era, approximately 21.7 % of total allocations were earmarked to industry. 
The Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes commenced the government’s activities from his three 
“obsessions”, namely textile, cement and sugar. In its initial stages, first the DP expanded the 
sugar and cement industries which were directly related with the lives of the mass. One of the 
important outcomes of this drive was that owing to the production unit’s locality, as being 
sparse in Anatolia, the people greatly accepted these industrial facilities since this meant new 
employment opportunities for them. The halt in sugar factories, which remained as four 
during the RPP administration, was resolved and the number of factories reached up to 
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fifteen-sixteen.  Cement industry’s expansion, on the other hand, accelerated the construction 
activities in the country. Another sector that had important improvements was textile. 
Concrete outcomes of these endeavors were increase in production, consumption and 
employment. All these had great influence on the lives of the population in general.110   
 
This orientation resulted in relatively high industrial performance, without changing the 
agrarian structure of the economy. During the 1950-53 era the growth rate of industry was 9.2 
%, yet its share in national per capita decreased from 15.2 % to 13.4 %.111 Data belonging to 
the era, though differing in various resources, reflected in any case that after this initial 
decrease, the share of industry in national income had increased steadily in the decade. While 
Keyder mentions that the highest level of industry’s share in national income was 16.8 % in 
1958112, Sahin gives this number as 16.9 % at the end of the era.113 Relatively high growth 
rate of industry continued until the mid-50s; then owing to the problems in economy 
industry’s annual growth rate decreased considerably in 1954-61 era, barely reaching up to 
4.3 %.114  
 
In the fifth DP government’s program Menderes assessed the previous seven years of 
industrialization drive of DP. He said that in this period, industry advanced more than four 
times and also claimed “there was not such a country in the world with such an advancement 
rate”. In order to support this industrial drive the DP governments endeavored to create an 
                                                 
110Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 1985), p.243; 
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112Keyder, “Economic Development and Crisis: 1950-80”, p.293.   
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appropriate environment with an increase in bank credits allocated for industry and an 
expansion of transportation infrastructure and public works in the past seven years.115   
 
This statement would have accuracy if the moving point were the growth rate. Yet in terms of 
composition of industry, it was difficult to claim that Turkey attained genuine 
industrialization.  Expansion of the industrial production in 1950-1960 was mainly due to the 
expansion of consumer and intermediary goods industrial branches. At the end of 1950s, 
Turkey still endeavored to complement the first stage of the industrialization process. In the 
era, impetus of the development occurred in the sub-branches that produced intermediary 
goods, concentrated on the production of consumption goods without any change in the share 
of investment and durable goods industries.116 
 
Though proud of the growth rate in industry, the DP was aware of the deficiency in the 
industrialization drive of the country. As early as 1953, the ruling circles of the party 
expressed that the best thing that could be done for the envisioned future of Turkey was the 
establishment of heavy industry and creation of a sound basis for foreign currency for the 
country by selling the products of heavy industry.117   
 
Another feature of the era was the division of labor between the public and private sector, a 
natural occurrence that made the economy a mixed one. Despite its political discourse to 
encourage and promote private sector, the DP did not reject the necessity of public sector in 
industrialization. This was another issue that represented continuity as well as conformity 
                                                 
115Program of Fifth Menderes Government.  
116Şahin, Türkiye Ekonomisi, p.106.  
117Journal of TBMM Records, Term IX, Volume 20, Meeting 3, 26 February 1953, p. 1120, 1122, 1125.  
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between two parties. In its first program, when announcing that the DP aimed to transfer all 
public institutions to private sector except those related to basic industries, it, in fact, indicated 
the mixed structure of activities in industry. Accepting the tendency of the private sector for 
the most profitable branches, DP referred to the public sector’s complementary role in 
branches which did not offer quick returns.118  
 
Accordingly, in the 1950s the public sector had a pioneering role in tea, tobacco, iron-steel, 
paper and intermediary goods branches. The private sector, on the other hand, preferred to 
concentrate on cement, sugar, cotton and woolen textile. Depending on the preferred activity 
field in industry as well as undermining the importance of technological development, the 
private sector used backward technology in comparison to the public sector.  Besides, despite 
the government’s pro-capitalists stance revealed in various incentives, owing to its relatively 
weak financial position the private sector was highly vulnerable to economic fluctuations. 
Though the public sector was also affected by the economic crisis of the mid-50s, impact of 
the crisis was devastating for the private sector. It   curtailed its investments in every 
branch.119   
 
In conclusion, the era that commenced in the immediate aftermath of the WW2 was 
distinguished by the shift in the locomotive sector. In comparison to the previous era, 
agriculture received the highest allocations. Aiming to attain the production goals of Turkey 
determined in the framework of the ERP, Turkey adopted an extensive agricultural 
mechanization program. Parallel to this, Turkey earmarked resources for the establishment 
                                                 
118Journal of TBMM Records, Term IX, Volume 20, Meeting 3, 26 February 1953, p.1120, 1122, 1125; Journal 
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and development of industrial sector which was mainly comprised of light industrial branches. 
This sectoral balancing in the economic development of the country lasted for a decade. 
Following this era, commencing in the early 1960s, Turkish development strategy was 
reoriented. 
 
Development Strategy of Turkey in 1960-73 Era 
The era of 1960-73 commenced with a cease in the democratic system of the country. On May 
27, 1960 the military intervened, the government party members as well as a number of high 
bureaucrats were arrested and the National Union Committee (NUC) began to govern the 
country until the elections of 15 October 1961. Importance of this date for the development 
policies of the country was the fact that the military administration put the relations with the 
center countries into an order which had been tensioned since the second half of the 1950s. 
The adopted development strategy has to be evaluated from this perspective.  
 
In this era Turkey adopted planned development strategy. Though planning was not a novel 
phenomenon for Turkey it differed from its precedents in the 1930s by its comprehensive and 
integrated approach.120The debates on planning as well as demands of the donor countries for 
an economic planning since the mid-1950s were disregarded by the DP administration who 
was satisfied by the attained economic development “despite unplanned activities”.121In the 
1960s, on the other hand, necessity of planning was explained with respect to the unstable 
economic performance. According to this view, the low performance was due to the negative 
outcomes of unplanned and uncoordinated activities that resulted in unwise use of the 
available resources.   
                                                 
120Z.Y. Hershlag, Economic Planning in Turkey, (İstanbul: The Economic Research Foundation, 1968), p.2. 
121see Budget Debates of mid-50s.  
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In this favorable conjuncture, the new Constitution of the Turkish Republic defined the 
requirement of national economic planning.  By the Law no 91, enforced on September 30, 
1960 the State Planning Organization (SPO), an organization in charge of proposing and 
implementing plans for economic, social, and cultural development under High Planning 
Council, headed either by Prime Minister or Deputy-Prime Minister was established. The 
First Five Year Plan covering 1963-1967 era within a more general framework of a 15-year 
development program became operative on January 1, 1963.   
 
Another distinguishing feature of the era was the shift in the locomotive sector of 
development strategy. While in the First Five Year Development Plan a balanced 
development of agriculture and industry was envisaged, by the Second Five Year 
Development Plan ISI in the 1960s became the locomotive sector of the economy.122Similar 
to the previous era, this shift in development strategy was in full conformity with the views of 
center countries.   
 
Like planning, ISI was not a novelty for Turkey; instead, since 1929 it had dominated Turkish 
development strategies. Though Hansen says that the choice of strategy was related to the 
political philosophies of the party in government123, this statement is not very suitable to 
Turkey’s realities. While the RPP stood for etatist policies, both the DP and the Justice Party 
(JP) as the center-right parties stood for private sector, at least in rhetoric. In the era under 
study these two center-right parties dominated governments. Therefore, more than 
philosophies, Turkey’s realities determined the course of the policy since industrial sector 
                                                 
122Eighth 5 Year Development Plan: Industry Policies Ad Hoc Committee Report, SPO, (Ankara: SPO, 2000). 
123Hansen, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: Egypt and Turkey, p.360. 
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which was at infancy required protection. In addition to this, Turkish policymakers referred to 
the assumed long-term outcome of the policy, namely possibility of improving the country’s 
balance of payments in justifying ISI.  
 
Yet, owing to the outcomes of the ISI policies of the previous decades, qualitative hallmark of 
the 1960s was the composition of the produced goods. The goods represented an advanced 
stage in industry. In contrast to the consumer goods composition of industrial products, in the 
1960s durable goods such as radios, refrigerators, washing machines, televisions, automobiles 
and similar as well as basic intermediaries such as iron-steel, copper, aluminum, petro-
chemistry, chemicals, and construction materials were produced. Turkey moved to this stage 
due to the attained industrial level in the late 1950s. By 1960, Turkey had complemented the 
production basis in consumer goods.  
 
The support of the center countries given to ISI was explained with respect to the composition 
of industrial production. This industrialization drive, however, did not pose a challenge to the 
country’s ranking in the world economic hierarchy. Instead it augmented its dependency on 
the center countries. In contrast to the previous era when Turkey had to import consumer 
goods, in the 1960s the country was at the stage of importing capital goods as well as a 
considerable amount of intermediate goods. This was in line with the interests of the center 
countries since not only were their prices higher than those of consumer goods but also it 
represented a stable demand relation. Though ISI, on the one hand, enabled domestic 
production of certain goods which were previously imported, on the other hand, owing to the 
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growth of manufacturing output, there was an increase in the volume of importation.124 This 
made the country a lasting market for the center countries.            
 
Official statement of this support was the OECD Economic Survey of 1961. Reflecting the 
endorsement of ISI in this, center countries pointed out that the main strategy of Turkey had 
to save foreign currency in her imports as well as development of domestic industry. It 
recommended partial liberalization of the foreign trade regime, excluding domestically 
produced goods or domestic production of which was possible in the foreseeable future. 
While imports of goods essential to the achievement of the Plan would be encouraged, it 
recommended restriction of luxurious goods. In 1966, during the preparation of the Second 
Five Year Development Plan, OECD aid consortium recommended even stricter terms for the 
import regime through higher import duties or import taxes.  This policy line was defined as 
the condition for ISI’s profitability in economic terms.125    
 
Consequently, ISI became the basic feature of the prepared five year development plans, yet 
the degree of industrialization varied in the Plans. While the First Five Year Development 
Plan withdrew the unbalanced growth idea, and covered whole sectors with special reference 
to social development, the Second Five Year Development Plan gave more importance to 
industrialization than the first one. By and large planning principles with the ultimate 
objective of 7 % annual growth and economic policy remained unchanged until the debt crisis 
of 1978.126 Agriculture and industrialization policies of the era are examined in the light of 
this information in the following section. 
 
                                                 
124Keyder, “Economic Development and Crisis: 1950-80”, p.298-9.  
125Hansen, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: Egypt and Turkey, p.363-4. 
126Ibid., p.351, 353; Şahin, Türkiye Ekonomisi, p.127-8.  
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c. Agricultural Development Policy of Turkey in 1960-73 Era : 
Parallel to the shift in development strategy in the 1960s, the role of agriculture was defined 
as a complementary one.  This “complementation” arose from the fact of its being the main 
source for exportation, supplier of raw materials as well as being a market for domestic 
industry. In other words, as Margulies and Yıldızoğlu state, this multi-faceted function of 
agriculture promoted the integration of industry and agriculture in the 1960s.127 The growth 
rate of agriculture from 1961-63 to 1977-79 was 3 %. This rate had been 5.1 % for 1948-50 to 
1961-63. The contribution of agriculture to total GDP growth declined even more strongly, 
from 23.7 percent in 1951-53 to 1961-63 to 14.0 percent in 1961-63 to 1977-79.128  
 
Factors that induced agriculture’s decline varied, top among which was Turkey’s reaching the 
ultimate boundary for expansion of cultivated lands,  that is “close of the frontier”. Facing 
this, governments redefined the agricultural development strategy as intensified agriculture. 
Outcome of this new orientation was the adoption of the so-called Green Revolution.  
Indicating intensified agricultural methods, main premises of this Revolution were improved 
seed varieties, increased mechanization, expanded irrigation system along with increased use 
of inputs such as chemicals and pesticides.129   
 
Adoption of this policy indicated some continuity as well as shifts from the policy line of the 
previous era. Similar to the 1950s, the Green Revolution excluded the majority since its 
feasible implementation was only possible on large tracts of land. This meant that orientation 
of these techniques was to be practiced by the big landowners and commercialized farmers.  
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Besides, it required substantial amounts of importation from the center countries. This was the 
irony of the policy as it was justified to attain Turkey’s self-reliance in agriculture. Even if the 
country attained self-sufficiency with respect to production levels, this would not challenge 
the country’s dependence on the center countries. Instead a more institutionalized form of 
dependence was realized. Moreover, the commercialized farmers increasingly continued to 
enjoy various forms of incentives including expanded bank credits and subsidies. 
 
Parallel to these similarities, there were differences in some patterns and policies. Top among 
these was the change in the irrigation policy. In contrast to the relative neglect of small-scale 
irrigation schemes in favor of large-scale ones such as dams, the small-scale irrigation 
schemes were given high priority as intensified agriculture required regular irrigation. As a 
result of this, the size of the irrigated area doubled from 1960 to 1973.130   
 
The increased use of fertilizers indicated a difference from the previous era when their 
consumption was low. Between 1960-69, use of fertilizers increased more than tenfold. 
Despite the increase, the foreign experts did not regard the level as an adequate one. One of 
the crucial impeding factors for unsatisfied level of consumption was the high cost of 
fertilizers. Turkey was one of the countries where the fertilizer was most expensive. 
Therefore, in line with the recommendations of the foreign experts, in order to assure higher 
consumption levels, which were regarded as a precondition for the attainment of production 
                                                 
130Confidential Barker Mission to Turkey: Member Report No.9 on Turkish Agriculture by L.E. Kirk and 
William H. Nichols, 15 October 1950; Hansen, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth: Egypt 
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goals of the policy, governments adopted various incentive policies as well as “fertilizer use” 
demonstration programs in collaboration with FAO.131  
 
As another feature of the era, agricultural mechanization continued, though not with frequent 
increase. The end of stagnancy in tractorization commenced in the mid-60s and continued 
until the 1980s. While the number of tractors was 42.100 in 1960, this increased up to 
105,865 in 1970 and reached 435,000 in 1980.132Though importation of tractors was still the 
main trend, other machines were also imported.    
Table III ---Increase in the usage of capital inputs in agriculture 
Years Tractor (1000 
piece) 
Combine(1000 
piece) 
Thresher(1000 
piece) 
Chemical 
fertilizers  
(1000 ton) 
1960 42.1 5.6 2.5 -
1965 54.7 6.5 4.3 802.8
1970 105.9 8.6 14 2217.3
SOURCE: SSI, Statistical Annuals of Turkey 
Assessment of the policy revealed that the Green Revolution was satisfactory for the 
policymakers owing to the attained productivity level. Productivity that rose by 1.3 % per 
year in 1950-60, accelerated in the 1960s by an average of 2.5 % annually.133 Another 
outcome of this policy was diversification in the composition of agricultural products. The era 
witnessed the shift from cereal production to cash crop production such as cotton, tobacco, 
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sugar beet, tea, sunflowers and olives. Though gradual, this was important in reflecting the 
commercialization of agriculture. While the marketizing ratio for cereals was around 30 %, 
this degree increased to 90 % in cash crops, except oil with a degree of 66 %. Owing to this 
shift in priority, the agricultural export amount increased considerably, from an average of $ 
283 million in 1961-62 to $ 464 million in 1970-71.134   
 
d. Industrialization Policy of Turkey in 1960-73 
As mentioned above, the accepted development policy of the planned era was ISI. The shift in 
the locomotive sector of the development strategy also indicated the rearrangement of 
priorities. The annual growth rate of industry between 1963-71 era was 9 % and its share in 
national income was 27 % by 1970. In Keyder’s words this was “the 1960s boom”. Consistent 
with the pursued policy, this rate was an outcome of a well-protected domestic market. 
Though the growth rate was high, it failed to attain the objectives of the Plan envisaged for 
industry, which was 12.3 %.135   
 
Owing to the completion of the consumer goods industrialization, industrial activities of the 
planned era represented an advanced stage. In this era, the composition of industry was made 
up of durable goods and investments goods. In terms of attained level, the investment goods 
did not repeat the spectacular achievement seen in durable goods. This trend was explained by 
the high and early profit returns of the first and the latter’s being the most advanced and most 
difficult stage of industrialization.136    
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Out of all industrial activities, manufacturing comprised the substantial part of industry sector. 
During the First 5 Year Development Plan, its growth rate was 9.6 %. A majority of the 
created industrial capital was due to this sector’s production in the era. Besides, 90 % of all 
employees in industry sector also worked in manufacturing industry. The composition change 
in industry was best viewed in this manufacturing industry, since by time while the share of 
consumption goods decreased, intermediaries and investment goods increased. In the process, 
it was again the food, weavery, cloth and leather products of the manufacturing industry 
which were exported.137     
 
For the planners, the high priority objective of the industrialization drive was to save foreign 
currency by producing these goods domestically. Yet possibility of earning foreign currency 
was also regarded as a fringe benefit. In a publication of SIS, industrial branches were 
categorized into three as those whose goods could be exported, those who met the needs of 
the country and others. Sugar industry, carpet weaving and textiles were among the first 
category. By 1968, exportation of these comprised 7 % of the total exportation. Woolen and 
silk textile industry, foodstuffs, cloth industry were among the second which met the needs of 
the country. Machine industry, stone-soil, glass industry, chemicals industry, paper industry, 
and transportation industries were defined as other industries.138  
 
The profile of industrial activities of the public and private sector reveals that profitability was 
the main thrust for the private sector. High profitability of the durable goods sheds light on 
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private sector’s concentration in this branch.139On the other hand, the public sector was active 
mainly in monopoly goods, transportation vehicles, coal, petrol products as well as iron-steel 
industry branches. Acting mostly in a complementary fashion, the claim of competition 
between the two seems not to have been realistic owing to scales and financial resources of 
the public sector. A study of SIS in 1973 revealed that the public sector operated with a more 
advanced technology than the private sector. Productivity per production unit was higher in 
the public sector. Though public sector owned only 7.9 % of the facilities, it created 52.7 % of 
the acquired value added.140    
 
In this era, in addition to the protected domestic market the private sector enjoyed various 
incentives for its industrial activities.  As an incentive to reduce the production cost, 
governments widely subsided in the industry covering cheaper intermediary inputs, cheap 
infrastructure and other facilities.141 
 
This was the brief examination of the industrialization endeavors in the 1960s. As the 
locomotive sector of the economy, industry enjoyed the highest allocations and various 
incentives due to the belief that it led to self-reliance of the country. In essence, this was the 
motto in adopting all the policies of the era commencing in post-WW2. The degree of 
attainment of objectives is analyzed in the following pages. 
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Outcomes of Development Strategies   
a. Outcomes of the Agricultural Development Policies (1947-73) 
 
The challenge of the adopted agricultural development policies was to make the country a 
“breadbasket” for the European countries through generating her natural potentials. During 
the first era the donors and Turkish policymakers agreed on the necessity of policies with 
quick high returns relying on the increasing food deficiency in the West European countries. 
The outcome was the adoption of agricultural mechanization program along with some 
supplementary policies.  
 
Agricultural mechanization was regarded as a ‘must’ for Turkey’s attainment of productive 
goals. The initial years following the adoption of the program were distinguished by a 
production boom and promotion, which resulted in an optimistic atmosphere in the country 
and the related US circles. In 1952, Turkish policymakers heralded the overall solution of the 
wheat problem.142In 1953 Turkey became the fifth greatest wheat exporter country in the 
world. However, in a year’s time it again became a wheat importing country. The production 
level of 1295 kg per hectare in 1953 decreased to 854 kg in 1954, the lowest annual average 
since 1934.143 
 
When Turkish officials prepared to seek aid for wheat importation this was a great surprise for 
the US Mission and other high rank officials as the reversal trend was very rapid. These 
American officials believed that wheat existed in the country and it was the task of the 
Turkish authorities to use all their measures within their power to get it before asking the 
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343. 
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ECA.144Developments, however, revealed the unattainment of this request. On November 1, 
1954 Turkish delegation commenced negotiations with the American officials for Turkey’s 
wheat importation under PL 480. For the requested amount of 300 000 ton wheat and 200 000 
ton coarse grain, Turkey asked for a barter deal for 100 000 tons of wheat from US for 
chrome ore from Turkey. Explaining the rapid reversal trend in production level with respect 
to the serious drought that resulted in a bad crop year, the delegation emphasized Turkey’s 
obligatory appeal to the USA owing to the inadequacy of dollar reserves.145 
 
The abrupt reversal in the production level was due to Turkish agriculture’s vulnerability and 
dependency on uncontrolled variables such as climatic conditions. During the short-lived 
agricultural boom the ruling party denied the direct correlation between the good harvest and 
favorable weather conditions. Any explanation referring to good weather conditions’ 
contribution to high production level was rejected and labeled as unfair and deliberate 
undermining of the achievements of the ruling party.146 In contrast to the insistent denial of 
this relation by the ruling party, the US officials recognized this fact. In the confidential 
economic review the officials raised doubts about the country’s ability to sustain its “presently 
high rate of economic development” by referring to this feature of Turkish agriculture.147  
 
The immediate impact of Turkey’s poor performance was the end of the consensus between 
the superpower and its small ally on the accuracy of the adopted agricultural development 
policy. Turkish policymakers blamed the USA for these unsatisfying outcomes. They claimed 
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that the backfired agricultural policy was encouraged by the US. Another source of complaint 
was the US’ pressing of the Turkish policymakers to liberalize imports in 1951 and 1952 in 
the midst of a bad drought as a result of which a flood of goods came in that still could not be 
paid for.148 Such an early confrontation on the unsoundness of the program, however, did not 
lead to a policy change. Instead, importation of machines continued until the end of the 
decade.  
 
Critical assessment of the agricultural development programs of the first era indicated an 
orthodox approach that shaped the program. This led to the underestimation of Turkey’s 
dynamics. While this represented the core of the problem, however, the situation was 
aggravated due to its being mishandled by Turkish policymakers and officials. As a result of 
this, hundreds of types of machine’s importation turned to be an impassable problem of spare 
parts as well as inadequate number of repair shops149, idleness of the imported machinery 
which meant waste of resources150 and excessive prices of the spare parts due their sales in 
black market.151 This self-criticism in the country, on the other hand, juxtaposed with the 
criticisms of the American authorities. Evaluation of the program with respect to these factors 
shed light to the lasting interplay of the external and internal dynamics during its 
implementation.  
 
First of all, the implemented agricultural mechanization program was not feasible for Turkey 
due to the prevailing conditions in rural areas. Agricultural mechanization was promoted in a 
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country where more than 80 % of its rural population had very small landholdings. Not only 
the machine types but also costs of the machines led to an automatic exclusion of the majority 
of rural population. Besides, the imported machinery was capital-intensive. This was another 
irrationality as the country had an increasing surplus of labor force. By their labor saving 
features, these machines led to the displacement of a great number of people from their 
activities at the expense of those who afforded to buy these types of machinery. What 
aggravated the negative effects of this mechanization in Turkey was the absence of a sound 
non-agricultural sector, mainly industrialization, to absorb this surplus labor force. 
 
These features of the program indicated a dual exclusion that affected small landowners as 
well as agricultural laborers. But these outcomes were expected and welcomed for the initial 
stages as the program was prepared by the trickle down principle. The assumption beneath 
this principle was the trickle of the gained wealth down to all segments of the population by 
time. In that respect the initial disturbing effect of the program was not seriously taken into 
consideration. Yet, in the case of Turkey what raised the anxiety of the US administration was 
the relative smallness of those who fell into the scope of the program. Referring to the 
“vastness” of the excluded farmers owing to the size of their land holdings and insufficient 
capital to purchase such machines, the American technical experts regarded the situation as an 
“extraordinary one.”152  
 
Defining the Mission’s interference as a must they concluded that unless someone else guided 
the mechanization program, at the end “wheat will still be sown by hand and plowed under 
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and farmers will go broke.”153As a precaution to assure the success of the program, American 
officials recommended the establishment of farm machinery cooperatives in order to enable 
the access of average size Turkish farmer to these machines.154  
 
Another memo reflected the same sort of anxiety. In less than a year in April 1950, Head of 
ECA warned the US Mission in Ankara about the appraisal of the demands of Turkey for new 
importation of agricultural machines. Harriman asked from the American Embassy in Ankara 
to encourage Turkey on the usage of smaller and less expensive combines and tractors. He 
defined this as praiseworthy referring to the fact that they were the only types, which could be 
afforded by medium and small-size farmers. Consistent with this warning, technical experts 
emphasized the necessity of importing small types of laborsaving equipment that could be 
used with animal power with a cost low enough to be afforded by millions of small 
landowners.155  
 
However, the Turkish policymakers rebuffed any initiative of the American technical 
personnel. Against the recommendations for medium and small size machinery, Turkish 
policymakers referred to the urgent need for an increase in overall foodgrains production. 
Equated big-sized machinery with productivity rise, Turkish officials pointed out large estates 
and state farms as the focal point of their program.156 This insistence of the Turkish 
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policymakers on the big-size machinery led to an impasse. When the ECA was increasingly 
criticized by the US State Department for not interfering with this miscalculated and 
unbalanced importation,157the Mission attempted to incorporate some measures to agreements 
they accorded with the Turkish government which would enable the close surveillance and 
direction of the machination program by the American technical experts.  
 
This attempt, however, arouse Turkish government’s antipathy. Regarding American officials 
as overbearing, uncooperative and tending to interfere in Turkey’s economic plans “beyond 
the call of duty”, Turkish government implied the possibility of Turkey’s withdrawal from the 
Marshall Plan.158 In the process, though Turkey did not withdraw from the Marshall Plan, she 
froze her relations with the ECA Mission from mid-1952 to December 1954 by putting an end 
to normal consultations as well as meetings on economic matters.159 In addition to this 
attempt, another factor that went parallel to this and made the Turkish policymakers 
increasingly uncompromising was PM’s increasing dissatisfaction with the performance of 
the Chief of Mission when he bypassed PM and established direct communications with the 
President of the Republic.160  
 
Sales of improper and insufficient equipment represented the other important facet of the 
mishandling of the program. Sale of partial or unadapted sets of equipment, use of wrong 
types of equipment and oversized tractors were the basic deficiencies of the program from the 
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beginning. Turkish officials’ failure to deal with these issues as a result of both controllable 
and uncontrollable factors threatened the program totally as it led to a waste of resources as 
well as impeding the optimum use of machines. Defining the Turkish officials as neglectful 
and shortsighted on this issue, the American technical experts asked for new mechanisms that 
would enable their efficient interference with the process.161 Turkish authorities, while 
regretting these attempts, explained the prevailing deficiency with respect to the independent 
spirit of the Turkish peasants. According to the Ministry of Agriculture the character of 
farmers in the country who acted freely and independently with a special dislike of 
interference of the State into their own businesses was the main cause of improper sales.162 
  
The spare parts issue turned to be much more problematic owing to the fact that Turkish 
policy makers dealt with the issue in an unplanned manner.  Various forces were at force in 
this failure. While Turkish officials referred to the obligation of a wide variety of importation 
parallel to the varied agricultural machines and shortage of foreign currency by the mid-50s, 
American officials also referred to the pressure of dealers who put very high margins of 
profits, black marketing as well as reluctance to import spare parts at all, in preferring the 
quicker profits to be made by importing new vehicles.163 
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As a result of these factors, Turkey turned into a “machine cemetery”. The price of this was 
very high for Turkey who relied on foreign resources for the importation of the machinery. 
The danger of such financing proved itself in Turkey’s increasing balance of payments 
problems. Shortage of financial resources resulted in failure to import even the most required 
equipments. 
 
Examination of the policies indicated that not only the agricultural mechanization but also 
policies adopted as supplementary of the agricultural mechanization also challenged the 
interests of the excluded majority. Top among them was expansion of cultivated lands. 
Aiming at the commercialized farmers applying mechanized agriculture this policy 
endangered the future of the main alternative income resource in Turkey, namely animal 
husbandry. This was due to the fact that majority of the land opened for cultivation was 
pastures. This practice was first commenced during one party era within the scope of Land 
Distribution Law when the pastures were distributed to landless peasants. In the 1950s it was 
accelerated and by time, peasants faced the problem of feeding their animals.164   
 
Another supplementary policy that had negative impacts on the rural majority was the 
agricultural credit. Regarding agricultural credit as an important means that led to production 
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and productivity increase165, Turkish policymakers expanded it considerably. While aiming at 
the minority, the policymakers did not pay much attention to the majority. As a result of the 
powerful minority’s increased accessibility to the public resources, the existing dual credit 
structure reinforced and differentiation among the higher and lower segments of rural 
population increased.166  
 
In sum, the program’s exclusion of the majority of the rural population, its financing from the 
foreign resources, mishandling due to controllable and uncontrollable factors such as 
unplanned and unsystematic implementation, lack of efficient monitoring, importation of 
unadapted and unset machinery, application of the program through political considerations, 
and influence of various elite group that the governments paid attention to were its main 
deficiencies. All these were crucial in shaping the unsatisfactory outcomes of the program. 
 
Assessment of the agricultural mechanization with respect to increased production, on the 
other hand, revealed that the program was not successful. At the end of the process Turkey 
had to import foodgrains. The process did not lead to a stable production level either; instead 
fluctuations were the distinguishing feature of the agricultural production. This feature sheds 
light on another deficiency in the sector, which was agricultural activities’ vulnerability to 
uncontrollable factors such as climatic conditions. Due to this vulnerability there was a direct 
correlation between adequate and timely rainfall and high production levels.  Preoccupied 
with energy and power needs of the country in the 1947-60 era the policymakers neglected 
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small-scale irrigation schemes which could be the sole solution to reduce production’s 
vulnerability to climatic conditions.  
 
The policymakers had to leave this negligence by the 1960s parallel to the adoption of 
intensified agricultural technologies as a remedy to have a more stable and adequate 
production level. Relying on extensive use of modern agricultural inputs including high 
variety seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, machinery along with regular irrigation the so-called 
Green Revolution led the policymakers to be more sensitive to small-scale irrigation schemes. 
Though wider application of intensified agricultural techniques provided a higher and 
relatively stable production level, this posed another dilemma for the country. In contrast to 
the objective of self-reliance, the country, in any case, grew dependent on foreign countries. 
While the agricultural production of the country was vulnerable to uncontrollable conditions 
and this led to low production rates, this dependency was in the form of foodgrains 
production; by the adoption of techniques to reduce this vulnerability the dependency was 
converted to importation of large amounts of modern inputs which required high foreign 
exchange allocations. In both cases, as the financing was not done by domestic resources, the 
outcome was increasing indebtedness and vulnerability to the availability of foreign exchange 
reserves. This outcome proved the failure of comparative advantage principle, which was the 
principle center countries relied on for the shift in locomotive sector of the economic 
development.     
 
Assessment of the agricultural development strategies with respect to their impacts on social 
structure in rural areas indicated an increasing differentiation among the higher and lower 
segments of the rural population. The agricultural strategies until 1973 were shaped by the 
trickle down principle whose underlying assumption was the trickle of the gained wealth 
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down to all segments of the population through time. Instead of trickle down, concentration of 
power and institutionalization of the interests of the minority at the expense of the majority 
was the case. As the strategies aimed at commercialized agriculture the ones involved in this 
attained higher incomes. Since this segment made up the minority of the rural population the 
majority was left untouched and continued their subsistence agricultural activities. The 
increased difference in incomes reinforced the prestige and power of the commercialized 
minority vis-à-vis the majority. In other words, this feature indicated the sharpening of the 
dual structure in rural Turkey. One facet of this duality was the commercialized minority 
distinguished by its developed urban values and manners as well as integration to the world 
economy. The other represented the majority that continued to survive by subsistence 
agriculture, unable to have any access to public resources and highly vulnerable to 
conjuncturel developments.  
 
Assessment of the program from the perspective of the center countries revealed its success. 
The agricultural development strategies served both the practical and strategic considerations 
of the center countries. Owing to the agricultural boom of initial years Turkey managed to 
fulfill its role in the ERP as a foodgrains supplier country. In addition to the practical 
concerns, these strategies had far-flung outcomes with respect to the center countries strategic 
considerations. Through these strategies Turkey was put “in order” regarding its participation 
in the international division of labor as an agricultural country. Shaped by the comparative 
advantage principle it was assumed that by exploiting its vast arable lands, Turkey contributed 
to the world market via exportable agricultural goods. This assumption was, however, 
invalidated in the Turkish case.  Turkish exportable agricultural goods were in most cases 
uncompetitive in world markets due to their higher prices and low standards. The produced 
wheat was not only harsh but also rusty which resulted in serious loss of the value of the 
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product. Especially oxidation of the wheat was a serious problem, which led to the loss of the 
existing markets. The same was true for the produced cotton.167 
 
Though there was a sort of agreement on the low standard of the products, the higher prices of 
the exported goods represented a bone of contention between center countries and Turkey. 
The higher prices of the goods were mainly due to Turkish policymakers attempt to reflect the 
widely applied subsidies to the prices in order to meet the budget deficit aroused due to subsidies. 
The higher prices than the world market meant that they had difficulty in finding customers for their 
goods in the world market. Despite this difficulty Turkish policymakers lacked flexibility in the 
determination of the prices. In a miscalculating way Turkish governments had insistently 
announced higher prices even when there was an abundance of the exported goods in the 
world market. This inflexible attitude of the Turkish policymakers led frictions between the 
center countries and Turkey. The continuous tendency of Turkish governments was defined as 
their continuous search for of the possibility of selling the exportable goods at higher prices. 
Criticized and also pressed by the US officials, Turkish policy makers were attempted to be 
convinced to adopt a reasonable price policy as well as better marketing techniques.168  
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b. Outcomes of the Industrial Development Policies (1947-73) 
 
By the 1960s Turkey reoriented its development strategy by shifting the locomotive sector to 
import substituting industrialization.  This shift led to the reemergence of the 1930s’ view 
regarding industry’s being the sole remedy of a less developed country to become self-reliant. 
Shaped by this view one of the basic objectives of the planned era was the high possibility of 
Turkey’s reaching self-reliance at the end of the Second Five Year Plan when she was no 
more in search of exceptional external finance such as foreign aid for her development 
policies. Main premise of this objective was her industrialization drive of the 1960s.  
 
Assessment of the industrialization drive from this perspective, however, reveals that the 
outcome of the drive was contrary to this common belief. The defined objective regarding the 
end of the Second Five Year Plan remained highly optimistic since Turkey’s dependency on 
advanced countries increased mainly due to her industrialization drive. This was frustrating 
for the Turkish policymakers who based their modernization principle on industrialization by 
the advocacy that industrialization served the attainment of a nation’s real economic 
independence. What led to this outcome of increasing dependence needs to be addressed, 
since answers of this reflected the structural problems of industry. The analysis reveals that 
the problem was not industrialization but how to industrialize.   
 
The first deficiency of the Turkish industrialization was its unbalanced nature. The “unbalanced” nature 
of the established industry was reflected in the proportions of the sub-industries. In contrast to the highest 
share of the consumer goods, the share of the investment goods was the lowest. This disproportion 
between the consumer and investment goods industry reflected the pseudo-industrialization of Turkey.  
According to the definition, in an industrial structure higher proportion of investment goods industry 
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indicated genuine industrialization structure as this branch covered the machine production, metal goods, 
electrical machines and apparatus, electronics, highways and railways vehicle production, ship 
construction and aircraft industry.169 
 
However this definition was also misleading since criterion of genuine industrialization had to be 
production of these goods by relying on the country’s domestic resources. As seen in the Turkish case, 
when the “production” was in the form of assembly, this did not represent a genuine industrialization. 
The widening scope of assembly industries in the process covered durable consumer goods and 
investment goods, leading among which were automotive industry, electronics, electrical engines and 
other electrical goods. Though in the short run, this was perceived as a “life buoy” as it enabled relatively 
comfortable provision of technology transfer and financial resources, in essence assembly industry 
reinforced Turkey’s dependence on foreign countries,170 in terms of resources such as industrial inputs 
and capital. Besides, the relatively comfortable provision of semi-manufactured and manufactured 
goods impeded genuine production.171 In this respect, assembly industry impeded the establishment and 
flourishment of national industry. In the Turkish context, attacks on the assembly industry focused on the 
fact that what Turkey witnessed was a disguised importation, and not industrialization.   
 
Dependency on advanced countries in terms of industrial inputs and foreign currency as well as 
indifference to technology production was the core of the issues that explained why industrialization of 
the country did not serve its economic viability in the medium- and long-terms. Dependency on 
foreign resources was to such an extent that when the aid of Aid Consortium had a deficit of $ 
63 million in 1963, this impeded the implementation of the Plan.172 This outcome, which 
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indicated drastic increase in importation also invalidated another expectation from the ISI, 
namely saving dollars as a result of domestic production.  
 
In the process some attitudes of the donor countries also aggravated the conditions of dependency. These 
included inadequate and delayed amounts as well as unfavorable conditions of the exchange transfer. 
Their negative impacts on the industrialization drive could be summarized as undercapacity and 
inefficient functioning of many industrial facilities and increased production costs. All these resulted in 
the widely known phenomenon of a gap between production capacity and realized production.173  
 
Technology transfer represented the other dimension of the dependency that made Turkey an 
enduring market for the center countries. In the ISI period of planned era, Turkey relied to a 
great extent on transferred technology for its industrial production, including the investment 
goods industries which were established to minimize the country’s dependency on foreign 
countries. In the face of improving and changing technological developments the peripheral 
country had to either spend increased amount of foreign currency or continue its activities 
with outdated technology. In many peripheral countries, including Turkey, the latter was 
preferred. Besides, the center countries were firm on keeping the recent technology in their 
hands as they regarded this as the crucial means for their dominance over the periphery.  
   
Finally, the industrialization drive of the country that lacked a sustained nature due to the above-
mentioned factors also hindered employment generation. This was against the assumption of Turkish 
policymakers whose expectation was that along with services sector increased industrialization would 
lead to the absorption of surplus labor force relieved from agriculture. In the process, though the labor 
force in agriculture was reduced, in terms of absorption of labor force services sector was more 
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successful than industry. While in 1945 the percentage of the industrial employment was 6.6 %, this 
barely increased to 11.4 % by 1972.174 
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DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES OF INDIA IN THE POST-WW2 ERA (1947-73) 
An Introductory Glance at India in the Post-WW2 Era 
 
India was another aid recipient country within the foreign aid policy of the USA. By the mid-
70s it was among the top ranking countries with respect to the received aid. By Independence, 
Indian policymakers concluded that India had to use all sorts of means including foreign aid, 
as the available domestic savings were not enough for the economic development of the 
country. Consistent with the predominating assumption regarding foreign aid, the Indian 
policymakers claimed that flow of foreign exchange would put an end to the low domestic 
savings that impeded economic development and this would accelerate the rate of economic 
development of India. Yet, in their appeal for aid they had the reservation that aid had to be 
without strings.  
 
Despite India’s volunteerism for foreign aid, the amount of the aid from the USA was 
relatively low until the early 1960s mainly due to their different perceptions in diplomatic 
field.  Though India did not belong to the “communist” bloc, she did not belong to the “free 
world” bloc either.  This in-between stance shed light on the moderate allocations until the 
1960s. Criticizing India on the one hand the USA, on the other, could not totally sacrifice 
India owing to her strategic importance, having a democratic political system and abundant 
but yet inefficiently exploited natural resources. Commencing in 1951, during the era until the 
early 1960s, most of the aid was in kind, mainly food aid along with small amount of aid in 
cash. The turning point between the two countries was John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s ascension 
to the Presidency when the aid allocations reached to billion dollars. 
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Welcoming these initiatives, the Indian policymakers assumed that by the early 1970s the 
country would attain its self-reliance. But this was not the case. India was another example 
which invalidated the basic assumption of the foreign aid policy. In contrast to the 
expectations, the outcome was a highly dependent economy vulnerable to policy changes of 
the center countries. The question of what led to this outcome necessitates the examination of 
development policies as well as inner and external dynamics that affected the process at 
varying degrees.  
 
Development Strategies of India in the Post-WW2 Era (1947-73) 
14 August 1947 indicated not only the independence of India but also shattering of the 
foundation of the British colonial system. Standing as the backbone of this system, India’s 
independence was an impetus for the emergence of new independent states.  Two of them, 
India and Pakistan emerged by the partition of the land of Hindustan. This partition had very 
important short and long-term consequences in economic, political/administrative and 
diplomatic fields.  While the partition stood for division of military forces and civil 
servants175, it also stood for a lasting hostility between two neighbors, which found its first 
concrete expression in Kashmir issue. The economic dimension of the partition was very 
much related to the wellbeing of Indians since it led a deficiency in foodgrains and industrial 
raw materials, mainly jute, in India. This indicated strong dependency ties of India to foreign 
countries. It was an ironic outcome, at least initially, which was totally adverse to what the 
Indian Founding Fathers, mainly Jawaharlal Nehru, who stated that they accepted partition for 
the sake of economic development.176 
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Attainment of Independence was the decades-long dream of the Indian people. They had great 
expectations related to their life standards. Meeting these expectations was crucial for the 
Founding Fathers since the national movement was propagated by the slogan that it was the 
British rule that hindered the economic development of the country. Moving from this 
rationale in the aftermath of Independence, the Indian policymakers defined their ultimate 
task as proving that the British rule, which represented colonial exploitation, was the factor 
that impeded the economic development of India.  
 
The scope of the task that they had to undertake was, however, immense. In Nehru's words, 
India "was in a servile state, with its splendid strength caged up hardly daring to breathe 
freely; its people poor beyond compare, short-lived and incapable of resisting disease and 
epidemic; illiteracy rampant; vast areas devoid of all sanitary or medical provision and 
unemployment on a prodigious scale, both among the middle classes and masses". By the 
time of independence, India was one of the poorest countries in the world. Its economy had all 
signs of an underdeveloped country. While agriculture was the leading sector with the share 
of 49.1 %, it was followed by mines and manufacturing industries. Low productivity and 
inefficient use of existing resources was apparent in all fields. Affected by the partition, India 
required substantial amounts of foodgrains and industrial raw materials to meet the minimum 
requirements of the country. The rural areas comprising the majority of the population were, 
on the other hand, distinguished by widespread poverty.177 Under these circumstances the 
Government of India (GOI) concentrated its efforts on determining, more truly crystallization, 
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of the economic development strategy of the country. The adopted development policy had 
three pillars, namely planning, mixed economy and ISI.  
 
The concept of planned development was not a post-Independence phenomenon. Instead it 
was an idea widely supported and had its heyday in the early 1930s during the Great 
Depression. At the time when the capitalist system suffered from various setbacks, the success 
of the USSR, “the Russian miracle” under a planned economy fascinated the people in the 
LDCs. This conjuncture expanded the scope of pro-planners to upper-income groups,178yet 
with different expectations. While for the majority of the pro-planners the planned 
development was the mechanism for an egalitarian social order, for the upper segments of 
Indian society planning was a mechanism that served the empowerment of the private capital 
through constructing the required infrastructure.179 
 
Mixed economy was the second pillar of the adopted development strategy. Against the 
claims of the leftist components of the Parliament who demanded total state ownership that 
left no place to private sector180, the rightists as well as pragmatic socialists, including Prime 
Minister Nehru himself propagated mixed economy. Their support of the mixed economy 
indicated realism of the Indian capitalists concerning the scope of their strength. They left the 
idea of laissez-faire but asked for a mixed economic system in which protection and cheap 
raw materials were provided for the private sector. In other words, they had the vision that 
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under such a scheme the capital accumulation process would be accelerated to a great extent. 
The pragmatic socialists, on the other hand, supported the view that Indian state was in its 
infancy and did not have the “luxury” to discard the capitalists at any time it desired since it 
was not stronger than the capitalists.181 
 
In that respect, as the main proponent of the mixed economy PM Nehru’s views are worth 
examining.  In contrast to the 1930s, when Nehru refused a middle path between socialism 
and capitalism, in the late 1940s he supported the mixed economy as a system that could best 
serve economic growth and social justice. He defined mixed economy as a transitory stage to 
socialism during which the Indian society could be reorganized on more egalitarian basis and 
be prepared for the socialistic system.182 
 
Nehru envisioned a mixed economic system in which the public sector controlled the 
“commanding heights of economy”, mainly the basic and heavy industries that made a nation 
an industrialized one in the real sense. The public sector had to expand and dominate all vital 
fields in the economic system while the private sector had a complementary role. In the Indian 
context the expanding public sector was related to and justified by the so-called Nehru 
socialism. Nehru was a believer in socialism but he had his own interpretation which was 
called as Nehru socialism. For Nehru, socialism meant social ownership and control of the 
means of production, and state intervention through planning and equality.  This interpretation 
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of socialism was, however, not a fixed, rigid or doctrinaire. Instead it was evolutionary and 
adaptable in each society and at every stage of development.183  
 
Nehru believed that the mixed economy offered opportunities to attain this socialistic order. 
When the balance between the public and private sector was changing in favor of the first, 
then any state’s transition to socialism was a matter of a short time.184 Yet in this scheme, he 
underlined that expansion of the public sector should not be at the expense of the individual. 
In his socialistic ideal, the end stage was the fullest development of the individual, the 
“enlightened self”, not the state. He opposed to the development of the state at the expense of 
the individual, as this resulted in “regimentation under a bureaucratic state”.185 
 
ISI was the last pillar of the adopted development policy of India. The GOI adopted this in 
1951 when the policy was highly favorable and adopted in many LDCs. In the initial years of 
the Republic, like other LDCs which suffered from low capital accumulation, the GOI faced 
the question of saving as well as increasing the amount of foreign exchange reserves of the 
country. It regarded import substitution and export promotion as possible policies, but the first 
had the priority. This was mainly due to the prevailing export pessimism in India. Among the 
policymakers no one had the belief that by the traditional agricultural products such as jute, 
tea, and cotton textiles India could attain a big push. Therefore, the focus shifted to foreign 
exchange saving instead of earning. Adopted by these considerations, in the scope of ISI high 
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priority was given to the domestic production of manufactured goods that consisted a high 
proportion within the total of Indian imports.186             
 
Following the determination of the main pillars of the development policy, Indian 
policymakers began to establish mechanisms to realize and institutionalize these pillars in the 
Indian economic system. The mixed economy idea was realized and institutionalized through 
industrial resolutions of 1948 and 1956, which clearly defined the division of labor between 
the public and private sectors and governed the industrialization policy of India from that time 
onwards. ISI, on the other hand, was practised through various policies such as tariff walls, 
quotas and some other regulatory policies. The planned development, on the other hand, 
found its expression in the Five Year Development Plans that commenced in 1951. 
 
Examination of Five Year Development Plans reveals that the planned economic development 
of India did not have a linear path. While the Fourth Five Year Development Plan differed 
from the previous three by its individual-oriented approach, the first three plans, known also 
as Nehru Plans had fluctuations with respect to the locomotive sector of the economic 
development process. The First Five Year Development Plan (1951-56) was distinguished 
from the second and third by its emphasis on agriculture-led development as the existing 
circumstances necessitated. Increased difficulty in meeting the basic food needs of the 
population, aggravated financial burden of imported foodstuffs as well as increasing need of 
the industrial establishments for agricultural raw materials were the main factors that led to 
the adoption of this agriculture-led strategy. While agriculture received the highest share in 
allocations, the industrial objectives of the Plan was moderate, such as full utilization of the 
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existing industrial capacity in producer and consumer goods, expansion of capacity in capital 
goods industries as well as completion of on-going projects.187  
1956 was the milestone in Indian development planning. It was in this year that the Indian 
policymakers adopted the so-called Mahalanobis model. The adoption of this model, which 
was in fact the reorientation of the development strategy for the large-scale industrialization 
with special reliance on the heavy and capital industries, as soon as the First 5 Year 
Development Plan was completed, was not coincidental. Attainment of the objectives of 
increase in foodcrops and considerable improvement in agriculture led to an overoptimism 
and overconfidence among the Indian policymakers. Regarding these achievements as 
permanent, they concluded that time was ripe for the reorientation of the development 
strategy to attain their long-dreamed national objectives. In addition to this, the widespread 
underemployment and unemployment was an important factor for this adoption.   The 
policymakers who perceived agriculture’s limited capacity that did not match with the surplus 
labor force concluded that this problem had to be met by speeding up the pace of development 
through more rapid industrialization.188  
 
Outcome of the so-called Mahalanobis growth model, named after Professor Mahalanobis 
was the Second Five Year Development Plan that represented the foundation of India’s 
development strategy. The Plan relied on the creation of basic industries such as iron and 
steel, coal, fertilizers, heavy engineering and heavy electrical equipment and secondary 
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industries, as well as decentralized cottage industries, to create jobs for India's huge 
unemployed and the underemployed population. Yet, as the model took the Soviet experience 
as its model its major thrust was basic industries. Aiming to attain a Nehruvian version 
socialistic society, Mahalanobis pleaded for enlarging the public sector at the expense of 
private enterprise, particularly with respect to basic industries. In addition to basic industries, 
the model called for the state’s entering into various activities such as banking, insurance, 
foreign trade or internal trade in selected commodities by the rationale of strengthening the 
public sector vis-à-vis the private.189 
 
The same basic strategy continued in the Third Five Year Plan (1961-65) led by rapid 
industrialization with special emphasis on capital and producer goods industries. While 
priorities were apparently the same with the Second Plan, funds for the Plan were increased. 
As the locomotive sector of the strategy, industry, particularly basic industries, received 
considerably high proportion of allocations. The role of the public sector was increased even 
further in the Third Plan, both practically and ideologically. Yet, as an unexpected 
phenomenon, the private sector was expanded more than envisioned in the Plan.190The share 
of the allocations according to sectors in the Plans during Nehru’s Prime Ministry was as 
follows: 
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Table IV: Composition of aggregate investment 1950-51 to 1965-66 (Rs. in billion at 
current prices) 191 
  First Plan Second Plan Third Plan 
 Rs. % Rs. % Rs. % 
Agriculture 9.1 27 12.6 19 21.2 18 
Industry& 
minerals       
4.4 12 18.1 27 29.9 25 
Power 2.7 8 4.8 7 12.9 11 
Transportation 5.9 18 14.1 21 23.5 20 
Others 11.5 35 17.9 26 32.0 26 
Total 33.6 100 67.5 100 119.5 100 
 
Following Nehru’s death, India entered a period of plan holiday for three years lasting from 
1966 to 1969 due to the increased foreign exchange shortage and economic crisis. In the midst 
of successive droughts and foodgrain shortages, emphasis of the annual plans was on 
agriculture and particularly on minor irrigation projects. Following these three years, the 
Fourth 5 Year Plan (1969-1974), as the First 5 Year Plan prepared after Nehru’s death, 
departed from the previous five year development plans with respect to target group and 
locomotive sector.  
 
The first three plans were distinguished by their community-orientation instead of individuals 
and their objective was implementation of programs which could serve the well being of the 
community. The land reform policies, cooperative farming, community development 
programs, major irrigation schemes were all designed to serve this end. But the fourth Plan 
shifted from these considerations and concentrated on the individual. The adopted HYV 
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technologies, implemented tubewell sort irrigation schemes and redefinition of the 
cooperatives as credit units indicated this shift. The Fourth 5 Year Plan was designed by the 
trickle down principle with the assumption that the advance of few at first would lead to the 
advance of the others in the process.  
  
The second departure point was with respect to the locomotive sector. Intensified problems 
with respect to agricultural development led Nehru’s successor Shastri to change the priorities 
of the development strategy. Referring to the high probability of material wellbeing of the 
rural population with the agricultural development, PM Shastri in his short term in the office 
defined agriculture as the high priority sector. An immediate impact of this policy change was 
a considerable increase in the allocations earmarked to agriculture. This was a shift from the 
public-oriented to the private-oriented development192, at least on paper.  
 
By the sudden death of PM Shastri, Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi was elected as the PM. 
By her ascension to power, a shift from Shastri’s development strategy was expected since 
she severely criticized his predecessor’s attempts as “erosion” of her father’s policies.193 
 
These expectations were not realized, as Gandhi did not have too many options to return to 
her father’s policy. After a three-year-plan holiday due to acute food shortage, inflation, 
agitation by communists and the Indo-Pakistani War, by accepting the necessity of 
agricultural modernization, agriculture was defined as the high priority sector in Indian 
economy in the Fourth 5 Year Plan (1969-71).194  
                                                 
192Nayar, India's Mixed Economy: The Role of Ideology and Interest in its Development, p.255.  
193Quoted by Nayar, India's Mixed Economy: The Role of Ideology and Interest in its Development, p.256.  
194Sun Peijun, “Agricultural Development in China and India: Experiences and Problems” in Economic 
Development of India and China: A Comparative Study, Indian Council of Social Science Research Lancer 
International in Association with Indian Council of Social Science Research, 1988, p.45-6; Dalip S. Swamy, The 
 125
 
Parallel to the redefinition of priorities in Indian economy, proportion of the allocations for 
sectors was arranged accordingly. In comparison to the Third Plan in which foreign exchange 
component for agriculture was only Rupees 191 crores, this amount was raised to Rs 1114 
crores in the Fourth Plan of 1969-74. In the redefinition of priorities, the objective for the 
industrial sector was the full utilization of capacity in large-scale industry that had been 
created during the 1960s. In the Plan the correlation between this objective and development 
in agriculture was pointed out by referring to the undercapacity of industry due to low 
agricultural productivity. 195  
 
a. Agricultural Development Policies of India in 1947-73  
As a backward country India had an agriculture-based economy. The basic feature of 
agriculture by the time of Independence was low and uneven productivity. Agricultural yields 
in India were among the lowest in the world. The 250 million people involved in agriculture 
were able to produce only 50 million tons of cereals and pulses for a population of 350 
million. Low and uneven productivity indicated the subsistence nature of agricultural activity 
for the majority of rural Indians. Excessive fragmentation and noneconomic holdings, 
absentee landlordism, poor methods of cultivation and tillage, and dependency on 
uncontrollable factors, mainly rainfall and weak human capital were the main reasons for the 
low and uneven productivity.196  
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The Indian policymakers regarded self-sufficiency in agriculture crucial due to its being the 
major activity for the majority of the population, being the raw material supplier for industry, 
and rural areas’ being a market for the industrial goods. The assumption was that by attaining 
self-sufficiency in agriculture, first the majority of the Indian population would be improved 
which meant an increase in the demand for industrial goods. While this assured an expanding 
domestic market for the industrial sector, it also served the end of raw material shortage, 
which was a crucial, yet not the sole determinant for working in full capacity in the industrial 
sector. According to this assumption, as a corresponding development, the industrial sector by 
its working in full capacity as well as expanded domestic market would begin to absorb 
surplus labor force and eliminate unemployment and underemployment in the process.197 The 
agricultural development policies of India were developed accordingly.  
 
The agricultural development policy to attain self-sufficiency had three pillars, namely 
cooperative farming, land reforms and community development. Lasting until the mid-1960s 
this agricultural strategy aimed at structural changes in rural India. Though some commented 
that this strategy was adopted under Gandhian teachings,198 the real dynamic that led to the 
adoption of this strategy was the highly mobilized mass tired of exploitation by semi-feudal 
remnants in agricultural production relations and had great expectations from the national 
leaders who depicted a “promised land” by Independence.  Besides, the Indian policymakers 
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believed that, more than anything else, the most important cause of low productivity in 
agriculture was the existence of exploitative structures which were inherited from the British 
rule. A Committee set up under the chairmanship of Nehru in 1947 concluded that  
“agricultural land should be held only for use and as a source of employment, absentee and 
non-cultivating landowners should not use land as a source of exploitation, ceilings on land 
holdings were necessary and cooperatives should be developed in villages.”199 Therefore, the 
Indian policymakers regarded any change that served the transformation of the semi-feudal 
structures into economically viable capitalist units as an obligation.200 
 
The first component of the adopted agricultural policy in the 1950s was cooperative farming. 
The assumption beneath this policy was that by combining the small plots the small producers 
could combine all the benefits of large-scale productive employment in agriculture and at the 
same time minimize the disadvantages and handicaps of a small farmer with respect to access 
to credit and non-labor inputs as well as marketing of products. Besides, it was assumed that 
the cooperative farming would lead to an appropriate environment for mechanized 
agriculture. The last point aimed to be reached by cooperative farming was to transform 
villages to economically viable units and a development of capitalist relations in rural 
India.201   
 
In the process, however, the idea of cooperative farming vanished. The main policy lines for 
the cooperative farming were departed from during the Fourth 5 Year Plan. It was during this 
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era that all progressive aspects of cooperative framing were abandoned. Instead the Plan 
regarded the cooperative community as credit supply sources. This was justified by the 
intensified agricultural activities that necessitated various expensive inputs such as fertilizers, 
seeds and pesticides.202  
 
Land reform was the second component of the agricultural development policy. It was, in fact, 
the most crucial pillar, the backbone of the initiative for structural changes in rural India on 
which the success of the overall agricultural development relied. The land reform initiatives 
of the GOI had various components such as abolition of intermediaries, tenancy reform, 
ceiling on agricultural holdings and distribution of surplus land and consolidation of land 
holdings.   
 
Before examining these components separately, a brief analysis of the prevailing external and 
domestic conjuncture that made the land reform an imperative act is necessary. The most 
important external fact of the era was the so-called Asian social revolution. This was a trend 
indicating the rising expectations of the Asian people the majority of whom lived in villages. 
The Asian people felt that something “had to, could and would be done about their lot.” The 
successful mass revolutions of the recent past such as Russian October Revolution of 1917 
and Chinese Peasant Revolution also fostered the feeling that unless the existing system made 
a move, as people, they had the power to change the things. This belief lied at the core of 
radicalization of the Asian masses and it alarmed many, including the USA. In the case of 
Indian peasants their radicalization revealed at various peasant movements in pre-
Independence era for the reduction of rents and relief of indebtedness.203  
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What made the Indian policymakers cautious was the undivided Communist Party that had 
adopted an agrarian thesis in 1948. The cornerstone of this agrarian thesis was 'land to the 
tiller' which meant, on the one hand, to promote equity for the masses, and on the other, 
economic productivity for national development. The Communist Party of India (CPI) 
supported a radical way to free the agrarian order from economic exploitation and social 
oppression. In this, the CPI stood against not only feudal features in rural India but also 
capitalist development. Various peasant revolts in pre-Independence era such as the 
Telengana struggle in Andhra Pradesh and the Tebhaga movement in Bengal were examples 
of the struggles launched by the Communists to achieve 'land to the tiller' in a radical way. All 
these gave an idea to the Indian policymakers about the prevailing tensions in rural areas, at 
least in some parts.204   
 
The Congress Party counteracted for this strategy of CPI by also adopting ‘land to tiller’ 
principle in the framework of land reform issue. Land reform was adopted not due to 
ideological reasons, but for political and economic considerations. The Indian policymakers 
were anxious about the possible developments in case that they failed to meet the expectations 
of the mass, which waited for the “promised land”. The potential threat was defined as the end 
of political stability. These new policy makers were aware that they had also mobilized the 
peasantry in their anti-British struggle by promising a just social and economic order. After 
independence this sort of rhetoric continued, as they needed the votes of the peasantry. In 
these appeals their main reference was the prevailing injustice in land ownership. By the early 
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1950s, 74.7 % of the landowners owned only 16.3% of the total land.205The economic 
considerations beneath land reform issue, on the other hand, was related to the prevailing low 
productivity due to huge discrepancies in land ownership and absentee landlordism These 
prevailing features reduced land productivity, immobilized the domestic market for industrial 
goods and also prevented the generation of new productive forces.206 
 
Shaped by these developments and considerations, the GOI began to enforce legislation 
regarding land reforms. First of these was the abolition of intermediaries. The main objective 
of this act was defined as bringing ‘cultivators’ into direct relationship with the state through 
eliminating ‘intermediary’ interests. 
 
At the time of independence a dual structure prevailed in rural India. Along with semi-feudal 
structures, a degree of capitalist structure also existed. But since the predominant structure 
was a semi-feudal one that hindered production and earmarking of resources to productive 
ends, the so-called land problem was in fact a problem that was derived from the semi-feudal 
structure. India inherited the land problem from the British colonial era. In general lines, the 
land tenure introduced by the British was the ownership of the land by a small group that did 
not actually cultivated the land but exploited the actual tillers of the soil. 207  
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While the tillers were comprised of the tenants and agricultural laborers, there were various 
types of intermediaries in India. Different laws enacted by the colonial rule governed these 
different types of intermediaries. In the zamindari areas, the absentee landlords known as 
zamindar owned a sizeable part of land. As hereditary land tax collectors, zamindars 
employed agents to collect periodical dues from the cultivators. In states where zamindari 
system prevailed, the State had no direct contact with the tillers of the land. As far as the 
zamindar paid the fixed revenue to the state, he was free to extract any amount from the actual 
cultivator. In the process various intermediaries developed between the zamindar and the 
actual cultivator that aggravated the misery of the peasants. These sub-intermediaries extorted 
rack-rents, which meant a great burden for the cultivator.208    
 
Another type of intermediary was the ryotwari. In principle and in the initial stages of its 
practice, in ryotwari areas the State granted the rights of ownership to private landowners who 
paid land revenue directly to the state. As the State had a direct relationship with the existing 
proprietor who paid his land revenue based on land survey and resettlement, the situation in 
the ryotwari system was better in comparison to the zamindar areas. As a consequence, in 
these owner-operated lands returns accrued to the decision-makers and the incentive for 
innovation was stronger. But by the lapse of time absentee landlordism developed in the 
ryotwari areas mainly due to the inability of the propertior to pay his land revenue and his 
having to sell his propertiorship. Though there were bureaucrats and merchants among these 
absentee landlords, in most cases they were the petty landlords of that area. Another type of 
intermediary was the mahalwari systems in Punjab. This was nearly the same as the ryotwari 
system which shared the same deficiencies. In 1947, while the zamindari land revenue system 
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covered 57 %, the ryotwari system covered 38 % and the mahalwari system 5 % of the 
country.209  
 
Facing the increased discontent of the cultivators the Congress Party set up committees for the 
abolition of intermediaries who were sided with the British rule as their interests were 
guaranteed by the prevalence of the status quo.210 However, this call for the abolition of 
intermediaries was not taken by consensus. Instead there were great differences in the 
opinions of leading figures of the national movement such as Nehru and Gandhi. While Nehru 
defined these intermediaries as spoiled children of British administration and “complete 
parasites” on the cultivators, relying on his notion of trusteeship Gandhi supported the view 
that the wealthy segments of the population would use their wealth for the good of all.  He 
opposed abolition of intermediary sort of arrangements, which would upset the rural 
structure.211   
 
Despite differences among the leading persona of the national movement due to the above-
mentioned conjuncture there could not have been much resistance to this call. In the 
immediate aftermath of Independence, in November 1947 the related Committee on 
agricultural reform set down the principle that the land with all its mineral resources had to 
belong to and be regulated by the community in its own interests. It also recommended the 
elimination of all intermediary tenures, ceiling on personal ownership of land, elimination of 
all private moneylenders and traders as well as formation of the village credit and marketing 
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societies based on the compulsory membership of all cultivators. While the central 
government put the guiding principles in this policy, it was the responsibility of the state 
governments to enact the land reform legislation. By 1956 all states enacted the required 
legislation for the abolition of the intermediaries. 212  
 
The second important component of the land reform policies was the tenancy reform. Owing 
to the predominant absentee landlordism, cultivation of agricultural land by non-owner 
cultivators on the basis of contract for the lease of the land was a very wide spread system of 
cultivation. The Tenancy Reform Act was an important component since it attempted to 
improve the conditions of the cultivators who were at the mercy of the absentee landlords 
without any security. Diagnosing these problems of the tenants, the central government 
endeavored to fix the rents and to provide some sort of a security for the cultivator for 
cultivating the land. In addition to this social objective, the central government also had some 
economic considerations such as ensuring an increase in agricultural productivity via 
providing an appropriate environment for continuous farming operations.213 
  
While the first facet of the tenancy reform acts was the fixation of rents, the other facet was 
related to the security of the tenants to prevent their arbitrary ejection from the rented lands. 
In the framework of the fixation of the rents the central government aimed at scaling down the 
rents to 1/4th or 1/5th of the produced crops. In the scope of the second principle, the central 
government asked for given permanent rights for the tenants subject to the landlords’ right to 
resume a minimum holding for his personal cultivation within a limited time. Later this 
principle was rearranged by stating that all tenancies should be declared non-resumable and 
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permanent, with the exception certain circumstances determined by the legislation. What was 
aimed by this principle was conversion of the tenants into owners through paying moderate 
compensation to the landlords at the end of a certain cultivation period. Ultimate objective of 
this arrangement was explained as having land holdings that contributed to the country’s 
economy through surplus production.214  
 
The Tenancy Reform Act, in fact paved the way to the other land reform policy, namely, 
ceilings on land holdings. The rationale behind ceilings on landownership was redistribution 
of the excess amount of land to cultivators and landless agricultural laborers. The ceiling on 
land holdings legislation was justified by referring to the prevailing unjust propertiorship, 
concentration of huge amounts of land in few hands at the expense of few, as well as, 
widespread underemployment and unemployment of labor force in agriculture. The ultimate 
objective of this program was defined as reduction of inequalities in ownership, in use of land 
and agricultural incomes.215         
Consolidation of holdings was the fourth component of the land reform initiatives. This fourth 
component of land reform initiative differed from the previous ones since, in contrast to the 
others, which were designed to challenge the powerful stance of vested interests, that were 
mainly the semi-feudal remnants in rural areas, the target group was the rural mass in this 
component. The ultimate objective of this legislation was to establish agricultural units which 
were economically viable as the exiting plots were fragmented due to the inheritance laws. 
Defining this fragmentation as one of the main structural deficiencies in agriculture that 
resulted in noneconomic land plots, various committees recommended the idea of 
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consolidation of small holdings and prevention of their further fragmentation in the immediate 
aftermath of Independence.216   
 
In addition to cooperative farming, the above summarized were the components of the second 
pillar of the agricultural development policy of India in the 1950s, namely land reform 
initiatives. The third pillar of this first stage of agricultural strategy was the Community 
Development Program. This was, in fact, the advanced version of the Grow More Food 
Campaign which commenced during WW2, particularly after the Bengal Famine of 1943.  
Though the Campaign had some achievements to meet the needs, it failed to attain the 
expectations. Appraisal of the process led the Indian policymakers to conclude that there had 
to be a comprehensive approach to deal with the problems of rural areas covering extension 
services, setting up or empowerment of institutions at rural level such as panchayats, multi-
purpose cooperative societies, promotion of minor irrigation schemes and supply of better 
varieties of seeds and fertilizers to farmers. The outcome of this consideration was the 
Community Development Program.     
 
The Community Development Program commenced on 2 October 1952, on Mahatma 
Gandhi’s birthday, in the framework of the Indo-US Technical Assistance Program. For the 
beginning there were fifty-five community development projects. Each project covered about 
300 villages, a cultivable area of about 150 thousand acres and an approximate population of 
200 000 people. At the time of its start-up, the number of villages that these projects covered 
was 27,388 with a population of 16.4 million.  The criterion of the selection of these villages 
in the initial stage was the availability of adequate irrigation schemes or assured rainfall to 
implement intensified agricultural activities. Later on this criterion was loosened parallel to 
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the expansion of the Program nationwide. By 1963, on paper the Community Development 
Program formally covered all the villages in the country.217 
 
The Community Development Program had broad objectives among which was assistance to 
each village in planning and carrying out an integrated household and village plan to increase 
agricultural production, improve existing village crafts and organize new ones, provide 
minimum essential health and educational services and improve housing and family living 
conditions. These objectives indicated the multi-purpose nature of the initiative that covered 
production, employment generating activities, communication, education, health and 
cooperative act as well as initiating a mentality change to become self-reliant people.218 
Shaped by these, the ultimate objective of the program was to bring about socio-economic and 
institutional transformation in rural areas comprehensively through the self-reliant and 
collective efforts of the rural people. This found its expression in the slogan of “movement for 
self-help where the State was supplier of required inputs such as credit and fertilizers.”219 
 
Regarding this program as a complementary of the cooperative farming where the peasants 
either gained or enhanced the capacity to work together, the policymakers expected to activate 
the dormant energy of the countryside through Community Development Program. The 
primary emphasis of the program was to alter people’s motivation and attitudes toward 
change and make them self-reliant. The idea of creation of self-reliant people with the ability 
to take initiative represented a total shift from the tradition-bound, economically 
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unresponsive, unmotivated and inefficient user of the resources for their own benefit. With its 
human-centric approach this program was a crucial novelty, even “revolutionary” as Nehru 
pointed out, which aimed to change “the face of India”.220  
 
In sum, the first stage of the agricultural strategy was shaped by the assumption that low 
productivity in agriculture was due to the exploitative nature of relations between the owner 
and tiller. As the latter was severely exploited by the owner, he did not have the chance to 
earmark resources for land improvement the inevitable outcome of which was low 
productivity. By this belief the Indian policymakers focused first on structural changes along 
with programs to lead to a change in the mentality of rural mass. Though there were some 
initiatives regarding the agricultural modernization, as the prevailing structure prevented their 
widespread application, the main concern was on the policies aiming at structural changes in 
rural India.     
 
Commencing in the 1960s, however, the policymakers felt that they had to make a change in 
the focus of agricultural strategy as India was facing continuous droughts and severe famine.  
The rapid population growth that swallowed up any agricultural products aggravated the 
problem. In addition to these, stable production rate in industrial establishments necessitated 
high and non-fluctuating agricultural production levels. While agreeing on these factors, some 
scholars concluded that the shift was an obligation as Indian policymakers recognized the 
limits of policies in the scope of the first stage of agricultural development policy.221Others 
also pointed out the impact of external dynamics, namely the foreign donors. During debates 
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for increased foreign aid, the donors, mainly the World Bank and the USA conditioned 
increase in allocations for agriculture for an increase in foreign aid.222      
 
Another important factor that accelerated the shift for the adoption of the second stage of 
agricultural policy was the death of PM Nehru. As the outstanding supporter of rapid 
industrialization, in the eyes of many he was the arch-architect of the approach neglecting 
agriculture. By his death in 1964 those who shared this belief got the opportunity to press for 
their desire for a more agriculture-oriented development policy. Nehru’s successor, Shastri 
proved to be such a man and his ascension to the position of PM indicated the abandoning of 
Nehru’s cautious approach toward agricultural modernization. Unlike Nehru, Shastri  was not 
fascinated by gigantic projects. In his first Cabinet meeting he said that he was a “small man” 
and believed in small projects with small expenditure to get quick results. Concluding that the 
fundamental problem was inadequate production, the policymakers initiated the new 
agricultural development policy, the central premise of which was that the Indian peasant was 
a rational economic being who had the capability of responding to incentives for the 
improvement of productivity.223  
 
The new focus in the agricultural development policy was defined as modernization of 
agriculture through various techniques. The main difference between two stages was the 
latter’s being production-oriented and aiming at self-reliance in foodgrains. The emphasis was 
on increase in yields through the use of modern inputs and improved methods of production in 
selected parts of the country. This stage commenced with schemes such as the Intensive Area 
Development Programs introduced during early sixties. This strategy was initially restricted to 
wheat in a few northwestern states and later it gradually spread to other crops and new areas. 
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The new strategy became successful as a consequence of large- scale investments in irrigation 
and in scientific research. 224  
 
The most distinguishing feature between the first and second stage was the latter’s lack of 
societal concern. This new strategy suggested a shift from the community approach to the 
entrepreneurial approach. This indicated an indifference to the plight of the masses and 
prevailing injustices in rural areas. Instead, the main concern was immediate increase in the 
agricultural production at any expense, in fact, at the expense of the poor in the rural areas 
since these newly adopted technologies could only be profitable in large-scale agricultural 
enterprises.225     
 
The first program developed in the framework of this new policy was the Intensive 
Agricultural District Program in the early 1960s. The Intensive Agricultural Area Program 
(IAAP) that was launched in 1964-65 followed this program. Though these indicated a shift 
from the first phase of the agricultural development policy, the watershed in this change was 
the High Yielding Varieties Program (HYVP), the so-called Green Revolution introduced in 
the mid-1960s.  
 
Though yielding some encouraging outcomes, neither IADP nor IAAP were able to reduce 
India’s dependency on foreign countries for foodgrain imports. By the successive droughts 
that shook India in the mid-1960s the shortage in the foodgrain supplies reached twenty eight 
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million tons. In order to prevent famines, the GOI appealed to foreign countries, mainly to the 
USA for foodgrains.226 
 
In the midst of these difficulties the American experts, along with a call for reorientation of 
overall investment priorities to agriculture, recommended the new high-yielding short-
duration, short stem fertilizer responsive varieties of seeds (HYVs) of wheat and rice. These 
seeds proved their potential and became available for commercial cultivation.227 
 
Regarding HYVs as a possible solution for India’s chronic food deficiency, the GOI was 
responsive to this “seed revolution”.228 In 1965 the Food Minister announced the new 
comprehensive program to deal with the acute food shortages. This pledged the Indian 
Government to a series of actions, which the American Embassy staff along with many Indian 
economists, experts from the World Bank, Rockefeller and Ford Foundation had been 
supporting. The program included HYVs, huge amounts of credit for the cultivators, 
expanded use of irrigation water and fertilizers. In order to enable the active participation of 
farmers and increase the attractiveness of the program, the government decided to increase the 
market price paid to the cultivators as a solution.229      
 
The program commenced by pilot cultivation, and then expanded in areas appropriate for the 
cultivation of HYVs. Main criterion for appropriateness of land for the program was adequate 
irrigation potentials and relatively high production rate in recent past. There were also some 
limitations regarding the cultivators. As recently introduced technologies and program 
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required large amount of capital as well as large landholdings, small cultivators were excluded 
from the program.230 This was the irony of Shastri who defined himself as a moderate man 
dealing with practical things. He supported food incentives and high support prices on grounds 
that by these practical policies, which reached the common man one could minimize the 
unhappiness of the mass.231 In contrast to his expectations, his policies regarding food or food 
prices did not really reach the common man.  
 
While HYVs comprise one component of the so-called Green Revolution, the others were 
fertilizers and pesticides. Special attention was paid to fertilizers as their usage was defined as 
an indispensable part of the Green Revolution. In the extension services for the program, use 
of fertilizers was defined as one single factor capable of making a substantial contribution to 
production.  Consistent with this definition, concerted efforts for their wide usage were 
launched including special credit schemes. Success of these efforts was revealed in the 
process. The use of fertilizers increased considerably by the lapse of time.232 
 
In areas where the HYVs were practiced, agricultural mechanization also increased. 
Distinguished by its non-mechanized feature, the degree of agricultural mechanization was 
not high in Indian agriculture in the first decade of the Independence. High cost of agricultural 
machines that contradicted with pervasive poverty of the majority and inappropriateness of 
the size of the majority of landholdings for mechanized agriculture were the main reasons of 
low mechanization. While the number of tractors was about five thousand in 1946-7, this was 
only twenty thousand in 1956-7 and fifty thousand in 1960, the majority of which was used 
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by public agencies. By the mid-60s demand for agricultural machinery increased parallel to 
the favorable circumstances.233  
 
Appraisal of the mechanization of agriculture led to the conclusion that adoption of the new 
agricultural development policy was an important turning point in its widespread application. 
Though there was a consistent increase in the number of tractors and various types of 
machines in the late 1970s, still most parts of the Indian agriculture was untouched by 
agricultural mechanization. This outcome, in fact, confirmed Nehru’s objections to those who 
attempted to compare the Indian case with other countries, mainly with that of advanced 
countries. He stated that each country had its own dynamics that could not be supplanted in 
another soil. 
 
One of the components of the agricultural policy was the agricultural credit. For the nation-
builders of India efficient expansion of the credit services to rural areas was a requirement of 
the social justice principle as well as a precondition of high agricultural productivity. The 
policymakers raised this issue very frequently by referring to the huge indebtedness of the 
cultivators to moneylenders. In the absence of credit organizations in rural India, 
moneylenders were the main source of credit for the peasants, who charged excessive 
interests for the money they extended. As a result, exploitation of the small and marginal 
farmers and the landless agricultural workers and artisans was widely prevalent in the 
countryside.234  
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In addition to this, defining rational usage of credit as a part of the mentality change in the 
tradition-bound peasants, the GOI paid particular attention to the issue. In addition to this 
social justice aspect, the policymakers concluded that lack of financial resources was a factor 
that impeded the cultivators’ adoption of new technologies or undertaking any investment to 
improve the land. Supply of credit to rural households was defined as an important 
contribution to the cooperative farming since by these credits the farmers could get the inputs 
required for their activities. However, in contrast to this rhetoric, the majority of the credit 
schemes developed to this end was in most cases aiming at big landholders instead of the 
small and marginal households. Parallel to the change in the agricultural development 
strategy, these credit schemes increasingly became capitalist farmer-oriented. Like in the past, 
these farmers continued to be the main beneficiaries with more favorable terms.235   
 
In conclusion, after Independence, India adopted two agricultural development policies. 
While the first lasted until the early 1960s and was shaped by PM Nehru, the latter 
commenced after this date under the influence of the western experts. The first strategy was 
distinguished by its challenge for structural change. Indian policymakers believed that the 
existing semi-feudal structure in rural India impeded agricultural development. As the semi-
feudal remnants were indifferent to investments for agricultural development and cultivators 
did not have the means for any initiative to this end, the existing structure was regarded as a 
great challenge for the country’s objectives of self-reliance in every field. Policymakers 
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concluded that by destroying these semi-feudal structures and establishing settings for 
capitalist relations India could attain her objective in the agricultural field.   
 
However, as the challenge of this policy was structural change, it did not offer quick returns. 
In the face of increasing difficulties and India’s chronic foodgrain deficiency, the 
policymakers adopted a new policy aiming individual initiative and increase in productivity 
through intensive agricultural techniques. Distinguished by its product and region wise 
approach, the new policy excluded the majority and focused on the minority. Without paying 
attention to its impact on rural structure, policymakers implemented the strategy by the 
objective of reducing India’s dependency on foreign countries.        
 
b. Industrial Development Policies of India in 1947-73    
By the time of Independence, except Japan, India was the most industrialized non-Soviet 
nation in Asia. In addition to handicrafts, by 1950 India’s most important industries were 
primarily consumer goods. India supplied virtually all its own needs of cloth, footwear, sugar, 
matches and most of its consumption requirements of iron and steel, cement and paper. 
Commencing in the late 1940s, it began to build ships, aircraft, locomotives, diesel engines, 
electrical equipment, automotive parts, machine tools and chemicals. While cotton textile 
manufacturing was India’s largest industry, the jute industry was the largest industrial export 
product. It supplied more than 90 % of the world’s exports of jute manufactures. The small-
scale but important industrial establishments were sugar, gur, paper and match.236 
 
                                                 
236Secret Country Study on India by the Working Group on NEA Economic Programs, October 1950, RG 469, 
Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, Far East Program Division, South Asia Country 
Subject Files, 1950-52; Restricted Country Study on India by Interdepartmental Advisory Council on Technical 
Cooperation, June 1951, RG 469, Records of the US Foreign Assistance of Agencies, Far East Program 
Division, South Asia Country Subject Files, 1950-2, India: Agriculture and Commodities. 
 145
Though impressive in a LDC’s context, the prevailing industrial structure, however, did not 
serve the country’s self-reliance in industrial production. By the time of Independence, the 
Indian industry had considerable progress in simple consumer goods and some progress in the 
direction of consumer durables. But it was deficient in capital goods owing to the policies of 
the British administration. Efforts of Indian industrialists to expand their activities were 
particularly constrained by the absence of machine manufacturing industries. Besides, the 
Indian industrial capital which had its political freedom after Independence was highly 
dependent on the advanced countries technologically. What aggravated the situation was the 
recession in industrial production mainly due to the shortage of industrial raw materials.237  
 
These were the deficiencies diagnosed by the leading Indian policymakers whose obsession 
with industrialization was well known. Commencing during the national movement of the 
country, Indian leaders believed that modernization of India was key for her “salvation” and 
the envisioned modernization could only be through industrialization. They concluded that 
India would either industrialize or perish.238 
   
The industrialization strategy of 1956 that aimed self-reliance through heavy and basic 
industrialization was the concrete formula of the long dreamed vision of many leading 
national leaders. They believed that only through this sort of industrialization could India 
have the chance to attain her self-sufficiency and economic viability, while minimizing the 
social tensions that had emerged due to high proportion of unemployment. These leading 
figures also had the expectation that through this strategy India could be a model for a 
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genuine “Third World” development, an alternative to socialist and capitalist systems. 
Difference of the Third World development was explained as its avoidance of the evils of 
capitalist exploitation and the hard labor and bitter shortages of socialist autarchy.239 
 
Nehru was one of the main proponents of heavy industry. He believed that unless a country 
was highly industrialized and developed its power resources to the utmost it could not be 
regarded as independent in the world order. He defined these two as preconditions not only 
for independence in international arena but also as means to attain high living standards and 
eradication of poverty domestically. He claimed that at her present position India, as an 
industrially backward country was a factor that upset the world equilibrium and encouraged 
the aggressive tendencies of more developed countries. Even if it retained its political 
independence, this would be a nominal one without any claim of economic independence. 
Therefore, in order to avoid these as much as possible, Indian economy had to rely on latest 
technological developments and grow to be distinguished by large-scale industrial 
establishments as well as “big machines” regardless of the possible negative implications.240 
 
Though this industrialization policy was the adoption of the “big push” strategy for 
industrialization, many western economists claimed that this strategy bore hardly any western 
notions. This denial of India’s adoption of a western-type development strategy could be 
interpreted with respect to India’s neglect of the recommendations of the center countries 
regarding the development policy. In the initial years of the Republic the center countries 
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recommended Indian policymakers to concentrate on the development of agriculture and, if 
necessary, on certain light industries. They claimed that such a strategy was consistent with 
the economic structure of India which was agricultural. Referring to the harmony in 
international division of labor, the center countries concluded that as India was an agricultural 
country it had to remain as agricultural and the developed countries that attained high level of 
industrialization had to remain as industrial countries. This idea was based on the theory of 
comparative advantage.241  
 
Indian policymakers rebuffed these recommendations on grounds that they relied on static 
comparative advantage which was adverse to the dynamism of life. Instead they argued for a 
rapid industrialization based on dynamic comparative advantage. In this they regarded the 
public sector as the engine for growth. Despite the determination of the Indian policymakers 
on heavy industrialization, however, the American diplomats in 50s continued to insist that 
India’s “desperate need” was not heavy industries but coir processing, art goods of all kinds, 
textiles, pottery, glass-making toys and households goods including furniture, utensils etc.242  
 
PM Nehru’s leading role in the adoption of heavy industrialization strategy met domestic 
criticisms also. In their criticisms, Gandhians accused Nehru on the grounds that he betrayed 
the vision of the spiritual leader of the country. Nehru’s disagreement with the Gandhian 
vision was not unknown. His reasoning was that the vision that based the Indian economy on 
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the small-scale cottage industries, namely Khadi could not be taken into consideration 
seriously as this vision did not offer a solution to the widespread unemployment and poverty. 
Instead it intensified individualism in production and was a throw- back to the pre-industrial 
age.243 
 
The industrialization policy was to be implemented according to the adopted development 
strategy that relied on planning, ISI and mixed economy. Consistent with the ISI and 
awareness of noncompetitive nature of the Indian industrial structure the industrial drive of 
the country was for import-substituting industries rather than export-promotion.244  
 
For the implementation of this strategy the public sector was defined as the locomotive to 
guide the process of industrial development, as the private sector did not have the financial 
capacity to undertake such a task. In this scheme, the private sector endowed a 
complementary role. In order to enable the proper functioning of the system the division of 
labor between the public and private sectors was defined through industrial resolutions of 
1948 and 1956. Parallel to these resolutions some other mechanisms, such as licensing, were 
put into effect to prevent the possible evils that could emerge from the system. In the Indian 
context these possible evils were defined as concentration of resources and economic power 
in few hands, unbalanced regional dispersal of industrial establishments and inhibition of 
development of small-scale industries.245Industrial licensing was developed by the belief that 
it was the best mechanism to prevent the emergence of these evils. 
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The required legislation for the implementation of industrial licensing was the Industries 
Development and Regulation Act of 1951. This legislation regulated the activities of the 
private sector industrial activities for two decades. While controlling and directing the private 
investments, the GOI aimed to channel investments in accordance with planning targets, 
ensure balanced regional development, give protection to small-scale industries against the 
competition of large-scale industries, prevent the concentration of economic power in the 
hands of a few business families and regulate, if necessary take over, those industrial 
undertakings the management of which was consistently breaking Government directives or 
was working against public interest.246   
 
With respect to industrialization, India’s endeavors were directed towards the establishment 
of a sound industrial basis to attain the ultimate objective of self-reliance through 
industrialization. These endeavors led to a remarkable growth and diversification of industry 
in the 1950-65 era. Up to 1965, the GOI managed to set up three new steel plants in the public 
sector, each having a one million capacity. The existing two steel plants in the private sector 
were doubled to realize their capacity fully. Besides, commencing by the Second Plan, 
foundations of heavy electrical and heavy machine tool industries, heavy machine building 
and other branches of heavy engineering were also laid. Production of machinery for the 
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cement and paper industries started in the country for the first time. In the field of chemical 
industries the country had a considerable advance.247  
 
The other distinguishing feature of the era was the high growth rate. This era of high growth 
rate commenced by the Korean War, when Indian economy underwent a sort of industrial 
boom. The rise in the industrial production during the War was not repeated for a long time. 
By the ability to meet the increased demands due to the bumper harvests the Indian 
policymakers optimistically claimed that the country was too close to attain her self-
sufficiency.248   
 
Indian policymakers, however, had to abandon this overoptimism in the face of fluctuations in 
the growth rate. While this fluctuation was true between years, the most serious commenced 
in 1957. This was not a simple fluctuation but a slacking down that indicated a future slow 
down in industrial production due to structural problems such as dependency on foreign 
countries with respect to foreign exchange and technology. These problems were not 
attempted to be solved by the industrialization drive but were ironically, aggravated by this 
drive.249 
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Following this recession, the overall decline in industry commenced in the 1960s. The fastest 
growing industrial sub-sectors of the 1950s were clearly slowing down during the Third Plan. 
Maximum decline in capacity utilization occurred in the capital goods sector. The worst 
performance with respect to productivity growth was in the intermediate goods sector, 
particularly in cotton textiles, jute textiles, non-ferrous metals, iron and steel. Similar to other 
sectors the consumer goods industries maintained a growth rate of a little over 1 % in this 
period. The only exception was the consumer durables sub-sector that expanded at the rate of 
8.5%.250  
 
Though these developments were alarming, the attained growth rate still satisfied the Indian 
policymakers until 1966. This year, however, was a watershed in the industrialization of the 
country as it indicated the beginning of the second era distinguished by a slowing-down in 
growth rate. In comparison to the average annual growth rate of 7.8 % in 1950-65, in this era 
the growth rate fell to 4.9 %.251 
 
There were various views regarding the reasons of this general deceleration in the industrial 
production. For some, this deceleration was the inevitable outcome of some extraordinary 
events that absorbed the resources of the country.  Interpreting the 1958 crisis as a temporary 
economic recession, these critics also pointed out the adverse effects of Sino-Indian War of 
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1962, Indian-Pakistan War of 1965 as well as two successive droughts in the mid-60s.252For 
some, the fundamental reason for this deceleration was the loss of plan discipline that led to a 
substantial decline in targeted levels of investment.253In addition to these explanations which 
referred to conjuncturel developments, there were explanations referring the structural 
problems of Indian economy such as low agricultural productivity, potential of the domestic 
market, excessive amounts of obligatory importation, depletion of foreign exchange reserves 
and increased dependency on foreign countries with respect to foreign exchange, industrial 
inputs and technology transfer and stagnancy, even decline in export levels.254  
 
The structural problems raised by the critics in fact comprised the components of a vicious 
circle that India had to deal with, like many other LDCs. Though there were times of relief 
again owing to the conjuncturel developments such as flow of more foreign aid, Indian 
industry entered a period of fluctuations, undercapacity and deceleration. Indian industry, as 
well as economy, in general, had to learn to deal with periodic crisis. While the country 
recovered from the crisis of mid-60s, another crisis of the same sort, yet with greater 
magnitude, occurred in the early 1970s.   
 
Evaluation of the era revealed that consistent with their preoccupation with self-reliance and 
economic viability, the Indian policymakers pursued heavy industrialization policy. 
Regarding a nation’s capability in machinery manufacturing as the prerequisite of self-
reliance in industrial production, their special attention was on this sector. Despite various 
difficulties they faced, the policymakers never abandoned this priority sector. The industrial 
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growth rate during the first three plans was 32.1, 7.8 and 18.2 %. Out of this, heavy industry 
had the most distinguished performance. While it comprised a relatively small share in the 
industrial production by Independence, as a result of the endeavors its share reached up to 85 
% of the total supply of capital goods in the early 1970s. Though this proportion did not give 
an idea about India’s dependence on imported components and technology in manufacturing 
indigenous machinery, this still indicated an impetus to attain a self-reliant economy to a great 
extent.255     
Table V:  Growth of Industrial Production: 1961-1973256  
                         %  annual 
Name of the Industry 
                        1961-73 
Basic Industries 
                            6.72 
Capital Goods Industries 
                            4.76 
Intermediate Goods Industries 
                            3.89 
Consumer Goods Industries 
                            4.07 
General Index 
                            4.88 
 
As a conclusion, the industrialization drive of India was distinguished by a good take-off   
followed by high growth rate then a slow-down. In comparison to the average annual growth 
rate of 7.8 % in 1950-65, in the following era this fell to 4.9 %.257The distinguishing feature 
of the process was that despite high growth rate the attained level fell short of what the Plans 
targeted. The beginning was good with the moderate growth target of 7 % per annum in the 
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first 5 Year Plan which was marginally exceeded by actual performance. In contrast to the 
Plan target of 10.5 % in the Second 5 Year Plan the actual growth rate was 6.6 %. This was a 
rate that fell short of the target and actually lower than the level attained during the First 5 
Year Plan. The same trend was true in the following plans. Besides, the process also led to a 
change in the proportions of the first and second sectors in GDP. In contrast to 21 % in 1950, 
industry’s share reached to 30 % in seventies.  
 
Parallel to this, the agricultural sector declined from 51.2 % of the GDP in 1950 to 45 % in 
the mid-70s.  However, as revealed by the proportions, the increase in the sectorial share in 
GDP did not lead to a change in ranking. Agriculture continued to be the first sector in Indian 
economy (Table VI).258 
 
Table VI: Distribution of GDP, by sector, 1950-70, % 
Year Agriculture Industry 
1950 51.2 21.0 
1960 50.9 24.4 
1970 49.6 28.0 
Resource: UN, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1958, 1968, 1985 
 
By the early 1970s India had achieved a relatively high standard in modern capital goods 
required by domestic industry. India produced its own machine tools, chemical equipment, 
mechanical machinery, heavy and other electrical equipment, transport equipment, 
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professional and scientific equipment, and basic metal and alloys. It had steel and power 
plants while developing its all-important railway network. Most of this production was 
located in the public sector whose contribution to the total GDP reached 15 % in 1970.259Yet 
this performance was not enough to categorize India as an industrialized country which 
attained its economic viability due to the structural problems as is examined in the following 
pages. 
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Outcomes of the Development Strategies  
a. Outcomes of the Agricultural Development Policies (1947-73) 
 
By the 1970s rural India was increasingly marked by inequalities, abject poverty, tension, 
deprivation, duality and regional disparities.  While the poor majority comprised one 
component of the dual social structure, the other component was a growing influential 
capitalist segment along with wealthy landowners. Analysts of the process concluded that 
failure of the policies led to the chronicization of poverty and inequality in rural areas.260 
 
This was not the future that the Indian policymakers promised to the Indian rural population. 
Failures of the policymakers and contributing factors to this outcome are crucial concerns 
those should be examined.  
 
The agricultural development policies of the Indian Republic had two ultimate objectives. The 
first of these was creation of a more egalitarian social order shaped by the principle of social 
justice. The second was an increase in agricultural productivity. Parallel to the given promises 
to the Indian peasantry during the national movement for better living standards the first stage 
of the agricultural development policy was mainly shaped by the first objective. The most 
important feature of Nehru era agricultural development policy was that it had cooperative 
and egalitarian notions without objecting development of capitalist relations in rural India. As 
Nehru believed without an improvement in the production relations in rural areas there would 
not be a considerable increase in production levels. So, he put high priority on the second 
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objective. The outcome of this prioritization was cooperative farming, land reform policies 
and CDPs.     
 
Distinguished by their challenge to realize structural changes in rural India, these policies 
failed to attain promising outcomes. Though they were perfect schemes on paper, they proved 
to be not very applicable in the Indian context. The impracticability of these policies had two 
premises. While one was related to technical limitations aggravated by indifference of 
bureaucrats, the other was related to the resistance and successful emasculation of the rural 
elite whose interests were challenged by these policies.    
Cooperative Farming 
 
The cooperative farming that was regarded as the main premise of the structural change 
disappeared by time without much impact. Even during the heyday of the concept, these 
cooperatives did not cover even 1 % of the villages. Among the existing ones, while some 
exited only on paper others were not related to producers.  Excluding the small cultivators and 
landless laborers from the process, they turned to be mechanisms that empowered the stance 
of the rural elite, who successfully utilized funds earmarked to these cooperatives. At the end, 
during the Fourth Five Year Plan social aspect of these cooperatives was totally given up and 
converted into credit units for the big farmers who applied intensive agriculture techniques.261      
 
Factors that served the unpromising outcomes were mainly related to the powerful stance of 
the rural elite and their successful emasculation of these arrangements. The core of their 
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power was their domination of the state legislative assemblies. Owing to this, the rural elite 
successfully emasculated the scheme by excluding the majority from the process. Instead, via 
using the funds provided for these cooperatives, these rural elite reinforced their stance in 
rural India. In their open confrontation with the PM Nehru in 1959, the rural elite relying on 
their power in state legislative assemblies led to the refusal of the proposal regarding 
cooperative farming being an unavoidable strategy for agrarian reform.262  
 
Land Reform Policies 
Evaluation of the outcomes of land reform policies with respect to objectives revealed a 
partial success. Land reforms succeeded in abolishing the intermediaries in many parts of 
India. This development had various impacts on the countryside. According to official data, as 
a result of various land reform acts 800 000 tenants had acquired ownership rights. The 
maximum rates of rent were fixed at the rates not exceeding one-fourth to one-fifth of the 
gross produce in all the states, except a few. Under the land ceiling acts 7.2 million acres of 
land was declared as surplus. Out of this 5.6 million acres had been taken in possession.263  
 
These official data was, however, were highly controversial. Bettelheim points out that though 
official documents between 1947-56 stated that the intermediaries were abolished to a great 
extent, in practice this was not the case. In most cases, villages were even not aware of the 
enactment of the legislation.264 In the majority of the villages instead of abolition, the 
intermediaries’ conversion into big farmers was the case. Regarding the amount of distributed 
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land to the landless, there were also controversial claims. Sharma and Punia claim that 4.4 
million acres were distributed and 2.8 million acres remained undistributed out of the surplus 
land.265  
 
Sau, on the other hand, claims that by 1977 actually redistributed amount reached 1.29 million 
acres.266In contrast to these relatively high amounts, Madan claims that four million acres was 
the amount that GOI expected to distribute as a result of these policies. Yet in practice, due to 
the slow implementation, only 62.000 acres of land was available for distribution.267  
 
Though on paper these outcomes seemed satisfying, for a subcontinent like India these were 
far from satisfactory. In the 1950s out of 100 million cultivators 40 % were tenants and more 
than 30 % were landless agricultural laborers.268 This proportion indicated that by these 
reforms the GOI aimed at 70 % of the total cultivators. Yet, at the end only 800 000 tenants 
acquired ownership rights. This comprised not even 1 % of the tenants. Besides, the 
governments failed to provide security for tenants. In many areas, where the peasant 
movement was weak, landowners ejected considerable amount of tenants.  In contrast to the 
official statements, in many places tenants were suffering from very high rents.269  
 
These land reform policies did not lead to a more egalitarian society; on the contrary, they 
accelerated concentration of land into few hands. While they struck the feudal concentration 
of land, they did not prevent, but instead promoted favorable environment for capitalist land 
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concentration. This mechanism indicated a restructuring in the upper strata of rural 
population. This basis led to the emergence of a new capitalist segment in rural India.270 
 
This outcome was not adverse to what the Indian policymakers wanted to attain. As the Indian 
policymakers regarded semi-feudal landowners and intermediaries as obstacles for high 
agricultural productivity due to their absentee landlordism and exploitation, they promoted the 
creation of more entrepreneurial farmers in rural areas. The legislation gave the richer 
peasants, as well intermediaries, an opportunity to become big landowners. The mechanism 
functioned in such a way that rather than the abolition of intermediaries, their conversion into 
big farmers was the case. Dube points out that legislation increased agriculturists’ legal 
security by curtailing the excessive powers of feudal landlords.271 
 
Therefore, to conclude that the first stage agricultural development strategy paved the way to 
the capitalist farming practice of the late 1960s and the 1970s would not be misleading. 
Nehru’s policies were anti-feudal but in essence not anti-capitalist. As the most “socialist” 
component of his agricultural development policy, Nehru’s cooperative farming idea was 
even envisioned as a take-off for such capitalist relations. He assumed that in the scheme of 
cooperative farming the petty landholders would come together, collaborate, use modern 
inputs for production and as the ideal market the surplus. By this process, each village became 
economically viable units involved in capitalist relations.  
 
What made Nehru different from his successors was, however, his more egalitarian and 
societal approach. His liberal egalitarianism was based on the idea of equality of opportunity. 
He believed that through cooperative farming every member at that peculiar village 
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contributed to and benefited from the process. Instead of the individual, his focal point was 
the community. In contrast to this approach, his successors relied more on individual 
initiatives. Relying on the trickle down idea, they assumed that by concentrating on creation 
of wealthy “progressive” farmers who would act as impetus in rural areas, the increased 
welfare would trickle down to the lower segments of the rural population in the process. 
 
Evaluating the land reform policies, the Third Plan noted that ‘the total impact of land reform 
was less than was hoped for”. Land reform measures raised high hopes but not all could be 
accomplished for various reasons. Various factors such as lack of political will, bureaucratic 
indifference, ignorance of the cultivators and long drawn court procedures in the event of 
litigation shaped this unpromising implementation of the land reform acts. But more 
important than these was the stance of those whose interests were challenged by these reforms 
they shaped the process. In order to mitigate the land reforms these semi-feudal remnants 
devised various strategies in the process.    
 
In the case of abolition of intermediaries, the intermediaries managed to retain substantial  
amounts of land, usually of the best quality, and paid generously for what was taken away. In 
many states the legislation was arranged in such a manner that who received the  greatest 
benefits was the former zamindars themselves. In many cases these zamindars did not declare 
any surplus land for distribution. By evicting the tenants these zamindars declared that they 
were self-cultivators. In most of the legislation zamindars recognized the right to own the land 
that they cultivated directly with agricultural labor. The States had no right than to impose a 
land-tax on this sort of land holding. As a result of this arrangement, most of the middlemen 
became landowners. 272  
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In addition to these intermediaries, the rich peasants were also able to expand their 
landholdings by purchasing lands from the state. This dual mechanism which functioned 
during the land reform acts was crucial as it paved the way to capitalist development in rural 
India. In addition to this guaranteed land plot, zamindars were also paid huge amounts of 
compensations, which enabled them to establish big farms.273 This was not contrary to 
Nehru’s model since the land reform policies were anti-feudal but pro-capitalist. Nehru’s 
opposition to semi-feudal remnants was due to their absentee landlordism without any 
investment for land. This was regarded as an obstacle for increase in agricultural productivity.      
 
The semi-feudal landowners, on the other hand, who were affected by the land ceiling act also 
successfully sabotaged the ceiling laws. When the GOI announced ceilings on land property 
to preserve what they had in their hands, the landowners distributed the land among their 
family members, which was permitted by the law of inheritance, so that the surplus land 
available was reduced to the minimum. Further, much of the land that was declared surplus 
was not suitable for cultivation. The State governments had also encouraged the retention of 
land in excess on one's share, provided it was being used for rearing of cattle and dairy 
farming. This had provided opportunity to big landlords to declare a part of their land under 
these activities while actually it was being used for agriculture.274     
  
The Tenancy Reform Acts shared the same fate. In principle the tenants were conferred 
ownership rights with regard to the land they were cultivating. Aware of the improper records 
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regarding the tenants names, before the enforcement of the acts, the absentee landlords began 
to evict their tenants either by force or legally to avoid the application of the laws to them. 
Tenants, on the other hand, could not ask for their legitimate interests either due to improper 
records about themselves or ignorance on procedures.275  
 
In addition to these strategies, another factor that impeded any genuine initiative aiming at 
structural changes in rural India was the political power of the rural elite both at central and 
state levels. As an organized interest group they had an important bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the GOI, particularly when it had to deal with problems due to low agricultural productivity. 
For the GOI the threat of deliberate decline of foodgrains production was an important 
deterrent for not adopting stricter policies. All the time the policymakers had the anxiety that 
any disturbance in agrarian relations would worsen the food problem.276 
 
In addition to this bargaining power, representatives of the landlords had successfully lobbied 
against land reforms on various grounds. They opposed low ceiling on the grounds that 
fixation of ceiling too low would have lead to the monopoly of illiterate and ignorant class of 
people. According to the proponents of this view, by this monopoly, the intelligentsia, well-
to-do and educated classes of people would have driven out of land.277  
 
Though the rural elites were influential at the center through lobbying, the scope of their 
power was much more at state levels where the state legislatures were under their dominance. 
Relying on this dominance the rural elite developed various strategies to minimize the 
challenging aspect of these policies. One of them was the moderate tone of the legislation. 
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The legislation on land reform differed in each state with respect to its content and measures. 
This feature led to loopholes through which the vested interest in rural India continued to 
enjoy their privileges. This was particularly true in land ceiling legislation. Each state adopted 
different levels of ceilings and different basis of application. Some states put a ceiling limit on 
the aggregate area held by the members of the family. In some one individual was regarded as 
one unit. In the latter case there were lots of transfers to evade surplus area of land. 278 
 
Another strategy that the rural elite applied at state levels was to delay the enactment of 
legislation on land reform policies. Though the Central Government recommended in favor of 
the ceilings on land holdings in 1951, most of the states did not enact legislation till 1960-1. 
Between the time period of enactment and enforcement of the legislation, the landowners had 
enough time to make arrangements for their own benefit. The most frequently used method 
was manipulation of records to retain substantial portion of the land. The implementation of 
the law even tended to be blocked to an extent through lengthy lawsuits filed by landlords in 
the courts.279 
 
Economic dimension of the land reforms was an important factor that led to their inefficient 
implementation. For the implementation of this reform, the government had to pay huge 
compensation to the intermediaries. In addition to the compensation whose total was about 
Rs. 6700 million, the government had to earmark substantial allocations for the settlement of 
the tenants debts to landlords.280 
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American diplomats pointed out the economic impossibility of the reforms in 1949 under 
existing circumstances in India. In a strategy paper, they referred to the issue and stated that 
though the government accepted the policy that land should not be taken without adequate 
compensation, it lacked the required funds to pay for the lands and recognized that such 
payment led to high inflation.281 The impossibility of paying compensation was due to its 
being of a high amount. The amount of compensation was to such a degree that critics of the 
compensation argued that the compensation amount was against distributive justice.282 
 
Community Development Programs 
 
The GOI had high expectations of the Community Development Programs as one of the basic 
pillars of the first stage agricultural strategy. The CDPs were put into effect between 1952-65, 
however, did not contribute significantly to agricultural production or alleviation of rural 
poverty. In contrast to the motives behind them, their major benefits were  accrued to the 
richer farmers.283 Examination of the outcomes of the CDPs revealed that they failed to meet 
not only the material but also structural objectives such as democratic decentralized units to 
“function without revolutionary changes in the existing political and economic order”284 and 
self-sustaining village communities. 
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Chronic food shortage that led the policymakers to act pragmatically and that distorted the 
multipurpose content of the program to agriculture-oriented initiatives, indifference, even 
sabotage, of the bureaucrats and field staff in charge of the program were the main factors 
those were at force in CDPs emasculation.285As a result of these factors, at the end, the CDPs 
turned to be nearly nothing. Despite these deficiencies, according to Sukhatme, the program 
went a long way toward improving village environments and establishing certain 
administrative structures that still function.286   
 
Outcomes of the New Agricultural Development Strategy (1966 onwards) 
In the Indian context, more than the assessment of the previous policies, what led to the 
adoption of the new agricultural development policy in 1966 was the chronic foodgrain 
deficiency and India’s dependence on foreign countries for foodgrain imports. In the second 
stage, agricultural development strategy marked a total shift from the first stage with respect 
to its approach. Shaped by the trickle down principle, ultimate objective of the strategy was 
the attainment of higher agricultural productivity regardless of its social implications.  
 
Integrated Agricultural Development Program (IADP) 
IADP was the forerunner of the policies shaped by the new agricultural development strategy. 
Implemented before adoption of the new agricultural development strategy, the IADP 
represented the transition between two stages. Like its successors, the IADP was region-wise 
implemented in a limited geographic area. In the case of IADP, the pilot practices were 
undertaken in seven districts. Later on, this was expanded to only twenty-two districts in 
North India, selected on the basis of their comparative advantages characterized by natural 
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geographic features, climate and entrepreneurial skill of rich farmers.287 For a country like 
India twenty-two districts were nearly nothing.  
 
Against the criticisms regarding this limited scope of activities which had many negative 
implications such as increase in regional imbalances, and differentiation among the rural 
population, supporters of the policies justified these by the possible outcome of cheap food. 
Defining cheap food as the best form of socialism, these supporters pointed to a neglect of 
other considerations at least for a while.288  
 
In contrast to the expectations, the impact of the program with respect to an increase in 
agricultural output was unsatisfying. Though there was an increase this was not high, and was 
on a sustained basis despite the expansion of the use of modern inputs, particularly fertilizers. 
Unreliability of the attained increase revealed during the successive drought of 1965-6.289  
 
Green Revolution  
The Green Revolution was paid high credit by the Indian policymakers as well as the 
American proponents of the program. By its individual-oriented approach shaped by the 
trickle down principle the program marked the beginning of a new era in Indian agriculture. 
As it was introduced as a “saving” mechanism for India, there was much debate on the impact 
of the Green Revolution focusing on its success to meet the expectations. While those who 
interpreted the process in an orthodox manner concentrated on the agricultural output rate, 
those who questioned the social implications of this policy concentrated on its impact on rural 
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population structure, production relations as well as quantitative outcomes. In the course of 
the paper, the second pattern is followed.      
 
There were various views regarding the impact of the Green Revolution. Proponents of the 
Green Revolution defined it as a milestone for India since it served the solution of food 
deficiency problem. According to this view, by this Revolution India became a food-sufficient 
country and could pursue independent policies free from any strings. Proponents also claimed 
that the process verified the trickle down principle as the process first benefited the big 
farmers rather than the petty landowners.290     
 
Critics of the Green Revolution, on the other hand, refused these views and claimed that with 
respect to the outcomes, the term ‘Green Revolution’ was a hyperbole. They referred that the 
so-called Revolution was confined to cereal crops and to regions with good irrigation 
potential. Sustainability of the attained production rate was highly vulnerable depending on 
the availability of assured rainfall or irrigation; preferably the latter due to untimely or 
excessive rainfall in the absence of adequate drainage would prove harmful to growth.  They 
also noted that this revolution stood as a milestone for the acceleration of capitalism in Indian 
agriculture.291   
 
Examination of the growth rate attained following the Green Revolution was crucial as the 
challenge of these programs was to end low growth rate in agriculture production, minimize 
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India’s dependence on foreign countries for foodgrains as well as industrial raw materials and 
save foreign exchange through these improvements. The growth rate in production indicated 
that the revolution did not lead to a boom in agricultural production. On the contrary, in total, 
it fell behind the growth rate of the previous era (Table VII): 292  
 
Table VII: Average Annual Growth Rates of Production % 
 Pre-Green Rev. Period 
(1949-51 & 67-70) 
Post-Green Rev. Period 
(1967-70 & 82-85) 
Cereals 3.26 3.01 
Pulses 0.98 0.70 
Foodgrain crops 2.94 2.77 
Oilseeds 2.33 2.03 
Fibres 2.95 1.78 
Sugarcane 2.94 2.76 
Non-foodgrains crops 2.72 2.62 
All crops 2.88 2.72 
 
In addition to this moderate growth rate, another prevailing feature that the so-called 
revolution failed to challenge was the agriculture’s dependency on uncontrollable factors such 
as rain. Owing to its region-wise nature, the adopted technologies failed to challenge 
agricultural production’s dependency on these uncontrollable factors. Similar to the initial 
years of Independence fluctuations in monsoons led to fluctuations in agricultural 
productivity. In 1972 immediately after announcing India’s intention of terminating the US-
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Indo Food Aid Program due to the failure of monsoons, India again had to turn to the foreign 
countries for foodgrain importation.293  
 
As this brief examination revealed, the Green Revolution had moderate achievements with 
respect to sustained foodgrain growth rate. Though the official circles recognized this fact, in 
the Indian official literature294 the Green Revolution was defined as an important landmark for 
India’s self-sufficiency in foodgrains. The most probable explanation for this was the change 
in the nature of the impetus for the agricultural growth. In the pre-Green Revolution era 
nearly 70 % of the growth was attained by an expansion of cultivated land.295By the time of 
adoption of Green Revolution techniques Indian agriculture reached its natural limits with 
respect to acreage. As acreage-relied agricultural production reached its limits the possible 
outcomes were more acute starvation and dependence on foreign countries, unless Indian 
farmers commenced yield-relied production.    
 
In addition to this quantitative implication, the Green Revolution had important social 
implications deriving mainly from its trickle down basis. Priority of the second stage of the 
agricultural development policy was individual, not the community at first. The main thrust in 
this capitalist transformation in rural areas was the Green Revolution. This was inevitable as 
the approach of the program was individual-based development, and not the community. 
“Progressive” farmers, who had enough means including large lands, irrigation facilities and 
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financial capability to practice modern inputs such as tubewells, HYVs or fertilizers, could 
best implement techniques required by the Green Revolution. These advantageous farmers 
turned to be capitalist farmers in the process through marketing of agricultural surplus they 
gathered.296  
 
The capitalist transformation indicated diversification of the rural elite. In addition to the 
semi-feudal landholders capitalist farmers reinforced their position in the rural structure in the 
process. Development of capitalist relations in rural India was realized at the expense of the 
feudal remnants to a great extent. This condition resulted in contradictions and clashes 
between the semi-feudal remnants and capitalist farmers in which the latter was more 
advantageous owing to the policymakers’ pro-capitalist tendencies.297 
 
The dichotomy between the precapitalist semi-feudal landlords and capitalist farmers 
comprised one facet of the duality in rural India. The other facet was the dichotomy between 
the lower segments of the rural population and this diversified rural elite. Examination of the 
outcomes of policies revealed that instead of an egalitarian social structure, a more 
inegalitarian social structure emerged parallel to this capitalist transformation. As the impetus 
of change, the big farmers evicted their tenants and began to lease in land from petty 
landowners on terms, which seemed attractive to the latter in order to increase their profit.298 
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In most cases this leasing-out resulted in the owners’ loss of property. While tenants lost their 
security, agricultural laborers began to receive less wages. As a result, significant numbers of 
small farmers became marginal farmers and the number of landless workers increased. In 
short, the growth and reinforcement of the capitalist farmers was at the expense of petty 
landholders. While they were getting impoverished, the “progressive” farmers through 
concentration of resources and power and easier access to incentives such as credit, and 
subsidized inputs increased their wealth and influence. This process aggravated the 
differentiation among the rural population, intensified tensions as well as giving momentum 
to migration from rural to urban areas. 299  
 
This differentiation accelerated another development, namely institutionalization of the dual 
structure in Indian rural areas, both as social groups and regions. While on the one hand a 
minority wealthy farmers who used modern inputs integrated with the world economy, on the 
other hand, there was a majority that had to rely on subsistence economy without any security 
had to live in traditional way.  Joshi points out that this dual structure in rural areas was 
reinforced by the capitalist transformation since the small landholders were converted into a 
propertiless class. The process led to their growing into wage laborers over a long period. This 
indicated pauperization without proletarianization. As the capitalist transformation was 
region-wise this mechanism functioned more intensely in these regions.300 
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The Green Revolution also intensified the regional disparities. It excluded not only the 
majority of rural population but also a majority of the lands as it required certain 
infrastructure and climatic conditions. This resulted in a concentration of activities in a 
limited geography, namely North India. This was not a novelty but instead it represented 
continuity with the region-wise policies implemented in the 1950s. Regions in the scope of 
the revolution became more advantageous with respect to increase in agricultural output and 
income as well as public resources through various incentives.301  
 
The basic irony of the Green Revolution was, however, India’s dependence on foreign 
countries. The new agricultural development strategy adopted in the mid-60s was justified on 
grounds that it led to the minimization of India’s dependence on foreign countries for 
foodgrain importation. In contrast to this claim, the revolution created another dependency 
link with the foreign countries as the applied technology required considerable use of modern 
inputs.  With respect to the amount of use of modern inputs nearly all of which were 
imported, India had an exceptional performance, particularly in seeds and fertilizers.302 
 
Examination of the agricultural development policies revealed the changing priorities of the 
policymakers. While the first stage of agricultural development policy had the objectives of 
promotion of equality of opportunity and increase in agricultural productivity, the second 
policy of the 1960s was distinguished by its more pragmatic approach. Concentrating on the 
growth rate and productivity rise policymakers disregarded the social implications. Evaluation 
of these policies with respect to the defined objectives revealed that both of these failed to 
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attain the objectives. Powerful segments successfully emasculated policies aiming at 
structural changes in rural areas in the scope of the first policy. In contrast to the objective of 
more egalitarian social order regarding opportunities, they all served to the interests of 
powerful segments.  
 
b. Outcomes of the Industrial Development Policies 
Except a brief period in the initial years, India adopted a development strategy led by heavy-
industrialization. Despite the reservations of the center countries, Indian policymakers 
pursued this strategy without cease. Like their counterparts in other LDCs, they believed that 
only through a genuine industrialization India could attain modernization and self-reliance. In 
addition to self-reliance, the policymakers regarded industrialization as a precondition for 
political independence as the strong industrial basis would be a strong deterrent against 
enemies of the country. They identified big industrial complexes with high development 
level.303 
 
The industrialization drive of the country between 1947-73 witnessed structural changes with 
respect to the composition of the industrial goods. In the era under study the annual growth 
rate in traditional industries such as textiles was 1.2 %. This varied between 8 to 14 % in non-
traditional industries such as engineering and chemical industries. Consistent with the 
Mahalanobis Model, the most significant growth took place in capital good industries. The 
share of capital good industries increased from 4.71 % in 1956 to 16.76 % in the mid-70s. In 
terms of performance within this sector the so-called new industries such as machinery 
production, power equipment, cables and wires grew much faster. Basic industries also had a 
rapid growth rate. Their share went up substantially from 22.63 % to 36.14 % in the same 
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period. In contrast these developments, the share of consumer goods decreased from 48.37 % 
to 27.83 %.304  
 
These growth rates gave the impression that India attained a sound industrial establishment 
consistent with the national objective. Examination of the growth tendencies in the sectors, 
however, revealed the uneven balance among them. The heavy industries owed their high 
growth rates to the performance before the mid-60s. Parallel to the increased foreign 
exchange shortage, growth of heavy industry decelerated. The relative stable growth rate was 
observed in the consumer goods industries. As the main activity field of the private sector due 
to its quick returns, the consumer good industries represented the unevenness in the industrial 
sector. Within consumer goods, durables, mainly as items consumed by upper-income groups 
had grown faster than non-durables. These catered to the demand of urban and rural rich 
classes.305 
 
This preference of the private sector, however, had crucial negative impacts on the country’s 
industrialization. First of all, the private sector contributed most to the depletion of foreign 
exchange reserves for unproductive ends. The consumer goods, which were not of major 
economic importance, used imported semi-products. Developed mostly out of the context of 
the plans by the support and contribution of foreign aid, these industries were detrimental to 
the economy as they increased the import needs. Imported raw materials, semi-products, spare 
parts weighed heavily on the balance of trade and reduced the currency available for 
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importing the equipment needed for heavy industries. Therefore, the expansion of industries 
producing consumer goods of secondary importance immobilized large amounts of capital 
and led to pseudo-industrialization. This development slowed down, even halted genuine 
industrialization.306    
 
A trend that could be interpreted as the Indian industrialists’ lack of vision was raised to the 
agenda in the mid-60s in the midst of the industrial recession. In an official report, the 
industrial capitalists, even the greatest of all, such as Birla, was criticized because of  their 
concentration on consumer goods but not on basic industries.307 Diagnosis of the negative 
impact of this trend led the political elite to take precautions to this end. In the late 1960s PM 
Gandhi submitted a memorandum on possible urgent measures for economic development in 
which she asked the big capital’s exclusion from the consumer goods industries.308     
 
This disproportional growth of consumer goods shed light on the inefficient functioning of the 
mechanisms, such as licensing, developed for the efficient use of the scarce resources. 
Ironically, by its policies the GOI contributed to this uneven development. While there was 
hardly any import duties on capital goods and raw materials to protect these from the 
competition of foreign producers, duties on the import of consumer goods were several fold of 
those on capital goods. The latter was also subject to quotas. As the GOI did not develop 
countervailing policies, the structure of industry and the relative position of consumers and 
capital goods industries were distorted.309 
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Another uneven development related to the import substitution industrialization was related to 
the economic power. The rhetoric for decentralization of economic power was not the case in 
practice. The process witnessed the concentration of resources and power in the hands of few. 
By 1973 the growth of monopoly houses continued. By March 1973, about 50 % of the 
private capital was controlled by seventy-five houses. Fifteen out of these seventy-five houses 
comprised the “cream” as they controlled more than 55 % of total assets of the seventy-five 
houses.310 
 
The GOI, in fact, welcomed the existence of monopolies to a degree, since it regarded the 
monopoly capitalism as the engine for industrial development. The Monopolies Commission 
defined monopolies as concentration country-wise and concentration product-wise. Related to 
the first, the Commission stated that this existed during the WW2 when only the organized 
industry was ready to take up the challenge. It claimed that after the WW2, when the country 
desired a rapid economic development, these were the only people that could undertake such a 
task. Besides, the Commission thought that as this organized industry had a big profit instead 
of distributing these profits, it kept it as a surplus and ploughed back in the further 
development of industry. On this ground the Commission concluded that concentration of 
economic power on a country basis was good for the economic development of the country. 
Though the degree of the concentration of the economic power in the private sector was more 
than what could be justified, these commissions did not suggest dissolving the existing 
monopolies but taking precaution against future monopolistic development.311    
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Owing to their dominating position and their freedom from foreign competition, these 
monopolists determined the course of the sector as well as the economy. For the anti-
monopolists, along with the public sector, the monopoly capitalists were mainly responsible 
for India’s technological dependence on foreign countries. The assured domestic market as 
well as incentives for the sake of increase in industrial production prevented these 
monopolists to take any initiative for indigenous technological development. Instead they 
constrained the country to imported import substitution, which meant dependence on 
imported technologies almost totally and repeatedly, instead of accompanying imports by its 
indigenization, adaptation, modernization and after a while, its complete replacement through 
domestic research and development (R&D).312  
 
As the locomotives in the industrial sector, the monopolists also shaped the fake 
industrialization process. Instead of manufacturing the products, due to its relative easiness 
and quick returns they concentrated on assembly. By importing the required inputs, they 
assembled machines.313 As for its production Indian industrial goods required a high amount 
of imported inputs financing of which was again foreign resources they were noncompetitive.   
 
Last but not least, the industrialization drive of the country did not generate employment 
opportunities for the unemployed pool. This was one of the premises of Nehru when he 
justified rapid and heavy industrialization drive of the country. Owing to the capital- intensive 
feature of Indian industrialization, industry failed to absorb surplus labor force and generate 
employment. More than industry, it was the services sector that generated more employment 
opportunities. In the face of the low employment generation of industry, the planners sought 
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Alternative Development Strategies and the Indian Experience. 
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to protect and develop cottage industries without sacrificing the main industrialization line 
with heavy industry at its core.314 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Examination of the development policies of both Turkey and India proved the discrepancy 
between the vision and reality regarding the countries’ development. Neither the agricultural 
nor industrial development policies served to the economic viability and the self-reliance of 
Turkey and India. Instead, their dependence on foreign countries increased on various 
grounds. Their institutionalized dependence to center countries augmented with respect to 
foreign exchange and technology. This dependence, on the other hand, increased the 
indebtedness of Turkey and India as they failed to finance the development plans from their 
own resources. This was an outcome contrary to the main assumption of US foreign aid 
policy according to which by solving the low domestic savings problem as the most important 
impeding factor of economic development of LDCs through foreign aid until these countries 
had enough capital accumulation, the LDCs would attain their self-reliance.  
 
Both Turkey and India reached a certain capital accumulation but this did not lead to self-
reliance.  In addition to its contribution to accumulated capital, the medium- and long-term 
negative impact of the foreign aid policy was the artificial convenience it created among the 
policymakers. Along with the flow of remittances of the workers abroad, this led to the 
undermining of the inability of the country to increase her domestic savings. However, to 
explain this inability only with respect to the artificial convenience would be misleading as it 
undermined inner dynamics of the country. Failure of Turkey and India with respect to self-
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reliance was an outcome as well as an indicator of the prevailing structural problems in their 
economy, namely low domestic savings and balance of payments problems.       
 
First of all, both Turkey and India faced the dilemma of the gap between the domestic savings 
and scope of the development tasks that they desired to undertake. Preoccupied by the idea of 
rapid development to attain self-reliance they embarked upon ambitious development plans 
that necessitated a great degree of importation. The system that developed highly relied on 
expanding public sector that meant the absorption of considerable amount of resources by the 
public sector which was an important premise for the capitalist capital accumulation. By its 
task to supply subsidized inputs to private sector it considerably served the growing deficit in 
the domestic savings. Criticized due to their failure of efficient use and regeneration of the 
existing domestic resources in productive fields315, Turkish and Indian policymakers decided 
to devise policies to increase the low domestic savings.   
 
Examination of the process, however, confirms the accuracy of criticisms regarding the 
policymakers’ inability to regenerate potential resources.  Despite their determination for 
devising policies to increase domestic savings such as efficient tax system, minimization of 
subsidies and other types of incentives, every attempt turned out to be the repetition of the 
previous ones with respect to their failure. In other words, their determination remained in 
rhetoric.  There were various inner factors that shaped this failure. On this issue top among 
these factors was the policymakers’ vulnerability vis-à-vis the powerful segments, namely the 
elite groups, of the country.  
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This vulnerability was apparent in the resistance and successful maneuver of the elite groups 
against any initiatives to develop an efficient tax system and also in their successful 
manipulation of the conditions to institutionalize their interests through various policies 
including credits and subsidies. Consequently whatever the determination policymakers 
mainly cut off means to increase the level of domestic savings. In the face of this, as a remedy 
for the growing deficit Turkish and Indian governments either sought means to reduce 
domestic consumption or deficit financing by printing money that led to inflationist trends. 
While the expanded public sector failed to enable the successful implementation of the first, 
the latter was regarded as the remedy both by Turkish and Indian policymakers. 
 
Deficit financing that was defined as “a necessary evil” by the Indian policymakers316 meant 
financing of the increased gap between the savings and public expenditure through imprinting 
more money. Using the Central Bank as the main means in this policy, Turkish and Indian 
governments, for a long time, undermined the negative impact of this policy. The money 
supply had inflationist pressures on Turkish and Indian economies and indicated a sort of 
vicious circle because the high inflation rates led to larger budgetary deficits since the public 
sector’s expenditure was at unreasonably high rate. This led to a higher rate of money supply 
which meant further inflation.  
 
Despite this feature of the deficit financing, governments of Turkey and India increased their 
implementation on grounds that this was a temporary policy that would be abandoned when 
the country attained self-sufficiency at the end of the pursued development policies.317 In fact, 
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this was the sole remedy for the governments, as they could not efficiently implement policies 
resulting in higher domestic savings.  In contrast to the ‘ought to be’, in Turkey and India the 
ratio of direct taxes decreased while the proportion of all sorts of incentives including 
subsidies and credit mechanism increased. 
 
Inability of increasing domestic savings and the resulting domestic deficiency represented one 
facet of the structural problem that Turkey and India faced. The other facet was the balance of 
payments problem that indicated inability of Turkey and India to increase their export 
incomes to the level required to meet imports and also to reduce imports.  In their insistence 
on the continuity of the development policies and inability to raise domestic savings, Turkish 
policymakers were left with the option of reducing the imports while increasing the export 
earnings.  
 
In a sound economy, the country did not necessitate heavy borrowings or face the balance of 
payments problem as its foreign exchange resources mainly from its exportation would be 
sufficient to meet the foreign exchange needs of the country. This was not the case for Turkey 
and India, which mainly participated in the world economy by primary products. It is an 
accepted view that countries which participated in this division of labor by agricultural 
products and raw materials have a disadvantageous stance against those who participated by 
advanced industrial and technological goods owing to the trends in the prices of these goods. 
In contrast to the agricultural goods and raw materials prices, which have a declining 
tendency, there was a continuous increase in the prices of the industrial and technological 
goods.  
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What aggravated the situation for the LDCs in their endeavor for development was the fact 
that the advanced countries sold not only industrial or technological goods but also 
agricultural raw materials. In this respect they are the competitors of the LDCs again enjoying 
the advanced stage in production, marketing and networking. As seen in Turkish and Indian 
cases, fluctuations in the agricultural production owing to its dependency on uncontrollable 
conditions such as climate, increased domestic demand on these goods owing to the 
establishment of industrial facilities as well as rapid population growth made many LDCs 
promising markets for the advanced countries. Besides, the advanced countries’ adoption of 
import substitution policies in the goods that they had to import was also the other reason of 
this trend.318        
 
Turkey and India were not exceptions regarding this process. In contrast to the decline in the 
prices of their exportable goods, price of the imported goods increased. Regardless of the 
expensiveness of Turkish exportable goods, the disproportion in the price increase of the 
agricultural and industrial goods served the loss of the first. Referring to the loss of Turkey 
due to this trend in the prices, Turkish policymakers accused the USA for reinforcing her 
stance in the international division of labor.319 The Indian policymakers exemplified this trend 
by referring to what India experienced when there was a sudden decline in the cotton and jute 
prices after which the balance of payments began to deteriorate.  
 
Besides, owing to the nature of the exported goods, share of Turkey and India reduced in the 
process. While Turkey’s share in the world exports was % 0.47 in 1950, this reduced to % 
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0.21 in 1970.320 The same trend was true for India. The share of Indian exports in the world 
market decreased from 2 % in 1950 to 1.1.% in 1960 and 0.65 % in 1970. The industrial basis 
that could be regarded as an advantage in Indian exports, on the other hand, could not be an 
advantage due to the noncompetitive character of the Indian industrial goods until the mid-
60s. When the Indian industrial capitalists struck in domestic market via using foreign aid 
policy India managed to export industrial goods to her periphery but with limited success.321    
 
The other option regarding to the balance of payments was the reduction of imported goods, 
which was not the case both for Turkey and India, mainly owing to the adopted development 
policy and consumption patterns of the people.  Both the agricultural and industrial 
development policies required huge amounts of importation, which increased their 
dependence on the center countries. What aggravated their situation with respect to the 
foreign exchange reserves was the unwise exhaustion of available resources via importation 
of luxury goods. Besides, the Cold War context and created tensions led to considerable 
increase in defense allocations, which were again led to great amounts of importation. In 
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addition to these, in the Indian context the increased foodgrains importation as well as high 
defense allocations served to the intensification of the balance of payments problem.  
 
However, foreign trade level was not the sole determinant of the balance of payments 
problem. In the scope of foreign aid regime, conditions of the extended loans or engaged 
alliances or partnerships had impacts on the rate of deterioration.  Schick & Tonak point out 
that the process that led to the indebtedness of the LDCs had a more or less cyclic repetition. 
The process commenced by an experiment in “free trade” and failure of this free trade 
experiment resulted in a set of “symptoms” such as balance of payments deficits, gradual 
imposition of restrictions on foreign trade insufficient to reverse the trend, a reluctant 
enforcement of International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescriptions parallel to the deepening of 
the crisis. These prescriptions were in fact bore the seeds of the following crisis due to their 
conditions of the lifting of restrictions and the liberalization of international trade as well as 
capital movement. The received aid created a period, a short-term cure of the crisis, which is 
followed by reappearance of problems caused by IMF’s prescriptions.322  
 
Both Turkey and India’s experiment fit into this scenario. Following its entrance to the 
foreign aid policy of the superpower of the capitalist world bloc, in 1947 Turkey began to 
liberalize its foreign trade regime. However, the era that could be defined as the “free trade” 
era was 1950-53 era, that is the agricultural boom years. This short free trade experiment 
terminated when the exportation resources dropped and Turkey faced the problem of balance 
of payments deficit.  
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In the Indian context, these sorts of demands were particularly raised at the most vulnerable 
times of the country, namely in search of additional aid allocations. During the negotiations 
for additional foreign aid when India faced foreign exchange shortage and economic crisis 
these agencies conditioned aid to liberalization in foreign trade and devaluation of the rupee. 
The latter was justified on the grounds that it made the Indian export goods cheaper and led to 
demand increase to these products. The Indian example proved the inaccuracy of this 
assumption. While devaluation did not help an increase in exports, it increased the country’s 
debt amount.323 
 
The process resulted in heavy indebtedness of Turkey and India to center countries. This was 
to a degree that the received aids were used not for productive ends but for the repayment of 
previous loans. In both countries workers’ remittances obtained from those who worked 
abroad delayed the debt crisis for few years, but in the late 1970s both faced the debt crisis.   
 
This brief analysis sheds light on the vicious circle that most of the LDCs faced. This also 
indicates the limits of the power and influence of the political elite. Whatever its decision, the 
pragmatic and shortsighted interest-oriented domestic groups as well as center countries 
which protected their medium- and long-term interests by developing mechanisms to keep the 
LDCs in their places in the international division of labor were at force against the priorities 
as well as national interests.  
 
In sum, under the interplay of various forces both inner and external, outcome of the 
development policies was chronic indebtedness as well as pseudo-development of Turkey and 
                                                 
323See Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World; Sukhatme, “Assistance to India” in Aid and 
Development, eds, Krueger, Michalopoulos, Ruttan; Sumit Ganguly, “US-Indian Relations During the Lyndon 
Johnson Era” in The Hope and the Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan, eds., Gould and 
Ganguly; Nayar, India's Mixed Economy: The Role of Ideology and Interest in Its Development.    
 187
India. Distinguished features of this pseudo-development were relatively high economic 
growth, dual society, regional disparities, increased unemployment and underemployment as 
well as increased injustice in the distribution of income. These features also indicated the 
failure of not only the trickle down principle but also the main assumption of the US foreign 
aid policy.  
 
In order to diagnose the impact of inner and external dynamics to this outcome, in the 
following chapters first the ruling elite coalition as the fundamental inner dynamic on the 
reallocation of resources, emasculation of various policies and manipulation of existing 
circumstances are analyzed. The last chapter covers the examination of the interactions 
between the peripheral aid recipient country and the superpower with respect to the latter’s 
impact on the development course of the aid recipient country. 
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CHAPTER III 
INNER DYNAMICS: THE RULING ELITE COALITION 
 
I. Ruling Elite Coalition of Turkish Republic, 1923-73 
Foundation of the Turkish Republic indicated the recomposition of the ruling elite coalition. 
By the adopted secularism and ousting and expelling of the Ottoman dynasty members, the 
ruling elite coalition of the Turkish Republic comprised the political elite, the military and 
civilian bureaucracy, landed notables and trifling trade capitalists. In the re-composition of the 
elite coalition during the Republican era, which lacked the dynasty and the ulema, while the 
bureaucratic cadres represented the continuity with the Ottoman past, the landed notables and 
trade capital were the new components. Yet this composition was incomplete due to the lack 
of big capitalists. Relying on and supporting the existing elite groups, policy makers of the 
new Republic designed their nation building process on policies of creation of big capitalists 
who would be under the surveillance of the political elite and bureaucratic cadres.324  
 
In the words of the Founding Father of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk there 
were not any classes in the country as the country lacked the necessary dynamics for these 
classes. In this context, creation of national capitalists by the State support was defined as a 
policy to prevent Turkey’s exploitation.325 The nation building process shaped by this vision 
witnessed various changes in the ruling elite coalition with respect to preponderance of 
various components within the coalition. The most important domestic intervention with this 
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preponderance was the Military Coup of 1960 that led to the recomposition of the ruling elite 
coalition. 
 
Examination of the interaction between these components revealed that various factors both 
external and domestic were in force in this interaction. Though the rhetoric gave the 
impression that interaction between the components of the ruling elite coalition was shaped by 
internal dynamics, it was never free from the influence of external dynamics. In the 
framework of the foreign aid policy, the center countries acting as the impetus in shifts in the 
locomotive sector and adoption of the planned development contributed to the preponderance 
of landed interests, industrial capitalists as well as the civilian bureaucracy respectively. In 
addition to the influence of the center countries and interplay of the components of the elite 
coalition, the mass stood as an important internal dynamic as it was the silent witness of the 
discrepancies between the envisioned welfare society and the unsatisfying outcomes of the 
pursued development policies. Failure of the political elite to undertake the required 
precautions regarding the structural problems of the economy and the ability of the elite 
groups to preserve and reinforce their interests in the regime were in most cases at the 
expense of the mass. In its evolution from the umma, subject of the ruler to the electorate, the 
mass witnessed the political elite’s increasing appeal to them. Yet in most cases, this appeal 
was for the sake of saving the day without touching the core of the problems that the mass 
suffered.  
 
In this section, first the interaction of the ruling elite and the mass is analyzed in order to 
reveal the process that led to the discrepancy between the rhetoric and practice for economic 
and social development. Following this, the interaction between the ruling elite components is 
analyzed as to diagnose how the confronting components manipulate the process for their own 
 190
sake. The analyzed policies are limited to those which affected the development policies and 
domestic savings such as taxation, incentives.    
 
Interaction between mass and the ruling elite coalition 
Realities of Turkey in the post-WW2 era did not fit into the vision that Turkish policymakers 
depicted in the initial years of the independence. Although progress was seen in some areas, 
in the midst of shortage of financial, technical and human capital, endeavors for economic 
development failed to challenge the backward structure of Turkey. Consequently, in the late 
1940s Turkey was an underdeveloped country with respect to the life longevity, calorie per 
take, literacy level of the population, predominance of agriculture in its economy and 
accessibility of the basic services such as education, health and justice, distinguished by 
poverty and backwardness. As the basic criterion of underdevelopment both the economic 
growth rate and national per capita was low.  Keeping a mobilized army posed a great burden 
on the weak Turkish economy not only with respect to obligatory expenses for this 
mobilization but also with respect to the absorption of productive labor force under arms. In 
order to feed the army the political administration had to adopt restrictive policies, which 
made the life unbearable for the population the majority of whom lived in rural areas.  As the 
main economic activity people involved in agriculture distinguished by low productivity and 
subsistence in character. In most cases, the population barely fed itself. Due to 
malnourishment and inadequacy of health services the life expectancy at birth was low.326        
 
                                                 
326See Ergun Özbudun, ed. Atatürk Founder of A Modern State (London: Hurst and Company, 1997); Walter F. 
Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey: From Atatürk to the Present Day (New York: Holmes and Meier 
Publishers,1981); Memoirs of Files, Intelligence File. OSI- IS Reports, Enclosure C; Papers of Clark M. 
Clifford, Department of State, Harry Truman Library, Student Research File, Folder: Truman Doctrine and 
Begging of Cold War, 1947- 49.  
 191
This was contrasting with the official rhetoric in which the Founding Fathers defined peasants 
as the master of the nation. Excluding a minority, peasants did not enjoy mastership. In 
contrast to the fact that they comprised the majority of the population, they were the ones who 
were not considered as a priority for the development polices of the country. The 
industrialization drive of the 1930s had an urban bias and orientation. The scarce resources 
were earmarked to industrial establishments and public works which were not directly 
connected to the prevailing circumstances in rural Turkey.  The policymakers justified this 
bias and the neglect of agriculture by referring to the importance of rapid industrialization to 
attain self-reliance and genuine economic independence. Yet the peasants faced the dilemma 
when the locomotive sector of the development was shifted from industry to agriculture. As 
already seen in the previous chapter in the 50s, though the locomotive sector was agriculture, 
the majority of the rural population was again excluded as the program was oriented towards 
the commercialized farmers who had big land plots.  
 
As a result of the adopted policies the commercialized farmers enjoyed quick profits. In 
contrast, policies concerning the plight of the peasants were doomed to end in inconclusive 
debates without much concrete implementation and outcomes. Examination of the process 
revealed that regardless of the benefits that peasants in particular, and the country in general, 
could have enjoyed, when the policies challenged the interests of the elite groups the ‘master’ 
of the nation was sacrificed.  This was true not only for the peasants but also for the mass in 
general. There were numerous policy debates and recommendations where the interests of the 
mass and the elite group(s) were at stake and the latter successfully prevented or watered-
down these policies.  
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The Founder of the Republic referred to this interaction between the mass and the elite groups 
when he explained the reason why the peasant problems could not be the high priority policy 
of the new Republic. Ataturk explained the impossibility of such a high prioritization by 
referring to the dynamics in terms of interest groups whose hatred would be aroused in case 
the priority was given to the peasants’ problems.327 In the following pages some of the basic 
issues which were related to the domestic savings and reallocation of resources and were 
reflected the interaction between the mass and elite groups are analyzed. 
 
First of these issues was the land reform. As the majority of the population lived in rural areas 
proponents of this issue regarded this as crucial for the country.  The first concrete initiative 
on this issue during the World War II era was the Land Distribution Law of 1945. Launched 
at a time of great confrontation between the political elite and trade capital and rural elite, this 
law stood as a watershed concerning the issue which indicated the commencement of a 
process with an inconclusive end. The immediate outcome of this law was the crystallization 
of the confrontation between the political elite and trade capital and rural elite that found its 
expression in the establishment of the DP. Commercialized large landowners and supporters 
of this elite group founded the Party. Regarding the initiative against private property, 
opponents of the legislation defined it as a measure that could destroy the existing order in 
rural Turkey.328  
 
In the face of this unified criticisms against the legislation, the political elite tried to slow 
down the process by appointing a large landowner, Cavid Oral as the Minister of Agriculture 
who acted as a factor easing the emasculation of the legislation. By preparing a legal 
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arrangement, the Minister made the land distribution through expropriation from private 
holdings nearly impossible. The considerably small amount of distributed land within the 
framework of this legislation was mainly the treasury land. While 97 % of land belonged to 
this category, remaining 1.5 % was endowment and municipality lands with very small 
proportion of private lands. Out of the total distributed land a considerable amount was the 
pastures, a factor that would also affect the animal husbandry. 329  
 
Following the Land Distribution Law of 1945, land reform was on the agenda of nearly every 
government until 1973.330 The rhetoric on the vitality of the issue had different aspects 
including its being a precondition for high agricultural productivity, a necessity of social 
justice, and an obligation in the transformation of the fragmented land plots into economically 
viable units that would lead to the development of capitalist relations in rural Turkey.331  
 
The rhetoric on the necessity of the land reform by referring to various aspects of its benefits 
prevailed until 1973. By that date the debate on the land reform was legally ended up by the 
rationale that arrangements under the name of agricultural and land reform was against the 
Constitution. Instead of an overall legislation, the enforced legislation on the issue restricted 
agricultural and land reforms to irrigatable lands. Though various factors were at force, one of 
the most important factors that paved the way to this end was the radicalization of the 
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peasants.  Their radicalism revealed in the land invasions as well as meetings for more 
equitable land distribution. Regarding this as a great challenge not only to the interests of the 
rural elite but also to the order, the elite groups concluded that debates on the land reform 
contributed to the flourishing of this radicalization as it increased the expectations of the 
peasants.332 As Boratav points out by this conclusion Turkey remained one of the few 
countries that could not realize its land reform among the countries which gained their 
Independence by an Independence War.333  
 
The crucial question regarding the issue was the factors that led to this inconclusive end. 
Examination of this indicated successful maneuvers of the landed interests, powerful position 
of the rural elite and existence of a sort of elite solidarity vis-à-vis the mass that led to 
emasculation or prevention of any initiative on the issue.  
 
In addition to launching successful anti-land reform movement in the Parliament, the rural 
elite also exploited loopholes in the land reform legislation and by relying on their power at 
local politics they promoted an appropriate environment for the fake implementation of any 
initiative. When the implementation of land ceilings issue was brought to the agenda, as a 
precaution, these large landowners partitioned their lands among either their brothers or sons, 
which made them medium size landowners, at least on paper. As a result of this, there was 
hardly anybody who was affected by the legislation.334  
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In this watering-down, the rural elite mainly relied on the support and collaboration of the 
political elite. The fact was that though every party at varying degrees adopted the rhetoric on 
the necessity of land reforms, there was a disguised consensus on not dealing with it seriously. 
The political elite developed various strategies for this emasculation including palliative time-
spanning solutions, delays in the enactment of legislation and use of ambiguous language in 
legislation.335Though these were the common strategies, DP and JP, which acted as the 
mouthpiece of landed interests and capitalists, differed from the RPP and reform governments 
by their exploitation of the Cold War context and ideological notions. At various times they 
identified land reform as an invention of communism that challenged and disregarded private 
property.336  
 
The land reform issue also led to confrontations between the components of the elite coalition 
when other components of the ruling elite coalition such as industrial capital and military 
bureaucracy raised the issue. While the first regarded arrangement of land relations as a 
precondition of agricultural productivity that would lead to an increase in the incomes of the 
peasant population as well as demand for the industrial goods, the second defined it as a 
condition of social justice. While the political elite preferred to adopt a manipulating tone to 
avoid challenging the interests of the rural elite, which resulted in great discrepancy between 
paper work and practice of the arrangement, the military administration gave up its demand 
for the land reform.337 In contrast to the less aggressive and pressing attitude of the industrial 
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capitalists due to their anxiety about the possibility of repetition of the same challenge to their 
own properties in the form of confiscation of private property338, the military administration 
withdrew the policy suggestion in the face of a complex network of relations. 339 
 
The Village Institutes was another issue that led to ceaseless debates until their transformation 
into Teachers’ School. Village Institutes were the byproduct of Turkey’s peculiar conditions. 
When the political elite aimed to launch a nationwide higher literacy rate through expanding 
primary education, they faced the problem of teacher shortage, with required skills for the 
villages. This shortage resulted in the emergence of the concept, which was justified by the 
extreme backwardness of the country. The main premise of the concept was to train the 
village teachers in a manner that they could act as pioneering figures in the villages on various 
issues.  The apparent success of the institutes was the increasing rate of literate citizens in 
rural areas. However, despite this success mainly due to the opposition of elite groups, the 
Village Institutes were officially converted into teacher schools in January 1954. Though they 
were converted by the DP administration, their emasculation commenced in the late 1940s 
during RPP administration by the overall modification of the curriculum that abolished the 
practical courses.340  
  
The process that ended with the emasculation of the Village Institutes was crucial to reveal 
the elite group’s high consciousness and sensitivity to preserve their dominating status vis-à-
vis the mass. Though the leading opponent group was initially the rural elite, in the process, 
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the civilian bureaucracy and capitalists also joined to the anti-Institute rally due to their 
anxiety that their interests were also at stake.  
 
The rural elite attacked the Institutes on various grounds, such as creation of class difference 
by the government due to its discrimination by favoring children in rural areas and ‘extreme’ 
empowerment of graduated teachers by their endowed ‘authorities’. In contrast to the basic 
motive behind the concept of Village Institutes regarding promotion of equality of 
opportunity for rural population in education, the opponents claimed that these Institutes were 
against the equality and Populism (Halkçılık) principles of the Constitution.341  They also 
successfully exploited the Cold War context by claiming that these Institutes were 
communism nests on the grounds that their education program reflected the communist 
ideology. In the anti-Communist trial, some administrators and teachers of the Institutes were 
accused of being extreme leftist, and “even Marxists.”342       
 
What led the large landowners to such an anti-Village Institute rally was their anxiety due to 
the rising consciousness and capacity of the peasants, which would challenge their 
predominant status in rural Turkey.  In expressing their anxieties, the rural elite tried to get the 
support of other components of the ruling elite coalition by raising the possibility of 
destruction of private property. The rural elite succeeded since this was the issue on which all 
the elite groups were highly sensitive. The rural elite claimed that by destroying the private 
property, the institute graduates were aiming to attain the objective of establishment of a 
proletarian dictatorship.343   
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Bureaucratic cadres, on the other hand, comprised the other opponent group in the anti-
Institute rally. In contrast to the rural elite and capitalists who were anxious about the 
possibility of abolition of private property, the bureaucratic cadres concern was related to 
authority. They were also anxious that the rising consciousness might lead to a challenge of 
the deep-rooted hierarchy and the common submission of the mass to the central 
administration. They regarded some aspects of the Institutes, such as appointment of the 
young teachers and students to administrative positions, as being against the traditions and 
accepted practices of the nation.344   
 
These were the policies, which were prevented by the elite group due to their anxiety that as a 
result of these their dominant stance vis-à-vis the mass would be challenged. In addition to 
these, there were other issues in which the ruling elite successfully used the mass for their 
own ends. For example, without benefiting from various schemes such as credits and 
subsidies, the mass was used for the justification of these. 
 
Bank credit was one of the crucial policies in the resource transfer from the public to the 
private sector. The problem with this transfer was the fact that these policies mostly fostered 
the nonproductive sectors of economy owing to the elite groups’ desire for quick profits. 
Examination of the government programs including the military administration of 1960-61 
revealed that the governments had conformity with earmarking of the bank credits to 
productive fields, production, employment generating activities, as well as the necessity of 
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developing a control mechanism to discourage utility of these credits in speculative areas345, 
yet without much success.       
 
The 1950s stood as a tidemark with respect to the bank credits as there was a tremendous 
increase in the credit amounts. Critical of the previous administration because of the high 
interest rates that discouraged the use of credit, the new administration made arrangements 
accordingly. In comparison to the credit for infant industrial establishments, agriculture 
enjoyed a tremendous increase in the bank credit amounts consistent with the adopted 
agricultural modernization program that necessitated huge substantial agricultural inputs. In 
three years time increase in the agricultural credit exceeded 300 %. 346 
 
The proportion of the bank credits with respect to the size of the land holdings revealed that 
the political administration devised the credit schemes to solve the low capital accumulation 
problem of the rural elite, in contrast to the populist appeal to the mass. Large landowner 
orientation of the credits was inherited from the RPP era. Conditions of the credit schemes, on 
the other hand, automatically excluded the majority of the rural population similar to this 
group’s exclusion from the agricultural modernization program. In the initial stages, those 
whose land property was 600 decares were regarded as eligible for the credits. Later this 
ownership requirement was reduced to 300 decares. But still this excluded the majority of the 
rural Turkey, which was distinguished by dwarf size land plots.347   
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The agricultural credit program of the governments of the era had profound effects on the 
rural structure of Turkey. First the automatic exclusion of the majority strengthened the 
existing two-fold credit structure emerging in Turkey in either an organized or unorganized 
manner. While Agricultural Bank, agricultural credit and sales cooperatives made up the 
organized part, it was dealers and moneylenders that comprised the unorganized section of 
these agencies. This strengthening process also served the acceleration of the differentiation in 
rural social structure due to a widening of the gap between the majority and the minority. The 
small landowners and landless laborers had to take loans from the credit receivers with 
extraordinary high interest rates.348  
  
The problematic aspect of these credits for the mass in a resource scarce country was their use 
for speculative, and not for productive ends. Besides, the political elite’s responsiveness to the 
elite group’s demand for bank credits had negative impacts on the economy of the country. 
Even in the midst of shortage of public resources, the political elite was able to get extended 
credit by emission, which resulted in inflation.349 The development was adverse to the 
justification of the bank legislation modifications, which relied on the assumption that easy 
credit led to the growth of productive sectors of the economy.350   
 
With respect to this form of resource transfer the 1960s indicated another turning point as the 
holding companies under the grip of monopoly capitalist began to establish new banks or took 
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over the existing banks. In contrast to the trend which commenced in the 1930s, where the big 
industrial capital held high rank positions and shares in various banks, in the 1960s this group 
preferred ownership. By bank ownership these monopoly capitalists reinforced their 
manipulative influence on the economy as they guaranteed cheap deposits and reimbursed at 
levels well below inflation. As a consequence, these big holdings had the opportunity to 
expand more extensively since they provided the finance internally.351 
 
Another efficient way of transferring public resources to private sector was subsidies. In 
Turkey, subsidies in agriculture were in the form of high support prices and provision of 
modern inputs, particularly tractors, and the development of roads and infrastructure in 
agriculture. In the framework of industry, provision of required inputs produced by the State 
Economic Enterprises (SEEs) was cheaper than the production cost and free or cheaper 
infrastructure was the main subsidy.  Their impact on the economy was deficit in budgets and 
higher inflation rates mainly due to their being indirectly financed by the Central Bank. In late 
the 1960s the proportion of subsidies was so great that even the major proponents  declared 
that Turkish economy could not survive by these subsidies since “no money would be left for 
investments”352 With respect to the world market, on the other hand, this situation challenged 
the competitiveness of the agricultural exported goods as the governments tended to reflect 
subsidies on the export prices in order to meet the budget deficit.353   
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Usage of subsidies for political ends commenced in the DP era and expanded by its 
successors. Agriculture subsidies began to be widely used as a part of government policy in the 1950s.  
Their scope was widened in the process by the successive governments, particularly the JP.  In contrast 
to the 1950s, when they covered mainly cereals, their scope was expanded to various 
agricultural products such as tobacco, cotton, grain, tea and other animal products.354 Though 
justified as a policy for the improvement of the lot of the peasants355, main beneficiaries of the 
subsidies were the commercial farmers and intermediaries who bought the crops in the field at 
cheaper rates owing to the general indebtedness of the peasants. Thus, subsidies were defined 
as a factor that accelerated the differentiation in the rural social structure.  
 
The supply of subsidized inputs to industrial establishments, on the other hand, was 
particularly applied during the planned era. Though during the previous era flow of various 
resources under incentives and bank credits were the case also356, the planned era offered 
more opportunities owing to the increased domestic production of the industrial goods as well 
as the pursued policy of ISI.  It was widely used during the Second and Third Five Year 
Development Plans prepared by JP governments. By the adopted policy, the scope of the 
subsidies reached such a degree that the public sector’s function in the economic system was 
limited to being only a supporter of the private sector.357  
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The cost of these subsidies was very high for the mass as they led to deficits, deficit financing, 
high inflation rates as well as lower share in the world market depending on the higher costs 
of the goods increasing due to reflection of subsidies to the prices of the exported goods. 
Another important factor that affected the development level of the country was lack of 
resources for investment since subsidies absorbed the available resources. This last impact 
was a concrete proof of the distorted priorities of the political elite.  Instead of permanent 
solutions, they preferred palliative ones that narrowed the vicious circle of the country, which 
was distinguished by resource scarcity. 
 
The last issue that revealed the contradictory interests of the mass and the elite groups was 
taxation. The US foreign aid policy in the post-WW2 era was justified by relying on the 
distinguishing feature of the LDCs, namely low domestic savings.  Taxation was the main 
source of domestic savings; however, inability to develop an efficient taxation system vis-à-
vis the resistance of the elite groups deprived the LDCs to increase the domestic savings. 
Turkey was not an exception in this respect, as revealed by the disproportion between the 
indirect and direct taxes. In the process, in contrast to the decrease in the proportion of direct 
taxes, proportion of the indirect taxes to be paid by the mass increased. This was the 
fundamental indicator of an unequal tax system prevailing in Turkey.   
 
The debate on the taxation of agricultural income prevailed under successive governments. As 
a result of various arrangements agriculture became virtually free from direct taxation, except 
the low property tax, in the late 1940s.358By legislation no 193, from 1 January 1961 onwards 
the agricultural income was also included in the Income Tax. Implemented first in 1963, this 
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legislation was far from meeting the expectations. As a consequence of the successful 
exploitation of the prevailing loopholes in the legislation, in contrast to the expected total of 
100 million, the accumulated amount was only 30 million TL. Disappointed by this outcome, 
the Government arranged some new and regular taxes, as well as narrow tax exemptions, to 
increase the number of taxpayers.359   
 
Analysis of the course of events regarding improvement in the tax system reveals the 
continuity in the logic and strategies of resistance disregarding the political elite. Lack of 
realization of the frequently raised tax reform was not due to the unsatisfactory performance 
of a party; instead it was due to the power of the resistance against many of these 
arrangements. Appraisal of the periods revealed that rhetorical sensitivity of the parties was 
aroused when they were in opposition since it was then that they acted as mouthpieces of all 
segments of the society. However, when they came to government, they did the reverse of 
what they had advocated in the opposition.360The most important premise of these elite groups 
in emasculating these policies was their ability to have and find advocates in the Parliament.   
 
The tax reform issue was one of the most trendy issues of the post-war era. Commencing in 
1947, this unsuccessfully dealt issue was justified and supported by referring to its being a 
necessity for social justice361 as well as to its means of financing the development plans of the 
country.362While the taxation system’s injustice was mostly defined by the disproportion of  
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the indirect taxes to direct taxes,363 the other dimension of this injustice was explained by the 
disproportional share among the economic sectors such as the exceeding share of services 
sector compared to the agriculture and industry sectors.364 The importance of the rise in the 
tax revenues was explained with reference to the country’s high dependence on foreign 
countries and her high vulnerability due to this dependence.365 Particularly during the planned 
era, requirement of new tax arrangements were justified by referring to the necessity of 
reducing the country’s dependency on foreign credits to attain the desired economic 
development.366   
 
Vulnerability of the political elite vis-à-vis other elite groups that shaped its inability to 
develop efficient tax system was apparent in various events. The most striking among them 
was the sharpening confrontation of such groups on the Capital Levy Tax.367 Despite its 
enactment by the political elite it was successfully emasculated to a degree at the end of 
which target groups of the tax remained untouched. Yet levy of this tax had more far flung 
impacts on the ruling elite coalition since, along with the Land Distribution legislation, this 
tax legislation acted as an impetus for the capitalist and trade groups’ “rebellion” against the 
political elite when they accelerated their endeavors to recompose the political elite. Concrete 
outcomes of these were the DP and its ascension to the power.368 
 
There were various cases that revealed the ‘loneliness’ of the political elite vis-à-vis the elite 
groups who successfully exploited the differentiation among the legislative. Refutation of the 
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Income Tax Draft of 1950 that would have enabled the taxation of the agricultural income 
was possible by the collaboration of the RPP, the DP and the Nation Party (NP) deputies in 
the Parliament.369 In 1955, in search of alternative resources, the political elite submitted a bill 
to the DP group. Even without submitting it to the Parliament the DP group declined the 
bill.370 This was crucial as it reflected the encounter of the Party governing circles with the 
MPs of the Party. 
 
Taxation of the agricultural incomes was the most debated issue related to the tax reform. 
While advocates of this taxation stress the social justice aspect, its negative impact on 
development endeavors was also emphasized. One of the debates regarding the tax reform had 
full conformity with what the second prevailing opinion suggested, that is inactivated tax 
reserves. In the debate, vitality of increase of domestic savings was explained as being the 
required additional financial resource for the implementation of the Plan. RPP had the belief 
that in the country there were still tax reserves that could be used for development financing. 
Top among this reserve was agricultural incomes.371  
 
This claim was countered by various mostly polemical views. Top among them was the use of 
small and poor landholders as pretext to preserve the interests of large landowners. These 
pretexts were countered by various proposals such as exemption of those who have less than 
1000 acres. Facing this proposal, the anti-reformists raised the impossibility of defining the 
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criterion for agricultural taxation owing to the changing quality of the lands in different 
regions of the country.372 
  
Agricultural income tax issue represented an interesting episode among the elite groups as it 
led to a confrontation between the rural elite and industrial capitalists. In the mid-1960s the 
industrial capitalists exerted pressure on the political elite for the taxation of agricultural 
incomes. The industrial capital regarded non-efficient taxation of the agricultural sector as a 
serious impediment to its development since it meant that the agricultural income was not 
transferred through taxation. Since their main concern was provision of resources for 
investment both private and public, as a source of capital they proposed taxation of 
agricultural sector. 373  
 
Arguing that the tax burden fell unfairly on industrialists and workers, the industrial capital 
demanded a comprehensive tax reform that would increase the share of taxes paid by the 
professional classes in addition to landowners and the peasantry. In the face of these 
increasing demands from the industrial capital, the political elite adopted a manipulating tone. 
As a result of all of these, by 1967, while the agricultural production comprised 40 % of the 
total production, the share of the direct taxes in agriculture was only 1 %. While 99 % of the 
agricultural population did not pay taxes, the level of the taxes paid by the remaining 1 % did 
not exceed the level of a small state official.374   
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Similar to this, another tax manipulated by the politicians was the Income Tax. This was 
opposed either by tradesmen or representatives of the tradesmen in the Parliament. Those 
opposing this tax emphasized that this would endanger the survival of national tradesmen 
whose number was nearly none in the initial years of the Republic.375 In opposition to this DP 
and JP governing circles took the lead and acted as spokesman of the big capitalists, just as JP 
did in its opposition to the wealth declaration issue. In this opposition, the JP claimed that 
such a tax would create abstention among higher interest groups and this would result in 
impeding the investments. It also added, in a polemical manner, that such a declaration would 
lead to polarization in the society as those who declared wealth and those who did not.376  
 
Therefore, as the fundamental pillar of the domestic savings, governments could not develop a 
just tax system in Turkey. Instead, as the increasing disproportion between the indirect and 
direct taxes revealed, an increasingly unjust tax system that “retarded economic 
development”377 became the outcome of the pursued policies. Comparison of the political 
parties’ sensitivity on the issue revealed that the DP and JP were the political parties who 
successfully led the development of counter arguments on agriculture and income taxes. The 
RPP ruling circles, on the other hand, adopted a more pressing stance on the issue. Only 
during their government period there were short periods when the proportion of indirect taxes 
decreased while direct taxes increased. Yet the opposition parties successfully rebuffed 
them.378 
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The brief analysis on the interaction between the ruling elite coalition and the mass reveals the 
latter’s disadvantaged position due to the high costs that it had to pay for the sake of the elite 
groups. The latter’s sensitivity on the preservation of its interests led to the sacrifice of the 
general well-being of the mass. While preserving its interests, the elite coalition in most cases 
preferred to avoid direct confrontation with the mass. Instead the mass was used as a pretext 
for the policies which served to the interests of the elite groups. As a balancing factor between 
the ruling elite coalition and the mass, the political elite, on the other hand, adopted a rhetoric 
that touched on the expectations and concerns of the mass. This was due either to its 
preferences or its circumscription by other components. Degree of this “circumscription” was 
crucial as it indicated that the interaction between the components of the elite coalition was 
not free from tensions and confrontations. In the next section, nature of the interaction 
between various elite groups and the degree of ‘autonomy’ that each group had vis-à-vis other 
components of the coalition are analyzed.      
 
Interactions between the Components of Ruling Elite Coalition 
Political Elite 
The distinguishing feature of the era that lasted until post-World War II was the political 
elite’s relative freedom in the policymaking owing to the weakness of other components vis-
à-vis the political elite and absence of institutionalized interest relations that increased their 
bargaining power. The political elite who enjoyed keeping other components of the elite 
coalition under its control to a great extent, however, witnessed the weakening of its position 
vis-à-vis some components during and after the World War II owing to the empowerment of 
capitalists and rural elite by their successful exploitation of the wartime conditions.  
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In condemning the means which these components, namely “ex-swindler farm aga, the 
speculator tradesmen who even attempted to make even the air a tradable good if it was 
possible and few politicians who regarded all these problems as great opportunities in the 
midst of their political ambitions”,379 applied for their empowerment, the President of the 
Republic who was at the same time the Chair of the single party solidified the estrangement 
among the components. Viewed from this perspective, the recomposition of the political elite 
following the elections indicated the political elite’s incorporation with other components 
which indicated the readiness of the first group to accept the interaction between them in 
contrast to the past when the political elite did not leave much space for such a sharing of 
power in policymaking. 
 
While the confrontation among the components of the ruling elite coalition was one 
determinant in this recomposition, the responsiveness of the mass for a change in the political 
administration was crucial for it also. Defining the election and its results as the rise of the 
mass, the new political elite touched upon the expectations of the mass who were previously 
regarded as a distant entity to be kept under control by the ruling circles. This approach was 
shaped by the top down administration understanding inherited from imperial past of the 
country. In that respect the populist rhetoric of the new political elite was meaningful as it 
represented a breakpoint from the past when the mass was the passive audience of the 
developments.380  
 
As a result of the 1950 elections the policymakers who ruled the country for twenty-four years 
abandoned their posts to the newly elected ones. Though the latter was in the ruling political 
                                                 
379Bila, CHP: 1919-1999, p. 97-8.   
380Eroğul, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, p.55; Keyder, “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy”, 
p.39. 
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party they did not influence the policymaking process, as they did not belong to the inner 
circle of the Party. Only one of them, Celal Bayar, was very influential in policymaking and 
represented the national capitalist interests until the death of Ataturk. After his death, Bayar 
was successfully excluded from the inner circle by the maneuvers of Ataturk’s successor, 
Ismet Inonu. Except him, other components in the political elite represented the potential elite 
who remained “out” of the inner circle and regarded the elections as an opportunity for their 
vertical rise.381 
 
Menderes who became the PM represented a vivid example in this respect. When his high 
school graduation was defined as an obstacle for his rise in the party, Menderes graduated 
from the Faculty of Law. However, in contrast to his expectations, his graduation did not lead 
to his involvement with the political elite. Instead, he witnessed that the RPP center was like a 
closed box, a place where a clique life endured and those who ruled were the ones who were 
invited to Ataturk’s famous dinners. Discontented by the fact that he was not among these, 
Menderes, by personal experience grew aware of the harsh and distant limits of the Party 
hierarchy.382 Therefore, the success that his party attained in the elections and that paved the 
way to his Prime Ministry which lasted a decade was a “mass revolution” for Menderes more 
than anybody else.  
   
In a short while, consistent with the expectations of the empowered components of the ruling 
elite coalition, impact of the recomposition of the political elite concerning the preponderance 
of the components in the ruling elite began to be felt in rhetoric, policy and resource 
allocation. As the component which received the explicit support of the previous political 
                                                 
381Secret Paper entitled as Summary of Issues and Trends in Turkey, 15 October 1945-15 January 1946 prepared by Department 
of State, RG 59, Department of State, Miscellenous Lot File, Office File of Harry N. Howard, UN Advisor, 
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elite, the civilian bureaucracy faced the humiliating rhetoric regarding its existence and role in 
the system. On the other hand, owing to the conjuncturel developments and shift in the 
locomotive sector, the landed notables began to enjoy their heyday in contrast to the previous 
era when their interests were sacrificed at various cases.   
 
The era of the DP lasted for a decade and ended by the intervention of military bureaucracy 
on May 27, 1960. When the civilian administration was reintroduced in 1962 by the coalition 
government, the PM was the RPP leader and ex-President İsmet İnönü. Welcoming the 
arrangements of military administration which reinforced the stance of the civilian 
bureaucracy and increased the importance of the public sector, İnönü tried to govern the 
country with the least possible deviation from the established setting.   
 
The structure of the RPP with respect to its elite group orientation remained the same until the 
late 1960s. İnönü proved to be the leader who had civilian bureaucracy orientation. However, 
this was challenged by the rise of new figures in the Party.  When the RPP members preferred 
these new figures and endowed them with the tasks in the party ruling mechanisms, the RPP 
was oriented towards the public. In their support of the peasant movements and adoption of 
the motto “land to the tiller” these new figures portrayed the degree of the change in the 
Party’s outlook. Advocating this position, they underlined that the RPP abandoned evaluating 
things from the bureaucratic intelligentsia perspective. Instead, it began to evaluate them from 
the perspective of the public by the new policy of “left of the center.”383 This reconciliation of 
the RPP with the mass resulted in the separation of those who preserved the accuracy of 
bureaucratic intelligentsia perspective and denied the new wave as radical left. This new wave 
                                                 
383Cumhuriyet, 6 July 1970 quoted by Suna Kili, 1960-75 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler 
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within the Party toppled İnönü from Chairmanship in the early 1970s. Before his death, İnönü 
who represented the bureaucratic intelligentsia tradition of the Party, resigned from the 
RPP.384   
 
The RPP-led coalition government continued to govern the country until 1965 elections. By 
this election, the JP that claimed to be the inheritor of the DP ascended to power. Critical of 
the setting that was established by the military administration, the JP administration proved to 
be in the DP line in its disavowal of the bureaucratic mechanisms. The JP identified itself with 
the capitalists disregarding their differentiation and announced this by claiming that the JP 
was the party of all capitalists in the country. When in the process it failed to meet the 
expectations and demands of capitalist fractions and was compelled to make its preferences 
on behalf of the monopoly capitalists, this led to the departing of those who represented these 
fractions and to a formation of splinter parties such as the Democratic Party and the National 
Salvation Party.385 
 
Rural Elite   
For the rural elite the post- World War II indicated a new beginning with respect to its 
preponderance in the elite coalition, which that the political elite of the pre-war period denied 
to them. The rural elite was introduced to the ruling elite coalition of the country by the 
foundation of the Republic. While they gained a relatively strong position vis-à-vis the 
Ottoman central administration, the national movement and the new political order set up by 
the Republic offered them the opportunity that they envied for centuries.  
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Collaboration of the military-civilian bureaucratic cadres with the large landowners during the 
national movement was shaped by the needs of the day and, in a sense it was a break from the 
past. Though there were times when the Ottoman central administration established temporary 
alliances with the landed notables, these were not long-term alliances and were shaped mainly 
by practical reasons. These alliances were far from satisfying the ambitions and expectations 
of the landed notables. Though they got a certain degree of autonomy through these alliances 
they had never been a component of the ruling elite coalition. Exploiting the historical 
opportunity which the national movement offered them, the landed notables took their place 
while the ruling elite coalition of the country was recomposed by the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic.  
 
In contrast to their expectations, however, during the period that lasted until the post- World 
War II era the political elite, along with the main bastion of the system, was not always 
responsive to the demands that the rural elite asked for. They did not enjoy a systematic 
support from the political elite which the civilian bureaucracy and capitalists enjoyed to a 
great extent.  Instead through various arrangements, such as the Village Institutes, Land 
Distribution Law of 1945, and Soil Products Tax the political elite attempted to challenge 
their interests.386     
 
The course of the events, however, changed by the favorable circumstances that World War II 
offered to them. Successfully manipulating the discontent of the mass with the system, the 
rural elite along with the capitalists led the counterattack against the RPP that was identified 
with the bureaucratic cadres and heavy regulations. The impetus that led to the formation of 
the DP as a political party, identified with the interests of the rural elite and national 
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capitalists, was the proposed land reform.  The leading figures of the DP were mainly 
commercialized farmers and large landowners. Owing to this formation, DP was the “revolt” 
of the empowered components, particularly the rural elite against the ruling political elite.387  
 
However, the crucial fact that should be kept in mind, which was valid for other elite 
supporters of the DP also, was the situation that though the large landowners were crucial in 
the rise of the DP, this did not mean that all the large landowners or their representatives in 
the Parliament were in the DP ranks. Instead, the parties were an amalgam of all the elite 
components. Some of their representatives were also in the RPP. An example of this would be 
the Minister of Agriculture Cavit Oral who collaborated with the ones in DP ranks. 
  
In addition to various policies favoring the rural elite such as high support prices, subsidized 
inputs, excessive amounts of bank credits as well as tax exemptions , the DP cancelled or 
emasculated various arrangements that challenged the interests of the rural elite such as the 
conversion of the Village Institutes to Teacher Schools, as has been discussed in the previous 
pages.  The rural elite who was anxious about the idea of an educated peasant population 
opposed the Village Institutes on the grounds that their ultimate objective was to destroy the 
propertiership and creation of a “proletarian dictatorship.”388 These policies were justified as 
required policies to attain the national objectives of the country through production increase in 
agriculture. To this end, the political elite defined every means as appropriate since at the end 
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the country would attain self-sufficiency and join the ranks of advanced developed 
countries.389     
 
Through these policies the political elite reinforced the rural elite’s stance in the ruling elite 
coalition. Owing to the political elite’s ceaseless support and unchanged attitude, the rural 
elite remained as the most devoted elite group that the DP relied on. Relations of the political 
elite with the rural elite were in full conformity during the DP era, except one event. In the 
mid-1950s when the political elite attempted to introduce taxes on agricultural income as well 
as making a reasonable increase in the Land Tax, these initiatives of the political elite 
received severe reaction of the representatives of the rural elite in the Party group. As a result, 
these proposals did not even come to the Parliament.390 This was an important confrontation 
which openly showed to the political elite the limits of their freedom in their dealing with the 
landed interests that they fostered through various mechanisms.   
 
The important point that should not be undermined related to the rural elite was that its 
empowerment within the ruling elite coalition was not only due to the country’s dynamics. 
The prevailing conjuncture also promoted a favorable environment for the rural elite. The 
USA’s impact on the shift of the locomotive sector of the country in the 50s, the large 
landowner orientation of the agricultural development programs, and American experts policy 
recommendations for favorable credit terms to the large “progressive” landowners who had an 
enthusiasm to adopt new techniques were the main supporting mechanisms of the superpower 
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in the rise of the rural elite. Therefore it can be concluded that the priorities of the superpower 
correlated with the inner dynamics of the country. 
 
This correlation, however, does not indicate a full conformity between the donor and the rural 
elite. The superpower of the capitalist bloc, which was also the main donor, and the rural elite 
often confronted on very delicate issues such as land reform, taxation and subsidies.  
 
Land reform issue in particular represented the conceptual confrontation of the donor and the 
rural elite. Various official documents reveal the US administration’s sensitivity on the issue. 
Though the officials also mentioned the poor lots and malnourished nature of the majority of 
the rural population owing to the inegalitarian land properties, their fundamental concern 
seems to have been the vulnerability of the “ill-housed, hungry, exploited and resentful” 
peasantry to the communist propaganda and the challenge that these poor people posed to the 
democratic systems and security. Accepting that the US Missions had a limited capacity in 
influencing the land reform policies due to the serious economic losses of the landlords, the 
policymakers of the US underlined that the desired land reform depended on the political 
courage of the governments of the country. Despite the limited influence of the US 
administration, the policymakers suggested the American diplomatic circles in the countries 
to endeavor for the disengagement of land reform issue from the ideas exploited by the Soviet 
‘communism’. As a sort of incentive, it is underlined that the US administration would 
support the steps in the direction of attaining land reform.391  
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These kinds of official communications were sent to all ECA Missions. But since the US 
administration did not categorize Turkey as a country distinguished by extreme inequalities in 
land proportion, these policy recommendations did not cover the Turkish rural elite. 
Consequently Turkish rural elite’s confrontation with the donor was on conceptual basis. But 
later on when the US administration asked for endeavors for an agrarian reform whose 
component was not only land reform but also improvement of agricultural economic 
institutions such as tenancy, land rents, taxation of agricultural land or income from land, 
agricultural credit and producer marketing, the confrontation of the donor and the rural elite 
turned to be on concrete issues. The USA’s recommendations for efficient tax systems, 
including the levy of agricultural tax, were at odds with the interests of the rural elite. This 
indirect confrontation of the donor and the rural elite proved the more efficient position of the 
latter in the shaping of the tax policies. The Turkish rural elite successfully emasculated any 
tax arrangements challenging its interests.392   
  
Another issue of confrontation was the support purchases of the agricultural products. The 
American officials were critical to these high subsidies as they resulted in the high prices of 
the agricultural goods in the world market. As in the case of tax arrangements the political 
elite while disregarding the policy suggestions of the American officials, Turkish 
policymakers were more responsive to the expectations of the rural elite as well as 
intermediary trade capital involving in the sales of these goods.393    
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Relying on these documents it can be concluded that there is not a lasting correlation in the 
concerns of the rural elite and the superpower. Instead the conjuncture’s favoring of 
agriculture coincided with the inner dynamics of the country. In the diagnosis of the problems 
and policy recommendations for the economic viability of the recipient the donor had 
confrontations with the rural elite. 
 
In short, in the immediate post- World War II era, owing to the inner and external dynamics, 
the landed interests enjoyed its heyday. The shift in the locomotive sector, agricultural 
mechanization program, and various incentives were the main pillars that the landed interests 
relied on during its heyday. The rural elite identified these interests with the DP. 
Consequently, the Military Coup of 1960 challenged these interests. Due to their 
identification with the toppled DP administration, the landed notables had a weakened 
position within the ruling elite coalition. Because of this identification with landed interests, 
one of the first policies of the military administration was to form a camp at Sivas and 
interned two hundred twenty landlords from East Anatolia in this camp.394   
 
In the planned era, the leading monopoly industrialists challenged the interests of the rural 
elite. The big industrial capital’s endeavors to create the best setting for their own interests 
inevitably led to its confrontation with the rural elite.  The big industrial capital complained 
about the non-efficient taxation of the agriculture as a serious impediment for the industrial 
development on the grounds that this prevented the transfer of agricultural income through 
taxation. As their main concern was provision of resources for investment both private and 
public, as a source of capital they proposed taxation of agricultural sector. The agricultural 
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sector, owing to the political reasons dating to the DP era, enjoyed exemption from taxes. 
Arguing that the tax burden fell unfairly on industrialists and workers, the industrial capital 
demanded a comprehensive tax reform that assured an increase in the share of taxes paid by 
the professional classes in addition to landowners and the peasantry. 395  
 
Furthermore, the industrial capitalists asked for land reform and later on establishment of the 
Village Institutes. They defined the existing land ownership patterns as an obstacle that 
prevented the village’s incorporation to the world economic system.396 Instead, the majority 
of the population preferred to make subsistence agriculture with decreasing consumption 
patterns. This was a great challenge to the industrial capital, as it could not exploit the 
potential domestic market fully. Another issue that challenged the interests of large 
landowners was the land reform. In support of this, the industrial capital raised the argument 
that more equitable distribution of land would increase production, which meant the increase 
of the surplus available for the manufacturing industry. However, as Barkey puts, they were 
less aggressive on this issue due to their fear that arguments in favor of breaking up of large 
landownership could one day be repeatable for their own enterprises.397       
 
Developing a just tax system particularly for agriculture sector was another highly 
controversial issues. The debates were taking place by referring to social justice, which was a 
rising concept in the era. Opponents of this tax claimed that in Turkey establishment of a just 
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tax system was not possible due to varying degrees of land productivity, access to inputs to 
increase productivity and to climate.398  
In the face of these increasing demands from the industrial capital, the political elite had to 
adopt some policies. However, due to its political considerations, the political elite did not 
pose a challenge against the landed notables. Instead they adopted a manipulating tone. 
Contrary to the expectations of the industrial capital, the political elite continued to recognize 
privileges to landed notables. This resulted in a huge discrepancy between paper work and 
practice of the arrangement as the political elite and rural elite did their best to water-down 
these arrangements through delaying their implementation and putting very high ceilings 
which excluded majority of the rural elite. Though studies on the issue resulted in agriculture 
tax legislation no 193, owing to the loopholes as well as categorization of the taxpayers, the 
amount of the collected taxes, and the number of taxpayers who fell into this category were 
minimum.399  
 
Facing criticisms that these unsatisfying outcomes were the government’s failure to preserve 
stability, even endangering the democratic system400 the political elite claimed that Turkey did 
not have a big tax reserve in agriculture sector. Instead they claimed that with its expectation 
of receiving more than two hundred thousands, the agricultural tax levy was unrealistic. 
Besides, they adopted a polemical language and used the small landowners as a pretext to 
camouflage their desire to protect the interests of the landed notables. In this polemic, 
population dealing with agriculture was defined as the stability factor of Turkey. Therefore, 
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unless taxation of this factor relied on a just basis this would lead to instability in the country. 
In their rationale, in contrast to the claims that this low performance endangered stability in 
the country, unjust taxation of the small agricultural enterprises to satisfy the expectations of 
some segments was mentioned as a direct challenge to existing stability.401   
 
In short, in the immediate post-WW2 era, owing to the internal and external dynamics, the 
rural elite enjoyed its heyday. The shift in the locomotive sector, agricultural mechanization 
program and various vast incentives were the main pillars which the landed interests relied on 
during its heyday. Though they lost their dominating stance in the elite coalition following the 
DP era, they managed to preserve their interests. The successive governments, including the 
military administration, did not achieve to implement land reform and taxation of agricultural 
income policies successfully, owing to the rural elite’s successful counteracts. 
 
Trade and Industrial Capital 
The DP was known as the political party of not only rural elite but also of capitalists. As 
Turkey lacked industrial capitalists, at least until the late-1950s, the term national capitalists 
indicated trade capital. Like the rural elite, the trade capital was the new component of the 
ruling elite coalition. In contrast to the Ottoman Empire where the non-Muslim minorities 
participated in the division of labor as tradesmen, by the foundation of the Republic they were 
purged for the sake of national tradesmen. The political elite adopted policies to create and 
empower this group whom they defined as a ‘must’ in the creation of a strong national 
economy. In the words of Ataturk “tradesman is the one to whose intelligent and hand was 
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trusted for the empowerment of the nation’s labor and production and who should prove that 
he deserved this trust.”402 
 
Like the rural elite, trade capital was also dissatisfied with the policies of the one party 
regime. Yet there was an important difference between the rural elite and trade capital.  In 
contrast to relative indifference of the political elite to the rural elite, empowerment of the 
trade capitalists and their conversion into industrial capitalists to a great extent was an 
important pillar of the strategy of creating national capitalists by the state support whose 
weakness was regarded as a serious setback for the nation’s development.  Consistent with 
this view, the political elite of the pre-WW2 period developed various policies and 
mechanisms to attain this objective. The initial years of the Republic offered good fortunes to 
the tradesmen who involved in exportation and importation owing to the fact that Turkey had 
to adopt an open door policy in foreign trade up to 1929 as agreed in the Laussanne 
Agreement.403  
 
This period of economic reconstruction and enrichment, particularly for these tradesmen, 
however, came to an end by the early 1930s due to the Great Depression and the preferred 
economic policy of the government aiming to save foreign currency as much as possible by 
producing the imported goods domestically. As the new course of policy meant the 
mobilization of the required sources from the center404 this empowered the stance of the 
civilian bureaucratic cadres.  
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Regarding various arrangements in the scope of this protective economic system as a 
challenge to its interests, the trade capital began to seek an alternative via which it could 
challenge the dominant stance of the bureaucratic cadres under whose tutelage it grew. 
Parallel to its empowerment, the intensity of clash of interests between trade capital and its 
tutors increased.  Besides, awareness of the conjuncturel developments and the excessive 
earnings that the war economy provided were important factors which served the trade 
capital’s search for autonomy. In their search DP was an alternative for them via which they 
could be more influential in policymaking.405  
 
This initiative of the trade capital, however, represented a “rebellious” development that was 
not foreseen by the political elite when they envisioned the empowerment of the trade capital. 
As Keyder and Frey point out, what made this search of autonomy a ‘rebellious’ one was the 
fact that the controlled capital development of the one party era did not recognize a free hand 
for the groups, which were flourished by the protectionist policies of the dominating 
components of the ruling elite coalition.406     
 
Though continuing with its supportive policies, the RPP failed to prevent trade capital’s 
orientation to the opposition. Consistent with the expectations of the trade capital, 
responsiveness of the political elite to their demands increased during the DP era. Policies 
pursued in the era proved the priority which the political elite assigned to the trade capital. In 
order to ensure high profits for trade capital, and through this, to reinforce its stance in the 
ruling elite coalition, the recomposed political elite adopted various policies such as 
                                                 
405Şenekerci, Türk Devriminde Celal Bayar: 1918-60, p.192-3; Vatan, 23 May 1946.  
406Keyder, “The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy”, p.41; Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, p.388.                                       
 225
improvement of infrastructure, bank credits, high profit margins determined by the Trade 
Ministry, tax exemptions, tenders, premiums and subsidies.407  
 
The foreign observers defined the increasing trade activities with respect to the favorable 
environment created by the new political elite. In replying a question regarding the boom 
observed in the trade capital that led to an increase in trade activities, leading tradesmen 
referred to the favorable environment that DP created for them in which they worked in 
security. They also referred to another important outcome of this pro-capitalists approach, 
namely institutionalized nature of the mechanisms that served to foster their trade when they 
stated that the established trade order remained as it was, regardless of changes of 
governments.408      
 
Like the institutionalization of the pro-capitalist mechanisms, the era witnessed various 
developments, which were crucial, regarding the composition of the capitalists. First of all, 
the support mechanism for trade capital did not offer the same opportunities to all. Criticisms 
with respect to the pursued policies emphasized the promotion of a sort of monopolization as 
a result of the pursued policies among the trade capital. The distinguishing feature of this 
monopolization was its being mainly activity-specific since the majority of the monopolists 
involved in importation. Regarding this monopolization as an indicator of the existence of a 
favored inner circle among the trade capital, critics pointed out the manipulative power of 
these monopolists. Their increasing wealth was at the expense of augmented troubles of the 
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public, in general, as they preferred to concentrate on high profit luxury goods while 
undermining the real needs of the people.409  
 
Aydin Menderes, the son of Adnan Menderes confirmed the existence of this “inner circle” 
among the trade capitalists. Defining this as one facet of the differentiation among the 
capitalists, Aydin Menderes referred to the unavoidability of such a promotion, as in every 
change in power there were some who were excluded from the inner circle while there were 
some who moved in. This was the case during the power change of the 1950s. Aydin 
Menderes explained that at the time of DP’s ascension there was a trade capital group that 
benefited from the system and desired the continuation of the status quo. On the other hand, 
there were ambitious people who desired to be in the private sector, and more truly, in the 
ruling elite coalition.410  
 
With respect to tradesmen, therefore, to conclude that the rise of the DP represented the 
recruitment of highly mobilized potential elite would not be misleading. In addition to the 
favorable conditions, policies pursued against those who were excluded from the inner circle 
also contributed to the strength of the “inner circle” capitalists to a great extent. In his 
memoirs Vehbi Koc, one of the prominent tradesmen of the era revealed the nature of policies 
that the DP political elite pursued towards the “out”.  Following the DP’s ascension to power, 
Koc was gradually removed from the Chambers, and other professional establishments, and 
was compelled to resign from the membership of the Executive Board of the Industry and 
Development Bank, in short from any post that made him a decision maker or influential in 
resource reallocation.  In addition to these, he was accused of dealing with oil stocking.  The 
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political elite indicated the “remedy” for rescuing from these as being in or at least with the 
DP.411  
  
The era also witnessed the differentiation of capitalists as trade and industrial capitalists. 
According to Aydin Menderes this was the scheme beneath the DP’s creation of a sort of 
monopoly capital among the trade capitalists. He stated that while the DP was supporting the 
ambitious people who desired to be “in”, the political elite expected that this support would 
contribute and lead to their capital accumulation that would enable them to have a leading role 
in the attainment of the envisioned industrial development. In short, while making their best 
to promote an appropriate environment for the trade capital, the political elite oriented these 
monopoly capitalists to productive sectors such as industry.412  
 
The political elite of the era witnessed the accuracy of their expectations. It was in these years 
that the national capitalists began to be differentiated as trade and industrial capitalists. In 
most cases the big trade capital, while earmarking its resources to industrial establishments, 
did not leave the trade sector that offered high profit margins due to its speculative 
interference. This differentiation was crucial, as from that date onwards, during the successive 
governments, the big industrial capital began to act as the mouthpiece of the national 
capitalists. This outcome proved to be the successful and satisfying attainment of the vision 
that the Founding Fathers defined during their nation building process. In their promotion of a 
favorable environment for the capitalists and for their capital accumulation, the DP political 
elite continued the policy line that was drawn by the Founding Fathers.       
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Before analyzing the position of the industrial capital in the ruling elite coalition and its 
influence on resource reallocation as a last point regarding the trade capital, it should be kept 
in mind that interaction between the political elite and trade capital was not free from 
conflicts. Instead, relying on its empowered stance the trade capital delayed various policies 
which were recommended by the donors as necessary steps for the improvement of the 
economic situation. Though there were various explanations regarding the delayed and 
reluctant acceptance of the recommendations of the international donors, the trade capitalists 
had their part in this delayed acceptance.  
 
A secret telegram from the American Embassy in Ankara sheds light not only on this part but 
also on the scope of the circle that the political elite could move in. In a document dated July 
1958, the American Ambassador informed the Secretary of State about a new economic 
program that was prepared as a condition for foreign-aid-containing items which would be 
objected by important groups in the country. He added that for the sound implementation of 
the program without any frustrating objection, the DP political elite must have outside support 
to offset attempts [emphasis is added]. In this, Warren indicated the trade capital as one of the 
components that would raise objections due to the program’s demand for a larger scale of 
licensing of imports.413 
 
Flourishing of industrial capitalists in the mid to late-1950s, on the other hand, was not 
coincidental owing to the policies pursued by successive governments. These policies, 
consistent with the national vision of creating national capitalists, promoted an environment 
that led to capital accumulation of the capitalists. The unsatisfying industrialization 
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experience of the 1920s taught that, expectation of successful industrialization drive from 
industrial capitalists who lacked adequate capital accumulation was immature. Through 
policies that promoted appropriate environment for required capital accumulation, in the late 
1950s the industrial capitalists began to emerge as a separate elite group highly conscious of 
their rights and eager to expand their preponderance within the ruling elite coalition. In 
addition to the adequate level of accumulated capital, by the contribution of the conjuncturel 
developments, such as the shift in the locomotive sector of the development policy and the 
adoption of ISI, the heyday of the industrial capital commenced in the 1960s.  
 
Thus, the Turkish industrial capital grew under the tutelage of the state. Pursuing favorable 
discriminatory policies supporting capitalists, the political elite attained the vision of the 
creation of nationalist capitalists. Parallel to the envisioned future of the country, the assigned 
role to the capitalists was their involvement in the industrial activities. When the national 
capitalists reached this stage by the 1960s the political elite continued to support them through 
subsidized inputs, flow of the public resources through establishing joint ventures and bank 
credits, tax exemptions and provision of infrastructure. In order to strength their stance vis-a-
vis the social dynamics against them, the political elite prohibited the right of strike and put 
various other restrictions against of all the possible dynamics.414 
 
Although the attained level was satisfying for the political elite as it represented 
diversification among the capitalists, it required new strategies to cope with the differentiated, 
in most cases contradictory interests and expectations of the capitalist. The 1960s were 
distinguished by the existence of these clashing interests and the difficulty the political elite 
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had in dealing with these interests. This was particularly difficult for a party like the JP which 
claimed to be the party of all capitalists. Parallel to the diversification of capitalists, the 
political elite was obliged to adopt various strategies. In the decade the political era faced 
some encounters where the capitalists acted as a unified body by suppressing all the 
differences since they thought that their interests were at stake. It also faced some cases when 
the political elite had to make preferences among the differentiated capitalists.  
 
The most important encounter of the political elite with the industrial capital was in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1961 elections. In contrast to the expectations of the capitalists 
that elections would end the ambiguity due to the inadequacy of the amount of the votes that 
each party had, the post-election era led to new ambiguities. Leaders of the political parties 
aggravated the situation by their uncompromising attitudes. In the face of this, as a unified 
body the capitalists reminded the political parties about their social responsibilities as their 
uncompromising attitude resulted in economic stagnation. By this initiative, the style of which 
was novel for Turkey, capitalists accelerated the process that led to political stability. Though 
they did not ask for them, the political elite made some arrangements favoring the capitalists 
such as tax exemptions and cease of wealth declaration.415  
 
Though the RPP did not adopt any policy adverse to their interests, owing to the pro-private 
capital rhetoric of the JP, capitalists assumed that its ascension to power would  bring more 
favorable conditions for them. Yet the developments after JP’s ascension to power by 1965 
election proved to be the contrary, owing to the claim of the JP that it was the party of all 
capitalists. This proved to be an over-generalized statement which undermined the dynamics 
among the differentiated capitalists. There were numerous issues on which the industrial and 
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trade capitalists confronted, including reallocation of scarce resources such as foreign 
exchange, participation in the Common Market416, access to bank credits 417 or control of the 
prices. In these encounters the political elite preferred to pursue a balanced strategy to avoid 
estrangement of diversified capitalists. The outcome of this strategy was, however, far away 
from their expectations since, in most cases, neither of the confronted capitalists was satisfied 
with the political elite’s handling of the issues.418 In this respect, one of the most important 
encounters was on the elections of the Union of Chambers, which resulted in the leading big 
industrialists’ further discontent about the JP and led to the establishment of TUSIAD.    
 
One of the fiercest confrontations among the capitalists was the domination of the executive 
board of the Union of Chambers owing to its political preponderance as well as its power in 
the reallocation of foreign resources and the control of the prices. Due to these means that 
made the Union very powerful, both the industrial and trade capital desired to dominate it as 
its domination led to the domination of all capitalists. Therefore, during the elections each 
capitalist group asked for the support of the political elite. Consistent with its mid-way policy, 
the political elite abstained from siding with one capitalist group, and instead it suggested an 
election list that covered all fractions within the capitalists. The industrial capitalists, 
particularly the leading ones, did not welcome this as they expected a positive discrimination 
favoring them. This expectation was due to the disproportion between their contribution to the 
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economy and their relative lower share in the Union owing to the quantitative majority of the 
petty trade capital.419   
 
Though later on the political elite explicitly and illegally interfered with the Union’s elections 
of 1969 on behalf of industrial as well as metropolitan capital after Necmettin Erbakan’s 
election as the President of the Union as a representative of Anatolian petty capital420, this did 
not prevent the leading industrial capitalists’ search for an alternative. Regarding the political 
elite’s attitude as an obstacle to their rapid development, the leading industrial capitalists 
developed counter strategies vis-à-vis the political elite as well as trade capitalists. First of all 
they proposed various amendments to improve their stance in the Union of Chambers. When 
the Board of the Union turned these down the leading industrial capitalists sought means to 
restrict the authorities of the Union. They attained their aim following the military’s Memo of 
1971 as the Union was defunctionalized through the removal of the right of foreign currency 
allocation. They exerted pressure on the political elite for tax reforms that introduced tax for 
the trade capital. As a last step, in order to solve the problem of disproportional representation 
within the Union, they founded TUSIAD in 1971.421          
 
The establishment of TUSIAD was a milestone in the interaction of the leading industrial 
capitalists with the petty industrialists, trade capital as well as the political elite. As it covered 
the top industrialists TUSIAD intensified the differentiation among the industrial capitalists. 
The leading ones reasserted their preeminence vis-à-vis the small industrialists. The trade 
capital, on the other hand, could not enjoy the advantage in the Union due to the quantitative 
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majority of the petty trade capitalists. Establishment of a separate body, therefore, challenged 
their position among the capitalists as well as in the system. As the prevailing circumstances 
favored the industrial capitalists, they were obliged to move in the subordinated position that 
industrial capitalists pointed out.  
 
In the case of the political elite, through TUSIAD, the industrial capitalists declared their 
autonomy. Relying on their qualitative power in the balance of power among the capitalists, 
these ‘commanding heights of the industrial capital’ continued to exert pressures on the 
political elite for their demands. Most of these demands were consistent with the objective of 
reinforcing their preponderance in the system and ruling elite coalition as well as assuring 
their economic development. Preparation of planning under political elite’s surveillance, tax 
reform covering reduction for industrial capital but introducing agricultural tax, trade 
bourgeoisie and rentiers, promotion of investments through facilitation of finance and 
importation and firmness on policies that served the expansion of the domestic market were 
the most important arrangements for their interests. The last arrangement mentioned above 
also covered recommendation of finding new markets in the Middle East and Third World 
countries by pursuing multilateral foreign policy without neglecting the possibility of 
participation in the Common Market.422  
 
Examination of the demands revealed that the leading industrial capitalists asked for policies 
which challenged the interests of other elite groups such as bureaucracy, trade capital and 
rural elite. Complaining of the red tapism, the leading industrial capitalists asked for the 
rationalization of the state administration that led to a less bureaucratic structure. However, 
aware of the increased importance of the bureaucrats in the ISI, the leading industrialists 
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avoided explicit confrontation with the bureaucratic cadres to the ultimate possible degree. 
Instead they endeavored to develop sound relations with the bureaucratic cadres. Yet they 
desired to have a system where they enjoyed less bureaucratic surveillance as indicated in the 
demand of less bureaucracy.423  
 
In their demand for tax reform these industrial capitalists aimed not only at trade capital but 
also at the rural elite as well. Regarding the latter, industrial capitalists also asked for land 
reform and the reopening of the Village Institutes.424 In support of the previous, the industrial 
capital defined the existing land relations as an obstacle for agricultural productivity and for 
the taking of initiative of the peasants, majority of whom preferred subsistence agriculture 
that prevented their consumerism and demand for industrial goods. They concluded that this 
was an important factor which led to stagnancy in the domestic market.       
 
This call for social development policies was, however, not due to the developed  
‘enlightened self’ of the industrial capital. Instead, the leading industrial capital that observed 
the developments in the country with anxiety recommended these as precautions to prevent 
further radicalization of the population. Unlike the previous decades, various segments of the 
society such as peasants, students and workers were highly politicized. More than the others, 
the radicalization of the trade union movement increased the anxiety of the industrial 
capitalists as well as increasing the dissatisfaction of the prevailing political administration. 
The dissatisfaction and questioning of big capitalists about the power of the JP to deal with 
this movement reached its acme by the great workers march on May 15-16 1970. This was a 
turning point in the relations of the political elite and capitalists as the latter lost their 
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confidence in the JP. After this event, the big Turkish capitalists began to question more 
intensely the JP’s ability to rule and govern an increasingly differentiated society.425  
 
This background sheds light on the leading industrial capitalists’ support of the military’s 
Memorandum of 1971. This Memo reinforced the industrial capitalists stance vis-à-vis the 
workers through imposed restrictions on the latter. The political elite’s support for the big 
industrial capital, on the other hand, continued after the Memorandum. During Talu and 
Melen governments, a majority of the incentives was distributed to the big industrial 
capital.426      
 
In sum, the 1960s witnessed the national capitalists’ declaration of its autonomy vis-à-vis 
other components, particularly the one that defined its creation as a national vision.  In 
contrast to the previous eras when their dependence on the political elite was immense, 
commencing in the late 1950s and accelerating in the 1960s, as a result of the accumulated 
capital and the increasing self-confidence parallel to this accumulation, the national capitalists 
made their preference to transform into industrial capital perceiving the tide of events 
accurately. Owing to the favorable conjuncturel developments they reinforced their 
preponderance in the regime and within the ruling elite coalition.  
 
This favorable conjuncture was related to the donors’ support for industrialization-led 
development policy. The relative empowered stance of the Turkish industrial capital in the 
early 60s coincided with the donors’ policy recommendations suggesting a shift in the 
locomotive sector. Not only the policy suggestions but also the constructed infrastructure by 
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the aid allocations also served the interests of the industrial capital. Therefore, the industrial 
capital found a more favorable environment to foster.  
 
Lacking innovative or recreative features as well as a sound financial basis, the Turkish 
industrial capital preferred assemble industries instead of adaptation and domestic genuine 
industrial production. As it did not challenge the interests of the donor, instead served its 
interests by choosing the ‘disguised importation’ the Turkish industrial capital paved the way 
for conciliatory relations with the donor, not conflicting ones. By providing cheap labor force 
and cheaper production costs the Turkish industrial capital acted as a kind of distributor 
agencies for the foreign capitalists. Yet, as only the big monopolist industrial capital could 
engage in partnerships with the foreign capital, they were the beneficiaries. The process again 
excluded the small-scale industrial capital. The monopolist capital within the industrialists 
developed and successfully implemented strategies to assure the sustainability of the 
preponderance that it enjoyed.  
 
Civilian Bureaucracy 
Civilian bureaucracy was the main pillar of the political elite for the nation building process. 
In fact, under the prevailing circumstances it was the sole possibility of the political elite. 
While, on the one hand, it defined the vision as the creation of national capitalists to end up 
the feebleness of the private capital, on the other hand, it had to undertake a wide range of 
reform movements427 to attain the objective of  “reaching the level of advanced societies”. 
The civilian bureaucracy provided the required knowledge as well as experience in the 
running of the state mechanism. The important feature of the civilian bureaucrats was their 
alienated stance from the mass. Consistent with the top down approach of the political elite, 
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their role in the system was defined as fulfillment of the task regardless of the considerations 
of the ruled. In that respect not only their presence in the ruling elite coalition but also the 
administrative understanding represented continuity with the imperial past.  
 
The political elite of the first generation developed mechanisms that reinforced this alienated 
stance of the civilian cadres in the system. As a mechanism to increase the devotion of the 
civil cadres to the regime, the one party regime paid special attention to the welfare of the 
bureaucratic cadres. Restoration of the real incomes of the civilian bureaucracy was one of the 
initial policies of the political elite.428 These bureaucrats were not only paid well and 
benefited from distribution of goods in kind such as shoes, clothing, and the similar but also 
enjoyed the privilege that the official policy recognized for them. Tax exemptions, low-
interest public capital, state subsidies, priority in the allocation of scarce materials including 
foreign exchange and state assistance in training were among the major advantages that they 
enjoyed.429 As a result of these policies, the duality between the mass and the civilian cadres 
of the state increased. While the mass identified the bureaucrats with the regime that 
neglected their concerns, the bureaucrats could not grasp the increasing difficulties of the 
mass under heavy taxation and various sanctions.    
 
The widespread discontent of the mass from the bureaucrats as well as the regime was one of 
the most important factors that led to a change in the composition of the rulers. During the 
rallies the DP successfully exploited the prevailing discontent of the public with the 
bureaucratic cadres. The DP spokesmen challenged the official rhetoric that the peasant was 
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the master of the nation. They claimed that this rhetoric did not reflect the reality, as the 
master of the country was the fortunate “devletliler (statesmen)” who enjoyed their privileges 
under the State guard. They also claimed that the public interest was sacrificed at the expense 
of expanding bureaucratic cadres. Due to their increasing number, the civilian cadres posed a 
great burden on the country’s economy which was  distinguished by scarcity of resources. 
While their number was 104.000 in the early 1930s this grew almost to quarter million in 
1946.430  
 
The DP defined its ascension to power as an anti-RPP and anti-bureaucracy rally, which was 
difficult due to the intertwined nature of the high echelons of the bureaucracy with the RPP.  
As the governors and district-governors were appointed as the provincial chiefs of the RPP 
since 1935, this anti-bureaucracy rally of the DP was in fact against the state mechanism.  The 
RPP ruling circles justified this intertwined role by the notion that administrative mechanism 
was the skeleton of regime; therefore, the more this mechanism was in harmony and 
powerful, the more the regime guaranteed its continuation. Neutrality of these bureaucrats 
was not the case; instead, due to their politicized nature they represented the continuation of 
the RPP tradition. The DP claimed that even the governors themselves indicated this 
continuity by expressing the impossibility of success of any party except the RPP, as they 
were the governors of the RPP. 431   
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Regarding the civilian bureaucrats, the new political elite pursued a dual policy line. On the 
one hand they purged or defunctionalized the pro-RPP administrative cadres; on the other 
hand, they created new administrative cadres. While justifying the first group of activities as 
the means to abolish “the bureaucratic despotism”, the political elite defined the latter as an 
obligation of the party due to the prevailing features of the system. Shaped by this reasoning 
and by the assured confidence that the DP political elite had following the 1954 elections, the 
concrete policies to realize the statements on the necessity of the changes of the bureaucratic 
cadres, the remnants of the previous totalitarian regime, were commenced. 
 
Criterion of this purging was defined as the performance of the administrative officials in the 
1946 elections as well as attempts to sabotage the activities of the policies of DP 
governments, which were designed for the benefit of the public. The political elites of DP 
justified the first criterion by claiming that multiparty era in Turkey could have commenced 
even in 1946 if some of these, even 15-20 governors as well as 50-100 district-governors did 
not involve the violation of the law. Relying on this, the political elite expressed their 
intention not to work with these politicized officials who were performing the rituals of a 
“political religion”.432    
 
Although before that day numerous governors’ places were changed, after the 1950 election 
the scope of the purging policy widened to a great extent. The means devised to this end was 
the legislation no 6122, dated 1953. Initially military officials, academicians, members of the 
Court of Appeals, judges and prosecutors were excluded from this legislation. However, by 
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legislation no 6422 dated 21 June 1954 they were also included as professional groups which 
could be purged. Importance of this inclusion derived from the fact that these were the forces 
acting as security valve of a system against the political elite’s arbitrariness. These 
arrangements also abolished the right to appeal to the court by those who faced unfair 
treatment.433        
 
The legislation no 6435 on 5 July 1954, however, was the one that had the destructive effects 
on the bureaucratic cadres. Objective of the legislation was to lessen the power of the 
bureaucracy, purging of the bureaucrats who were regarded as “head of a boil”, to decrease 
the economic power of the bureaucracy and to eliminate the efficiency of bureaucratic rules. 
As explained by one of the MPs of the DP, who had great contribution to this draft’s 
preparation, the rationale behind this legislation was to challenge the privileged status of the 
bureaucratic cadres who enjoyed lots of guarantees from the government and its organization 
which was also regarded as an entity that was out and above the mass. Refusing that this draft 
aimed at purging, the ultimate objective of it was defined as rationalization of the state 
mechanism.434   
 
 As an importation from Switzerland, “a democratic country from top to bottom” the 
legislation brought a system of employing the state officials on a three-year-contract basis. At 
the end of each three-years period, the performance of the state official would be evaluated 
and either the continuity of his service for another periods of three years or termination of his 
contract would be decided. Justified by rationalization of the bureaucracy, the necessity of 
                                                 
433Ümit Özdağ,  Menderes Dönemi Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali (Military-Politics Relations 
during Menderes Era and 27 May Coup) (İstanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık, 1997), p. 59; Eroğul, Demokrat Parti: 
Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, p.116-7.  
434Pervet Arat’s Statetment, Zafer, 6 July 1954; Özdağ, Menderes Dönemi Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs 
İhtilali, p. 59.    
 241
such a system in Turkey was explained by referring to the prevailing facts during the one 
party regime, a totalitarian regime whose existence was impossible without bureaucratic 
cadres. The DP political elite insisted that more than anybody the bureaucratic cadres 
necessitated such a change due to the miscalculated articles of the officials’ status lying at the 
core of the red tape that played the ‘devil’ in every business of the country. The supported 
idea was that unless the officials felt the challenge of replacement this made them uncreative 
therefore anybody opposing this legislation was regarded as acting in a partisan way.435   
 
As a result of these arrangements which represented the milestones of DP’s purging policy, a 
high mobilization was observed at the administrative level. Though DP political elite stated 
that there would not be any replacement or changes in the administrative cadres, from 22 May 
1950 to 13 June 1956, 156 reassignments were carried out at governate level. While sixty-two 
governors were appointed to center governorship, thirty-eight governors retired and ten 
governors resigned. In addition, 188 deputy governors were reassigned. While five deputy 
governors were appointed to the center, nineteen deputy governors were appointed and four 
resigned from their posts. At the level of district-governorship, 1375 district governors were 
reassigned. While five district governors were appointed to the center, thirty of them retired 
and hundred-and-sixteen resigned.436   
 
Parallel to the purging of the bureaucratic cadres, the DP created a new administrative 
mechanism distinguished by partisan appointments. The political elite justified these partisan 
appointments as a precaution to assure the success of the economic development policies. 
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Their rationale was that as the bureaucratic cadres had a dominating stance in the system 
unless they had amicable feelings towards the ruling party by their powerful stance these 
bureaucrats would attempt to sabotage all the initiatives of the political elite aiming at the 
economic development of the country and welfare of the public.437 This policy line 
represented continuity between the RPP and the DP despite all the rebuffing rhetoric.   
 
The crucial point, in the essential continuity with the RPP era, was that the DP political elite 
had the concern of having the upper hand vis-à-vis the bureaucratic cadres created by 
themselves. In contrast to the rhetoric, they adopted policies which aimed to minimize the 
initiative of the bureaucratic cadres. This policy line was explained as their reluctance to share 
the administrative power assigned to them by the free will of the nation with the bureaucratic 
cadres. They also claimed that bureaucratic cadres’ ability to take initiative might have 
increased economic problems due to their mistaken interventions.438  
 
Though the political elite aimed to minimize the preponderance of the civilian bureaucrats 
both in the ruling elite coalition and the state mechanism, it was not an easy task to undertake 
owing to the roles that were assigned to the bureaucratic cadres. Examination of the 
interaction between the political elite and civilian bureaucracy revealed that nature of the 
conflict between these components did not change in the successive governments either. In 
contrast to the late 1940s and the 1950s, what challenged the possible success of the political 
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elite vis-à-vis the bureaucratic cadres was the introduction of the economic planning in the 
1960s.  
 
The most important development in the 1960s regarding the civilian bureaucracy was 
Turkey’s transition to planned development and establishment of the State Planning 
Organization (SPO) on September 30, 1960 (Laws Number 91, 99, 340). Designed as the 
principal mechanism for the allocation of resources, the latter was the bastion that reinforced 
the position of the civilian bureaucracy in the system. In addition to this, the Supreme Court 
and the Council of the State were other organizations on which the preponderance of the 
civilian bureaucrats relied. Dodd defines these organizations as the reliable basis for the 
reassertion of the bureaucratic preeminence by referring to their definition as the “watchdog” 
of the political regime as well as the economic development policies.439 The adopted 
economic development policy of the ISI completed the scheme that reasserted the 
bureaucratic preeminence as it made the state the main regulator of the domestic economy. 
Consequently, the bureaucrats became the inevitable organizers and administrators of the 
allocation of the economic resources.440  
    
More than others, the SPO was in the focus of the debates mainly due to its superior position 
of resource allocation. By establishing the SPO the military administration revealed its 
sensitivity to the years-long recommendation of the donor countries on the necessity of an 
advisory planing organization. Since the mid-50s the US administration pressurized for 
planning in order to minimize the waste of resources as much as possible. In explaining the 
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necessity of a planning organization, the US administration referred to the uncontrolled and 
inconsistent expenditures of the 50s.  
 
Therefore, establishment of the SPO was in full conformity with the demands of the US 
administration. Chief assignment of the organization was the state planning and executive 
authority. What made the SPO’s a point of attraction was related to its role in the allocation of 
resources. The planning authority would make rules about the distribution of two fundamental 
economic resources, scarce foreign exchange and public credit. Parallel to this role, the 
assigned position to the Director of the SPO was a deputy prime minister in charge of the 
industrial sector. 441    
 
By its establishment, the pro- and anti-bureaucracy emerged as pro- and anti-planners. Owing 
to the leading role of the RPP in the coalition government until the 1965 elections the pro-
plan atmosphere was dominating. Referring to the uncontrolled and uncoordinated 
expenditures of the 1950s, the pro-planners expressed their faith in the new organization.  In a 
short while, the SPO attracted a number of young economists and administrators who 
idealized SPO as the most suitable means for rapid economic development and social justice. 
Though the coalition government’s failure to carry out land reform and associated measures 
led to the resignation of the senior staff of the Organization who was known as the brain team 
at the time of its establishment in 1962, until the JP’s ascension to power as the governing 
party in 1965 there was harmony between SPO high staff and the political elite.442 
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The pro-plan as well as pro-SPO atmosphere was challenged by the JP’s ascension to power 
in 1965. Acting as the inheritor of the DP, the JP led an anti-bureaucratic policy line and acted 
to undermine the power of bureaucracy in any possible case.  The JP era was distinguished by 
anti-SPO policies until its emasculation in the late 1960s. In the advocacy of the 
emasculation, the political elite claimed that the government had to have the last word 
regarding resource allocation, since it represented the will of the nation. Their criticism of the 
dominating position of the SPO relied on the possibility of encroachment of the political will 
by the technocrats. They raised the absurdity of the resulting situation due to the stance of the 
SPO. Under the prevailing scheme, the government had to justify any wrong decisions 
causing waste of resources shaped by the initiative of the SPO to the voters. 443 
 
Pursuing a strategy, the JP completed the emasculation of the SPO in the late 1960s. In the 
first stage the political elite adopted policies which aimed to remove the SPO from its basic 
objectives. They rejected the possibility of any conflicts between the political administration 
and the SPO as the first questioned the views of the SPO and had the initiative to adopt or 
reject them.444 In the process, departments and branches that were established by legislation 
no 91 and were in charge of fulfilling the planning studies of the organization were weakened 
to a degree that they could not fulfill their main responsibilities. Parallel to this, departments 
and branches established by decisions of the Cabinet to fulfil tasks directly related to 
executive branch grew in an unnecessary and unbalanced way. By this, the SPO was moved 
away from its planning activities and grew more involved into executive activities.445 
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As a result of this strategy, the SPO lost its position vis-à-vis the political elite and turned to 
be an organization that justified all policies of the government. The increase in the amount of 
expenses by the arbitrary demands of the ministers was regarded as the sign of this loss of 
character. By using SPO, the political elite deteriorated the balance between sectors in favor 
of the private sector. The SPO was reduced to a bureau that developed projects for the private 
sector. Its decision making power to authorize on foreign capital investment without the 
Cabinet’s approval was also removed in this process.446   
 
Viewing from the perspective of the donor’s sensitivity on the planning organization, the JP 
governments’ demeanization of the SPO was a challenge to the demand of the donor. Parallel 
to this demeanization, the SPO was reduced a unit that approved the irrational use of the 
resources for their political considerations. The demeanization of the SPO created an 
awkward situation concerning the aid recipient’s responsiveness. While the demanded 
planning organization’s arrangements related to the form was completed, its functionality 
envisioned by the donor was nearly totally distorted.         
 
Whether this distortion made a great difference or not with respect to the rational use of 
allocated resources is highly controversial. It seems that the recommendations for the 
planning organization were relied on the assumption of rationally functioned and well-
checked bureaucratic system. In the case of Turkey this was a rather overoptimistic 
assumption. Due to the considerable corrupted nature of the high echelons of civilian 
bureaucracy, it is not possible to claim that rational use of available resources was assured by 
the ultimate control of the civilian bureaucracy.       
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Emasculation of the SPO was one aspect of the anti-bureaucratic rally. In addition to this, the 
JP administration purged a considerable number of bureaucrats. Though their policy the same 
as the DP’s, with respect to scope it was wider than its predecessor. Justifying their anti-
bureaucracy rally by referring to the one party era and reminding the “brutalities’ of the civil 
servants, the JP ruling circles were explicit in expressing their mistrust in the civilian 
bureaucrats. Besides, they exploited the phobia of communism by propagating that the RPP 
was equal to communists, as both lack religion. As the bureaucracy was traditionally 
identified with the RPP, it was also equal to communists, this meant that the bureaucracy was 
equal to pressure and brutality. Relying on this propaganda, the JP commenced its purging of 
the “leftist” and/or pro-RPP civil servants.447   
 
This purging had various aspects. The civil bureaucrats were appointed as either an advisor 
who was never consulted or as a standing council of no significance. Mass appointments, 
rapid execution of these appointments, inappropriate timing of the appointments such as late 
autumn were the main methods that the JP applied. Like the previous governments to it, the 
JP appointed bureaucrats who were sympathetic to JP. When JP established the government 
by itself, one of its first policies was to make a wide-spectrum change at governors, district-
governors and high-level officials. In this process, the criterion of appointing a person to a 
good place or post was whether the bureaucrat supported the JP or not, or whether he 
attempted any anti-JP initiative.448  
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The most debated legislation of the sixties that served the objective of purging bureaucrats 
was the legislation no 657. It was one of the first policies of the JP when it ascended to the 
government by itself in 1965. The legislation was arranged in a manner that while some state 
officials benefited from the State Official Legislation, others did not. This legislation was in 
essence shaped by the understanding of divide-and-rule principle in order to prevent a unified 
bureaucracy. Dodd defines one of the basic tenets of Turkish bureaucracy as lack of unity that 
would enable them to present a strong front to the government. The bureaucracy also lacked 
the strength to lead the country during times of political instability.449  
 
In addition to these, in the scope of the strategy to preserve its autonomy vis-à-vis the civil 
cadres, the JP political elite preferred to ignore the decisions of the bureaucratic organizations 
including the Council of State and Supreme Court. In the 1965-71 period, the Council decided 
that a total of 1400 governmental decrees of appointments in the civil service as null and void. 
In this, the main motive of the Council was that the officials’ duty was to implement the 
decisions of the government only, and not to share the views and philosophy of the 
government. The JP announced its respect for these decisions but responded only to forty of 
these decisions. Even for these, it did not let these bureaucrats to the post but only paid 
indemnity. The government members justified their ignorance of the verdicts by the rationale 
that as the elected body they relied on the most important source of power namely the will of 
the nation. Therefore the appointed did not have the right to interfere with the decisions of the 
political elite.450            
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Evaluation of these policies with respect to their outcomes reveals that similar to the DP’s 
experience, despite these policies, the JP failed to suppress the civilian bureaucracy to the 
level of total obedience.  This was not due to the collective act or counter strategy of the 
bureaucrats but due to their role in the system. Whatever the strategy of the political elite or 
other components, the influence of the civilian cadres could not be eliminated up to a certain 
level.  
 
At the end of the process, though the bureaucracy continued to preserve many of its rights, 
their loss was immense with respect to their preeminence in the coalition. Both Karpat and 
Heper define this loss with respect to the inability of the bureaucracy to stand as a unified 
body vis-à-vis the political elite. Heper stresses the highly politicized environment as the 
fundamental cause that served the disintegration of the bureaucracy. Parallel to the highly 
politicized and polarized nature of the society, which also sharpened the ideological features 
of the political parties, the decade witnessed the disintegration of the united front that the 
bureaucracy presented in the 1950s. The bureaucratic elite spread from right to left in the 
1960s, a fact that prevented them to repeat a set of common values. This disintegration was in 
essence parallel to the high polarization in the society which also shaped the ideological 
stance of the political parties. Political preferences, especially those of high rank bureaucrats, 
became more diversified after 1961. One outcome of this was increased distrust in the 
political elite and political parties and the civil servants in comparison to the DP era.451 
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Military Bureaucracy 
The military bureaucracy differed from other components of the ruling elite coalition with 
respect to its presence. In contrast to the capitalists and rural elite as the ones involved in the 
coalition by the Republic and the civilian bureaucracy that represented continuity with the 
past regarding its presence in the coalition, the military bureaucracy was successfully 
excluded from the coalition by the political elite of the new Republic. Its re-involvement in 
the coalition was possible by the Military Coup of 1960 after which it preserved its presence 
through establishing mechanisms that reinforced its role in the regime.     
 
Maneuvers aiming at subordination of military bureaucracy commenced even before the 
Republic. While military bureaucrats regarded themselves as undeniable factors in shaping 
the future of the country, the nation builders regarded their subordination as necessary since 
they had a wider sphere of action vis-à-vis other components.452 Scholars studying the issue 
point out that Ataturk himself handled this subordination move due to the discontent of the 
military bureaucrats with his increasing dominance. In the scope of this move, he dictated the 
principle of the Army’s non-interference with politics before the Independence. Despite 
various confrontations with the active and retired military officials who acted as MPs, the 
political elite regarded this principle as its guideline in shaping its relations with the military 
bureaucracy. 453   
 
Following the death of Ataturk, İnönü who was elected as the Second President of Turkey 
empowered his stance vis-à-vis the military by purging the higher rank military bureaucrats 
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who were either more experienced or had the same experience.454 The military was 
dissatisfied due to the political elite’s indifference to the prevailing problems in the military 
including type and age of the arms, reliance on animal power and other factors that reduced 
their operation capacity.455  
 
This discontent led to the establishment of a secret organization within the army against the 
political administration in the late 1940s aiming to interfere in politics in case elections were 
held unfairly. Though this indicated the presence of discontented factors in the military in 
relation to the political administration, it was not possible to generalize it to the whole body of 
the military; instead, it was generally accepted that despite the problems the majority of the 
military officials were devoted to the one party regime that they were trained in.456     
 
In sum, the one party regime was an era of reinforcing the stance of the political elite in the 
ruling elite coalition vis-à-vis the military bureaucracy. The policies aimed at making the 
military a security valve for the regime under the command of the political elite and the 
civilian bureaucracy. Naturally, pursued policies led to the emergence of groups within the 
military against the RPP administration, who were excited about realizing a multi-party era 
under a new ruling party.      
     
In contrast to the high expectations, however, the military bureaucracy was subject to the 
same sort of attitude during the DP era. In contrast to the expectations of the military 
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bureaucratic cadres, the DP political elite was not enthusiastic to deal with the problems of the 
military. This was disappointing for the military bureaucrats who had welcomed the ascension 
of DP hoping that the new political elite would leave the indifferent stance of the previous 
era.457  
 
The interaction between the political elite and military bureaucracy during the DP era was 
distinguished by the political elite’s distant, suspicious and indifferent stance.  As PM 
identified the military bureaucracy with the ex-President, during the initial stages the feeling 
that military by the agitation of the ex-President toppled the new regime which was obsessed 
by him. Moved by the belief that by controlling the higher echelons of the military, the whole 
military could be kept under control, the political elite made great changes in the higher ranks 
of the army. As there was not such an overall change previously, this was regarded as a 
civilian coup against the military. By this move political elite established its authority on the 
army, at least on the higher rank of the military.458    
 
In the rest of their administration the DP ruling circles never abandoned the principle of 
relying on higher ranks of the military while disregarding the majority’s concern. Yet even 
this dealing with the higher echelons was not made properly. Ex-military officials claimed 
that instead of seniority or success in the profession, the political elite chose the highest 
echelons in a trial-and-error manner. In this selection period, for the first time in the history of 
military, a young staff colonel acted as Chief of Staff without a decree.459  
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According to the memoirs of the ex-soldiers, by time the enthusiasm for the new 
administration declined as the military grasped the indifference of the political elite. The 
political elite limited its task regarding the military which only to intervention with the higher 
echelons of the military while undermining various problems which were the source of 
contempt among the military officials. Including the inadequacy of the arms, ambiguity in 
promotions, inflation in the higher echelons, unsatisfying payments and low-living standards, 
these problems were frequently debated in the Parliament. Except polemical responses, the 
political elite did not show a genuine interest for the solution of these problems.460   
 
Low payments, lower living standards and loss of prestige parallel to these two factors were 
the most debated issues. Critics referred to the direct proportion between the military’s loss of 
prestige and low payments, which were devaluing due to the deteriorated economic 
conditions. The concrete indicator of loss of prestige was defined by the decrease in the 
number of students who wanted to be military officials. By adopting a humiliating tone, the 
political elite preferred to recommend some palliative solutions which did not touch the core 
of the problem. Instead of dealing with the problem they avoided finding solutions to the 
appeals of the military officials. The rationale beneath this avoidance was that military 
officialdom was a post of altruism and no one was keeping the military officials by force. The 
military bureaucrats were invited to try their chances in the civilian life if they had the belief 
that earning large amounts of money was easier in the civilian life. As an increasing number 
of military officials had to live in the shanty houses under worsening conditions, the 
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unresponsiveness of the political elite became the factor that contributed more to the 
alienation of the military.461   
 
There were similarities in political elite’s dealing with the civilian and military bureaucracy in 
order to reinforce its stance vis-à-vis them. Regarding the military, the political elite did not 
correct the ambiguities in the promotions in rank as these ambiguities enabled political elite to 
take arbitrary initiatives.462The problem inherited from the RPP augmented to such a degree 
that the promotions as well retirements were carried out without certain rules but according to 
the dictates of the frequently changed National Defense Ministers. Critics of these practices 
pointed out the inappropriateness of these policies as they dishonored and humiliated the 
officials, particularly the high rank officers most of whom did not know the reason of their 
retirement. Similar to the policy line in dealing with the civilian bureaucrats, the DP political 
elite manipulated the retirement of the officials. In cases where the military officials appealed 
to the judiciary, verdicts of the judiciary were denied by the rationale that decision of the 
legislative elected by the will of the nation could not be limited or challenged by the 
appointed.463      
 
In sum, until the Coup of 1960 the military bureaucrats were excluded from the ruling elite 
coalition. Consistent with the role defined for them by the nation builders they were kept as a 
subordinate segment under the political elite. In the process, augmentation of problems 
regarding military parallel to the indifference, even humiliation by the political elite promoted 
an appropriate environment for the Military Coup of 1960.  Yet Keyder refers to another 
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important factor, namely the belief that the DP betrayed the Kemalist ideals that accelerated 
the process that led to the Coup. Keyder points out that developments regarding the 
rebalancing of the ruling elite coalition were, in fact, departures from the Kemalist path. This 
raised the possibility of resentment among the military, particularly the senior military 
officials who were still of “a generation educated by Kemalism”.464 
 
The process, on the other hand, provided the opportunity for the military bureaucracy, whose 
stance in the ruling elite coalition deteriorated by the RPP political elite, to reassert its 
position. Without undermining the social dimensions of the military coup of May 27 1960, its 
analysis with respect to elite interaction indicated that it was an attempt of the military 
bureaucracy to reassert its position and intervene with the rebalancing of the ruling elite 
coalition that departed from the Kemalist line to a great extent.   
 
Assessment of the 1960 Coup from the elite interaction perspective revealed its importance 
with respect to the military bureaucracy. By its intervention the military bureaucracy became 
one of the permanent components of the ruling elite coalition. This was a reassertion for the 
military since it was not a new component such as the rural elite or capitalists. Instead it was 
an important component of the coalition of the imperial era. As one of the initial 
arrangements, insistence of the military administration to change the position and rank of the 
Chief of Staff’s in the state hierarchy was very meaningful in this respect. Instead of being 
responsible to the National Defense Ministry, the Chief of Staff became responsible to the 
Prime Ministry and was appointed by the President. By this arrangement, the rank of the 
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Chief of Staff in the state protocol became the fourth place following the President, Speaker 
of the Parliament and the Prime Minister.465   
  
In this reassertion, the military bureaucracy established mechanisms that served the 
institutionalization of its position in the elite composition. These mechanisms were regarded 
as precautions to avoid any future possible attempts against its stance within the elite 
coalition. While, by the establishment of the National Security Council, it formed the political 
bastion of its stance, by the Army Mutual Solidarity Fund (acrimony in Turkish is OYAK) it 
created an economic bastion.      
 
The first crucial arrangement regarding the balances within the elite coalition was the 
establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) in 1961. Its establishment indicated 
new balances in politics and administration. By this the military bureaucrats reinforced their 
stance in the ruling elite coalition vis-à-vis other components of this alliance. It was the 
mechanism to prevent ignorance of their views by the civilians in the future. As a permanent 
arrangement the NSC indicated the envy of the military bureaucrats, which they reasserted by 
the Military Coup of 1960 since the NSC assigned an integrated role to the ruling circle of the 
military as military and political elite. In the NSC, leaders of the armed forces and the Chief 
of Staff convened with the top civilian leadership under the chairmanship of the President to 
consider all matters related to the security of the state and national interest. This was the legal 
forum that enabled the military bureaucrats to express their views to the civilian politicians.466 
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 257
While the National Security Council formed the political bastion of the military’s stronghold 
in the elite coalition, Army Solidarity Fund (OYAK) was designed as the economic bastion of 
this stronghold. Established by legislation no 205 on 1 March 1961 OYAK was justified at 
public as an additional social security for the military officials to meet their health expenses 
and provided pension. Experiencing the humiliation of the low life standards during the DP 
era, this establishment was met by great enthusiasm from all ranks of the military.  
 
Yet its establishment from the strategic viewpoint indicated the vitality of OYAK for the elite 
considerations of the military.  The military elite regarded OYAK as a precondition to have a 
realistic basis for the military’s stance in the ruling elite coalition with respect to other 
components, particularly the capitalists. Memoirs of one of Turkey’s tycoons shed light to the 
fact that from the very beginning the military determined its route to become a big capitalist 
entrepreneur. Vehbi Koc stated that a competitive atmosphere was observed between the 
capitalists and the military officials responsible for the drawing of the strategy for OYAK. As 
they assigned OYAK a role more than being an insurance organization, these military 
authorities rejected recommendations of the three industrialist members of the Executive 
Board of OYAK. First of the confrontations was whether OYAK would be involved in the 
construction of the houses for its members or not. Against the tendency of the military 
members for this involvement, civilian members opposed the idea on grounds that  
construction was an expensive  business that  should not be considered. Instead they 
suggested bidding of tenders for these constructions.467  
 
The second issue was related to OYAK’s involvement in food sector through the Army 
Markets. Civilian members opposed this idea on grounds that it was a risky business due to 
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the possibility of deterioration of the purchased goods, inefficient marketing or overstock that 
would result in out-fashioned goods. The third issue that civilian and military officials 
confronted on was related to OYAK’s involvement in industry. The civilian members 
opposed the idea of OYAK’s undertaking management of industrial establishments. They 
suggested partnerships in the fields that Industrial Bank and Is Bank offered it, instead of 
management. The military members of the Executive Board refused to accept these 
recommendations of the civilian members by implying that they were deliberate 
misapprehensions as the civilian industrial members regarded the establishment of OYAK 
against their interests.468       
 
Following this confrontation the civilian members did not attend the Executive Board 
meetings. Yet the process revealed the avoidance of their recommendations and the pursuit of 
the strategy that military authorities defined for OYAK’s role in the system. As a result of 
this, in the early 1970s, OYAK turned to be one of the greatest monopolies in the country 
which had diversified investments in various sectors such as construction, tourism, insurance, 
automotive industry as well as intermediary industry such as refrigerator, cement, petro-
chemistry and food processing. In the diversification of the activities, it did not hesitate to 
seek the partnership of foreign capital. The radical critics of these initiatives in economic 
activities defined them as the military’s being in a compromise with the existing capitalist 
order. Those who did not make such a claim, on the other, accepted that by OYAK the high 
ranking soldiers accepted to a degree the economic status quo.469  
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Remembered by many as the military coup that presented a liberal and democratic 
Constitution to Turkey, the Coup’s role in the successful arrangements related to the military 
bureaucracy’s position in the ruling elite coalition was assured through the established 
mechanisms of NSC and OYAK. While the liberal and democratic Constitution of 1961 
became a memory for the nation, the above-mentioned arrangements survived and continued 
to shape the macro policies of the country. 
 
The nature of the interaction between the military and other components could be grasped 
through the unattained policy statements and undertakings of the military even when their 
authority was at its peak in the immediate aftermath of the Coup. Analysis of the military 
administration era reflected that the military administration did not repeat the same success 
that they had in the establishment of the mechanisms for its own strategic considerations with 
respect to elite coalition.  By time they withdrew policies including land reforms and tax 
arrangements which they had defined as crucial to attain a genuine development.       
 
These withdrawals reflected that the military elite did not have the intention of challenging 
the stance of other components. Instead in a compromising manner the military reasserted its 
stance within the coalition that was denied to the military bureaucracy during the Republican 
era. This preference of a compromising attitude in their dealing with other components also 
shed light on the expulsion of the fourteen radical and utopian members of the military 
committee who involved in the Coup and insisted on the military’s remaining in power until 
the real strides such as land reform, health reform, education reform, social solidarity reform 
and reform in religion, defined as the social reforms, were taken in the field of social 
development. 470  
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In the immediate aftermath of the Coup the military administration expressed its discontent 
with the existing feudal structure. In this they referred to East Anatolia where there were 
captured lands in which the peasants were exploited by agas and seihks. Emphasizing their 
decisiveness to end this feudal order, the military administration stated that land would be 
distributed to the peasants who were the cultivators and they would be the owners of the land 
that they cultivated.471 
 
Similarly in the program of the first military government various crucial issues related to the 
allocation of resources were mentioned. In addition to the just land reform, non-partisan and 
non-concessionaire distribution of bank credits, end of emission to distribute credits, and 
reform in the SEEs particularly with respect to prevention of their financing from the Central 
Bank resources472 as an inflationist policy were the main points that were related to the 
allocation of the resources as well as challenging the interests of ruling elite components.        
This pattern of thought also shaped the Constitution. By the 1961 Constitution the military 
administration paid special attention to taxation, land reform, nationalization of private 
enterprises and social rights. Ozbudun defines this interest as the military administration’s 
genuine concern on the redistribution of the wealth and income as well as calling for the State 
to intervene to minimize the inequalities. Based on the social justice principle, the 
Constitution defined the criterion of taxation as; everyone had to pay taxes according to his 
financial capacity (article 61). Enforcement of this article would challenge the interests of 
those who enjoyed tax exemption or extensive rebates from the taxed amount. Another 
attempt of this sort was related to the land reform. By a favoring stance for the poor and 
landless peasant, the Constitution made an important exception regarding the payment of the 
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expropriation compensation. In contrast to its immediate and full payment, it called for its 
payment in equal installments for twenty years at maximum. The law would determine the 
interest rates for this repayment.473 
 
Another important measure with respect to allocation of resources was the nationalization of 
the private enterprises. The defined criterion for this measure was that the nationalization had 
to be for the public interest and the nationalized enterprise was in the nature of a public 
service. The law would determine the compensation payment and repayment period would not 
exceed a decade. In the sphere of social rights, the Constitution defined two categories. The 
first aimed at the protection of the workers vis-à-vis the employer by the recognized right of 
unionization, strike, collective bargaining and a paid rest. The second category was related to 
social security, medical care as well as housing, as new impositions on the State.474  
 
Examination of the military administration’s policies, however, revealed either impracticality 
or momentariness of the practices related to these policies.475 This examination also 
underlined the difference between being the government and being in power. As the change of 
the administration from the civilian to the military did not change the status of the existing 
elite groups, the seemingly ultimate power of the military seems to be an illusion. If the claim 
of an ex-military officer is regarded as true, a good example of this limited power was 
revealed in the case of the production of the first national automobile. He points out that the 
low-quality produced national automobile, half of the material of which was also importation, 
namely Anadol, was the cunning trick of the Turkish capitalists who were in full collaboration 
with the foreign capitalists to kill Cemal Gursel’s idea of establishing automobile industry in 
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the country.  According to this ex-soldier, the reason for sabotaging was the challenge of the 
interests, and financial profits of the importer capitalists, including the business tycoons. 
Though the country would have made great profits from the automobiles production, in such a 
case the loss of these importers would be great.476 
 
Related to the early abandonment of some polices which were declared as crucial for the 
attainment of social development such as land reform, and taxation policies, Karpat indicates 
the military’s withdrawal from the idealistic rhetoric in the face of a complex network of 
relations among the ruling elite coalition. He also defines this as the reason for military’s 
relatively early leaving of the administration to civilians. In the words of Karpat the military 
administration’s early perception that a simple military dictatorship could no longer deal with 
the complex pressures of an increasingly differentiated social structures (emphasis is added) 
was the reason why military relinquished its power to civilians.477 
 
Hale refers to the same aspect in explaining the expulsion of the 14s from the military 
committee. Hale points out that this cleaning within the Committee in a very short time was in 
fact an attempt to put the Committee in order. This was the purging of the utopians who failed 
to grasp the complexity of the existing relation networks. The committee members, who were 
known as 14’s supported a long-term, may be permanent, military administration due to their 
distrust in the civilians. Regarding the 14s as radicals, the majority of the NUC inclined for a 
short-term stay, a time period that would be enough for them to put things in order.478  
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In sum, the appropriate environment for the military coup of 1960, prepared by the 
uncoordinated and irresponsive policies of the civilian administration of the 1950s, paved the 
way for the military bureaucracy’s reassertion of its stance within the ruling elite coalition.  In 
this reassertion it also created the mechanisms, which reinforced its position within the 
coalition in the process. Despite its idealistic rhetoric regarding far-reaching social reforms, 
the military elite, in a short while, perceived the degree of autonomy that it enjoyed in the face 
of complex network of relations networks in the society. Though it endowed the society with 
liberal democratic rights by the 1961 Constitution, in a decade’s time again due to the 
interplay of various factors under the appropriate circumstances it contributed to the interests 
of other components of the ruling elite coalition by restricting these liberal rights of the mass. 
 
Concerning this identification of interests, some scholars point out the pro-capitalist 
arrangements that military memo of 1971 provided. For the capitalists the military 
intervention of 1971 was like a saving mechanism since they had difficulty in coping with a 
highly politicized society. The increasingly differentiated society with its dynamism, activism 
and militancy began to pose serious challenges to the ruling elite coalition, particularly to the 
industrial capitalists. Parallel to a strong trade union movement, the wave of strikes 
challenged the interests of capitalists, both national and foreign. Arrangements which purged 
the liberal elements of the 1961 Constitution  prepared under the surveillance of the military 
administration of 1960, aimed to eliminate these challenges. In essence, these arrangements 
not only eliminated the challenges but also served the big capitalists’ consolidation of power. 
This consolidation was possible through various economic policies such as expansion of bank 
credits and provision of various incentives including cheap money to the capitalist circles and 
arrangements regarding labor market such as proscription of strikes, restriction of right of 
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association.479 The proscription of right of strikes and restrictions on the trade unionism were 
justified and propagated by other elite components on the ground that Turkish public was yet 
immature for these democratic rights. 
 
Another important feature of the military interventions in Turkey is related to their Western 
orientation. This is neither surprising nor unexpected; instead it represented a continuity of at 
least two-centuries long tradition of Westernization of the military. However, in the Cold War 
context, the interaction between the military bureaucracy and the USA represented a more 
complex nature. This could not be explained only with respect to the military’s western 
orientation. Depending on the country’s geopolitical importance in the Cold War era, the 
military was the direct beneficiary of the foreign aid allocations. Therefore, the Turkish 
military bureaucracy was the ruling elite component that had more stable relations with the 
donor. Confirming Turkey’s alliance with the Western Bloc in the immediate aftermath of the 
Military Coup of 1960, the military bureaucracy proved its act’s difference from the Iraqi 
Revolution of 1958. While the latter emerged as the response to the discontent of the pro-
Western policies of the country, the Turkish military coup did not have such a claim. Instead, 
the military bureaucracy put Turkey’s relations with the Western countries in order, which 
were deteriorated during the last years of the DP era. By making arrangements such as 
establishment of a planning organization and purge of the inflated high ranks in the Turkish 
military480, the military bureaucracy was responsive to the concerns of the Western Bloc.  
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However, the military intervention of the 1970 was different from the one in the 1960. Instead 
of administrating the country, the military warned political elite about the prevailing anarchy 
in the country. It implied that unless the civilian administration had a determination in solving 
these problems, then the military had the right to take over the country’s administration. 
Though it was not the military bureaucracy that made arrangements following the Memo of 
1970, it could be concluded that the military paved the way for the appropriate environment 
that the USA also welcomed.  First of all, it was the so-called reform government that banned 
poppy cultivation that the US administration asked for a long time. Suppression of the mass 
movements and labor trade unionism in the country481 after the Memo served also the 
interests of the foreign companies in the country. 
 
As a concluding remark, it can be stated that owing to its empowered position within the 
ruling elite coalition, the military bureaucracy has been an important determinant in politics 
and resource allocation. Through establishing mechanisms, the military bureaucracy achieved 
the institutionalization of its interests. The National Security Council (NSC) enabled the 
military bureaucracy’s continuous participation in the decision-making process on the most 
strategic national issues. Its establishment indicated new balances in state administration. The 
political elite who represented the national will have to share its decision-making power with 
the military bureaucracy. 
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II. Ruling Elite Coalition of Indian Federal Republic, 1947-73 
 
By the time of Independence, Indian ruling elite coalition comprised political elite, industrial 
capital, rural elite and civilian bureaucracy. At the dawn of the new era each component had 
its expectations and visions regarding the future. The political elite and the majority of the 
industrial capital enjoyed Independence. For them this new era offered new opportunities 
without the dominance of foreign rule. While this was a common feeling among these 
components, the same was not true for the rural elite. As they owed their emergence as well as 
perpetuation of their interests to the British rule, they were not among those who participated 
in the anti-British movement.482 The civilian bureaucracy, on the other hand, had mixed 
feelings due to the ambiguity of their stance in the new regime. They were aware of Nehru’s 
and other leading figures anti-bureaucratic feelings as they identified the civilian service with 
the British rule. The civilian service was known as the “steel frame of Empire” and its 
members were “the men who ruled India”483 regardless of the concerns of the Indian public.     
 
Examination of the policies reflected this tensioned dialect between the components. The 
process was shaped by the interaction between these components for the sake of dominance in 
the coalition. According to their power to affect the process these components shaped the 
development policies. While this interaction between components represented one dimension, 
the other dimension was related to the mass. In the latter the interaction was shaped as ruling 
elite versus the mass. In this section, first the interaction of the Indian ruling elite and the 
mass is analyzed in order to reveal the process that led to the discrepancy between the rhetoric 
and practice in economic and social development process. Following this the interaction 
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between the ruling elite components is analyzed as to diagnose how the confronting 
components manipulate the process for their own sake. The analyzed policies are limited to 
those that affected the development policies and domestic savings such as taxation and 
incentives.    
 
Interaction between mass and the ruling elite coalition 
In 1947 Indian ruling elite coalition comprised the dominant interest groups in a society 
where majority of the population lived in rural areas distinguished by widespread abject 
poverty. The mass was highly mobilized by gaining Independence for which they waited and 
struggled so long. For the majority of the rural population Independence meant ending of the 
era when they were exploited by the British system. The leaders of the National Movement 
defined the Independence as the termination of this exploitation era. They depicted a 
“promised land” to the majority of rural population without any exploitation. The motto they 
adopted for this “promised land” was “land to the tiller”. These rising expectations of the 
majority of the Indian rural population, which were manipulated by the leaders of the National 
Movement, became more alarming in the Asian context due to the so-called ‘social 
revolution’ in Asia. This was the name given by the American diplomats regarding the rising 
expectations of the Asian people shaped by the belief that something “must and could and 
would be done about their lot.”484  
  
The political elite, mostly including the leading figures of the National Movement, was aware 
of the expectations of the mass and expanding communist danger in the country.  They set up 
ideological settings to touch on the expectations of the mass. Nehru’s political rhetoric was 
the so-called Nehru socialism that promised a more egalitarian social order. As a pragmatic 
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interpretation of socialism,485 in the framework of Nehru socialism, Indian policymakers were 
able to reinforce capitalist relations in the Indian society. 
  
Despite the announcement of its being a pragmatic interpretation by Nehru, relying on his 
statements, not only the mass but also some segments of Indian capitalists thought that India 
was led to a socialistic pattern of society.  When Nehru announced his socialistic tendencies, 
some segments of the Indian capitalists reacted to this vehemently on the grounds that these 
principles endangered the private property rights of the individuals. Panicked by this 
principle, they signed a manifesto against socialism and communism while openly attacking 
Nehru. It was G.D. Birla, the mouthpiece of the organized big capital in India and main 
financier of the National Movement among the Indian capitalists, who opposed this initiative. 
He criticized those who signed the manifesto on the grounds that any explicit opposition to 
socialism meant antagonism of the mass. As the general tendency in the Congress, which was 
against socialism, as revealed in various sessions, Birla questioned why the capitalists 
increased the antagonism of the mass by openly opposing socialism and advocated the rights 
of capitalists.486 Regarding Nehru’s socialistic recourse as a means to keep the masses in their 
place to prevent their radicalization, this logic of Birla never changed and also shaped the 
stance of the big capital to a great extent.      
 
The creation of an ideological setting that correlated with the expectations of the mass was not 
a one-stop policy. Instead it was a strategy that represented a continuation regardless of the 
era. Following his father, Indira Gandhi, in the face of widespread poverty as well as 
increased radicalization of the peasants, adopted garibi horatio, eradication of poverty 
rhetoric. For Gandhi, adoption of garibi horatio was a matter of survival not for her political 
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career but also for the continuation of the regime. In a speech that she made in December 
1970 at a session of Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry Gandhi hinted the 
possibility of a mass movement against the country’s administration that would be “swept 
away” by this movement unless the administration achieved the egalitarian distribution of 
prevailing resources. Not only the message but also the audience was crucial. This can be 
interpreted as her underlying of the fact that the adopted policy was for the sake of all vested 
interests.  
 
The concrete policies were in conformity with the created ideological setting. The first stage 
of the agricultural development policy gave the impression that the political elite was 
responsive to the expectations of the rural mass. The adopted agricultural development policy 
aimed cooperative farming, Community Development Programs and land reform policies 
including abolition of intermediaries, tenancy reform act, and ceiling on landholdings. The 
overall objective of these policies was defined as attainment of a more egalitarian social order 
as well as creation of productive and consuming peasants.487       
 
Analysis of these policies reveals that they aimed to annihilate the semi-feudal structures in 
rural India which were remnant of the British administration. An important feature of these 
policies was their pro-capitalist orientation. The capitalist orientation of these policies was 
revealed first in the objectives of cooperative farming. This was a scheme designed to 
increase agricultural productivity as well as transforming villages to economically viable units 
via producing marketable surplus. In addition to this, the Indian political elite aimed at 
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expanding mechanized agriculture through these cooperatives.488 All these indicated a scheme 
of capitalist rural economy where the peasant not only produces but also consumes more. The 
other indicator of this capitalist scheme was observed in the flexible measures of land reform 
legislation.  Relying on the “resumption right” or purchase measures the former 
intermediaries were allowed to possess very big farms, which were feasible for mechanized 
farming.  
 
The second stage of agricultural development policy (1966-1974) was apparently capitalist in 
approach, orientation and objectives. The adopted intensive agricultural techniques which 
required huge capital as well as appropriate climatic conditions excluded the majority and 
aimed at the individual-based development. These policies were shaped by trickle-down 
principle assuming that the wealth level reached by the “progressive” farmers would trickle 
down to all segments of rural structure in the process.489This policy along with incentives for 
its expansion served the acceleration of capitalist mode of production in rural areas.     
   
Therefore, as the above-mentioned analysis reveals, the agricultural development policies had 
two dimensions. First of all, at least on paper, the political elite gave the message to the mass 
that they were taking some crucial steps to attain the “promised land”. Secondly, parallel to 
the objectives of the economic development as well as to the urgent needs of the country, the 
political elite attempted to annihilate the semi-feudal structures while promoting capitalist 
relations. The cooperative farming as well as land reform    policies fell into the second 
category of interactions, namely intra-elite confrontation. Yet, in this confrontation the 
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concern of the political elite was not the stance of the rural elite but its function, more truly 
de-functionality, in the rural social structure. 
 
The Green Revolution, on the other hand, represented the first category of interaction, namely 
the ruling elite versus the mass. Promotion of this policy was done at the expense of the lower 
segments of the rural social structure. They were impoverished to a great extent due to direct 
and indirect policies of the political elite. Parallel to this, while the political elite served the 
diversification of rural elite as big landlords and capitalist farmers, by these policies they also 
served the interests of the industrial capital, which necessitated high agricultural productivity 
and expanding domestic market.   
 
Policies regarding the industrial capital reflected the same tendencies. In his ‘socialistic’ 
appeal to the nation, Nehru assured not only a less exploitative system but also a creation of 
mechanisms to prevent concentration of power and resources into few hands. The latter was 
an implication related to the industrial capital whose distinguished feature was being 
monopoly capital as another remnant of the British era. Diagnosing the anxieties as well as 
complaints about the mixed economy, which enabled a huge maneuvering field for the private 
capital, Nehru emphasized the GOI’s endeavors for a decentralized social order.490      
 
The main mechanism that GOI developed to this end was the licensing system. Enacted in 
1951 under the name of Industrial Development and Regulation Act, licensing aimed at 
preventing concentration of resources and economic power in few hands, unbalanced regional 
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dispersal of industrial establishments and inhibition of development of small-scale industries 
through the rational allocation of resources by the State in a socially optimal way.491  
 
Evaluation of the outcomes of licensing system, however, revealed just the opposite of this 
rationale. Instead of social optimality the distinguished feature of the system was allocation of 
resources to the monopolist capital.  The big industrial capital institutionalized its 
monopolistic power through exploiting the loopholes in the legislation as well as using their 
better connections and better access to get the lion’s share in the bureaucratic allocations of 
the licenses. They also restricted the new comers’ entrance into the sector. This behavior of 
the big industrial capital caused the disproportionate distribution of the licensing in favor of 
the top industrial houses. Owing to their influence in the system, these monopolist capitalists 
distorted the country’s investment priorities and also aborted their conversion to installed 
capacities. As they began to dominate production, in a protected domestic market they 
preferred to produce low quality products. Besides, they contributed extensively to the 
regional disparities in the country.492 
 
When the ineffectiveness of this mechanism became evident in the mid-1960s the political 
elite attempted to revise it. Yet, in a short while it faced the dilemma of extending new 
incentives or aborting the system as the country’s industrial production began to decelerate. 
The political elite chose the first way for the sake of increased production. It was at that time 
the Commission in charge of investigating Monopolies concluded that concentration of 
economic power on a country basis was good for the economic development of the country. 
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Though the degree of the concentration of the economic power in the private sector was more 
than what could be justified, the Commission did not suggest dissolving the existing 
monopolies but taking precaution against future monopolistic development.493    
 
This enabled the industrial capital to exploit the system more. They increasingly created 
unlicensened capacities. In contrast to the expectations they were never punished but in many 
cases actually rewarded by subsequent regularization of such illegally created capacities. 
Commencing in the late 1960s, the political elite was insensitive to the uproar in the country 
against proved corruption cases in delivering licensing. The corruption stood just the contrary 
of the verification of licenses. Even though the claim was licenses were derived according to 
the national interest, and not according to narrow party or personal interest, which were 
guiding the government’s decisions. In fact, as many critics pointed out the political elite was 
helpless vis-à-vis the monopolist capital as the latter institutionalized the manipulation of 
prevailing loopholes in the system. 494  
   
Another issue related to the monopoly capital was nationalization of the existing private 
establishments. It was brought to the agenda more frequently than other issues as the leftists 
regarded it as an ideological concern. As a pragmatic socialist Nehru was firm in his 
opposition to this demand. Defining it as unrealistic and done for the sake of some theoretical 
debates, he stated that unless nationalization served productive ends it was not meaningful in 
a resource-short country like India. Pointing out the financial dimension of nationalization, 
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namely a huge amount of compensation, Nehru expressed the political elite’s preference to 
earmark such a huge amount to new fields and new production units.495 
 
Commencing in the late 1960s, various establishments including fourteen major commercial 
banks, general insurance companies, coalmines, textile and copper industries were 
nationalized by the GOI. On the eve of these nationalization acts, PM Gandhi defined them as 
the public sector’s initiative to curb concentration of economic power in certain hands. 
Supporting the nationalization acts, PM Gandhi stated that if the nationalization were for the 
interests of the country, the GOI would not have hesitated to nationalize. In her claim 
nationalization was explained as an act mainly to restrict the growth of monopolies through 
industrialization.496 
 
By this claim Gandhi totally departed from her father’s concerns.  Though the fact of huge 
compensation did not change, the conjuncture changed totally. In contrast to the high 
electorate support of the 1950s, in the late 1960s the CP, to a great extent, lost its electorate 
support. Interpreted this as a warning, Gandhi decided to adopt a radical program that touched 
upon the discontent of the mass who began to express themselves in various movements such 
as the Naxalite movement, in different parts of India.497 Nationalization issue was the main 
pillar of this radical program.  
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A serial of nationalization acts commenced by the nationalization of the general insurance, a 
sick industry with insignificant resources, meager profits and structural deficiencies. This was 
followed by nationalization of coalmines, another long debated issue that commenced even 
before Independence, exactly in 1937. Its nationalization was supported by referring to the 
great coal loss due to the highly deteriorated structure of the mines, unscientific extracting of 
the coal due to the increase in cost of labor, plant and equipment. Though modernization of 
methods and equipment was defined as a remedy for stagnancy in the production, the 
coalminers were either reluctant or unable to make investments for their modernization. The 
same was true for the textile industry. Being the oldest and one of the major industries in 
India, it was distinguished by lower production rates that failed to meet the national 
requirements. The GOI decided to nationalize it instead of extending huge credits for its 
modernization.498      
 
These were followed by nationalization of mineral and metal industries. In the scope of this 
activity, first a steel-producing unit was nationalized, fifty percent of the shares of which 
belonged to the state and in which production had considerably decreased since the mid-
1960s. Copper industry’s nationalization was also justified by the same reason of low 
productivity as well as ending the monopolistic control over its raw material.499  
 
Though these nationalized branches were crucial, nationalization of the fourteen commercial 
banks stood at the core of the nationalization concept.  Its interpretation as an ideological act 
led to the split of the CP in 1969. Against the splitting members’ claim that it was an act that 
                                                 
498Quoted from Journal of Lok Sabha Records, 2 June 1971,p.188; Madan, Congress Party and Social Change, 
p. 122-3, 159, 161.  
499Journal of Lok Sabha Records, 21 August 1972, col.333-4; Madan, Congress Party and Social Change, p.150.   
 276
led the country to totalitarianism,500 the PM Gandhi stated that by this nationalization the 
government ensured the public sector’s control and direction of the commanding height of the 
economy. In addition, by transforming the banking concept to “social banking”, the political 
elite defined their aim as to challenge the urban-biased orientation of the banking system and 
focused on rural areas.501 
 
Challenged by the rhetoric of the bank nationalization, the monopoly capital also complained 
about the GOI’s decision. Regretting Gandhi’s determinism on the issue, the monopoly 
capitalists claimed that in the post-Nehru era government’s pragmatic approach faded away. 
Interpreting bank nationalization as the GOI’s attempt to liquidate the private sector, they 
began to debate, withdrawing their support from the CP.502 Though they seemed to be firm on 
the issue, however, in an ironical manner again, the leading figures provided funds to Indira 
Gandhi’s Congress Party in 1971.503Continuation of this support could be grasped from the 
scope as well as outcomes of the nationalization policies.   
 
First of all, nationalization did not lead to the attainment of announced objectives. 
Nationalization of the General Insurance was justified on grounds that this led to the provision 
of institutional credit to small and neglected sectors of the economy. Though a sustained 
growth was attained with satisfactory profit trends, there was no evidence to prove that 
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financial resources of the general insurance were utilized for the benefit of the  common 
man.504   
 
In the case of coal industry, a major source of energy came under almost the complete control 
of the public sector. Mines which remained out of the public control, on the other hand, 
belonged to the monopoly capital. They were excluded from the process by the rationale that 
their nationalization could lead to serious production setbacks.  This was not the sole handicap 
regarding the issue. Besides, the public sector failed to attain the announced objectives 
including scientific production of coal, its easy availability at cheap rates to the consumer, 
uninterrupted supply of coal to the steel plants and better service conditions.505Like the coal 
industry, other nationalized branches shared the same deficiencies. Their being under the 
public sector did not lead to an additional benefit for the common man. Their performance 
was not improved after nationalization. Instead, to a great extent, they continued to function 
as feeders of the private sector. 506  
 
More than the others, the nationalized banks revealed how nationalization turned out to be a 
mechanism enabling the flow of public sector resources to the monopoly capitalists. First of 
all, this nationalization did not lead to the emergence of the so-called social banking that 
focused on rural areas. Rejecting its failure about this, the GOI referred to the increased credit 
allocations, disregarding the fact that these credits were under the monopoly of the big capital.  
This monopolization was best revealed in the low amount of the bank customers.  As late as 
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1980 only 10 million households, approximately 7 % of the total households, in India were 
customers.507 
 
The most important aspect of unattained objective was the unchallenged interest of the big 
capital. Instead, a reversal of this was valid in many cases. Despite all public appeals, the 
political elite was sensitive to the concerns of the big capital.  Through various amendments 
the majority of the industries belonging to the monopoly houses were untouched. In most 
cases the political elite did not even change the managers and executive boards of the 
nationalized enterprises including the banks which already had established institutionalized 
interest networks with the big capital. The political elite assured the monopoly capital from 
the Parliament floor by emphasizing that the GOI was not considering any general proposals 
to nationalize the big monopoly houses in the country. The GOI turned these statements into 
concrete forms by giving more licenses to the top industrial houses; exactly nine to Birlas and 
three to Tatas during 1969-71, for substantial expansion of the existing plants.508   
 
Besides, the paid compensation was so high that it made nationalization an uneconomical act. 
Defining compensations as a new method of forgery of public funds, the pro-nationalists 
expressed their dissatisfaction about this undertaking. Uneconomic aspect of the 
compensations was raised not only by the leftists but also by the monopoly capitalists 
themselves. The President of the Chamber of Commerce stated that the paid compensation 
made the undertaking a very uneconomical one and defined this as another act of government 
action without any economic justification. A member of the Cabinet, who represented big 
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capital and supported nationalization on the grounds that these were undertaken mostly by 
political considerations more than economical ones, confirmed this view. He expressed the 
satisfaction of the decision-makers in the government as they gave the message to the mass 
that they were keeping their promises.509   
 
In addition to high compensations, by keeping the same high staff in the executive boards of 
the banks and lasting membership of the big capital in these boards, the GOI did not challenge 
the interwoven relations between the big capital and managers of these banks. This was just 
the opposite of the announced motive behind nationalization, namely de-linking the control of 
top business houses from the banking sector, since the “evil” of these banks aroused from the 
fact that they were under the control and domination of the big capital. As one of the reports, 
the Mahalanobis Report discloses, in the ten leading banks of the country directors were in 
one or other way associated with the big industrial houses in the country. Besides executive 
boards of the first top eight banks of the country were distinguished by the dominance of 
industrial directors. This dominance was defined as the reason why the mass could not have 
adequate access to bank credits.510    
 
As their interests were unchallenged, nationalization did not lead to a shift in the credit 
patterns of the banks. According to the Reserve Bank’s Report at the end of December 1973, 
fourteen nationalized bank had given Rs. 582.32 crores as credits to the seventy-five 
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monopoly houses. In addition, State Bank of India had advanced Rs. 1627 crore to private 
companies of which 304.97 crores went to the top seventy-five big houses.511 
 
In addition to these particularly distorted policies, there were some mechanisms established 
for the benefits of the ruling elite. The most important of these mechanisms was the incentives 
that included public sector’s feeding role of the private sector through various subsidies. 
Despite their well-known contribution to the prevalence of economy’s structural problems, 
the political elite did, more truly could not, however abandon them. While continuing with 
these incentives the political elite preferred deficit financing, to cover them, which meant high 
inflation and depletion of the savings for unproductive ends.     
 
Critics of the public sector referred to its low performance, red tapism and inefficiency, yet 
none of them referred to the private sector’s crucial role in this inefficiency. Though 
expansion of public sector was justified as a policy that served the creation of a socialist 
order, the practice proved just the contrary. In contrast to Nehru’s definition regarding the 
relation of public and private sector, in India public sector acted as the feeder of private 
sector. By this the public sector served capitalism’s being fostered in India without the 
support of the state, which was impossible since the Indian capitalists lacked the technical and 
financial resources to build capitalism. Acting as a catalyst, the public sector was in the 
service of growth of capitalism and monopolies.512  
 
This feeding role of the public sector had various dimensions. First of all, its role was defined 
as venturing into fields where private sector did not dare to venture. These were generally 
fields that required huge investment due to their scope as well as demanding a long growth 
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period before they yielded returns. The Indian public sector had quite a remarkable success in 
these undertakings, most of which were related to the infrastructure of the country such as 
roads, railroads and irrigation.513Infrastructure building was a great contribution to the private 
sector as these infrastructural establishments decreased production and distribution costs of 
the industrial outputs.    
 
Another dimension of this feeding was public sector’s undertaking of all the unprofitable 
investments, particularly in basic industries. This was regarded as a distinguishing feature of 
Indian public sector as in the process a large number of private units were taken up by the 
state due to endemic ‘sickness’, exemplified by jute mills, mini steel plants, pharmaceutical 
and engineering units and a large part of the textile industry. The private sector began to 
exploit this tendency of the GOI. Mainly the big capital deliberately allowed some of their 
establishments to become ‘sick’ so that they could reduce their tax liabilities and divert public 
funds for private profit.514  
 
The third dimension of this feeding role was cheaper provision of subsidized inputs to the 
private industrial establishment. This was among the main causes that led to public sector’s 
low profit margins and waste of resources. It provided machinery, industrial raw materials and 
intermediate products at prices lower than international prices while buying the finished 
goods of the private sector at higher prices to squeeze out maximum profits. By this 
mechanism, the system enabled the private sector to make huge benefits at the expense of the 
public sector since the public sector enterprises were at a loss due to the cheap provision of 
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both raw materials and finished goods as well as costly purchase of the goods of the private 
sector.515 
 
The public sector was not only in the service of private industrialists but also the rural elite. 
The capitalist farmer benefited from the government’s price support program and from 
subsidized inputs such as water, power, fertilizer, diesel fuel and credit.516Nehru’s death and 
adoption of the new agricultural development policy with intensified agriculture technique-
orientation was the milestone in widespread application of subsidies. The political elite 
regarded subsidies and support policy as a crucial means to motivate the “progressive” 
farmers who applied modern technologies.517  
 
In 1965, the Food Minister mentioned that to enable the active participation of farmers and 
increase the attractiveness of the program as a solution, the government decided to increase 
the market price paid to the cultivators. To this end, in 1965 an Agricultural Prices 
Commission and the Food Corporation of India were set up. The task of the latter was to 
make purchases of foodgrains and to assure a fixed price to the farmer.  Shaped by these 
considerations the immediate arrangement was an increase of 15 % in the procurement 
prices.518  
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This new policy of the political elite, however, was manipulated by the capitalist farmers and 
used as a threat mechanism. These farmers defined high prices as a precondition for increased 
agricultural production. They claimed that unless the agricultural prices were high enough to 
act as an incentive for them than many could stop producing food grains and deal with 
commercial crops. By referring to the cheapness of the incentives vis-à-vis the imported 
foodgrains and to the correlation between the increased wealth in rural areas and industrial 
growth, these capitalist farmers had a sound basis in their bargain with the political elite. 
Besides, in a populist manner they used the small cultivator who in most cases made 
subsistence agriculture, as a pretext to provide gains for their own interests.519 In short, they 
gave the message that their satisfaction meant self-sufficiency of India in foodgrains, 
expansion of domestic market for industrial goods and also an increase in their support for the 
Congress Party. 
    
The process shaped by these dynamics served the increased power of the capitalist farmers 
vis-à-vis the political elite as well as the lower segments of the rural population. Though they 
enjoyed high surplus agricultural products due to the adoption of new technologies, the 
system began to function in a manner that it was the central government that heavily 
subsidized the innovation costs, and not the capitalist farmer. While high price support was 
one facet of incentives, the other was the cheaper prices for the capitalist farmers’ inputs such 
as fertilizer, power and diesel.520 
 
The other dimension of this reinforced strength was related to the majority of the rural 
population. Though these policies were justified as policies for the benefit of the rural 
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population, this was not the case. Like the new agricultural strategy itself, it excluded the 
majority while supporting the minority. In contrast to policymakers’ claim that through these 
policies there would be an improvement in the lots of the common man who was neglected 
during the planned era, 521 it was the capitalist farmers who benefited from the process. 
 
Last of the policies that directly affected the wellbeing of the majority, development process, 
as well as self-reliance of the country, was taxation. Like in many other LDCs Indian 
policymakers failed to develop a sound and just taxation system. Increased injustice of the tax 
system was revealed in the decreased share of direct taxes. In contrast to 1950-1 when their 
share was 36.8 % in the total government revenue, this rate declined to 21.5 % in 1967-8. In 
the same period the share of the indirect taxes rose from 63.2 to 78.5 %.  While defining low 
domestic capital as a serious setback for the chronic deficit in the budget, as they failed to 
levy direct taxes on the wealthiest segments of the society governments chose to increase the 
proportion of indirect taxes as the main possible remedy for the low domestic savings.522 
 
Facing the criticisms of different segments, as the governments adopted a positive 
discrimination favoring the upper strata of the population vis-à-vis the lower segments,523 the 
political elite had various attempts to rearrange the proportions between the direct and indirect 
taxes under different names such as Super Tax, Income Tax, Luxury Tax, Company Tax 
Estate Duty, Gift Tax, Wealth Tax, and Expenditure Tax, but the outcome was the same. They 
were either implemented for a short time at the end of which little revenue was collected or 
refused during the Parliamentary debates. This indicated the repetition of the course of events 
regarding the taxation issue.  
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There were mainly two intertwined fundamental factors at force in the repetition of the same 
unsatisfying outcomes. First of these was the political elite’s lack of determinism on these 
arrangements. An examination of the process revealed that these initiatives of the political 
elite were mainly pragmatic responses to the increased criticisms of the opposition.  Leaving 
their firm stance on the issue, the political elite developed excuses which also pro-rich 
notions. Top among them was the necessity of low proportion in direct taxes, as the country’s 
priorities as well as development level required. It was defined as an imperative to stimulate 
production, particularly in industry. Besides, high proportion of direct taxes was expressed as 
a possibility in developed countries but not in a developing country like India, since the 
inevitable result of this was to retard the formation of capital without which industrial 
development was not possible.524 
 
Regarding the proportion of the indirect taxes, the political elite, on the other hand, claimed 
that higher proportions in indirect taxes were necessary poor-saving mechanism that acted as 
a sort of security valve. According to this rationale, higher proportions of indirect taxes 
reduced consumption, particularly during the period of shortage of goods and high inflation 
trends.525Justified by this rationale, as well as the necessity for more domestic savings since 
the governments either increased indirect taxes or abandoned the development plans and 
remained as a backward country526, each failing arrangement to correct the tax system was 
followed by new increases in the indirect taxes.527 
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Another factor was the uniform stance of the wealthy segments vis-à-vis the political elite in 
each attempt. Their ability to develop a common language and collaborative acts resulted in 
the most convincing threat, namely decline in production outputs. The political elite faced this 
uniform stance of the capitalists as early as 1948 during the Interim Government.  Defining 
the Interim Government as the worst time for them, the capitalists were panicked by the tax 
arrangements. They claimed that in the eight months of the government, the whole capital 
structure was shaken to its foundations. Calling the rest to develop strategies to cope with this, 
Birla as the leading figure, alarmed all wealthy segments by saying that what they 
experienced was an earthquake and they should not wait for other quakes.528    
 
The deficient aspect of the Indian taxation system was, however, not only related to industrial 
capitalists. It also lacked agriculture income tax. Though there were various attempts to levy 
this tax and increase land revenue substantially, the outcome was just the contrary. As the 
main direct tax on agriculture, the land revenue tax that had not been adjusted since the war 
declined from 4.5 % of the next value of agricultural output in 1938/39 to less than 2 % of net 
agricultural output in 1960/61.529 
 
Similar to the industrial capitalists, the lobby of the rich farmers and political considerations 
of the state governments were at force in the successful rebuff of these attempts. Despite the 
recommendations of the Taxation Inquiry Commission to introduce agricultural income taxes, 
the state governments were reluctant to act since they mainly derived their political support 
from rural areas and, so they did not want to antagonize their supporters. When the Central 
                                                                                                                                                        
General Budget, 11 March 1966; Journal of Lok Sabha Records, Debates on General Budget, 1973-4,14 March 
1973; Namboodiripad, Economics and Politics of India’s Socialist Pattern, p.196, 251.   
527Ibid.   
528M.M. Juneja, G.D. Birla: Life and Legacy (Haryana: Modern Publishers, [pub.year]), p.98.  
529George Rosen, Democracy and Economic Change in India (Bombay: Vora Publishers, 1966), p.146, 149.  
 287
Government introduced the compulsory levying of this tax in 1973 landlords launched a 
struggle against the Government in some states of India. Chief Ministers of wheat producing 
areas convinced the Committee which worked on agricultural income tax that such a 
compulsion was not wise from the standpoint of votes since it would hurt the interests of the 
rural rich who contributed generously to the Congress Party’s electoral victory.530     
  
These prevailing deficiencies in agricultural taxation were in contrast with the increased 
subsidies and other incentives extended to the agriculture sector. With a tax policy that 
resulted in taxes lagging behind expenditures in the agricultural sector, there was a steady 
flow of resources through the government from the nonagricultural to the agricultural sector.  
Under such circumstances it was not surprising that the shift in the structure of the Indian 
economy from agriculture to non-agriculture was lagging behind hopes and plans.531 
 
This was a brief analysis of the specific policies that reflected the interaction between the 
ruling elite coalition and the mass. The majority of these policies were the immediate 
pragmatic appeals to appease the mass and prevent their radicalization.  Due to pro-elite 
arrangements in their implementation, there was a huge discrepancy between the rhetoric and 
practice. While the mass lacked a collective stance against these policies, the ruling elite was 
successful to assure its interests.  
 
Though the ruling elite coalition stood as a unique entity vis-à-vis the mass, to conclude that it 
had the ability to act as a unified body on every issue would be misleading. The relation 
between the components of the ruling elite was highly tense and shaped by the consideration 
of having a dominant position in the coalition to influence the decision-making, particularly 
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those decisions related to resource allocation. The following section is about this interplay 
among the ruling elite coalition and its impact on the development process.   
 
Interactions between the Components of Ruling Elite Coalition 
 
Political Elite 
The political elite was differentiated from the other components of the ruling elite coalition, as 
it had to take the electorate into consideration more than other components. It was in a way a 
scene that was criticized and attacked directly by the mass for the unfulfilled promises 
without regarding other dynamics beneath this unfulfillment.  
 
In the Indian context, the first generation of the political elite symbolized the Indianization of 
the country’s administration. They were mostly the leading figures in the National Movement 
during which they raised the expectations of the people for the “promised land”, a land free 
from exploitation. Though Independence was a reality, the possibility to realize the promised 
land was highly questionable. The political elite began to shape the country’s policies in this 
context.   
 
The undisputed name among the first generation of political elite was Jawaharlal Nehru. As 
the first PM and External Affairs Minister of the Republic, Nehru held these posts until his 
death. But in the process, in addition to these he also acted as the Ministry of Atomic Energy 
and also, for brief periods, as Finance and Defense Minister. He had such a dominating 
position that during the seventeen years of his Prime Ministry no one thought another name 
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instead of him. He was the de facto nominated PM of the country even before the 
Independence by Gandhi himself. 532  
 
The critical question regarding Nehru was why Mahatma Gandhi nominated him as his 
successor even though the ideological difference between two was well known. In contrast to 
Gandhi’s right-wing stance, Nehru was known as a socialist leader who by his charisma had 
great influence on the mass. This questioning led us to the conclusion that this was a very 
strategic appointment which the leading big capitalists also agreed on. This consensus on a 
socialist leader would have been ironical if the person was not Nehru as was diagnosed by 
Gandhi himself. When his nomination of Nehru as the Congress President even before the 
Independence was highly questioned by the right wing leaders, Gandhi, without disregarding 
that Nehru was an extremist far ahead of his surroundings, stated that he was humble and 
practical enough, so unlike many other socialist figures, he would not have to force the pace 
to the breaking point.533 
 
This view of Gandhi began to have more supporters during the National Movement. Nehru 
was regarded as a balancing factor who prevented radicalization of the mass to a great extent. 
In his dealings with the British in the mid-1940s, Birla, the leading Indian capitalist who 
defined Nehru as a “a first class fanatic” in the late 1920s and the 1930s534 underlined the 
importance of not to imprison Nehru. He explained that when capitalism and socialism 
confronted in legislature, capitalists did not have any problem to defeat socialists. However, 
in case that there would have been an open fight between capitalism and socialism, such an 
open fight could have been an uncontrollable one if Nehru was imprisoned. Birla underlined 
that without the leading role of Nehru youngsters could  be more radicalized and establish 
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communist system in the country. Relying on these considerations, Birla assured the British 
authorities that in cases where there was any difference of opinion between Gandhi and 
Nehru, the latter simply followed Gandhi.535  
 
Other leading capitalists and conservative leaders who defined Nehru as a figure who did not 
create insurmountable difficulty shared this view. He would “fret and fume, storm and was 
often in a rage but at the end one saw a sport man with the ability of quick regaining of 
balance.”536 By this feature of his personality, Nehru, a distinguished Indian bourgeoisie 
became the trustworthy leader of the left from the viewpoint of the rightwing Congress 
leaders as well as capitalists. All these shed light why the Indian capitalists did not raise 
objections against his Prime Ministry. Instead, they had a readiness to accept him as the Prime 
Minister of Independent India in 1947.  
 
Though he declared himself as a socialist, his interpretation of socialism was a mild and timid 
one. It was not the doctrine and political movement of a particular class, of the working class 
as was the case in other countries.537 When he asked the help of capitalists to attain socialism 
the contemporary socialists criticized this contradiction. Acharya who state that the socialist 
pattern or what was widely known as Nehru socialism was a “historically specific expression 
of the hegemony of the Indian corporate-capitalist class” share their criticism.538The 
pragmatic leadership of Nehru, however, had the community perspective in any case. Though 
the path was for a capitalist order, he tried to initiate policies and transformations that would 
lead the majority to survive as capitalist producers. 
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Following the death of Sardar Patel, prestigious spokesman for the Indian capitalists in the 
Parliament, in 1950, Nehru shaped the nation building process as the nearly unchallenged 
arch-architect among the political elite. Due to his dominating feature, many analysts dubbed 
Indian democracy as a "prime ministerial dictatorship".539 Nehru owed his nearly 
unchallenged stance to his charisma and influence on the mass as well as his strong base in 
the Parliament. Yet even these strong premises did not prevent him to develop mechanisms to 
minimize challenges to the utmost possible degree in the Indian federal system. 
 
The most favorite tactic of Nehru in the face of any challenge was either the threat of or 
practice of resignation, not from Prime Ministry but from the Committees or related bodies of 
the Party. One of the first cases where he applied this tactic was in 1950 when the right wing 
members of the Party led by Patel elected a CP Chair despite his open objection to the elected 
person. Nehru resigned from the Party’s Working Committee that was also predominantly 
composed of the rightists MPs. The elected Chair withdrew in favor of Nehru on grounds that 
Nehru symbolized the nation. Though this act of Nehru was defined as an attempt to impose a 
dictatorial rule in the Party, Nehru did not pay much attention to these criticisms. In 1951 he 
became the CP Chair and remained so until 1954. These years were distinguished by 
consolidation of dissenters who attempted to challenge senior members and restoration of 
harmony between the Party and government but at the expense of the Party. After 
withdrawing from this post in 1954, each candidate had to take Nehru’s approval. He 
preferred to choose the Chairs who were responsible to him. Consequently instead of 
                                                 
539Sethi, Indian Economy Under Siege, p.7.  
 292
challenging, a sort of subordination was the case for the Chair. By his withdrawal, the 
government began to dominate the Party.540  
   
This centralization period lasted until 1963 when Nehru challenged it first in 1959 by 
expressing his discontent about the CP and government relations as the relations swung too 
far in the direction of parliamentary supremacy over the Party. By this discontent as well as 
the declined electoral support in 1958 elections, the process for the era of divergence 
accelerated. Yet the divergence period that commenced in 1963  indicated a time lag between 
Nehru’s complaints and fading of centralization and convergence. What caused this lag was 
the old guards successful rebuff of Nehru’s scheme regarding land ceilings and cooperative 
farming in 1959. In this the so-called old guards, mainly comprised the powerful Chief 
Ministers of the states and their allies in the Center, who were not in the inner circle of Nehru, 
secretly collaborated with the rural elite against Nehru. They acted as the spokesman of the 
rural elite. This was an important milestone, because those who felt that they could no longer 
remain in the Party departed and formed another Party. Those who did not have the courage to 
depart remained in the Party but continued their opposition behind the scenes.541  
 
This confrontation of Nehru with the Chief Ministers of the States represented another aspect 
regarding his position. Nehru era was known as the era of centralization and in this his ability 
to keep the States in a subordinated position was crucial. The most important means for   
Nehru governments that curtailed the power of the states and enhanced the dominant position 
of the Center was the right recognized to the Center for the fixation of the prices of essential 
commodities in 1954. This meant curtailing of income of the states. Following this, the Food 
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Corporation of India procured and sold for the benefit of the Center. The 6th Amendment of 
the Constitution was enacted in 1956. By this, the Parliament assumed the power to regulate 
state trade, and to levy taxes on sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers. Therefore, 
while one source of central income increased, this was done at the cost of the State’s 
interest.542 
 
Yet, even these mechanisms were not enough for the implementation of the policies on which 
Nehru’s sensitivity was well known. As the state legislatures were mainly comprised the rural 
elite, the Chief Ministers were more responsive to their concern more than the Center’s 
wishes. A concrete and crucial example of this responsiveness was related to the policies 
which aimed at structural changes in rural areas. These were not implemented, as they should 
be, since their implementation was under the responsibility of the states. Emasculation of 
these policies to a great extent despite the desire of the Center indicated the boundaries of 
Nehru’s “unchallenged position”.      
  
Though delayed, Nehru never gave up his endeavors for establishing a greater equilibrium 
between the Party and government. In 1963 he defined the instrument to this end, namely 
Kamaraj Plan.  This Plan called for senior Congressmen in the Parliamentary wing of the 
party to step down from the office and devote their full time to organizational work of the 
Party. Response of these senior members to this call was affirmative. By their withdrawal 
from their posts, the old hierarchy of leadership within the CP government was ended.  A 
certain degree of equilibrium of power between the government and the CP was observed. 543 
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The centralization and convergence period lasted until the last year of Nehru’s life. He did not 
have the chance to see what happened in the divergence period to which he paved the way 
too. In these years he was the PM, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chair of Planning 
Commission, for brief periods Minister of Atomic Energy, Finance and Defense. As the Head 
of the Cabinet, he appointed other members. Rosen defines the distinguished feature of this 
period as the subordination of the ministers who enjoyed narrower scope of responsibilities to 
the PM enjoyed.544 The period that commenced after him revealed that these administrative 
features were not institutionalized, but remained as successful suppression of the possible 
alternative voices for Nehru’s nearly omnipotent stance. These possible alternative voices 
made the post-Nehru era a highly tense in comparison to Nehru era.  
 
Those who responded to Nehru’s call along with some powerful Chief Ministers named as 
Syndicate,545turned to be the most powerful countervailing power vis-à-vis the Cabinet, 
mainly the PM. It was the Syndicate who determined the successors of Nehru, first Shastri, 
then Indira Gandhi. The era of divergence that lasted between 1963 and 1967 was 
distinguished first by Shastri’s conciliatory approach and Indira Gandhi’s conciliatory-cum-
clashing approach to the Syndicate. This interplay within the political elite also led to various 
pragmatic alliances with other groups to assure a dominating stance.     
 
Following Nehru’s death in 1964, Kamaraj who was elected as the CP but who was also the 
natural leader of the Syndicate played an important role in securing the election of Shastri. He 
was a man well known by his peacemaking and conciliatory attitude.  By his ascension to 
power various important changes occurred in the political administration of India, most 
striking of which was in the decision-making style. Instead of concentrating power in his 
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hands, PM Shastri established the ‘Grand Council’ comprised of the most powerful 
personalities in the Congress Party as the supreme decision-making body at the center.  This 
council turned to be a platform where exchange of ideas was possible. In most cases, 
following this exchange, decisions were taken by consensus.546 
 
This new era commenced by Shastri also led to the increased autonomy of the states vis-à-vis 
the Center. The Chief Ministers of the states exerted pressure on the PM and Cabinet for the 
share of power. They requested that the Chief Ministers of the states as well as major policies 
could only be decided by the assent of state governments, with or without the approval of the 
Central Government.547  
 
Owing to his personality as well as his decision-making style, PM Shastri welcomed these 
divergences. It was true that during his brief tenure of one-year the gravity of administration 
shifted to the states. Without disregarding the importance of PM’s personality, another 
important factor that served the empowerment of the states vis-à-vis the Center was the shift 
in favor of agriculture. Owing to the division of labor between the Center and the states, this 
agriculture-orientation enabled the states to take more initiative in the policymaking.548The 
Center had to be more receptive to the demands and concerns of the Chief Ministers of the 
States who were mostly from rural elite or under the influence of the rural elite.    
 
Another change in the administration was the more independent and powerful stance of the 
CP Chair vis-à-vis the Prime Minister. Chair’s bold statements on several crucial issues 
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including planning and foreign affairs were a novelty that was not the case during Nehru era. 
However, these novel aspects did not assure an equal or dominating stance to the CP Chair. 
Instead he continued to be a subordinate to the PM.  Reelection of Shastri without seeking the 
support of any particular group as well as India’s success in the Indian-Pakistan War of 1965 
were referred as events that served the PM’s dominating stance.549  
 
In a year’s time India once more faced the question of “after Nehru who?” This question 
again found its reply by the arrangements of the Syndicate but this time with more tension due 
to the problems within the group itself. In contrast to Shastri’s nomination on which the 
Syndicate had a consensus, in the case of Gandhi a serious internal division was observed. It 
was Kamaraj who extended his support to Gandhi as Shastri’s successor despite the 
opposition of the majority of Syndicate members. While these members opposed her mainly 
due to her spirit of independence, supporters of Gandhi as Shastri’s successor regarded her as 
a transitory and relatively inexperienced figure who could be used as a puppet until the 
elections. They hoped to benefit from her as being Nehru’s daughter, as being from the 
populous Hindi region as well as being liked in the South and being liked by the minorities. In 
short, Gandhi was regarded as an asset for elections. In addition to these factors, her 
nomination turned out to be a matter of testing of power for Kamaraj within the Syndicate.550 
 
Elected by the arrangements of the leading names in the Syndicate, during the first year of her 
Prime Ministry Gandhi faced the decisiveness of the Syndicate concerning the scope of the 
free space that she could enjoy. Her attempts to reshuffle the Cabinet and the refusal of her 
candidates for the election were the main indicators of this firmness. More than others, denial 
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of Khrisna Menon as a candidate was meaningful as he belonged to the inner circle of Nehru. 
By these, the Syndicate conveyed the message that her power was on the Syndicate's support 
and she had to subordinate if she wanted to hold the post after the elections. Owing to her 
insecure political position as well as the brief period remaining for the elections Gandhi 
avoided any confrontation with the Syndicate. Instead she acted as a figure who completed the 
tenure of Shastri by continuing his policies even though she was very critical of them as a 
MP.551   
 
This seeming subordination to the Syndicate was a tactic for Gandhi until the elections. Yet 
she did not miss any opportunity to exploit the increased tension within the 
Syndicate.552Though various developments such as devaluation of rupee, food shortages, high 
inflation as well as increased violence in the country weakened her position to a great extent, 
still she was regarded as the locus of power due to the conceptualization of Prime Ministry in 
the previous decades. In her attempts to ignore her senior colleagues in the CP, Gandhi 
preferred to rely on her young advisors.553  
 
The course of relations between the Syndicate and the PM continued in this manner until the 
elections. Elections of 1967 gave her a golden opportunity since the leading names of the 
Syndicate were defeated in the elections. Now relying on her freer space of action, Gandhi 
assumed domination over the CP. This, however, turned out to be an overoptimistic 
assumption due to the prevailing strong influence of the ousted leading figures in the Party. 
Because of the slim majority that CP had after the 1967 elections Gandhi had to compromise 
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with Syndicate-imposed policies such as appointment of a leading right-wing conservative as 
Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.554  
 
While this conservative figure sought to reinforce his support within the Syndicate by 
depicting himself as a security valve for the democratic system, Gandhi interpreted this as a 
conspiracy of the Syndicate. Putting the issue as a matter of political survival, Gandhi decided 
to be more aggressive in her coping with the Syndicate and she pragmatically leaned on the 
radical leftists within the Party, namely the Young Turks. This was not coincidental. The 
Syndicate distinguished by its conservative orientation was undoubtedly conflicted with 
anyone regardless of her/his name or position that collaborated with the leftists. This group, 
well known by its criticisms against the Syndicate, defined it as a gang of old and exhausted 
men whose main interest was personal power and patronage. They blamed these old men for 
impeding Nehru’s design for a socialist society. As revealed in the emphasis of “old men”, the 
ideological conflict between the Syndicate and the Young Turks intensified due to the 
generation gap.555  
 
Another motive beneath Gandhi’s alliance with the radical leftists was her concern to become 
more popular in the eyes of the mass. Withdrawing their support from the CP which they 
identified with the conservative Syndicate, Indian public’s widespread resentment against the 
wealthy class was clear.556 Dissatisfied with the policies of the CP that failed to prevent 
poverty, the mass had an increasing leftist tendency that found its expression in various 
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movements. Therefore, for Gandhi, alliance with left as well as the socialistic rhetoric that she 
adopted meant appeal to the mass.    
   
The concrete measure for confrontation was the 10 Point Program after the 1967 Elections. 
This led to another serious confrontation with the Syndicate and accelerated the process that 
resulted in the split of the CP in 1969. The program envisaged the social control of banking 
institutions, nationalization of general insurance, extension of the state sector in the export-
import trade, the strengthening of the system of public distribution of foodgrains, curbing of 
monopolies and concentration of economic power, acceleration of steps for implementing 
land reforms, provision of minimum wages to agricultural laborers, supply of drinking water 
in rural areas and the provision of certain benefits to the children. By these features, the 
program posed a challenge to the interests of capitalists and rural elite. As a result the 
Syndicate simultaneously collaborated with these groups. Acting as the mouthpiece of these 
segments, the Syndicate severely attacked Gandhi, yet without any concrete gains. 557Constant 
tensions between the left-supported Gandhi and the Syndicate lasted until the latter’s split 
from the CP following the legislation for nationalization of fourteen banks.      
  
As her struggle with the Syndicate for domination in the party was more than a question of 
individuals but the concern of whether the Center or States dominated the decision-making 
process in the federal structure of India, Gandhi, parallel to these developments also pursued 
policies that led to the centralization of power in her hands as was the case during her father’s 
era. For PM Gandhi centralization of power in her hands was so crucial that even politicians 
close to her began to defend the idea that democracy was not suited to the Indian 
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temperament. Therefore, they suggested infliction of ‘limited dictatorship’ on the country for 
a considerable period.558 
 
Regarding powerful Chief Ministers as the greatest challenge to the dominance of the PM, 
Gandhi, through a several-staged strategy, was able to weaken the state assemblies’ power. At 
this time criterion for appointment in state legislative assemblies became weak political base. 
Besides, by controlling the Working Committee, the Parliamentary Board and the Central 
Election Committee, all of which represented the governing bodies, composed the high 
command of the CP. As the Bylaws of the CP gave the above governing bodies extraordinary 
formal powers in conducting party affairs, control over these made the Congress leadership a 
potentially dominant voice in party organization and affairs, and in recruitment of central and 
state legislative party elite. This was the reason why Gandhi pursued a strategy to control 
these bodies and directly intervened in the affairs of the state and district party organizations 
and operations of state legislatures.559  
  
In addition to, and in fact as a precondition for the control of, these governing bodies of the 
Party Gandhi kept the CP Chair, the key post under her control. As the CP Chair had great 
influence on the appointment of members of these bodies, PM Gandhi first assured this post 
for her own ends. To avoid challenges of the CP Chairs, Gandhi named her trusted supporters 
to the post and did not keep them in that post too long to build up an independent base of 
power. As a result of this, from 1969 to 1974 the Congress changed four presidents. None of 
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these presidents had a strong political base in the Congress and was totally dependent on the 
PM.560     
 
Control over the central organs of the party comprised one pillar of centralization of power. 
Another important pillar was creation of dependent cabinets to ensure complete and full 
control over her cabinet. Unlike her father, she recruited considerable number of young 
intellectuals with little or no political base in the party. The key criterion in the selection of 
these candidates was “loyalty” to Gandhi. Loyalty was the basic value that she sought from 
the candidates from both the center and state levels. In addition to this, in order to keep 
ministers off-balance and prevent their consolidation of power she frequently made minor 
shifts in the Cabinet. She also retained a variety of key portfolios under her direct control. By 
these policies, PM Gandhi strengthened her position and suppressed any possible 
challengers.561   
 
In addition to these arrangements regarding the Center, Gandhi pursued policies to eliminate 
the intermediate mechanisms and enabled herself to receive direct information from various 
departments. In the early 1970s she transferred 60 of the 100 sections of the Home Ministry, 
the Indian Administration Service (IAS), the Intelligence Bureau and Central Bureau of 
Investigation to the Cabinet Secretariat, being directly responsible to PM. Besides, by 
abandoning the principle of representation in the Congress Party, Gandhi filled the party 
offices at all levels by appointment from above. The rationale beneath this was enhancement 
of her position and powers. Though in some respects this enhanced her power, in a more 
serious manner it worked in an adverse way. Party officials preferred not to transmit negative 
news to her as they felt that they owed their positions mainly to the PM. After a while, she 
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could not have reliable information to a great extent since in order to hide negative 
information, officers began to submit inaccurate information.562  
 
At the end of her systematic policies Gandhi had a strong central leadership and  successful 
restoration of one-party dominance that characterized Nehru era. The political system under 
her centralized power had more institutionalized patterns rather than reliance on the 
charismatic leadership of the PM which was the case during Nehru era.  This 
“institutionalization”, however, had at least two dimensions regarding the centrality of the 
power. While the PM established the mechanisms for an institutionalized 
centralization563challenge of which was more difficult in comparison to previous years, the 
shift of gravity from the states to the Center did not lead to a serious change for the ruling 
elite component with respect to the gains that it derived from the Center. The capitalist 
farmers had also institutionalized the mechanisms that served their receiving higher support 
prices and various incentives. Therefore, Gandhi’s supremacy vis-à-vis the states did not have 
an adverse impact on the capitalist farmers owing to the latter’s institutionalized strategies to 
protect their interests.  
 
The analysis of the political elite revealed that in contrast to Nehru who enjoyed great 
independence and dominance among the political elite, his successors did not enjoy such a 
freedom. This was mainly due to the attainment of real pluralism in the political system, and 
not pluralism in formality. During his short tenure Shastri adopted a more conciliatory 
approach with an increasing independent stance towards the end of his tenure. Gandhi, on the 
other hand, was not a figure to accept a subordinating position. Therefore, to attain supremacy 
in the system, she developed strategies accordingly.  
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At the end India had a highly centralized system that mainly depended on one-person 
dominance at the Center. As this one-person dominance did not very much fit the highly 
diversified and mobilized nature of the Indian society, Gandhi’s system faced serious crisis. In 
the light of this analysis the next concern would be the questioning of political elite’s freedom 
vis-à-vis other components of the ruling elite coalition to reveal the interaction between the 
components of the coalition. 
 
Civilian Bureaucracy 
Civilian bureaucracy as a component of the ruling elite represented the most complex multi-
structured group in the administrative system of India.564 For the civilian bureaucracy the 
post-Independence era was full of ambiguities. This state of ambiguity arose from the fact that 
during the National Movement the Indian Civilian Service (ICS), that is, the bureaucrats were 
claimed to be the collaborators of the British rulers. The struggle of the mass was directed 
primarily against the bureaucracy who were the visible arms of the Raj. The Indians who 
comprised less than half of the ICS carried on the routine part of administration. The British 
administration due to its distrust in the Indian civil officers formed a set of rules and 
regulations, filing system, and even set language for drafts and applications. The 
administrative structure was set in such a manner that there was hardly anything left to be 
decided by Indian civil service officers. 565  
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Though the leaders of the National Movement knew this fact, as the bureaucratic rule was 
based on fear and also mass obedience was extracted by repression those who belonged to this 
services was regarded as the “natural enemy” of the nation. Until independence, the Indian 
National Congress criticized not only this role of the ICS but also its tradition, as it was 
administratively inappropriate to fit into the changing conditions and had an elitist 
structure.566 However, the Indian administration was realistic and pragmatic. As they knew 
that to run the state machinery without these civil servants was impossible, they began to 
work on the recruitment and reorganization of the civil service.  
 
Main feature of this reorganization and recruitment was the system’s Indianization. In 1947, 
upon the eve of Independence, there were 1064 members of the ICS approximately 425 to 450 
of whom were Indians. This indicated that more than half of the bureaucrats were British. 
Parallel to the British officers resignation from their posts, the vacant posts began to be filled 
by the Indians. In order to fill the gap in the posts, the GOI declared Emergency Recruitment 
Scheme. By establishing ad hoc committees in the provinces, GOI managed to complete the 
task of recruitment in a considerably short time span by mid-1949.567    
    
The Indian policymakers expressed their decisiveness on the reform and reorganization of the 
ICS. As the ICS, later on named as IAS was the top cadre among the bureaucrats vis-à-vis all 
other classes of the Indian public service; the most important posts in the administrative 
structure of the country was occupied by IAS. The IAS officials were closest and nearest to 
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the crucial decision-making centers of power. They were in direct contact with the political 
leadership.568  
 
Moving from this fact, one of the initial activities regarding the administrative structure of the 
country was to determine reform measures. To this end, even before the Independence, the 
Congress Party appointed a six-member-reform Committee. Its task was defined as 
investigation of personnel shortages, better utilization of the available manpower and 
improvement of working methods in the Central Secretariat to deal efficiently with the 
problems arising from the partition. Special attention was paid to the Central Secretariat due 
to its key position in the system. It was the center of power as policies and programs of the 
government originated from there. It was not only involved in policymaking but also 
concerned with the justification and support of policies. It was the center for conflicts, clashes 
and cooperation between ministers and bureaucrats.  This Secretariat was subjected to all 
kinds of political, sectional and interest group pressures.569 
    
Regarding the reorganization and reform of the ICS, to claim that the new Indian 
administration undertook reorganization in the real sense would be misleading. Though the 
civil service under Indian administration dealt with the problems of partition quite efficiently, 
this did not indicate a successful reorganization and reform of the service. Instead of a reform 
or remodeling, renewal of the service would be a more accurate definition. The name of the 
service was changed from Indian Civilian Service (ICS) to Indian Administrative Service 
(IAS) but the latter was constituted respectively on the model of the ICS. Not only the 
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bureaucratic system but also bureaucratic training were inherited from the British with minor 
changes in the content.570  
 
This renewal of the administrative cadre without any remodeling, on the other hand, resulted 
in the transfer of all imperfections of the system. The most irritating imperfection of the ICS 
that was raised frequently was its elitist structure, which made the bureaucrats in this service 
aliens to the majority. The most important feature of these high echelons of bureaucracy was 
its being a close-knit society. It was nearly a hereditary profession that passed on from father 
to son. More than eighty percent of the high echelons of bureaucrats’ fathers were also from 
high echelons of bureaucracy. They mostly belonged to the urban, Anglicized and well to do 
middle class Indians. The majority of them got their education in English medium public 
schools. What was tested in the examinations for a bureaucratic post was the candidate’s 
social status, manners, etiquette and command over English. This examination for 
administrative bureaucratic cadres comprised the other feature of elitism among these 
bureaucrats. Rosen points out that this high competition among the candidates led them to 
believe that they were superior. All these indicated the close-knit structure of the 
bureaucracy.571This feature of IAS continued without any challenge by the new 
administration of the country. 
 
Another frequently raised issue was the expensiveness of the administrative structure. 
According to the critics, India inherited one of the most expensive administration from the 
British. This expensiveness was due to red tapism as well as unnecessary expansion of the 
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bureaucrats.572 Despite a consensus on the hugeness of the administrative circle, the planned 
era witnessed a rapid expansion of the bureaucratic cadres owing to the diversification of the 
tasks of the bureaucrats. In that respect Independence indicated an important turning point for 
the civilian bureaucracy. In contrast to the British era, when their role was limited to law and 
order, during Independence they were in charge of executing development plans, allocating 
resources, managing the expanding public sector and supervising the private sector. In short, 
they were the executors and in many cases by taking initiative, decision-makers of a highly 
regularized system.573   
 
These were the general trends regarding the high echelons of the civilian bureaucracy. In the 
process depending on the power and preference of the PM, the position of the civilian 
bureaucracy vis-à-vis other components of the ruling elite, as well as, the mass varied. 
 
Nehru was the byproduct of a movement that regarded bureaucracy as the country’s “natural 
enemy”.574 During the National Movement Nehru defined the ICS as an expensive luxury. He 
had a well-known mistrust in the civil servants, particularly in those who worked under the 
alien rule for a long time. Yet he was practical enough to accept the necessity of the civil 
bureaucrats to run the state machinery efficiently. He said in 1949 that every thinking person 
knew that running a modern government required the machinery of highly organized, efficient 
and loyal services.575  
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Nehru, however, was not the sole leading policymaker supporting civil service. As the first 
Home Minister of the Republic Patel proposed and led to the approval of an annexed clause to 
the Constitution, which extraordinarily enabled the protection of the IAS. By this protection, 
stance of the IAS in the system was highly empowered. In contrast to Patel’s open support of 
the civil bureaucracy, PM Nehru disapproved of such an empowerment and revealed his 
reaction by not attending any of the sessions when this clause was debated and approved.576       
 
Despite these uncontrollable factors that empowered IAS, during Nehru era the civilian 
servants in the Center had a subordinate position. Though he accepted the necessity of these 
servants, Nehru did not develop any high regard for them. In his perception function of the 
civil servants was to implement policies or supervise their implementation rather than taking 
an effective part in the policy formulation. He never left minute recording of the Cabinet 
meetings into the hands of the civil servants, not even paraphrasing. Instead, he personally 
dictated the minutes of the proceedings and decisions to the Cabinet Secretary.577       
 
This position of the civil servants in the center remained to be a remarkable feature of Nehru 
era compared to their position in successive Prime Ministers. Both Shastri and Gandhi totally 
departed from this administrative feature. They created an empowered bureaucracy even at 
the expense of the legislature. While Shastri paved the way for this shift, it was during 
Gandhi’s term this feature reached its acme. 
 
With respect to the position of civil servants the widespread belief regarding Shastri era was 
that he increased the power of the civil servants by recognizing more autonomy to them. As 
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the civil servants took more initiative they had greater influence on policy making. This was 
in fact due to his dependence on these civil servants, as he did not dominate many issues. 
Before announcing any decisions, Shastri wrote to the related units and waited for their 
answers. As a result of this, civil servants had a prominent role in vital negotiations. They had 
more frequent delegation of responsibility for drafting key decisions. They exerted pressure 
for decisions which were opposed by the Parliament. The degree of their empowerment could 
be best viewed from the expanded duties of the PM Secretariat.578   
 
One of the first arrangements regarding civil servants was establishment of a strong Prime 
Ministry Secretariat. This was a shift from Nehru’s times as he had a small personal office in 
charge of secretarial tasks such as preparation of important speeches, statements, and letters. 
In contrast to this, PM Shastri strengthened the position of the PM Secretariat through the new 
tasks that he defined for it. In addition to the secretarial tasks, the Secretary was obliged to 
inform the PM on issues such as national integration, foreign affairs, defense, interpretation of 
the industrial policy resolution, and bottlenecks or delays in the completion of major public 
sector policies. As a result of these expanded duties, the PM Secretariat turned to be an 
important pressure group. Srivastava states that by this transition the PM Secretariat became a 
nerve center of political and administrative power in the country.579The PM’s Secretary began 
to appear everywhere including Government’s committees, foreign delegations led by the PM 
or foreign dignitaries. Due to his role in every policy, the PM Secretary began to be called as 
super secretary.580 
 
Another important development, totally different from Nehru era, was the erosion of the 
decision-making powers of the Planning Commission. This erosion of the power was due to 
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Shastri’s dissatisfaction with the pursued development plans shaped by the Planning 
Commission. During his brief tenure he achieved this subordinated role by rearranging the 
Commission membership on fixed renewable contracts, Deputy Chairman’s of the 
Commission’s attendance to cabinet meetings instead of the latter’s attending the 
Commission’s meetings and assignment of a formal role to the chief ministers in the 
formulation of national economic policy. Following the erosion of decision-making powers of 
the Commission, PM constituted a PM’s Secretariat with its own team of experts.581     
 
After this date the PM Secretariat became a key organ in the formulation of economic policy. 
The empowered stance of the PM Secretariat vis-à-vis the Planning Commission was 
concretely revealed in the confrontation of the latter with the Food and Agriculture Minister. 
Following the food shortage in 1964, the Minister and the Planning Commission reiterated 
their respective solutions for the crisis. While the Minister defined price incentives for private 
investment in agriculture and an increase in the plan outlays on yield enhancing inputs as a 
solution, the Commission recommended price control and monopoly procurement. When the 
Finance Minister sided with the Commission, the PM appointed a crisis committee headed by 
his Secretary. The committee developed a policy line with what the Food Minister asked for. 
This event was regarded as the concrete proof of the shift of power from the Commission to 
the PM Secretariat.582      
 
Indira Gandhi, who was critical of Shastri in many respects, did not make any revolutionary 
change to return to the days of his father. Instead, she institutionalized the power of the civil 
servants in the Center. First of all, PM Gandhi expanded the scope and power of the PM 
Secretariat. It began to issue directives to administer the departments, even the ministers. By 
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the transfer of several departments from the Home Ministry into the PM’s Secretariat 
including the country’s intelligence units in 1969 the position of the PM Secretariat was 
reinforced. In the process, when it included new powerful bureaucrats it began to act as a 
super Cabinet. Not even a Deputy Secretary was appointed without the agreement of PM 
Secretary. Each officer of the Secretariat dealt exclusively with almost everything in one field, 
whether economic, foreign or scientific. The planned economy also lost its meaning to a great 
extent. In any confrontation between the Planning Ministry and other public institutions, the 
PM’s Secretariat or Committee of Secretaries emerged as a more significant decision making 
agency than the Planning Commission.583   
   
This further empowerment of the PM Secretariat was highly criticized in the Parliament. 
Critics pointed out that the autonomous political power of the bureaucrats reached to 
dangerous proportions and such an empowerment meant concentration of power into few 
hands, which was against the democratic rule of India. They claimed that the process led to a 
sort of quasi-dictatorship in which the role of the Parliament should be questioned. Gandhi 
ignored these criticisms and also denied any responsibility on the grounds that  she was not 
the one who invented this Secretariat and paved the way for its empowerment. Instead she 
welcomed such a transformation in the functioning of the Secretariat as it was a perfect match 
with her needs.584 
 
The questioning of “her needs” indicated another failing aspect of her rule. That was her 
demand for politicized bureaucrats; or in other words “political loyalty” from the bureaucrats. 
This change began to be noticed from 1969-70 when Indira Gandhi and names close to her in 
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the CP called for more ‘commitment’ from civil servants with the argument that the so-called 
neutral administrative machinery was a hindrance for the governments as this was hardly 
relevant to Indian context. In one of her speeches regarding the issue PM Gandhi claimed that 
unless the civil servants were concerned about which political party was in power as in the 
days of the British rule, the country would be “in a rut”. When this open demand for loyalty to 
her and her Party was severely criticized, she interpreted “commitment”585 as loyalty to the 
guiding principles of Indian Constitution. Though this was her rhetoric, from the practice it 
was apparent that loyalty to the PM and the party in power began to become part of the IAS 
reward structure.586 
 
This debate on the empowerment of the IAS was in fact reflected at the confrontation of the 
two components of the ruling elite regarding their having a dominant stance in the coalition. 
To assume that this was an issue which came forth during Shastri and Gandhi era would be 
misleading. Though Shastri and Gandhi made it more visible, the dominant stance of the civil 
servants was a feature of the Indian administrative structure regardless of the stance of the 
leader. This feature emerged from the fact that these civil servants were at the top of the 
resource allocation mechanism.587To claim that Nehru with his relatively unchallenged 
position mitigated the power of bureaucracy would be deceptive. There were numerous 
debates in the Parliament that reflected this sensitivity of the legislative branch.         
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In one of these debates secretariats of the ministers were the concern. Critics of these 
secretaries regretted their existence, as they did not fit into the existing circumstances of 
independent India. They complained that each minister was surrounded at least by four or five 
IAS secretariat members who fulfilled the administrative tasks regardless of the presence of 
the minister.588 Besides owing to the generalist tradition, the IAS bureaucrats were assumed to 
have expertise on every issue. There were many cases where one IAS member was in charge 
of at least hundred committees. He was supposed to have expertise nearly on every subject 
matter and this resulted in inefficient administrative functioning.589  
  
In replying these Nehru did not adopt a defensive language. Instead by his words he reflected 
the helplessness of the political elite vis-à-vis the bureaucratic cadres. He pointed out that 
regardless of the power of the Parliament or the ministers, the civil bureaucracy had an 
advantageous position owing to the sustained nature of their posts.  This was just the contrary 
of the appointed ones’ who had limited tenures. Nehru emphasized that until the appointed 
grasped the nature of procedures, his term ended and in the meantime the civil bureaucrats 
continued to administer the things.590  
 
There were various cases that confirmed this diagnosis of Nehru. These events proved that the 
ministers, in most cases, had to obey the fait accompli of the bureaucrats. One of the most 
striking of these events was the confession of a Finance Minister who remained in that post 
for four years. In his complaint about the bureaucrats the Minister admitted that he did not and 
could not have control on the Central Secretariat. He claimed that acting as authorities on 
licenses, these bureaucrats excluded the Minister from the process by not informing him. In 
many cases, they issued import licenses without referring to the Minister. Facing these for 
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long years, in order not to be regarded as feeble in the eyes of public, the Minister remained 
silent. But when India’s foreign exchange problem intensified due to irresponsible imports 
and his policies began to be questioned harshly, the Minister revealed this fact to Nehru. As 
the correspondence between PM Nehru and Minister became public, some MPs asked for an 
inquiry into this.591   
 
This event was striking as it shed light on the civil servants contribution to the emasculation 
of various policies, including industrial licensing. This role of the civil servants was 
frequently debated as one dimension of corruption among the civil servants. This corruption 
included bribery, delay in execution of the decisions, manipulation of schemes or misuse of 
the public funds. Among these, however, the most frequently raised dimension was related to 
the civil servants’ contribution to unsatisfying implementation of the five-year development 
plans, particularly programs which aimed at structural changes. Khanna claims that Indian 
bureaucracy hesitated to facilitate the poverty-alleviation programs and restrain the elite from 
their exploitative tricks.592  
 
Arguments in the Indian Parliament were in full conformity with these scholarly claims. 
Critics of the civil servants defined them as the most important factor that hindered progress. 
According to these critics as the high echelons of the bureaucracy were accustomed to act for 
their own interests they posed a direct challenge to the efficient implementation of the plans. 
Some also referred to the civilian servants collaboration with other elite groups to serve both 
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for their own interests and interests of that particular group as seen in the case of watering 
down of the Panchayati Rajs in order not to challenge the interests of the rural elite.593  
 
These high echelons of the bureaucracy had interwoven interests with the industrial capitalists 
also. While thwarting the Five Year Plans the civil servants delayed giving licenses and 
required documents to discourage the small entrepreneurs. Though by these they promoted an 
appropriate environment for monopolies, these bureaucrats also successfully manipulated the 
industrial capitalists in delivering licenses until they got what they wanted from them for their 
own interests.594  
 
In all these claims critics explained this corruption by referring to the British legacy, the elitist 
structure of the IAS, irrationality of the civil servants or to the system created by Nehru. 
Those who referred to British legacy concluded that people who were trained in the tradition 
of the ICS, who “sold their souls to British” by the logic of not caring about the interest of 
their own country could not have kept pace with national objectives of the planned 
development.595 Those, who defined the elitist structure of the IAS as the main cause of their 
corruption, defined the IAS as “a special caste, a special hierarchy” who also regarded 
themselves as a separate class of people. Since they could not keep in touch with the mass 
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they also failed to understand the dynamics of the society. Consequently all the development 
initiatives became inefficient in their hands.596  
 
However, there was a general consensus on the correlation between the prevailing system 
adopted by Nehru and increased corruption of the civilian bureaucracy. The system 
empowered the bureaucracy extensively via its role of controlling allocations of raw materials 
and scarce resources, granting licenses both for the import and manufacture of the goods, 
taxation of goods and exercising quality control.  These critics point out that while Nehru was 
criticizing the intermediaries between the state and the people, he himself was the creator of 
an empire of intermediates.597  
 
Despite these diagnoses, the political elite failed to deal with the problem of “corrupted 
sabotaging” of civil servants efficiently.  Instead they continued to intensify the tone of their 
criticisms regarding the civil servants parallel to the unsatisfying outcomes of the Plans. More 
than their elitist approach, these critics regarded the civil servants as the main factor which 
served these unsatisfying outcomes due to their various interest relations with other elite 
groups. These were very serious claims. In the analysis of other components, the interaction 
between these and bureaucracy is dealt with in detail. 
 
Industrial Capital 
Industrial capital, more truly monopolist industrial capital had great expectations from the 
Independence. Indian industrial capitalists complained about  the discriminatory policies of 
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the British government, particularly discriminating protection provided to the British capital 
that worked against the interests of Indian business class.  They also criticized the British 
capital’s stronghold over the economy of India. Moving from this point the Indian industrial 
capital defined political freedom as crucial since it was in the interest of the country but also, 
mainly for the interest of the “capitalists, the employers and the industrialists”.598 
 
These complaints shed light on the Indian industrial capital’s perception of the national 
movement. The Indian capitalists regarded the national movement as the transfer of political 
and financial power from the hands of foreign monopolists to the national capitalists. In other 
words, for these national capitalists, independent India indicated Indianization of the 
monopoly capital. Due to this perception, Indian monopoly capital was regarded as the main 
impetus in toppling the British rule. In the terminology of the leftists scholars the process 
commenced by this toppling was shaped according to the class interests of Indian monopoly 
capital which was the “active conscription” of the state.  They preferred this since the process 
assured immense capital accumulation.599  
  
While the process’ being a capitalist capital accumulation was an accurate definition, the term 
‘conscription’ had strong notions that implied an unchallenged dominance of the industrial 
capitalists, which was not the case in the Indian context. While this was a common feature 
that capitalism shared with other components, the distinguishing feature of the monopoly 
capital was its coping with the challenging factors. Owing to its being the best organized elite 
group under the apex organization of the FICCI, the industrial capitalists successfully 
rebuffed challenges. They had a remarkable success in forming alliances with the other 
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components against the challenging ones and/or in incorporating with the foreign capital to 
preserve their position. Since the concern of this chapter is the interaction between ruling 
internal dynamics, the interaction of industrial capital with the political elite, the civilian 
bureaucracy as well as rural elite is analyzed in the following pages to have an idea about the 
scope of freedom that industrial capital enjoyed and to diagnose the degree of attainment of its 
expectations from independent India.  
 
Kochanek identifies three periods related to the interaction between the political elite and 
industrial capital, more truly monopolist industrial capital. The first period was a period of 
uncertainty and conflict lasting from 1947 to 1953. This was followed by a period of 
accommodation which lasted from 1954 to 1963. The last period covered the years of1963-
1973 with the distinguishing feature of renewed conflict.600 While uncertainty arose from the 
ambiguities of the future of the newly independent country that was shaken by partition, 
various disasters such as earthquakes, floods and droughts, conflicts arose due to different 
approaches on some basic issues. In the course of this paper, first periods of conflict (1947-
53, 1963-73) are analyzed with respect to the nature and timing of the adopted policies, 
reaction of the monopoly capital to these policies as well as responsiveness of the political 
elite to these reactions. Then the period of accommodation is analyzed with respect to its 
distinguishing features. 
 
There were two periods of conflict and divergence. While the first lasted from 1947-53, the 
other covered 1964-73. The first period of uncertainties and conflict commenced in the 
immediate aftermath of the Independence. Policies of the era that led to the confrontation of 
the industrial capital and political elite were controls, rules and regulations which aimed at 
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restricting the activities of the private industrial sectors as well as new tax schemes which 
were interpreted as schemes that restrained investment by the national capitalists. When the 
GOI set up an Income Tax Investigation Commission against many industrial groups, 
including the companies of the Birla group in 1950601, this increased the inconvenience of the 
industrial capital.  
 
Under these circumstances the leftists pressed for nationalization of private industrial 
establishments and consolidation of private property. In this claim leftists relied on the 
hostility of the general public to the industrial capital. Aware of this hostility the business 
community asked in “desperation” to improve this perception since in the country the private 
enterprise was being "looked upon with contempt, hatred and suspicion." The socialistic 
rhetoric of PM Nehru, on the other hand, provided the required ideological setting for these 
demands. It was in this context Nehru assured the nation on the precautions to prevent 
monopolies and concentration of wealth. The idea of establishing cottage industries at the 
advanced stage of the cooperative farming was another irritating aspect for the industrial 
capital.602   
 
Comparison of these with the policies of the second conflict and divergence period (1964-73) 
revealed the correspondence between them, along with some differences. Deterioration of the 
relations between the political elite and industrial capital commenced shortly after the Chinese 
invasion of border areas. During the war, the industrial capital extended its full support to the 
political elite mainly by providing funds to the National Defense Fund. Yet when the GOI 
introduced new taxes and new controls to meet the increased defense needs, the industrial 
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capital interpreted this as the flow of its wealth to the public sector. In addition to new taxes, 
the political elite enacted monopoly legislation in 1969, and made substantial modification of 
the industrial licensing policy to enlarge the scope of public sector as well as small-scale 
industries. When the political elite adopted a new industrial policy in 1971 that enabled public 
sector’s entrance to new fields such as consumer goods, industrial capitalists did not hide their 
disappointment in these initiatives. 603  
 
Similar to the first period, the leftists, who had a powerful position in the country and the 
Parliament due to the increased grievances of the mass again focused the attention of the 
country on Birla. Claiming that he was guilty of a variety of corrupt practices, the leftists 
asked for a complete government investigation of the activities of Birla House. However, in 
contrast to the first period, undertaking of one of the most debated and most delicate issues, 
namely nationalization of fourteen commercial banks, was also regarded as the triumph of the 
leftists due to the assumption that nationalization curbed the monopolist power of the top 
industrial houses. 604   
 
With respect to rhetoric, the periods of conflict had similarities. Concerning the expectations 
of the mass, while the first period was distinguished by Nehru socialism, rhetoric of the 
second period was garibi horatio, eradication of poverty with the same promise of a more 
egalitarian social order. Examination of the context revealed the perfect timing of their 
adoption.  
 
Policies of the first period of conflict and divergence were the byproducts of the immediate 
Independence. In the midst of communal revolts, vulnerable market conditions and emerging 
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raw material shortage due to partition, the Indian capitalists were grasped by the feeling of 
insecurity.605Yet more than these conjuncturel problems solution of which was possible in the 
process, suspicion from the new national administration shaped the interaction between the 
political elite and industrial capital. The industrial capital that envisioned an environment to 
foster the industrial capitalists in their country had difficulties in predicting the final intentions 
of the national government. A highly mobilized mass, on the other hand, ardently looked for 
the realization of their expectations regarding improvement of their lots, which were 
manipulated by the new political elite during the national movement.606 
 
The second period of conflict, on the other hand, was distinguished by a frustrated mass 
whose expectations were unfulfilled to a great extent. As a result of widespread poverty, 
failure to attain an improvement in the lot of the mass and failure of the assumed trickle down 
impact of development and growth, Nehru’s successors faced a highly radicalized population, 
expressing upon through various peasant movements. Due to the radicalization of the mass, 
both Shastri and Gandhi did not enjoy the high prestige that was attributed to Nehru. People’s 
alienation from the CP, which found its expression in the decline of electorate support, was to 
a degree what Gandhi suspected that it could have the chance for survival till next elections.  
 
Under these circumstances she undertook policies which were regarded as radical and 
challenging the stance of the industrial capital in rhetoric, such as nationalization of banks and 
coal mining. Undertaking in the framework of garibi horatio, these policies were regarded as a 
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matter of survival not for her political career but also for the continuation of the regime when 
she hinted the possibility of a mass movement.607  
 
In coping with these conflicts, the industrial capital developed various strategies to preserve 
its interest ultimately. The fundamental strategy developed by the industrial capital, regardless 
of the leadership in political elite, was de-investment.  In the post-Independence era, the 
industrial capital first appealed to this strategy during the first conflict period. Complaining 
about the grip of the government in the form of new tax schemes and ambiguities in the 
foreign trade policy, industrial capital chose to de-invest and it reduced industrial production 
as these were the greatest possible challenges to the ultimate objective of the political elite, 
which was an increase in industrial production output. When PM Nehru appealed the 
industrial capital to end their efficient bargaining means, as the mouthpiece of the monopolist 
capital Birla proposed and obtained reduction in the level of direct taxes on business 
profits.608 
 
The same scenario was put into force in the late 1960s and the early 1970s when the industrial 
capital faced more radical appeals of the political elite. Though the so-called ‘radical’ policies 
of the political elite did not pose such a serious challenge to the institutionalized interest 
mechanism of the big capital as was explicitly observed in the case of nationalized banks, the 
radicalized and aggressive tone of the political elite was again responded by the most efficient 
bargaining policy of the monopoly capitalists, de-investment. This time, in contrast to the 
monolith stance of the previous conflict period, duality was observed among the industrial 
capitalists. 
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While the majority of the big industrial capitalists who were identified with the FICCI implied 
de-investment as a possible remedy for the industrial capital in case that the deterring 
environment for investment prevailed, the minority known as Bombay school and who were 
led by one of the tycoons of the Indian industry J.R.D. Tata adopted an aggressive policy line 
while putting de-investment strategy in force. In his memorandum to the GOI in 1972, J.R.D. 
Tata claimed that political elite was responsible for the existing “investment famine” in the 
country due to its impractical policies which constrained large industrial houses whose 
production comprised half of the total.609 
  
The duality of the industrial capital in their reaction to the political elite was crucial as it 
represented the differentiation among the industrial capitalists. The majority of the industrial 
capitalists led by Birla and identified with FICCI were distinguished by their conciliatory 
approach in their dealings with the political elite. Though Birla expressed the contempt of the 
Indian capitalists after the advent of the national government due to the political elite’s 
“abuses, threats and warnings”, they continued to support the Congress government. The 
Birla-led industrial capital, which comprised the majority, repeated the same pattern of 
behavior after Nehru. Despite the pro-capitalists appeal of the Syndicate, Birla-led group 
supported Indira Gandhi before the split of the CP. In addition to this, despite the radical 
rhetoric of Gandhi in the 1971 elections and its aftermath, particularly during nationalization, 
again this group supported Gandhi.610  
 
The lasting support of the Birla-led group identified with FICCI was crucial as it indicated 
that Birla, as the mouthpiece of monopoly capitalists and political elite shared a common 
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language. Despite the acclaimed contempt the main premise of this group’s support given to 
the CP was lasting political stability. Birla believed that the CP under Nehru and Gandhi 
offered the best hope for political stability. In explaining his support to Nehru during the first 
period of conflict, Birla referred to Nehru as a balance point, the best option for the big capital 
in a Parliament that could have easily been diverted to the left. He relied on the same idea of 
political stability when he supported Gandhi in the late-1960s and the 1970s. The intensified 
economic problems, louder tone of anti-monopoly capitalists parallel to the political 
instability in the late 1960s by the weakening of the CP at the center confirmed the political 
judgment of Birla.611  
 
In contrast to this conciliatory approach of Birla-led group paying special attention to avoid 
alienation of the political elite, other group that represented the minority in FICCI at least in 
the mid-1970s and led by Tata was known as the Bombay school. Adopting an aggressive 
approach, this group supported a more activist policy line and a straight promotion of the 
virtues of free enterprise vis-à-vis the political elite to influence the decision-making process. 
As they regarded Nehru socialism, taxation schemes, and controls as major threats to private 
capital, they supported the establishment of pro-capitalist organizations including the 
Swatantra Party, the first party challenging the consensus on prevailing economic policy. In 
its assertive tone, this group was not so occupied with the idea of political stability. Kochanek 
explains this relative indifference to political stability with respect to the location of their 
industrial establishments. In contrast to the Bombay-based industries of Tata and his followers 
free from any Communist movements close to their headquarters, Birla and other crucial 
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monopoly capitalists were located in areas where Communist threat to their existence was at 
its acme.612    
 
In the period under study this group only once had the power to influence the FICCI’s 
position. In the mid-1960s under its influence FICCI broke with the Birla philosophy and 
adopted an aggressive tone. While its President attacked the GOI due to its abandoning of the 
pragmatic approach, the FICCI introduced various resolutions, which were critical to the 
government. Not only the PM Shastri but also Birla had to intervene. While Birla pacified the 
FICCI by saying that without CP the country could not prosper, PM Shastri through one of his 
Ministers urged that timing for such extreme criticism from the business community was not 
appropriate.613  
 
In the Indian context, therefore, a strong correlation between Birla and the CP was valid. 
While a strong CP by its multi-factional structure was regarded as a security valve by the 
mouthpiece of the majority of monopoly capitalists, in the process CP also used Birla to 
preserve the conciliatory position of the industrial capital. Examination of the process 
revealed the rationale behind this conciliatory role. As the mouthpiece of the monopoly 
capitalists for a long time Birla led the FICCI trying its best to lead changes in the decisions 
of the policy makers. This was done through FICCI’s membership and consultant roles at 
various government commissions, committees and councils, including the Planning 
Commission, through personal contacts with ministers and media organs. Yet, when the 
FICCI leadership felt that it reached the limits of its influence, it accepted the things as the 
“fait accompli” of the system, where monopolist capital had to reconcile. At that point the 
conciliatory FICCI sought means and developed mechanisms in that fait accompli to convert 
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the process for its own ends such as establishing direct contacts with the bureaucracy, 
exploiting the loopholes of the legislation or establishing alternative organs.  Regarding this 
feature, Birla defined a genuine industrial capitalist as the one who had the ability to adapt 
himself to the changing conditions.614 
 
While these were the main strategy trends of the industrial capital in its interaction with the 
political elite during the periods of conflict, the last question left regarding this interaction 
was the responsiveness of the political elite to these strategies. In the course of the events, the 
political elite adopted a reiterating strategy vis-à-vis the monopolist industrial capital. With 
some minor exceptions, this reiterating strategy involved adoption of policies which 
challenged the industrial capital’s interests, initial unresponsiveness of the proposals of the 
industrial capital for their amendment while propagating these policies within an ideological 
context, and, as the last move, undertaking modifications to appease the industrial capital or 
non-interference with the emasculation of the adopted policies.  
 
During the first period of conflict the most striking retreat from the political rhetoric was the 
Industrial Resolution of 1948.  This ended the industrial capital’s crisis of confidence in the 
political elite concerning issues that might arise from the uncertainties of the future since, as 
Nayar points out the Resolution certified the status quo. As it did not pose a threat to the 
private sector the Resolution diminished the industrial capital’s anxiety. Instead while 
referring to the limited sources for the public sector’s expansion due to the prevailing 
circumstances, the Resolution implied a limitless expansion of the private industrial sector in 
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its recognition of the “valuable role” that the private capital played in attaining the national 
objectives.615  
 
Facing criticisms from the socialists and appreciation of the capitalists, Nehru justified the 
moderate tone in the Resolution of 1948 by pointing out the social responsibility that any one 
had to feel in the Indian context due to the extraordinary events that the country faced 
including the Independence. Emphasizing the peculiar conditions of the country, Nehru 
claimed that these compelled anyone to avoid taking steps which could injure the existing 
structure. Defining himself as “not brave and gallant enough” for more destruction, Nehru 
opposed the idea that sweeping away of all the things a country had for the sake of 
establishing “what might be called as a clean state” and stated that this would serve  the delay 
of the progress.616 This explanation reflected influence of the de-investment strategy on the 
political elite who regarded the obligation of efficient use of the industrial capital for 
economic growth.   
 
Other retreats in policies which were criticized by the industrial capital were undertaken by 
the same justification. These included arrangements of tax schemes according to the demands 
of industrial capital, non-interference the expansion of the private sector into fields other than 
those regarded as the private sector’s responsibility, appraisal of the monopolization 
countrywide as a positive factor that contributed to economic growth and resistance to 
nationalization.617   
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In comparison to the first period of conflict, in the second period the political elite adopted a 
more radical rhetoric parallel to changes in the internal dynamics of the country. Yet retreats 
in policies showed great parallelism between the periods. In 1970 Session of the FICCI 
Gandhi advised the industrialists to take government as their friends, and not as an adversary. 
Examination of her era proved the accuracy of this advice to a great extent. The discrepancy 
between the rhetoric and outcomes was to such a degree that one could conclude that the more 
radicalized the rhetoric was the larger the scope of the retreat would be. Nationalization and 
anti-monopoly acts, changes in the industrial licensing policy, and enactment of a new 
industrial resolution were adopted in the midst of the protests of the industrial capital as well 
as assurance of the industrial capitalists regarding the preservation of their interests.618  
 
The last stage in these radical policies was their total abandonment parallel to the economic 
crisis of the mid-1970s. Without considering the structural bottlenecks as a cause, the 
industrial capitalists concluded that the radical policies led to this crisis. By the shift following 
this conclusion the agenda as well as rhetoric changed from distributive justice to economic 
growth.619 
 
In between these period of divergences, the Indian industrial capital and political elite had a 
period of accommodation. The period of accommodation lasted from 1954 to 1963. 
Examination of the era in global terms without penetrating into dynamics leads to the 
conclusion that this era was distinguished by a general conciliation between the political elite 
and industrial capital. According to such an examination, in the course of events the industrial 
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capital submitted its opinion to the political elite regarding the policies such as heavy industry 
strategy and the Industrial Resolution of 1956. As seen in its reaction to the Second Five Year 
Plan the industrial capital tried its best to lead change or bring about relaxation in these policy 
decisions. But when it failed to do this, then it preferred to interpret the policy decisions as the 
fait accompli of the system while influencing their application for its own benefits. The 
industrial capital successfully exploited the loopholes in resolutions and legislation while 
enjoying cheaper inputs and infrastructure provided by the public sector in a protected 
domestic market free from competition. Under these circumstances it continued to expand and 
accumulated capital. The political elite, on the other hand, adopted some challenging concepts 
such as socialist pattern of society but its pragmatic interpretation of these as well as 
decisiveness to use all possible resources without alienating themselves to attain the national 
development objectives served the prevalence of accommodation.620  
 
This period was, however, not free from confrontations. First of these confrontations occurred 
when the CP declared its determination of a socialist pattern of society. While announcing 
this, however, the political elite paid special attention to the appeasement of industrial capital. 
Assuring the industrial capital that there was not any scheme to replace the private industrial 
capital, Nehru stressed that the new policy was not aimed at socializing the economy but at 
developing large-scale industry in the public sector.  There were various confrontations of this 
sort that had a repetitive development. In cases when the political elite adopted harsher 
attitudes due to the continued aggressiveness of the Bombay school, Birla acted as a mediator 
between the industrial capitalists.621 
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Kochanek defines the initiation of the Second Five Year Plan as the official inauguration of 
the new era of cooperation. This Plan provided substantial scope for the growth of the private 
sector. Despite some initial criticisms, the industrial capital attempted to adapt itself to the 
new arrangement that was appreciated by Nehru. During the period of rapid expansion under 
the Second Plan business-government conflict continued to diminish along with the debate 
over the relative merits of public and private sector development. By the early 1960s, the 
accommodation between business and Congress reached such a point that Nehru declared the 
friction between public and private sector as unnecessary and harmful. In his meetings with 
the FICCI, Nehru underlined the benefits of private capital for India. 622  
 
Thus, business-government relations during the decade from 1952 to 1962 moved from one of 
confrontation to accommodation. The formula behind this was the grasp of the Birla-led 
FICCI that Nehru’s rhetoric was something different from his actions. While he was talking a 
great deal about socialism, Nehru never considered or did anything that really affected 
business interests. However, not all the monopolist had the same perception. Dissatisfied by 
the policies of the CP, the minority within the monopoly capitalists developed counter 
strategies against the CP such as establishment of a Forum for Free Enterprise, a pro-free 
enterprise organization for lobbying and Swatantra Party.623 This dual facet among the 
monopoly capitalists lasted until 1964 when the political elite had to abandon its pragmatic 
approach due to existing circumstances shaped by external and domestic factors. 
 
The above-mentioned examinations give an idea about the interaction between the industrial 
capital and political elite at the Center. This does not reflect the total as the industrial capital 
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also had similar strategies at state levels. Until 1967 elections, the industrial capital preferred 
nomination at state legislatures to influence the implementation of the policies. But 
commencing in 1967 elections, an increased number of industrial capitalists preferred to join 
elections as MP candidates. The CP was highly responsive to the appeal of the industrial 
capitalists and nominated many capitalists. By and after this election there was a considerable 
increase in the number of industrial capitalists in the Parliament, which enabled them to 
influence the policies affecting the interests of the business community as a whole more 
directly.624 Besides, the above-mentioned examination reflects the visible dimension of the 
interaction. Parallel to this, there were certain hidden, sometimes open secret mechanisms that 
worked parallel to this dimension such as donations to political parties and employment of 
close relatives of the political elite.625   
 
In sum, examination of the interaction between the political elite and industrial capital reveals 
that industrial capital was neither impotent nor omnipotent in its influence on political elite. In 
other words, the political elite was neither a puppet nor a master vis-à-vis industrial capital. 
Both components were careful not to lead a break in relations. Political elite justified this as 
an imposition of the context as India was a resource scarce country that had to exploit its 
resources cleverly. The industrial capital, on the other hand, justified this on political stability 
grounds as well as the political elite’s flexibility to leave them a large maneuvering space to 
exploit the loopholes or use other components to emasculate the policies to the possible 
extent. Though the political elite was important as the legislative, industrial capitalists were 
aware of the crucial role that the civil servants had in the system.  
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The highly regulated economic system adopted after Independence obligated closer relations 
between the industrial capital and bureaucracy. Due to their allocative power these civil 
servants had an empowered stance vis-à-vis other interest groups. The industrial capital had to 
rely on the decisions of the civil servants at nearly every stage of its activities. In quantitative 
terms, the bureaucracy made seventy-five percent of the decisions affecting business. Due to 
this proportion, some categorized the relation between the civil servants and industrial capital 
as a dependency the premises of which were licenses, permits and quotas. Consequently, for 
the industrial capital to have good relations with the high echelons of bureaucracy was 
important, even more important than having good relations with the ministers, owing to the 
sustained nature of the bureaucrats’ tenure in contrast to the brief tenure of the ministers.626 
The industrial capital had a cautious approach in its dealing with the bureaucracy. Owing to 
its elitist structure that alienated them from the society in many ways it was not always easy to 
influence the bureaucracy.  Awareness of these led the big capital to be careful in its relations 
with the bureaucracy, and avoid conflicts as much as possible as this could antagonize these 
important decision makers.627 Despite this important feature of the interaction, the high 
echelons of the bureaucracy were recognized as an important partner in emasculating policies. 
Without their contribution it would not have been easy for the industrial capital to exploit the 
loopholes of the legislation, regulations or resolutions. 628 
 
On the other hand, to assure the continuity of this partnership, the industrial capital had to rely 
on some mechanisms such as bribery, donations, employment of the relatives of bureaucrats 
as well as transfer of retired bureaucrats to the private sector, not only to assure the support of 
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bureaucracy distinguished by its allocative power but also to accelerate the procedures. The 
latter was an important consideration for the industrial capital since obtaining an import 
license in ordinary terms lasted one and half year. Worse than this the industrial capitalists 
required at least four years in meeting the terms of the required procedures for running an 
industrial establishment.629 
 
Rural Elite 
As the last component of the ruling elite coalition, the rural elite is distinguished from other 
components with respect to its pro-British stance. While regarding the continuation of the 
status quo as the best option for its interest, the rural elite considered the new national 
administration as a challenge for its survival. Putting the issue as a matter of survival or 
perishing, the rural elite was highly anxious of Independence. 
  
The new Indian administration, on the other hand, did not attempt to hide its anti-feudal 
stance. Referring to the rural elite’s exploitative nature as remnants of the British era, the 
political elite defined the existing rural elite as the most important factor impeding 
agricultural development. It pursued policies which proved the relevance of the anxieties of 
the rural elite. Yet this comprised one facet of the interaction between the rural elite and the 
political elite. Parallel to this, another mechanism was at force that led to a differentiation 
within the rural elite as semi-feudal landlords and capitalist farmers.  
 
The agricultural development policies, regardless of their socialistic appeal, aimed to create 
capitalist farmers and accelerated capitalist production relations in the Indian rural structure. 
Justified by referring to the prevailing low agricultural productivity, the envisioned future of 
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rural India was made up of economically viable individuals and communities. This was the 
reason why the political elite did not interfere with the expansion of the big capitalist oriented 
landowners in rural India. Instead, the political elite devised means which compelled the 
semi-feudal landlords  to convert into capitalist farmers. Top among these means was the 
semi-feudal landlords and intermediaries cut off from revenue collection. Though they 
continued to exist without this economic basis they felt insecure in the system. Facing these, 
many of the remnants of the British were convinced to adapt themselves to the new conditions 
hinted by the central government. Under these circumstances, the majority of the absentee-
landlords and ex-intermediaries converted themselves into the new style landlords or owners 
of capitalist farms using modern techniques, which was propagated as a good source of 
income as well as the sole means to attain self-sufficiency in agriculture.630 
 
Yet this recomposition in the rural India led to various confrontations between the rural and 
political elite as the first attempted to preserve its powerful stance vis-à-vis other components 
as well as lower segments in rural areas. The most important means that the rural elite relied 
on in its confrontation with the political elite was its participation in politics. Grasping the 
importance of this in shaping the policies, in the process the proportion of the rural elite 
increased considerably both at state and center level. While their share was 10.8 per cent in 
1950, this increased to 18.3 per cent in 1952 and 26.1 per cent in 1962. The increased 
proportion also reflected the emerging diversification within the rural elite. While in the initial 
years they were predominantly absentee-landlords, these representatives in the Parliament 
reflected the differentiation among the rural elite. Despite their conflicting interests at varying 
                                                 
630Owdet, “Capitalist Agriculture and Rural Classes in India”, p.88-9; Dube, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Study in 
Ideology and Social Change, p.179; Namboodiripad, Economics and Politics of India’s Socialist Pattern, p.219-
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degrees, however, both the traditional landlords and capitalist farmers acted as a unified body 
when the interest of the rural elite was at stake. 631  
 
Increased proportion of rural elite both in state and center level politics had important 
consequences with respect to the rural elite and political elite interaction. Through this 
representation the rural elite had a wide range of maneuvering space vis-à-vis the political 
elite. Being dependent on them concerning votes as well as funds, the political elite could not 
press for policies that challenged the rural elite’s position.  This increased power as well as 
the rural elite’s ability to exploit conflicts within the political elite led to a successful striking 
down of Nehru’s proposal for making the joint cooperative farming as the fundamental pillar 
of the agrarian reform. In this successful counter attack the rural elite also manipulated the 
fear of industrial capital regarding abolition of private property.632   
 
In addition to this the rural elite was successful in its opposition and prevention of agricultural 
income tax and any intervention of the center regarding their profit margin on foodcrops, in 
promoting an appropriate environment for the lasting flow of the public resources into its 
hands in the form of various incentives, top among which was subsidies and successful 
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emasculation of the revived land ceiling policies in the 1970s which were propagated by a 
more egalitarian rural order vision.633 
 
These agricultural development policies of the political elite, in short, led to the acceleration 
of the capitalist mode of production in rural India and a dual structure among the rural elite. 
While the absentee-landlords continued to prevail, it was the heyday for capitalist farmers. 
The latter was distinguished from the first by their relation to the land. In contrast to the first 
that enjoyed rentier relations, the capitalist farmers involved in agricultural activities, 
cultivated their land by using hired labor in great proportions rather than relying on family 
labor to have agricultural surplus for market. For these capitalist farmers making investment 
in land and adoption of modern techniques in agriculture such as fertilizers and agricultural 
machinery to increase productivity were crucial due to their profit orientation. 634  
 
These features of the capitalist farmers were best fitted the expectations of the political elite as 
well as industrial capital, regarding an increase in agricultural productivity. On the other hand, 
the accumulated capital in these hands did not lead to a more egalitarian social order in rural 
areas, which comprised the other facet of the objectives of the political elite. Instead, parallel 
to the concentration of lands in few hands for capitalist ends, tenancy declined while 
landlessness and proletarianization increased. This was the general tendency where capitalist 
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farming was more widespread. Though the emergence of the above-mentioned situations was 
a phenomenon common in all rural areas, it had varying degrees.635                 
 
In addition to this dimension of interaction, there were various cases where the industrial 
capitalists became the third component. In contrast to the initial support of the industrial 
capital given to the rural elite on the land reform issue, the interaction of the industrial capital 
and rural elite was highly tense due to the clashing interests of these two components. Until 
the mid-1960s the rural elite felt that its interests were sacrificed for the sake of the industrial 
capital by pointing out the minor amount of the allocations earmarked to the agricultural field. 
This state of affairs led to acute tensions between the industrial capital and the rural elite.636      
 
The interaction between the industrial capital and rural elite varied depending on the 
differentiation among the rural elite. As they regarded semi-feudal absentee-landlords as 
factors impeding agricultural productivity and expansion of domestic market, they extended 
their full support to any schemes, which challenged their position in the rural structure. Yet 
this challenge had its limits since some of the programs as well as slogans also led to the 
shattering of the basis of their own existence.637  
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In seeking a mid-way to attain their expectations in agriculture field without endangering the 
property relationship of the industrial capital, they welcomed the new agriculture strategy. 
Their support for this new strategy had two dimensions. While one was related to an increase 
in agricultural productivity, the other was the possibility of expansion of domestic market 
parallel to the assumed trickle down effect of the policies. Though this strategy was a success 
in creating capitalist farmers and fostering capitalist relations, the second dimension was not 
attained. The agreement with the capitalist farmers based on their role to increase agricultural 
productivity and surplus product was, however, not enough to assure an interaction free from 
conflict. Instead the increased power of these farmers and parallel increase of their incentives 
as a result of their successful bargaining comprised the tensions in the interaction of the 
industrial capital and capitalist farmers.638  
 
A crucial factor in the pro-rural elite atmosphere of the mid-60s was the US agencies, which 
had direct contribution to the rural elite’s increased preponderance within the ruling elite 
coalition. The appropriate environment for this increase could be defined as the successive 
droughts, deficiencies in food crops production, continuous food importation and ‘announced 
shame’ due to India’s excessive dependency to foreign countries in order to feed the nation as 
well as death of Nehru were the main domestic factors created a favorable atmosphere for the 
rural elite. The US agencies such as the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations successfully 
exploited this favorable atmosphere. The propagation for the need for large ‘progressive’ 
landowners and the necessity of various subsidies contributed to the pro-farmer atmosphere 
within the country. The outcome was the Green Revolution that created another type of 
dependency for the country.        
                                                 
638See Sau, India’s Economic Development: Aspects of Class Relations; Sathyamurthy, ed., Industry and 
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Yet it should be mentioned that by some overall policy suggestions as well as fund raising, the 
US administration in one way or another challenged the interests of the rural elite. In the 50s 
majority of the American aid allocations were in the form of emergency food aid. In addition, 
American aid was earmarked for the Community Development Projects. This also meant the 
indirect confrontation of the USA with the Indian rural elite. Though the CDPs did not pose a 
direct challenge to the interests of the rural elite, in the long run it could be a serious 
challenge. The CDPs envisioned a rural population, which is productive, consuming and 
aware of the existing opportunities and services. It was due to this envisioned future, the rural 
elite emasculated the CDPs successfully.  
 
The US administration’s sensitivity on the land reform issue was another source of 
confrontation. In contrast to the case of the Turkish rural elite who had a conceptual 
confrontation, the Indian elite had a direct confrontation with the USA. The US policymakers 
defined the land ownership pattern of India as a problematic one. In their perspective India 
was one of the countries, which had to achieve its land reform issue.639 
 
The over-sensitivity of the US policymakers regarding India was due to the so-called social 
revolution in Asia. Despite these suggestions and the land reform policies of the Indian 
governments, however, this issue remained unsolved in India also. In contrast to the 
expectations, there was not a social revolution of the kind that the USA defined. Militancy of 
the peasants was not widespread, instead remained limited locally. 
                                                 
639Confidential Communication from ECA Administration to all ECA Missions, 26 April 1951, RG 286, Records 
of the Agency for International Development, Mission to Turkey, Office of the Chief of Mission, Classified 
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Concluding Remarks 
Examination of the interaction between the ruling elite coalition and the mass as well as the 
interaction between the components of the ruling elite coalition shed light on the inner 
dynamics that led to the discrepancies between the rhetoric and practice of the development 
strategies. Importance of the examination of internal dynamics lies in the fact that it sheds 
light on the local context that serves or impedes attainment of national objectives regarding 
development. Evaluation of the Turkish and Indian development processes concerning their 
outcomes reveals their success with respect to sectorial and national growth rates, national 
income and improved infrastructures. Yet, they were unsatisfying with respect to prevailing 
widespread poverty, majority’s inaccessibility to existing resources and growing injustice in 
income distribution. This was not an unexpected outcome as the systems were arranged in a 
manner that they denied the diffusion of resources; instead they served the concentration in 
the hands of the minority.  
 
Analysis of the mass and ruling elite coalition reveals the mass’ lacking an alternative in the 
real sense. Though by using its electorate power it had the ability to influence the 
recomposition of political elite, the scope of its power was limited vis-à-vis the complicated 
institutionalized interest networks of the elite groups. Examination has indicated the irony in 
the interaction of the mass and some components of the ruling elite coalition. One of the 
important and ironical aspects was the ability of the elite groups to manipulate the mass for 
their own ends. The mass that was feeble to lead a change in the preponderance of the 
coalition turned out to be a means who served the institutionalized interest networks of the 
elite groups.  
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Justification of various policies which ensured efficient flow of the public resources to the 
elite groups such as subsidies and bank credits; or, prevention and emasculation of policies 
that challenged interests of the ruling elite such as taxation schemes were done by using the 
mass as a pretext for these policies. Besides, via punctual interference of the political elite 
radicalization of the mass was prevented. This interference was mostly in the form of 
adoption of radical rhetoric distinguished by social justice and/or pragmatic socialistic notions 
which touched upon the expectations of the mass.         
 
With respect to this ironical empowerment, the rural elite had a peculiar condition. Their 
influence on local politics and wide electorate basis were important deterrents for the political 
elite for not being firm on various issues and policies. Put in other words, the last dimension 
indicated the inability of the mass to grasp the role that it played in the institutionalization of 
the interests of the rural elite. As seen in the Village Institutes and Community Development 
Program issues, the rural elite safeguarded its interest by opposing and emasculating any 
schemes that led to an overall structural change in rural areas. Particularly true for Turkey, in 
this opposition the rural elite successfully manipulated the values and fears of the mass 
including religion, communist threats and atheism.    
 
As the examination reveals those who had the power to lead a change in the preponderance of 
the ruling elite coalition were the elite groups themselves. Yet any change in the 
preponderance of the components was not undertaken for the sake of the mass; instead, the 
concern was to reinforce its stance vis-à-vis other components of the ruling elite coalition. In 
other words, interactions between themselves were shaped by the concern regarding 
domination, or at least, preservation of position in the coalition vis-à-vis other components.  
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Inability of the Turkish and Indian policymakers to increase the domestic savings parallel to 
their failure to develop an efficient tax system, growing deficit in budgets, high inflation rates, 
depletion of resources due to subsidies and various forms of incentives for investments which 
served  the economic and social development of the country were indicators of the elite 
coalition’s indifference, even neglect, of the overall interests of the country when the interests 
of the components were at stake.        
  
All these serve the deceleration of the economic development. Investments shaped by the 
interest-orientation of the elite groups result in distorted growth patterns without a genuine 
development.  The high and quick profit concern of the industrial capital has led to the 
emergence of pseudo-industrialization that served the empowerment and reinforcement of the 
big industrial capital at the expense of others, but at the same time increased the country’s 
dependence on center countries. This dependency had various facets such as dependency in 
foreign capital, technology as well as basic inputs. The price of this dependence had to be 
paid by the nation as a whole, as it led to mounting indebtedness and increasing balance of 
payments problem. While this was related only to the big industrial capital, political elite’s 
decisions and support of other elite groups to minimize their dissatisfaction and discontent 
also led to a considerable waste of resources and irrational management of things.   
 
Relying on these outcomes, it can be concluded that pragmatic preferences and 
shortsightedness of the ruling elite groups were important factor that contributed to these 
countries’ unattainment of self-reliance and increased dependency to center countries. 
Questioning of which component had more contribution to these outcomes indicates that all 
components had a role in this shaping. It was not easy to define some as master or puppet in 
the hands of the other component. Owing to the circumstances and national priorities, each 
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component had varying degrees of influence. But among others, the civilian bureaucracy had 
distinguished features as regardless of the conjuncturel developments. It was the most 
powerful component vis-à-vis other components as the established system offered huge 
opportunities to these civil servants by endowing them with allocative power. Exploiting the 
loopholes of the system, the bureaucracy was the key determinant in the distortion of policies 
to a great extent. 
 
Yet in this diagnosis the important thing that should be keep in mind is that as the elite groups 
of an underdeveloped country they had serious setbacks shaped by the strategies of the center 
countries to preserve and reinforce their interests in the center-periphery dichotomy. In other 
words, attempt to explain the failures and successes of a country only with respect to internal 
dynamics is misleading since none of the countries were free from the influence of external 
dynamics of the center.  
 
Influence of the external dynamics varied depending on the type of these dynamics. The 
armed intervention of any country distorted the nature of development process since it 
necessitated more allocations for national defense. Or, true for the period under study, the 
Cold War context paved the way for immense armament shaped by the theory of deterrence.  
There were other types of interference emerging as a countervailing policy against a country’s 
national priorities and preferences about its role in the international division of labor, 
development policies and foreign policy. This latter type of interference was shaped by the 
strategic concerns of advanced countries.  
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The next chapter is the analysis of the interaction between Turkey and India as peripheral 
countries and the USA, as the superpower of the capitalist center countries in the post-World 
War II with special reference to the global (world economic system) as well as conjuncturel 
(the Cold War) setting. 
 345
CHAPTER IV 
EXTERNAL DYNAMICS: TURKEY AND INDIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS  
I. Turkey in World Affairs (1947-73) 
 
Turkey as a country in the free world bloc was among the top that benefited from the foreign 
aid program of the USA.  Welcomed and highly proud of this alliance, the Turkish 
policymakers referred to it as the proof of Turkey’s importance in the international affairs. 
Besides, they regarded it as a golden opportunity for Turkey who suffered from foreign 
exchange shortage and low domestic savings. The US administration, on the other hand, 
regarded Turkey a crucial link in the containment of the socialist ideology which was 
identified with the USSR totalitarianism. Though shaped by different considerations both 
Turkey and the USA emphasized the importance of their alliance.  
 
Mutual expression of the importance of alliance, however, did not ensure a relation free from 
tensions and conflicts. Examination of the process revealed that 50s was an era when the 
allies had full conformity on diplomatic issues whereas they had serious confrontations on 
economic issues. What contributed to the tension was the USA’s priorities shaped by her 
hegemonic power considerations and Turkey’s over-confidence regarding her importance in 
the Cold War context. In contrast to this, the 60s were distinguished by a dual confrontation. 
In addition to the economic issues, diplomatic issues became matters of confrontation.  The 
milestone in this confrontation was the Cyprus issue that led to the breaking of the glass and 
compelled Turkey to see the realities. In the following pages, the USA and Turkey relations 
are analyzed with respect to economic, diplomatic and military issues. 
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a. The USA & Turkey on Economic Issues 
Demands of the Superpower and Their Timing: 
 In the post-WW2 era, Turkey’s entrance into the foreign aid regime of the USA indicated a 
new beginning in the USA-Turkey relations. In contrast to Turkey’s loneliness vis-à-vis the 
threats of the USSR and indifference of the USA to Turkey’s call, by the 1947 Greek-Turkish 
Aid Program the USA declared her alliance with Turkey. After this date, as the main source 
of foreign aid, the USA became a factor that Turkish policymakers had to take into 
consideration in shaping their economic policies. Its influence was apparent in the immediate 
shift of the locomotive sector of Turkish development policy. In contrast to the pre-war years 
when there was continuity in the development policy of the country, shifts occurred 
concerning these policies in the immediate twenty-seven years (1946-73) of post-WW2 era. 
Following Turkey’s entrance to the US foreign aid policy, Turkish policy makers had to 
design the development policies by the recommendations of the western “free world” Bloc. 
While the locomotive sector of the development policy was agriculture in 1946-60 era this 
was reoriented as industrialization in 1960-73 era.  
 
The “free world” bloc countries were firm on the shift in locomotive sector and Turkey’s 
participation into the ERP was possible only after this change from industrial-led to 
agricultural-led development policy. In the context of Turkey this had a special importance as 
this indicated the abandonment of one of the ultimate objectives for the attainment of which 
the Republican administration endeavored since the foundation of the Republic. Turkey 
pursued an industrialization-led development program in the pre-WW2 era by refusing the 
center countries’ recommendations for the contrary.  For the Turkish policymakers heavy 
steel plates and power plants were more important than agricultural reform. As the country 
had adequate food supplies, the latter was not regarded as a prime necessity. In the London 
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Conference of 1933 Turkey’s Minister of Economy Celal Bayar stated that Turkey refused to 
accept colonial status implied by the developed countries regarding her role as an agricultural 
country in the international division of labor.640  
 
This refusal was due to Turkish policymakers belief that only by industrialization LDCs could 
attain their real economic independence, minimize their dependency on advanced countries as 
well as assuring their full economic and political independence. The development strategy of 
the era until post-WW2 was shaped according to this highly accepted view. In the appraisal of 
the development drive in pre-WW2 era, industrial development was defined as the means that 
Turkey relied on for the last two decades to attain a new balance in its economy. As a result of 
the industrial-led development Turkey began to exploit iron, coal, chrome, copper, zinc, omery 
resources.  Furthermore, there were construction of an iron and steel plant, establishment of cement, 
glass, paper, textile, other light industries and an expansion of transportation, power and communication 
facilities.641  
  
In essence, policy recommendations of the USA in the framework of the ECA regarding the 
change in the locomotive sector were contrary to Turkish policymakers’ expectations. In their 
welcoming and propagation for foreign aid, the policymakers stated that by the expected 
financial aid from the USA, Turkey would strengthen her industrial basis and attain her 
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industrial development. They hoped that these aid allocations would be used for the 
acceleration of the industrialization attempts.642  
 
The first country program of Turkey that was submitted to the OEEC (then OECD) well 
reflected this belief. The plan suggested the improvement of basic industries. Objectives in 
this program were the modernization and expansion of existing industries by importing 
suitable machinery, rationalization of production methods to reduce cost prices and reduction 
of the volume of imports. Textile, cellulose and paper, cement, chemical, meat and fish, sugar 
industries were the highlighted basic industries. In terms of heavy industry, the program 
mentioned iron and steel industry, output of which covered about 40 % of the national 
demand as of 1948.643  
 
However, there was a difference in opinion regarding the locomotive sector as revealed by 
OEEC’s refusal of the program on the grounds of its being a very “ambitious” plan that did 
not meet the expectations of the OEEC. By the recommendations of the OEEC, Turkey 
revised her country program where the sectoral priorities were agriculture, transportation 
related to agriculture and energy units. As a participant country, Turkey’s commitment to 
contribute to ERP was an increase of its agricultural production to a certain level; for cereal 
grain production, to 10.300.000 tons and for cotton fiber production to 100.000 tons by 1952. 
In addition, Turkey was committed to export 1.000.000 tons of cereals to Western European 
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countries. Improvement of the transportation system, mainly the highways, was defined as a 
crucial means to attain this objective.644  
 
Refusal of the industrialization-led program indicated the end of Turkish policymakers’ 
overoptimism and misinterpretation of the process. USA’s disapproval of such an 
industrialization program was well reflected in her decline of Turkey’s appeal for a loan of $ 
500 million during war years. This loan was demanded for the implementation of the 
Industrialization Plan of 1946. Anxiety to raise the living standards of the citizens as well as a 
desire to play a constructive part in the international trade composed the main rationale 
behind the Program. For the US administration, on the other hand, the program was  
“ambitious”; as it did not approve such ambitious programs it declined to raise the demanded 
amount. Instead it provided only $ 25 million and in order to receive this amount, Turkey had 
to curtail the most vital projects of the Plan such as expansion of production in Karabuk Iron 
and Steel Plant, a high priority plant with respect to economics and military, and the 
establishment of railway hauls connected to the Plant.645 
 
Consistent with this decline Turkey’s participation into the USA foreign aid program was 
justified by her comparative advantage related to her agricultural potential. The expected role 
of Turkey was defined as supplier of agricultural and raw materials as much as possible. 
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Turkey was a logical choice because it was the only country where land resources and 
climatic conditions offered the possibility of significant increases in agricultural production.  
The American officials underlined that it was only Turkey who had the potential of 
supporting much more than her population by her large areas of uncultivated land. Main 
means of the program was the agricultural mechanization, importation of which was mainly 
from the USA.646 
 
In addition to the strategic considerations of the center countries, the practical necessities of 
the day were another important factor in this policy suggestion. Referring to the cereal-
deficiency and starvation in European countries, the US administration defined Turkey as the 
sole possible choice among the participant countries as she had escaped from the physical 
damage of the war. These practical needs shed light on why the American officials defined the 
agricultural program as the most essential one and why failure in this program might mean the 
failure of the Marshall Plan.647  
 
The Western experts had a considerable role in the creation of a favorable atmosphere for 
agriculture-led development. First of all, there was an evident consensus in the 
recommendations of the Western experts and institutions about development strategies of 
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Turkey.  Their common suggestion was that the locomotive sector of Turkey had to be 
agriculture, parallel to the establishment of some light industries. Pioneering among these 
sorts of reports in the post-WW2 era were the Thornbourg Report of 1949 and the Barker 
Report of 1950.  
 
Max Thornbourg, as the representative of a big US contractor firm, prepared a report about 
Turkey ın 1949. In the famous Thornbourg Report, industrialization was restricted to light 
industry, namely production of simple agricultural and transport equipment, primitive forging 
and assembling processes as well as production of construction material and foodstuffs. The 
Barker Mission prepared another important report dated 1950, the Barker Report. It acted as a 
reference paper for later decision-making processes for the US policy makers. According to 
Suleyman Demirel this Report’s importance lies in the fact that it reflects the still prevailing 
atmosphere in the center countries.648 In the Report, development strategy in pre-WW2 era 
was criticized on the grounds that by having a prominent role in the process of westernizing 
the Turkish economy, industrialization had outstripped the development of agricultural 
resources on which it must be largely based. To support this argument, reference to Muntz 
Report of 1950649 was made: 
Unfortunately in the past the fundamental importance of agriculture has 
been neglected in favor of industry and public works. Large sums have 
been spent on industry that lacking the foundation of a healthy and 
efficient agriculture has resulted in an ill-balanced economy. Great efforts 
are now being made for agriculture but it is to some degree as if a man has 
                                                 
648Interview with Ninth President of Turkish Republic Suleyman Demirel, 11 August 2001, Ankara. 
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made a roof but no walls to his house and no has to support the roof on his 
back while he builds the walls.  
 
Moving from this criticism, it was recommended that Turkey should first and foremost exploit 
her agricultural resources, with an overall coordinated plan of agricultural development that 
gave some indication of priorities and their relative importance. Prerequisite of attainment of 
full exploitation of agricultural resources was defined as a drastic reorientation of government 
policy since up to date Turkey’s primary interest was on industrial development, with much 
lip service given to agriculture. Industrialization endeavors of Turkey were defined within the 
framework of modernization and Turkey’s preoccupation with Westernization, but with a 
weak foundation.650 
 
In the support of agriculture’s being the locomotive sector, the reports referred to USA’s 
experiment since agriculture had played a crucial role in the USA. Turkish authorities 
underestimated the vital role that agriculture could play in development. Related to industry, 
some industries such as manufacture of fertilizers, cement or textiles, and plants for the 
processing of certain agricultural products were defined, as certain for economic development 
of Turkey and that these should not to be neglected.651 
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It was again the center countries that recommended reorientation of the development 
strategies in 60s. Until this date during agriculture-led  development strategy consistent with 
the recommendations of the center countries Turkey created an industrial sector distinguished 
by agriculture-related branches of light industry such as textile and food processing. In 
addition to this, the center countries recommended self-sufficiency in cement, bricks and 
other construction materials. As additional industrial branches they recommended cellulose 
and paper industry, chemical industry and iron-steel industry, though with a modest 
allocation. Besides possibility of establishing a simple metallurgical industry was also 
highlighted.652  
 
As a result of the industrial activities in 50s, Turkey reached a stage that enabled her to 
advance to the next stage which was the establishment of intermediaries as well as durable 
consumption good industries. By the reorientation of the development strategy in 1960s, the 
role of agriculture as the locomotive sector in economic development changed as the 
complementary one.  This “complementation” aroused from the fact of its being the main 
source for exportation, supplier of raw materials as well as being a market for domestic 
industry.653 Similar to the previous era when Turkey was like an open market for the modern 
agricultural inputs, in 60s by her transition to the advanced stage in industrialization, she 
remained to be a continuous market for the center countries to supply required industrial 
inputs. 
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Connection with the center countries through foreign aid had also important repercussions on 
other economic issues.  One of the basic themes in the country program of Turkey was 
encouragement of private capital as the US administration was highly critical of the etatist 
system in Turkey. Increase of the private capital’s economic activities, reduction of 
government intervention and ownership in industry as well as reliance on more market 
decisions and price mechanism in both local and foreign markets were the measures in the 
U.S. Turkish Special Agreement, an agreement signed on July 4, 1948.654 
  
Promotion of private capital and encouragement of a favorable environment for the private 
enterprises was one of the top concerns of the US administration. The American policymakers 
conditioned the success of  “certain basic objectives” of the foreign aid programs of the USA, 
such as creation of market economies, “free enterprise spirit”, multilateral trade to the 
promotion of the private capital.655 Regarding the etatist structure as a main hindrance for a 
favorable environment, the American policymakers devised various mechanisms and made 
recommendations including earmarking of aid allocations for domestic private enterprises and 
appointment of a businessman as the Chief of Mission on grounds that this could promote 
private capital.656  
  
Yet in this demand for a favorable environment for private capital, the US administration’s 
sole concern was not domestic private capital but foreign capital also. In the country statement 
of the National Security Council of the USA this was referred to and suggestion was made for 
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the continuation of activities that enabled a favorable environment for foreign private capital 
as well.657 This was an issue that the American officials asked for in their dealings with the 
Turkish authorities while they were expressing their belief on the possibility of foreign 
capital’s contribution to Turkey’s development. They recommended Turkish policymakers to 
consider the crucial question of making the country attractive for foreign investment through 
incentives provided for the foreign investors.658   
  
In the policy statement regarding the issue, the American officials discussed the positive and 
negative features of Turkey for foreign capital. While they pointed out “great resources”, 
surplus of unskilled labor force and energetic nature of her labor force as positive features, as 
negative features they referred to bad memories and distrust in foreign capital due to 
capitulations, foreign exchange risks and controls as well as widespread acceptance of 
etatism.659 These diagnoses shaped the course of negotiations and the American officials 
endeavored to minimize these negative features in the process. 
 
Liberal foreign trade regime was another issue that was recommended, and by the time of 
Turkey’s entrance to the foreign aid regime.660 In essence, like other economic issues, foreign 
aid was conditioned to this liberalization instead of recommendation this could be regarded as 
the imposition from the center countries.  The center countries justified this liberalization with 
respect to Turkey’s being a possible efficient unit in the multilateral trade system.  
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In the foreign aid program, the US policymakers were sensitive to arrange the foreign aid policy to serve 
best for the realization of multilateral trade, one of the ultimate objectives of the program for the well 
being of the world capitalist economic system. Creation of such a trade system would mean free inflow 
of the goods. Consistent with this objective of the superpower, as an aid recipient country, Turkey had to 
adapt its economic and commercial policy to these policy lines. In order to receive the aid Turkey began 
to liberalize its commercial system by degrees.  Explaining the main factor behind these arrangements, 
Finance Minister of the era stated that unless Turkey worked to adapt economic and commercial 
arrangements to the world system, she would take such credit only much later and under difficult 
terms.661 
 
In their dealings with Turkish policy makers, American diplomats frequently raised the issue. They 
stressed that for new foreign aid allocations Turkey had to rely on the contribution that she made towards 
the European economy but also saving Europe dollars by exporting its goods and also assuring Europe 
that she would and was a certain market that was capable of great possibility of expansion.662 
 
The common point regarding the above mentioned economic issues were the timing of the 
demands from the center countries. In the case of Turkey the center countries did not face 
much resistance from Turkish policymakers, as the latter did not have much opportunity 
under Soviet threats. Besides, as they regarded low domestic savings as a major impeding 
factor for Turkey’s development for the sake of participation into the foreign aid regime of the 
capitalist superpower they agreed on these policy recommendations, adoption of which were 
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conditioned to Turkey’s foreign aid allocations. Yet this was not a perfect timing for exertion 
of pressure on the peripheral country. Examination of the process shed light on the parallelism 
between Turkey’s economic crisis distinguished by her search for “urgent” foreign capital and 
intensification of the center countries’ pressure.  This was the case in 1958 and 1970 crisis as 
well as the IMF prescriptions. It was again during these vulnerable periods the center 
countries and international donor agencies pressed for the devaluation of currency. 
Devaluation of currency was justified by the rationale of increasing the competitiveness of the 
export goods in the world market.663  
 
Though this could be a possible outcome it did not refer to the other facet related to the 
devaluation. Devaluation of the currency aggravated the amount of the loans that the country 
had and reduced the burden of payments that foreign companies made in Turkish currency.  
Though the first assumption was related to the competitiveness of the exported goods and 
expansion of the share in the world market remained as a possibility, the second was the 
automatic outcome of the devaluation decision. Due to the second facet, PM Menderes 
resisted the 1958 Stabilization Program for a long time. Both in 1958 and 1970 Turkey had to 
devalue her currency which was a condition for foreign aid. In the first devaluation, the 
realized devaluation rate was 265 %.664 
 
Examination of the responsiveness of Turkish policymakers to these recommendations as well 
as confrontations on these policy issues is important to reveal the dynamics in the interaction 
between the superpower and her ally in the periphery of the “free world” bloc.   
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Responsiveness of Turkish Policymakers: 
By abandoning their propagation of foreign aid as a means that served the attainment of 
industrialization of the country, Turkish policymakers began to question the accuracy of 
industrialization-led development policy for a resource-scarce country like Turkey the 
majority of population of whom was involved in agriculture. Similar to the western 
ideologues of the thought, these policymakers relied their claim on comparative advantage 
principle. Frequency and tone of these criticisms increased parallel to the intensification of 
relations with the American diplomats and policymakers. The Prime Ministers announced 
their giving high priority to agriculture to supply the nation’s food needs, provide the required 
raw materials and operating materials of national industry, reinforcement of foreign currency 
resources as well as the foundations of the country’s economic development. Advocacy of 
agriculture-led development was to such a degree that Turkish policymakers refused what 
they advocated less than a decade ago by saying that Turkey’s participation in international 
division of labor as an agricultural country did not mean lasting dependency on advanced 
countries.665  
 
Bayar as the President of Turkey expressed his deep belief on the appropriateness of 
agriculture-led development for Turkey. He emphasized that this was the thought of the DP 
also which made them distinctly different from the RPP “which had artificially encouraged 
the development of industry.”666 It was very ironic to hear these words from Bayar who in the 
London Conference of 1933 blamed the center countries for their strategy to keep Turkey as a 
                                                 
66518 June 1948, Program of the Second Saka Government; 16 January 1949, Program of Günaltay Government; 
Journal of TBMM Records, Term VIII, Meeting 3, Volume 16, 21 February 1949, p.342; Journal of TBMM 
Records, Term 8, Meeting 4, Volume 24, 23 February 1950, p.1111-.1112; Journal of TBMM Records, Term 8, 
Volume 8, Meeting 2, 26 December 1947, 1948 Budget Draft and Budget Commission Report, p.300-301; Press 
Meeting on January 8, 1934.  
666Secret Memo of Conversation between McGhee and President Bayar, dated May 15, 1952 sent by 
Ambassador McGhee to Department of State, RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Dept of State, Turkey, Ankara 
Embassy, Classified General Records 1950-52.  
 359
colonial state by advising her to be an agricultural country in the international division of 
labor. Besides, to claim that any particular party was responsible for this shift was unrealistic. 
Though by the elections of 14 May 1950 the political actors changed, this did not represent a 
break in the policy line. Instead the DP governments inherited the agricultural, economic and 
foreign relations policy from the RPP.  In other words, disregarding the governing party in the 
post-WW2 era, the development strategy would be the agricultural-led one. 
 
The general agreement was not only on the appropriateness of the agriculture-led 
development but also on “rapid” agricultural mechanization.  The assumption beneath this 
support was that agricultural mechanization led to the relief of the surplus labor force from 
agriculture for industry. Advocates of this view claimed that unless there was such a relief 
from agriculture to industry Turkey would never attain her industrialization. Moving from this 
assumption majority of the Turkish policymakers concluded that the USA had to sell more 
agricultural machines to Turkey, as this was the fundamental “constructive assistance” to 
Turkey.667 This was an inappropriate assumption for Turkey since Turkey was not a labor-
scarce country; on the contrary, a surplus labor force the majority of which were either un- or 
underemployed distinguished it. Yet, under the existing circumstances this was not questioned 
or challenged.   
 
Regarding the demands of the USA for an increased role and empowerment of private sector, 
and without raising explicit objections Turkish policymakers preferred to refer to the previous 
experiences of the country. They defined the failure of the private sector to act as a 
locomotive of the Turkish economy during the first decade of the Republic as the main reason 
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that led them to adopt etatism.  As the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Ataturk stated 
that Turkish Republic accepted etatism not due to ideological reasons but due to economic 
obligations. Moreover, Turkish policymakers stated that etatism was not against the interests 
of the private capital but a factor that served for their better functioning since the public sector 
provided the required infrastructure for the private sector’s flourishing.668    
 
Examination of the relation revealed that even the political parties such as DP and JP that had 
pro-private capital rhetoric did not differ from the pro-public parties in practices. The 
relatively unchanged nature of investments in private and public sectors could be regarded as 
a concrete proof of this similarity in policies. In the Turkish context this was explained as the 
natural outcomes of the tasks to be fulfilled.  In contrast to the claim that DP transferred all 
public institutions to private hands, Turkish policymakers in practice supported a 
complementary standing between the sectors instead of competition, as the country’s 
resources were scarce and had to be utilized rationally.669 This rationale was observable in the 
programs of the political parties which had either a pro-public and pro-private sector rhetoric.  
 
Following the first contacts with the American officials the governing party of the era, 
representing the one party era, redefined etatism. Though initial dynamics were also at force 
for this redefinition, the American officials interpreted this as the sensitivity of the Turkish 
policymakers to the recommendations of the American Aid Mission. The Mission particularly 
welcomed limitation of etatism, government support of private enterprise and permission for 
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foreign capital to participate in the development of oil resources.670 However, the unchanged 
proportion of the public and private sector in the process reduced the enthusiasm of the 
Mission. They began to complain of the attitudes of the Turkish governments as they regarded 
free enterprise as the basis of the capitalist economic system. According to the Chief of 
Mission, Turkish governments developed delaying tactics in putting high priority on private 
sector. Complaining of these tactics, he suggested developing countervailing tactics to 
accelerate the process for a favorable environment for the private sector.671 
 
Endeavors of the American officials to create favorable conditions were not limited to 
indigenous private capital but also to foreign capital, particularly to American capital. The US 
administration was aware of the psychological barriers that Turkey had owing to the 
Capitulations. Initial statements of the Turkish policymakers reflected their reservations on 
the question of foreign capital. However, in the process while they withdrew their abstaining 
stance and adopted a welcoming stance. In this policy change they referred to the immensity 
of the tasks in contrast to the available limited national resources.672   
 
Pursuit of foreign investors was particularly apparent for the industrialization plan of the 
country, prepared during the WW2. During the negotiations with Americans diplomats 
Turkish diplomats underlined the vitality of foreign capitalists for the implementation of 
plans. In the aftermath of the WW2, in order to increase the attractiveness of the country for 
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the foreign capital, Turkish governments made and enacted new legal arrangements to 
encourage foreign capital by giving permission for the transferability of the profits out of the 
country. This was the issue which was long raised since a long time and pressed by the center 
countries and defined as a factor that increased the attractiveness of the country for foreign 
investments. In line with the recommendations of the American officials, in late 40s Turkish 
governments worked for the establishment of Turkish Industry and Development Bank. The 
Bank was established in 1950 with the participation of IBRD for the establishment of private 
industry and promotion of foreign and national capital’s contribution to national industry.673     
 
Liberalization of the foreign trade regime that the superpower defined as a basis for the 
empowerment of the capitalist system, however, received less responsiveness from the 
Turkish policymakers. Except for the brief period of 1950-53, other two liberalized regime 
periods (1958-62, 1970-3) coincided with the economic crisis of Turkey and were adopted by 
Turkish policymakers after considerable resistance.  
 
By the recommendation of the center countries Turkish government liberalized the foreign 
trade regime between 1950-3. Yet, even during this period of liberalization, the tariff structure 
established previously was not changed. But the difference that made the foreign trade regime 
a liberal one was the exclusion of consumer goods from import restrictions. Previously only 
the capital goods were excluded from the import restrictions.  In order to enable flexibility in 
the regime most of the goods were on a “liberalized” list for which licenses were 
automatically granted.674   
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Initially the DP government was proud of this fairly liberalized foreign trade regime and 
regarded it as a matter of prestige. In February 1952 the Minister of Economy and Trade 
supported liberalized foreign trade regime in an address that he delivered in the Parliament. 
He claimed that liberalization policy had positive outcomes on Turkish economy such as 
increase of exportation. He expressed his pride by referring to other countries including 
France, England and Germany who began to put restrictions on their foreign trade regime at 
that time. The Minister claimed that in contrast to these countries Turkey still benefited from 
this liberalized regime.  He expressed his hope as to close the gap in the balance of payments 
of the country in the successive months via this liberalized foreign trade regime.675     
 
Yet the process nullified his expectations since instead of closing, the deficit of balance of 
payments widened. As a result of the excessive importation of consumer goods Turkey’s 
foreign exchange reserves were depleted. As the volume of import obligations exceeded the 
Central Bank's foreign exchange resources, Turkey's chronic foreign trade deficit began to 
grow out of control. In the face of this, the Turkish government, by degrees, removed 
liberalization. In April 1953 the liberalized foreign trade regime that lasted three years was 
totally abandoned officially.676  
 
The new trade regime was put into force in September 1953. It had more restrictive measures 
than the foreign trade regime put into effect previously since import restrictions included the 
capital goods also. This trade regime lasted until the 1958 IMF Stabilization Program. The 
government did not attain what it expected from this restrictive trade regime to a great extent. 
The objective of increasing the foreign exchange reserves was not possible owing to the 
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uncoordinated activities of the government and unsustained nature of the industrial production 
without importation. Under these conditions these remedies did not much serve the 
improvement of the situation. Instead following this date up to the 1958 IMF Stabilization 
Program, Turkey faced very serious foreign exchange shortage that affected the main sectors 
of the economy. By the time of the Stabilization Program,  Turkey was the first country to 
overdraw its IMF quota, and the first to request extensions when payments were due.677        
  
The Turkish government accepted the IMF Stabilization Program in 1958 after the 
government’s long resistance to this Package. Turkey was compelled to adopt this by the 
fundamental strategy of the center countries and international agencies during the vulnerable 
times of the aid recipient countries. While donor countries minimized the foreign aid and 
conditioned its increase or extension to the adoption of IMF prescriptions678, IMF suspended 
aid. Under these circumstances Turkish government had to accept the 1958 IMF Stabilization 
Program to which it resisted for a long time. In the scope of this stabilization program Turkey 
liberalized her foreign trade regime and devalued her currency. Like the other measures of the 
Stabilization Program this was adherently implemented for one year, then was neglected by 
the Turkish government. This lasted until the military coup of 1960 when the military 
administration announced its devotion to the measures and abolished some of policies that put 
some restrictions on foreign trade regime.679      
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This liberalized foreign trade regime lasted until 1963 when the civilian governments faced 
foreign exchange shortage. In 1963 and 64 the government reduced the number of items on 
the Liberalized List, tightened quotas, raised guarantee deposit requirements and imposed 
some other measures to control the flood of imports. In the following years, more steps were 
taken to tighten the import regime. Yet the dilemma of Turkey was the fact that whatever the 
nature of the foreign trade regime was, due to the ISI attempts the country’s need for imported 
goods increasingly continued. This restrictive foreign trade regime that indicated the total 
abolition of measures of the 1958 Stabilization program continued until 1970 when Turkey 
had to accept the second stabilization program with the same unchanged components.680 
 
Following the acceptance of 1970 Stabilization Program, Turkish government had to devalue 
the currency and liberalize the foreign trade regime. The government had to either relax or 
remove the policies that it developed in mid-60s, for three years from 1970-3. This covered 
reduction of the stamp tax from 25 % to 10 % and sharp decrease of the guarantee deposit 
requirements.681 
 
Examination of the responsiveness of Turkish policymakers, distinguished by its fluctuating 
tone, revealed that they were not in full conformity with the center countries on economic 
issues. Turkish policymakers did not miss opportunities to pursue polices that they desired, 
which were contrary to the expectations and strategic interests of the center countries. The 
superpower and her ally in the periphery of the “free world” bloc had serious confrontations 
on the above-mentioned economic issues, particularly when the latter suffered from the 
negative impacts of the policy suggestions of the center countries.      
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Regarding the confrontations of the USA and Turkey on the locomotive sector, Harris claims 
that Turkish critics were bitter towards the US due to agriculture-led development policy, as 
this was a direct challenge to the philosophy of etatism, as well as industrialization of the 
country. Though this was an accurate diagnosis Harris’ claim is in contradiction with the 
primary sources concerning the timing of the confrontation. In contrast to his claim that these 
criticisms had a bitter tone in the long run682, the primary sources indicate that they emerged 
as severe criticisms in the short-run, even in a few years time following the adoption of the 
agriculture-led development strategy. 
 
First of all, the agriculture-led development strategy did not receive hundred-percent support 
among the MPs. Instead in both parties there were MPs who insisted on the industrialization-
led development strategy. However under the prevailing circumstances explicit statement of 
this or any attempt to challenge the adopted development strategy was not an easy task. Yet 
the breaking point on the issue was Turkey’s increasing deficit in the balance of payments and 
indebtedness. In the face of increasing economic problems that affected all sectors of 
economy, the MPs began to question Turkey’s stance in the international division of labor. 
Turkey’s disadvantageous stance in the world order, like other agricultural countries, were 
explained by referring to the disproportion in the price increases of the exported and imported 
goods. They concluded that due to this disproportional increase in the prices of the imported 
goods vis-à-vis the exported goods the agricultural countries became the losers. From the 
price increases in exported and imported goods the MPs calculated that only in a decade at the 
end of 50s Turkey’s loss was $ 900 million.683  
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Another disadvantageous aspect was related to the size of the market for the agricultural 
countries. In contrast to the industrial countries, the agricultural countries had to share a 
relatively stagnant and vulnerable market. Yet the center countries challenged the share of the 
agricultural countries in the world market by exporting agricultural goods. As a concrete 
proof they referred to the International Wheat Agreement of 1949 that obligated the 
wheat/cereal importing countries of the ERP to purchase wheat from the US, Canada and 
Australia, within the lines of the agreement, to the extent of 60-70 % of their total estimated 
needs.684 The PL 480 was another example of this sort of challenge. This meant that the 
agricultural countries did not enjoy an extensive market but had to compete for the market left 
over the advanced countries.  
 
Moving from these trends against the interests of the agricultural countries, these critics 
directly blame the US since it was the USA that encouraged Turkey’s agricultural expansion 
and also made agriculture the locomotive sector of the development process.685 As a further 
step there was nearly a consensus on the necessity of industrialization-led development. 
Without referring to which stage of industrialization, some equated industrialization with 
development as well as its being a rescue from starvation686, some defined it as the sole only 
way of getting rid of Turkey’s backwardness687, and some defined this with special reference 
to the feeding ability of the countries. These debates led to the conclusion that Turkey’s sole 
                                                 
684Memo on Economic Development in Turkey from American Embassy in Ankara to the State Department, 
April 11, 1956, RG 469, Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, Director and Administrative 
Services Division, Communications and Records Unit, Geographic Files, 1950-56.  
685Memo on Economic Development in Turkey from American Embassy in Ankara to the State Department, 
April 11, 1956, RG 469, Records of the US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-61, Director and Administrative 
Services Division, Communications and Records Unit, Geographic Files, 1950-56.  
686Journal of TBMM Records, Term 2, Meeting 1, Volume 4, Ministry of Industry Budget Debates, 22 February 
1966. 
687Ibid. 
 368
means to attain self-sufficiency was industrialization as only industrialized countries were 
able to feed themselves in contrast to the starving agricultural countries.688  
 
It was after this questioning and self-criticism that Turkey attempted to develop some heavy 
industry plants by receiving the USSR aid. As the PM of the era Suleyman Demirel stated, the 
JP continued the industrialization drive “despite those outside us”. Referring to the refusal of 
the Western countries to finance some very crucial industrial projects and Turkey’s 
collaboration with the socialist USSR, Demirel pointed out the continuity in the 
recommendations of the Western experts. Defining the Barker Report as a milestone and a 
reference paper for the western experts, Demirel summed up the recommendations related to 
industry as establishing small-scale industrial facilities for processing agricultural products, 
without getting much involved in heavy industry. The last had been justified since late 1940s 
as not being overambitious as well as not exceeding her capacity. When the Turkish 
authorities appealed for the finance of the refineries that they regarded as top priority for the 
industrialization drive of the country with respect to its increasing energy need for industrial 
facilities, the western countries declined this appeal on grounds that Turkey lacked repayment 
ability.689  
 
Regarding the creation of pro-private capital environment Turkish policymakers and the 
western experts and donors had an ironical confrontation when the latter asked for planned 
development. Evaluating the uncoordinated and unplanned expenditures of the governments, 
western donors suggested planned development and establishment of a planning organization. 
Though they recommended this as a means to promote a favorable environment for the 
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private capital, parties, that had a pro-private capital stance, rebuffed the idea on grounds that 
planning had totalitarian connotations as it was the invention of “the iron curtain”. While the 
DP resisted the idea, later on, under the military rule Turkey adopted planned development. 
The JP which claimed to be the successor of the DP explicitly expressed its discontent by the 
planned development idea690 and devised strategies to demean the idea of planning.         
 
As the other dimension of the private capital, the USA put high priority on the promotion of a 
favorable environment for foreign private capital. When the American officials referred to the 
State of Department’s sensitivity and interest on the issue of promotion of favorable 
environment for the foreign capital in 50s, Turkish policymakers pointed out the endeavors to 
make the country attractive for the foreign private capital. Yet they did not hesitate to criticize 
the priority fields of the foreign private capital. In contrast to the justification of the 
superpower regarding the possible benefits of the private capital, Turkish policymakers 
expressed their anxiety about this possibility, as the foreign private capital preferred sectors 
which offered the highest immediate returns rather than sectors contributing to the long-run 
development of the country.691  
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Criticisms of this sort were intensified in the process.  One of the most debated policies about 
the foreign private capital was the transferability of the profits since by this “concession” the 
foreign private capital not only served the distortion of the priorities of the economic 
development but also caused a depletion of the foreign exchange reserves of the country. The 
Hıgh Planning Organization also referred to the advantageous position of the foreign private 
capital in Turkey by stating that Turkey was a “of sweet profits” country for the foreign 
capital. Critics state that in contrast to the claim that foreign capital served the development of 
the country, as the Turkey’s experience revealed, it became a method of “neo-exploitation.”692 
   
However, the fact was that due to the institutionalized interests within the country supported 
by various mechanisms, such as pressure of the donors including conditions to work with the 
companies of the donor country693 and suspension of foreign aid, it was not an easy task for 
the Turkish policymakers to challenge the stance of the foreign private capital in the country. 
Foreign instance, in the face of criticisms regarding the high costs of the American firm in 
constructing a plant while there were companies which could have handled the task cheaper, a 
high rank bureaucrat expressed that they had no other option, instead they were “obliged” to 
give the tender to the American firm.694 Besides, various circles preserved the belief that 
foreign capital was required for the development of the country.  
 
The debate on the liberalization of foreign trade regime also led to various confrontations 
between the USA and Turkey. When Turkey faced the negative impacts of 1950-3 liberalized 
foreign trade regime, including depletion of foreign exchange reserves and growing deficit in 
the balance of payments, the Turkish government abandoned the overoptimistic tone that they 
                                                 
692Journal of TBMM Records, Term 2, Meeting 1, Volume 4, 22 February 1966; Journal of TBMM Records, 
Term 3, Meeting 1, Volume 1, 10 November 1969, p.107; Journal of TBMM Records, Term 3, Meeting 1, 
Volume 1, 10 November 1969, p.131.  
693Journal of TBMM Records, Term 2, Meeting 2, Volume 16, 14 April 1967, p.160.  
694Ibid.; Journal of TBMM Records, Term II, Meeting 2, Volume 14, 21 February 1967, p. 17.  
 371
had in 1952 and directly accused the USA for the problems that the country faced since it was 
the USA who encouraged, and even forced Turkey to adopt a liberal foreign trade regime.695 
In contrast to the expectations of the center countries, by 1954 all imports in Turkey had to 
have importer’s certificates and their annual imports were limited to their highest annual 
imports of the years 1948 to 1953. This system was further tightened and modified in mid-
1955. By the end of that year the decision was that the Ministry of Finance and the Minister of 
Economy and Commerce had to be the bodies to determine the import needs of the private 
and public sectors and decide on their foreign exchange allocations. In the process, the 
government gradually became the sole importer of a variety of raw materials and other 
goods.696      
  
In the midst of problems aggravated by liberalized foreign trade regime Turkish government 
of the era refused until the last moment to accept the 1958 IMF Stabilization Program by 
referring to the exhausted foreign exchange reserves. Yet when donor countries and the 
international agency circumscribed the Turkish policymakers through suspension of foreign 
aid, they had to accept liberalization of the foreign trade regime once more in 1958. This 
reaction was not peculiar to the policymakers of the era. Instead the process witnessed the 
repetition of this resistance when in late 60s Turkey once more faced the increased pressures 
of the center countries regarding the issue.    
 
As a conclusion, as the examination of the process reveals even when the relation between the 
USA and Turkey was at its heyday in the most intense Cold War period, there were 
confrontations on the basic economic issues. In contrast to the over-confidence that Turkish 
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policymakers had in Turkey’s superpower ally in the initial years of the alliance, by the lapse 
of time, in the face of increasing problems due to the superpower’s recommendations, 
criticisms and confrontations intensified. The US administration, on the other hand, regarded 
this critical tone of the Turkish policymakers as “astonishing”. They defined the sordid relations 
on economic issues as Turkey’s adamant refusal of making basic economic reforms that would serve her 
economic viability despite strong US urgings for these. In the terminology of the American officials 
the greatest problem that they faced in Turkey was that top Turkish political leadership did 
not speak the economic language of the USA and resented efforts and suggestions of 
American diplomats to improve the existing conditions. These diplomats defined the task 
before the US regarding Turkey as a difficult one. In contrast to the economic issues, however, she 
had cooperated wholeheartedly with the USA in political and military fields and gave valuable assistance 
in both fields.697  
 
This American viewpoint reflected the harmony between the allies in diplomatic and military fields 
despite the problematic nature of relations in economic issues. Yet examination of the relations between 
the two reveal that the harmony in diplomacy was true until mid-60s after, which diplomatic relations 
was also became sordid between the superpower and its peripheral ally. The next concern is the 
interaction of the USA and Turkey on diplomatic issues. 
 
b. Turkey-USA Alliance: Diplomatic Relations 
Turkey’s full association with the Western Bloc through foreign aid was in fact indicated in 
its association with the Western countries in diplomacy. This portrayed a total break from the 
                                                 
697Secret Report on the Mutual Security Program in Turkey prepared by Roger S. Nelson & Frank A. Ecker, Bureau of the 
Budget, July 1957, RG 59, Department of State, General Records of the Department of State, Subject Files Related 
to Turkey 1947-58, Box 4; Confidential Economic Review, Turkey prepared by American Embassy in Ankara  
on November 26, 1954, RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Turkey, Ankara Embassy, 
Classified General Records 1953-54, Box 65; Secret Telegram on Memorandum of Conversation with Menderes 
from Warren to Department of State, April 11, 1955, RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, 
Turkey, Ankara Embassy, Classified General Records  1950-52.   
 373
foreign policy line of the pre-war era the main lines of which were determined by Ataturk. 
The break was due to the abandonment of the neutralist policy line. In the post-WW2 era, 
Turkey became an active partner of the Western Bloc in international conflicts. Turkish 
policymakers expressed the pro-Western foreign policy line in the immediate aftermath of 
WW2. In contrast to the wartime assumptions regarding Britain’s being the center of gravity 
in the western world698, under the existing circumstances Turkey based her foreign policy on 
Turco-American alliance.  
 
An accurate analysis of the foreign policy of Turkey in the post-WW2 era, which developed 
in the axis of Turco-American alliance, necessitates periodization.  The first period covers late 
40s to mid-60s when, despite the differences on economic issues, Turkey was a devoted ally 
of the USA in foreign policy. By the emergence of the Cyprus problem, as well as the 
increasing need for finding foreign markets for the industrial capital, however, a 
differentiation occurred and Turkey began to pursue a multilateral foreign policy line, without 
conceding its position as a member of the Western Bloc. This comprised the second period in 
Turkey’s foreign policy in the post-WW2 era.  While the distinguishing feature of the first 
was unidimensionality, multilateralism distinguished the latter. 
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First Period (late 40s to mid-60) 
The first period in the USA-Turkey relations were distinguished by “blind” solidarity of 
Turkey to the cause of the “free world” bloc. Identifying its interests with the western 
countries, particularly with the USA, Turkey adopted a unidimensional foreign policy. It was 
in this era Turkey institutionalized its relations with the West in diplomacy through 
participating in military and regional pacts. Examination of the period reveal the US-centric 
policy line in diplomacy in contrast to the confrontations on economic issues.  
 
The US-centric orientation of the foreign policy shaped the course of events in the first 
period. There were numerous cases when Turkey put her interests at stake without 
questioning the national benefit. In the UN resolutions Turkey acted in accordance with the 
superpower’s expectations. In that respect the shift in the relations with the Arab and non-
aligned countries is worth to examine as it stands as a perfect example of the US-centric 
foreign policy line.   
 
Relation of Turkey & Arab Countries: The first observable change in Turco-Arab relations 
parallel to Turkey’s participation in the free world bloc was Turkey’s position on the 
Palestinian question. Until 1948 Turkey supported the Arab side in the question of Palestinian 
partition in UN voting. However, she changed her policy regarding Arab issues when her 
relations with the Western Bloc began to develop. Turkey became the first Muslim country 
that recognized Israel on 28 March 1949.699 
 
By 1949, the RPP administration held the belief that development of relations with the Arab 
countries would not be beneficial for Turkey as the Arabs lacked solidarity, even among 
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themselves. More than this, however, ruling circles of the RPP grounded Turkey’s 
indifference to Arab as well as Asian countries on Turkey’s being a European country. This 
obsessive idea became an official announcement while Turkey refused to participate in the 
first Asian Conference of 1949 to discuss the situation of Indonesia. As the only country that 
refused to participate in this Conference, the RPP government sent a message to the 
Conference, where it emphasized that though Turkey was very much interested in Indonesian 
problem as Turkey was a European country she did not have the right to participate in this 
Conference. The Turkish policymakers did not even send an observer to the Conference.700  
 
Another example of this sort was Turkey’s indifference to the arrangements of Islamic 
conferences. In in 1949 and early 1950 Turkey acted as a country that did not want to be 
identified as the motivating force behind the Islamic Economic Conference. While in Karachi 
its participation was limited to an observer and three “private delegates” from the Istanbul 
Chamber of Commerce, at Tehran it was limited to one observer only. Turkish policymakers 
grounded this aloofness on their strong opposition to any economic “agglomeration” based on 
religious or racial groupings.701  
 
In fact this indifferent attitude was parallel to the Turkish policy of “deliberate dissociation” 
from the Eastern world since the 20s. The main motive of this dissociation was explained with 
respect to the westernized Turkish policymakers’ desire to be differentiated in Western eyes 
from the “backward” Arabs.702 However, by 50s this policy line of the RPP was criticized and 
rebuffed, as it did not serve the envisioned future for Turkey in the Middle East. In contrast to 
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this, consistent with the role that the US assigned to her small ally in regional politics, Turkey 
had to adopt an activist policy line regarding the Arab countries. Critical of the previous 
governments’ indifference to Arabs,703 Turkish policymakers of the era envisioned leadership 
for Turkey in the Middle East politics. Without weakening the rhetoric that Turkey was a 
European country, the role of Turkey in her dealings with the Arab countries was defined as 
an interest of a Western country located geographically in the Middle East, in eastern 
affairs704 
 
Turkish policymakers were enthusiastic to receive the support of the US for Turkey’s 
leadership in the region, as they believed that Turkey was the natural leader in the 
Mediterranean due to her geopolitical position.705 The US officials’ statements regarding 
Turkey’s natural leadership among the Arab countries and policy suggestions to develop 
mechanisms that assured this leadership fostered this belief. The US administration advised 
Turkish policymakers to follow a good neighborhood policy in the region. In a conversation, 
American Ambassador to Turkey, McGhee, suggested that in the Middle East Turkey might 
well pursue a Good Neighborhood Policy for her own interests, similar to the one that the 
USA pursued in Latin America. McGhee claimed that Turkey was a natural leader in the 
Middle East due to her historical position, military strength, political stability, economic 
development and membership in NATO.706  
 
The Ambassador continued his interesting suggestions by saying that although some of the 
Arab states contained important oil reserves and land that could be developed through 
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irrigation none had land resources, sufficiently varied mineral resources or political or social 
stability required to develop a powerful modern state. He concluded that due to these lacking 
aspects in case that Turkey continued to develop as she started and “stood head and shoulders 
above the other Middle East states”, she would be the unquestionable leader in the region. 
Turkish policymakers were receptive to this scenario by indicating the necessity of basing 
Turkey’s foreign policy on Turkey’s leadership in the Middle East. Rather than deep-rooted 
factors, they defined Turkey’s neglect of the Middle East in recent years while strengthening 
its ties with the West as the cause of Turkey’s relative weakness in the region.707   
 
Unjustified nature of these advises, however, can be observed from the field reports of the 
American diplomats sent to the region to convey a research on the reactions of the Arab 
countries for Turkey’s leadership in the region. Though recent position of Turkey on the 
Palestinian question was a hallmark, there were deep-rooted factors that challenged the 
assumed leadership of Turkey in the region including historical background, anxiety for the 
possibility of expansionist policies shaped by territorial ambitions, condemnation of Turkey’s 
attitude towards religion, her Western alliance that made her a country “on the other side”, 
and prevailing anti-colonial and anti-western feelings among the Arab countries.  The Arabs 
identified Turkey as an advanced force for the western countries particularly due to the USA’s 
support for Turkey. Criticizing this as a policy that upset the balance of power in the region in 
favor of Turkey, the Arab countries also questioned their neglect by the USA in terms of 
military equipment.708  
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These factors shed light to the failure, even backfire of the defense pact attempts in the region 
such as the Middle East Command and Baghdad Pact. Attempts to establish regional defense 
organizations commenced with the initiatives of the Western countries in the framework of 
policy of containment. During 50s, the Western Bloc had attempted to establish various 
Middle East defense organizations.709  
 
The initial idea was to establish a Mediterranean Pact consisting of Turkey, Greece, Iran, 
Britain, the USA and later on Pakistan. Another idea was the establishment of a Middle East 
Command and the Middle East Defense Organization. To this end, American and British 
policymakers invited Turkey and Egypt to lead the formation of these two pacts in 1951. The 
expected outcome of these organizations was the preservation of the Western military position 
in the Suez Canal. In essence this project would have served first to the strategic interests of 
the UK in the region, which aimed to preserve its existence in the Suez Canal zone. However, 
as this contradicted with the national priorities of Egypt who wanted to terminate British 
authority on the Suez Canal this initiative ended unsuccessfully when Egypt rejected the idea 
of the Middle East Command. Following Nasser’s coup in 1952 Egypt moved towards 
neutralism and, by degree, towards alignment with Moscow.710  
 
Among these endeavors, the Baghdad Pact differed from the others as it did not remain on 
paper but was realized to an extent, yet with unpromising outcomes. In 50s, Turkey based her 
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foreign policy in the Middle East in line with the Baghdad Pact. Established by great 
expectations by the support of the USA and Britain, this Pact symbolized Menderes’ great 
desire to make Turkey the leader in the Middle East. The assumption was that by such a Pact 
the Arab nations would be united against the Communist aggression under the leadership of 
Turkey, which sought to implement Washington’s conception of a defense of the Middle 
East’s northern tier till 1954. To this end, she commenced negotiations with various Arab 
countries as well as Pakistan. These negotiations ended with various agreements. First of 
these was signed between Turkey and Iraq on 24 February 1955. While the UK was the third 
country that participated in the Pact on April 4, 1955 Pakistan whose consideration was India 
rather than the USSR, joined the Pact on 23 September.711The last participant was Iran who 
signed the agreement on 3 November 1955.  
 
Though the Turkish policymakers welcomed these agreements as a good start, the process 
revealed overoptimism of these views as well as an orthodox understanding that shaped the 
Baghdad Pact, which undermined the existing deep-rooted anti-Western feelings among the 
Arab nations. The Pact backfired as it strengthened the Arab nationalism and Arab countries’ 
inclination towards the USSR712 to preserve the balance of power in the region. 
 
Both Turkey and Iraq faced increased hostility of the Arab world due to their leading position 
in this Western scenario for the region. Following Iraq’s agreement with Turkey, the Arab 
union under Egypt’s leadership declared that none of the Arab countries would cooperate with 
Turkey except Iraq. In this initiative, Egypt supported the view that cooperation with Turkey 
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meant cooperation with Europe, which also meant an indirect cooperation with Israel.713These 
developments were astonishing for the Turkish policymakers who failed to interpret the 
regional dynamics and assumed that the Arab countries would unconditionally support the 
Pact against the communist threats.  
 
Appraisal of the Pact with respect to its outcomes in the region reveals that it bore 
consequences contrary to the expectations of the USA and Turkey. First, except Iraq, these 
members belonged to the non-Arab part of the Middle East. The Pact increased the tensions in 
the region and led to a blocization among the Arab countries, namely Egypt, Syria and Saudi 
Arabia. More than anything else the Pact served the isolation of Iraq in the Arab world. 
Besides, it caused further estrangement of the Arab nationalists from the West and Turkey. 
Egypt expressed its opposition by forming a security pact with Syria and Yemen. It also 
directed its anti-imperialist propaganda against the Baghdad Pact countries, particularly to 
Turkey and Pakistan. The Arab nations led by Nasserist Egypt moved closer to the USSR and 
this strengthened the USSR’s position in this strategic region.714    
 
Appraisal of the situation from Turkey’s viewpoint also reveals unsatisfying outcomes. The 
DP governments, under the auspices of her superpower ally, based her Middle East policy on 
this Pact. The envisaged outcome was defined as a unified Middle East against Communist 
threat under the leadership of pro-western Turkey. However, due to above mentioned factors 
the envisaged outcome was far away from being realized. As Harris points out, more than 
anything else, the Baghdad Pact fueled the Turkish confrontation with the USSR.715   
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This initiative had also far-fetching consequences for Iraq. The rulers who signed the 
agreement were toppled by a Revolution that had a wide support among the Iraqi public as the 
Baghdad Pact was regarded as being against the national interests of the country. Owing to 
the timing of the Pact it was regarded as pro-British to assure the existence of her bases in 
Iraq, whose right on the bases expired in a short while.716 This Revolution, on the other hand, 
had important implications in the context of the Cold War. The new administration in Iraq 
justified the Revolution by referring to the pro-western policy of the previous administration. 
Rejecting this policy line, the new administration adopted a nationalist Arab policy. The new 
Iraqi administration announced that they established a Republican administration which 
protected national unity, established brotherhood relations with other Arab countries and was 
devoted to all commitments that were consistent with Bandung Conference decisions and the 
UN agreement. The main objective of their policy line was defined as serving the interests of 
Iraq.717 Therefore, Iraq, the only Arab country that “betrayed” the cause of the Arabs, was put 
into order by the Revolution.  
 
This Revolution also indicated the end of the Baghdad Pact, which meant failure of the basis 
of Turkey’s Middle Eastern foreign policy. Even though the new administration declared 
Iraq’s decision to remain in the Pact, this turned to be a tactical move since in a year’s time 
the new administration declared the country’s withdrawal from it. On 24 March 1959, Iraq 
announced its withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact membership. After this withdrawal, the 
Baghdad Pact was dissolved and a new organization, the Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO) was formed. CENTO as an organization was far from meeting the expectations. It 
functioned as a forum for regular high-level contact and served as an umbrella for a small 
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amount of economic assistance. In the sphere of military cooperation, which was its chief 
raison d’etre, CENTO never fulfilled its promise as it lacked regularly constituted forces.718  
 
In the face of these developments in the region, Turkey first adopted a harsh policy line 
against Iraq’s new administration. The policy makers regarded the revolution as the 
intervention of hostile external forces into the domestic affairs of a friendly country. One of 
the widely circulated rumors was the possibility of Turkey’s military intervention to Iraq after 
the revolution, which was prevented by the USA and the UK.  Later Turkey adopted a softer 
policy line parallel to the policy line of the western countries and recognized the new 
administration in Iraq on 31 July 1958.719 The harsh attitude of Turkey becomes meaningful 
when the Revolution is appraised in the context of Turkey’s claim to be a leader country in 
the region. This Revolution was a direct challenge to the Middle East policy of Turkey. By 
the loss of Iraq, Turkish PM’s dream of being a leader in the Middle East also ended. In fact, 
by this ousting of Iraqi monarchy in July 1958 Turkey was left friendless in the Arab 
world720as revealed in the simultaneous events in the region.  
 
The Turco-Syrian Crisis of 1957 was the direct confrontation of Turkey and the Arab world. 
Though this crisis commenced as a problem between Syria and Jordan, when Syria expelled 
three American diplomats from the country on 13 August 1957 on grounds that they acted to 
oust the existing regime, it led to a confrontation of the Blocs. Expulsion of three American 
diplomats meant the disruption of the long-awaited confrontation due to the increasing 
inclination of Syria towards the USSR. The western bloc interpreted this as Syria’s becoming 
a bridgehead of the USSR in the Middle East. When Turkish government announced its 
                                                 
718Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-71, p.70; Ramazani, 
The Northern Tier: Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, p.118.  
719Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye’nin Arap Ortadoğu’suna Karşı Politikası (1945-70), p.134-5. 
720Kürkçüoğlu, “The Evolution of Turkish-Arab Relations” in Harris, ed. The Middle East in Turkish-American 
Relations, p.46.  
 383
anxiety concerning the developments in Syria the crisis turned into a Turkish-Syrian crisis. 
Turkey also confronted with the USSR by this announcement. When the USA sided with 
Turkey following the USSR’s threat, the conflict became the first direct confrontation of the 
USA and the USSR in the Middle East.721  
 
Though the crisis ended peacefully following resolutions in the UN, it had very important 
outcomes such as the Eisenhower Doctrine, which made the USA an opposing party against 
the Arab nationalism. President Eisenhower, in an address before Congress on January 5, 
1957, called for a joint resolution not only providing for military and economic assistance 
programs for the region but also authorizing the use of U.S. armed forces when the US 
President deemed necessary. This Doctrine announced the USA’s readiness to extend 
economic assistance to the Middle East countries as well as use of the American armed forces 
whenever demanded by a country in order to save that country’s unity and political 
independence against international communism. While justified on these grounds, this 
Doctrine aimed to prevent the ideological and military intimacy of Syria and the USSR as 
well as creating a “military power balance” in the Middle East following the USSR’s 
emergence as a super power in the region. The last was defined by referring to the possibility 
of filling of the power vacuum in the Middle East by the USSR.722Turkey’s expression of 
gratefulness for the Doctrine which enabled the USA’s interference into the domestic affairs 
of the countries in the region, on the other hand, intensified the Arab estrangement towards 
Turkey.723  
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The 1958 Middle East Crisis was the last important confrontation between the Arab countries 
and Turkey in 50s. Using the Iraq Revolution as a pretext, the USA interfered with the 
Lebanon Crisis of 1958. What made Lebanon a tensely restless country was the confrontation 
of the pro-Western forces identified with President Chamoun and nationalist Arab forces who 
accepted Nassar as their ideal figure. When President Chamoun attempted to amend the 
Constitution to enable his re-election, the ideological differences resulted in armed conflicts. 
When Chamoun invited the US to stop the tension in the country, relying on the Eisenhower 
Doctrine the US intervened in this local issue on grounds that national interests of the USA 
were at stake. In this interference the USA used the American base in Turkey. 724  
 
As a country that still preserved its claim to be a leader in the region, the Turkish government 
declared its full support to the Western powers’ intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. For the 
policymakers of Turkey what happened in Lebanon was an example of outside interference in 
the domestic affairs. In this approval the prevailing rationale among the Turkish politicians 
was that as these destructive activities were arranged from outside, interference from other 
countries should be regarded as a just act. The DP government announced its unconditional 
support to the military intervention of the USA in Lebanon and UK’s in Jordan. The fact that 
these powers were invited by the administration of these countries was another basis in 
support of Turkish administration’s rationale.725 
 
The importance of these events regarding Turkey, as an aid recipient country, was the use of 
the American base in Turkey for the first time when the USA was dealing with an 
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international issue. The Turkish government cooperated with Washington during the events 
surrounding the Iraqi revolution and the Lebanese crisis in 1958, permitting the use of Incirlik 
base. Expedition of the USA to Lebanon in 1958 started from the base in Adana. This was an 
issue on which the Turkish government and opposition did not have an agreement. Usage of 
the American bases by the US administration without informing the government and the 
Turkish Parliament in advance, arrival of the troops on the initiative of Washington D.C, and 
not Ankara and denial of free access of the Turkish journalists to these facilities were attacked 
by the opposition as these violated the sovereignty of Turkey. This was an important criticism 
not only due to its content but also its being the first serious crack in the national consensus 
on foreign affairs.726  
 
As revealed from this examination, Turkey acting as the mouthpiece of the Western countries, 
failed to develop close relations with the Arab countries. In this failure historical background 
and anxieties regarding Turkey’s “territorial ambitions” had their part but the main impeding 
factor was her alliance with the West. Turkey’s ability to develop relations with the Arab 
countries in the following decade parallel to Turkey’s differentiating herself from the West on 
issues regarding Arab identity proved the influence of this impeding factor.  
 
Relations of Turkey & Nonaligned Countries: In the same period, position of Turkey and 
Arab nations vis-a-vis the nonaligned countries turned to be another source of confrontation. 
Turkish policymakers did not approve Arab nations increasing sympathy towards the 
nonaligned movement, consistent with Turkey’s pro-Western stance. Similar to the US 
administration, they believed that in a bipolar world order unless a country belonged to the 
“free world” bloc, it belonged to the socialist bloc.  Ironically, although respected by the 
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newly independent countries as the first country who gained her independence after a war of 
independence against the colonial powers in the 20th century, Turkey did not extend her 
political support to these countries.727Facing this attitude of Turkey, the non-aligned countries 
concluded that Turkey was the mouthpiece of the Western countries, which represented their 
colonial past. The Bandung Conference of 1955 provided a firm basis for these claims. 
 
As the occasion that reflected the uncompromising perspectives of Turkey and the newly 
independent countries, the Bandung Conference of 18-24 April 1955 was crucial. This 
Conference was the most important chain in the formation of the non-aligned Bloc and it 
opened a new stage in the relations between the Western Bloc and the non-aligned countries. 
This new phase was indicated by Turkish PM when he expressed that as the government their 
endeavors aimed at fulfilling the country’s requirements between the Asian-American 
communities that emerged as a result of the Bandung Conference.728  
 
The USA insisted on Turkey’s participation in the Conference to represent the Western 
viewpoint. In his speech as the Chair of the Turkish delegation Foreign Affairs Minister Zorlu 
appraised the West while attempting to demean the non-alignment movement. Defining 
nonalignment as a danger not only to the world order but also to the country itself that 
adopted non-alignment, Zorlu referred to the case of Czechoslovakia, a country which lost its 
independence since it pursued a mid-way policy.  In his support of the military and regional 
pacts in a bipolar world order, Zorlu defined Turkey’s NATO membership as a security valve 
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for her independence. In his concluding remarks he invited nonaligned countries to be a part 
of the free world bloc. 729  
 
The Indian Prime Minister Nehru who assumed to be the leading figure of the movement, on 
the other hand, challenged this advocacy of Zorlu. The duel between Zorlu and Nehru was in 
fact the ideological confrontation of the West and the nonaligned countries. Nehru had an 
aggressive attitude towards Turkey and accused her as the advocate of the West. He rejected 
all alliances in the Mediterranean and claimed that more than security they brought insecurity 
to the countries which recently participated in them. Against Zorlu’s appreciation of the 
NATO and such sort of organizations, Nehru said that NATO was one of the most powerful 
protectors of colonialism. For an Asia-Africa country being a part of this organization could 
only be regarded as disgracing of one’s self. Criticizing both blocs due to the prevailing 
tensions in the world Nehru expressed India’s self-pride due to her nonaligned stance in the 
international order.730   
 
In essence, not only the ideological issues but also Turkey’s alliance with Pakistan in military 
pacts led to the confrontation of India and Turkey. While the first assumed the leadership of 
nonaligned movement, the latter claimed to be the natural leader of the Arab countries. As 
India observed the estrangement of the Arabs from Turkey, for Indian leadership Turkey’s 
alliance with her hostile enemy was more important. In rejecting all military pacts or 
criticizing the US-supported armaments, Indian policymakers challenged the legitimacy of 
Turkey as well. Consequently, the Bandung Conference became an arena for the two assumed 
leaders in their regions to challenge the basis of their foreign policy preferences. 
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While this attitude of the Turkish delegation deepened estrangement between Turkey and 
non-aligned countries, it was appreciated by the US administration. In a meeting the Secretary 
of the State expressed his appreciation due to the high performance of Turks in the Bandung 
Conference.731 
 
As revealed in this brief analysis Turkey’s US-centricism in foreign affairs was the main 
dynamic that shaped her relations with other countries. Identifying Turkey’s interests with the 
West, Turkish policymakers were proud of the leadership role that the USA assigned to her in 
an orthodox manner by undermining the existing dynamics in the strategic region that she was 
located in. In contrast to the assumptions that Turkey led a unified Arab movement against the 
USSR, her identification with the West caused estrangement of the Arab and nonaligned 
countries for whom Turkey was a mouthpiece and a collaborator of the colonial exploiters. 
Under the impact of this estrangement countervailing developments were initiated in the 
region such as acceleration of the rapprochement of these countries with the USSR. 
Regardless of these developments, Turkey’s identification with the West led to an automatic 
confrontation with the socialist bloc, particularly with its superpower. 
 
Relations of Turkey & the USSR:  
When the USSR demanded land from Turkey in the immediate aftermath of the WW2, this 
revived the psychological hatred towards the USSR owing to centuries long conflicts between 
two neighbors. Under the circumstances Turkish policymakers endeavored to raise the 
attention of the western countries to these expansionist demands of the USSR that challenged 
Turkey’s security and territorial unity. Following her involvement in the “free world” when 
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the Cold War was at its acme, Turkey was distinguished by her enthusiasm in taking part in 
establishments against the socialist bloc.  The main motive behind this enthusiasm was 
Turkey’s desire to assure her security against the USSR.   
 
In the Cold War context, as an ally in the Western Bloc, Turkey had various confrontations 
with the superpower of the Socialist Bloc. The distinguished feature of the relations between 
these two countries was Turkey’s refusal of the Soviet calls for a less tense relation after 
Stalin’s death. While other NATO members regarded this as signs of normalization, Turkish 
policymakers preserved their anti-Soviet position. Turkish Foreign Minister defined the 
Soviet attempts for peaceful existence as a part of her strategy to falsify the free world. He 
supported that while she created the impression that she would not have an expansionist and 
aggressive policy, she would split the solidarity in the free world.732This hostile attitude of 
Turkish policymakers was meaningful in the Cold War context when her bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the superpower of the western bloc increased parallel to the increase of threats and 
pressures exerted by the USSR. Awareness of this direct proportion led Turkish policymakers 
to deny normalization of the process that might reduce the importance of Turkey. 
 
However, towards the end of the decade, parallel to intensification of economic problems, 
Turkish policymakers were receptive to the peace calls of the USSR. Timing of this 
receptiveness was, however, not welcomed by the western countries, particularly by the USA 
whose superiority in space was challenged by USSR’s launching of the Sputnik in 1957, 
which changed the balance of power in the Cold War. This was a watershed in the Cold War 
context after which NATO adopted a new strategy. Concrete implication of this new stage in 
Turkey was the establishment of nuclear missiles in the country with an intermediate range 
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designed to offset the tactical superiority in ballistics achieved by the Soviets. Though this 
resulted in the Cuban Crisis between the superpowers, the USSR was insistent on having 
normalized relations with Turkey. In December 1959, the Minister of Health visited the USSR 
where he expressed his hope regarding the improvement of relations between two countries. 
On January 9, 1960 Fatin Rustu Zorlu, the Foreign Affairs Minister declared that the world 
military balance made a Soviet attack unlikely on Turkey as a NATO power. He also added 
that the USSR was respectful of Turkey’s international commitments. In April 1960, the 
Turkish government announced the exchange visits between the Prime Minister Menderes and 
Soviet leader Khruschev. But these visits could not be realized due to the Coup 1960 that 
ended the DP era.733  
 
The above-mentioned missile crisis of late 50s that ended with the Cuban Crisis of early 60s 
was the most important confrontation between these two countries. Its importance arose due 
not only to the USSR’s direct challenge to Turkey but also its far-reaching impact on the 
Turco-American relations. This crisis compelled the Turkish public to face the vulnerability 
of Turkey’s security when the USA’s security was at stake. The USA paid little attention to 
the protests of the USSR concerning the deployment of out-fashioned medium-range missiles 
in Turkey until she realized that the USSR deployed missiles in Cuba. By excluding Turkey 
from the negotiations, the USA agreed on the removal of missiles in Turkey corresponding to 
the removal of ones in Cuba. Though the Turkish government announced Turkey’s support of 
whatever would be the decision of the USA it protested the decision when it learned in 
advance assurance given to the Soviets regarding the removal of the missiles by the US 
government.734  
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What was shocking for Turkey was the denial of Turkey from the deal between the USSR and 
the USA even though it would be the one which would be destroyed in case of any 
confrontation between two superpowers. This crisis shattered the foundations of Turkish 
security policy which relied on the assumption that NATO membership provided full security 
to Turkey against any challenge of the USSR.735 During the crisis, Turkey faced the fact that 
for the superpowers she was one of the “minor” battlefields that could be sacrificed to save 
their own interests. The Turkish policymakers also reached to the conclusion that some types 
of arms which were regarded as deterrent factors made, in fact, Turkey a target for the USSR.  
 
Moving from this rationale these circles concluded that Turkey also had to put its national 
interest first and regain some freedom of action in the international arena. Several members of 
Inonu cabinet and some senators suggested that Turkey had to contribute to the new climate 
of coexistence by a gradual reduction of its military and political obligations towards the West 
and by a neutralist foreign policy. They referred to the friendly relations with the USSR in 20s 
and 30s.736 This questioning and demands for redefinition of Turkey’s priorities in foreign 
policy that commenced within the Turkish Parliament later on became common for the 
Turkish public during the Cyprus crisis of mid-60s. This was the watershed that indicated 
commencing a of second period in Turkish-American diplomatic relations.   
 
As the analysis reveals, unlike the frequent confrontations on economic issues, 50s were the 
heyday of the Turco-American relations in the diplomatic field. While these years were the 
most intensified period for the Cold War, Turkey with the enthusiasm and overoptimism of 
being in association with the Western Bloc pursued a dynamic and active foreign policy. In 
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this move, another determinant that was crucial was the personality of the Prime Minister 
Menderes who was ambitious to play the role of the “Big Brother”737 in the regional 
arrangements. Another important factor for the “devotion” of Turkey to her big ally was the 
belief that the more Turkey acted in line with the USA on diplomatic issues, the more aid 
Turkey could receive from the USA.  However, maybe more important than these, the Turkish 
policymakers equated their interests with their big ally, without thinking of the possibility of 
“betrayal” from her allies, at least on diplomatic issues. This sort of thinking could explain the 
bipartisan foreign policy until the mid-50s. This bipartisan character, however, began to be 
shattered when the opposition felt the violation of the national sovereignty of the nation as 
well as the inclination of the governing party’s invitation of the country’s allies to intervene 
into the domestic policies. 
 
The questioning of the alliance in the mid-50s began to be widespread by time due to the 
increasing differentiation between the priorities of the allies. In fact, the allies, particularly the 
small ally began to identify and differentiate the existing conflicting interests by the waning 
of the Cold War. These developments along with the changes in the Turkish society made the 
60s totally different from the 50s. In addition to the confrontations on economic issues, 
Turkey began to confront with her big ally on diplomatic issues as well. The important thing 
that should be emphasized, however, was that these confrontations were not due to or led to 
her exclusion from the Western Bloc. Instead by remaining in the Western Bloc, Turkey 
started to pursue a multilateral foreign policy.   
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Second Period (1964 onwards) 
With respect to the foreign affairs policy, the 60s were distinguished by an intense self-
criticism and a search for a new line of action. Turkey had to reevaluate and reinterpret the 
country’s stance vis-à-vis other countries.  Some factors such as détente between the 
superpowers, signing of a partial nuclear test-ban treaty738 and pressures of Turkish public and 
opposition739 created the appropriate environment for such a self-questioning. However more 
important than these factors, there were some events that compelled Turkey to face her 
position in the international arena. The most decisive event of the era was the Cyprus issue 
through which Turkey reached “maturity”. Cyprus issue was a watershed in Turkey’s 
relations with her western allies. In fact it was the moment of judgement when both ruling 
elite as well as public in general were compelled to perceive the realities of the process that 
Turkey had undergone since the post-WW2. They also understood what  it really meant to be 
a small partner in such an alliance. As a result of this, Cyprus served for the “awakening” of 
Turkey through which they came to realize that on various grounds. Turkish policymakers 
defined Cyprus as a lesson for Turkey that they could at any time meet the betrayal of her 
allies. Accepting this as a fact, the politicians emphasized the necessity of giving a new 
direction to Turkish foreign policy.  
 
Cyprus, as the milestone in foreign affairs policy, was an issue till early 50s when Turkish 
policymakers denied that there was a Cyprus problem by referring to Britain’s domination and 
authority in the island. Though Britain did not have any intention of transferring the island to 
another country, Turkish policymakers were confident that in case that there would be such a 
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transfer Britain would transfer her rights to Turkey.740 In contrast to the belief of the Turkish 
policymakers, when Britain withdrew her rights on the island, Cyprus emerged as a problem. 
Both Greece and Turkey were sensitive on the issue of domination in the island concerning to 
the Greek and Turkish populations there. Though not free from tensions, the Cyprus problem 
was handled in a peaceful manner through negotiations of the guarantor states, namely 
Turkey, Greece and Britain.  
 
In the course of time, however, parallel to the increasing demands of the Greek population of 
the island, tensions between the two communities as well as Greece and Turkey increased. 
Various meetings between Britain, Greece and Turkey as guarantor states were inconclusive 
and the Cyprus issue remained as an impasse. When the tensions increased in 1963-4, Turkey 
interfered and also brought the issue to the UN. At that juncture Turkish policymakers faced 
the loneliness of the country, as Turkey did not receive the support of countries in the UN for 
resolutions on the issue, which she believed was her right.741   
 
What aggravated the impact of this realization was, however, the US stance during the crisis. 
In the face of the USSR’s overt support of the Greeks and her threats, Turkey received a letter 
from the US President Johnson that reminded the scope of Turkey’s maneuvering capability. 
Relying on the fourth article of the first Turkish-American Aid Agreement of 1947, Johnson 
warned the Turkish government that it did not have the right to use the arms provided by the 
American foreign aid to intervene in Cyprus. President Johnson also shed light on Turkey’s 
vulnerability against a Soviet attack. This warning that had a traumatic impact on Turkey was 
clear on NATO’s non-interference in case that Turkey was attacked by the USSR.  This was, 
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in fact, violation of the 5th article of the NATO agreement that guaranteed extension of all 
sorts of military and other kinds of assistance when a member country faced an aggression.742  
 
When a newspaper disclosed the Johnson letter Turkish policymakers first adopted an attitude 
of undermining the importance of the letter. Ministers either defined it as tactical moves of the 
USA without much influence to the process by referring to the Turkish government’s 
initiatives in Cyprus743 or as only a letter to be read and then put into the drawer.744While 
making these comments, however, these ministers were aware that the issue was not so 
simple. By this letter Turkey closed the era of Ankara’s automatic diplomatic cooperation 
with the USA. Turkey left its ultimate trust and be aware of the fact that her allies had 
interests that evidently could diverge at times from those of Turkey. For the first time 
thousands of Turkish citizens chanted `Yankee go home`. The Turkish public also blamed the 
American Embassy in Turkey on grounds that the Embassy’s officials misinformed the US 
administration.745 
 
The Cyprus crisis of mid-60s was crucial as it was a watershed in the diplomatic history of 
Turkey, with its far-reaching outcomes. First of all, this event shattered the foundations of 
Turkish foreign policy of post-WW2. Turkish policymakers as well as public grasped that 
identification of Turkey’s participation in the western bloc with guaranteed security vis-à-vis 
armed aggression was an illusion. Turkey faced the reality that what she relied on military terms 
lacked a sound basis since the country was denied of the right to use the arms provided by the US 
military aid. She also faced the reality that all the sacrifices or obligations that the country had to bear as a 
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NATO member were also in vain as the Organization would not extend its support to its strategic 
member at any time. This support would be extended when the allies of Turkey thought that it was 
crucial for their own interests. The trauma that Turkey underwent and requestioning of every dimension 
of Turkey’s relations with the USA should be evaluated from this perspective.  
 
The debates in the Turkish Parliament reflected the nature of this self-questioning. Critics of the policy 
summarize the process that resulted in Turkey’s loneliness in the international arena as Turkey’s 
identification with the Western colonial emperors. In their viewpoint the most painful aspect 
of recent developments was the support of Turkey’s allies offered to Greece while leaving 
Turkey alone. Moving from these diagnoses Turkish policymakers concluded  that there was a 
necessity of redefining the Turkish foreign policy according to nationalist lines parallel to the 
changes in the world order. The world was not the same in 50s when two superpowers had a 
dominating stance vis-a-vis other countries. They suggested that under the changed 
circumstances foreign policy of the country should be nationalist, and not an ideological one. 
Referring to the fact that countries which lacked any common point in the past now united 
against Turkey, the MPs suggested avoiding extreme hostilities and satellitizm in the foreign 
policy for the future. Last but not least, for the correction of the fallacious aspects of the 
foreign policy, they suggested making the required changes in the agreements to serve the 
national interests, rearranging relations with the countries and developing good relations with 
the USSR.746The far-fetching developments following the Cyprus crisis proved the firmness 
of the policymakers on the issue.  
 
The distinguishing feature of the second period was multilateralism in foreign policy, which 
indicated Turkey’s shift from the USA-centric unidimensional foreign policy. Relying on this 
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shift, Harris defines Cyprus crisis as the required impetus for the Turkish policymaker for 
such a sharp turn in the course of foreign relations.747 The loneliness in the UN on the Cyprus 
issue, which Turkish policymakers regarded as crucial for national interests as well as 
prestige, led them to reshape the relations with the countries that they neglected in the 
preceding period. While this reshaping eased the tensions with the USSR, Turkey, on the 
other hand, confronted with the USA on various issues.         
 
Attempts to develop relations with the Third World countries and Arab nations accelerated 
after the Cyprus crisis. The immediate objective of the foreign policy was to provide support 
in the international arena on the Cyprus issue. Yet the multilateral foreign policy had 
economic connotations also. This was related to the need to find new markets for the 
industrial goods of Turkey. Commencing in mid-60s Turkish industrial capital suffered from 
the stalemate in the domestic market. The growing crisis of the world economy in 70s 
aggravated the situation for Turkey. The decreasing contribution of the center countries to pay 
the deficit of the budget compelled the Turkish policymakers to create alternative income 
resources via new markets.748 As finding of new markets necessitated development of good 
relations with other countries, the foreign policy line was shaped accordingly.  
 
Turkey commenced the reshaping of her foreign policy from Arab countries. A considerable 
development in Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries occurred following Turkey’s 
putting restrictions on the use of American military bases in the moves against Arabs. 
Turkey’s relations with the Arab nations revealed the situation that instead of considering 
herself as a member of the Western alliance, she now developed her own policy line to best 
serve her national interests. This was a total shift from the policy line of the previous decade.   
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Decisions that Turkish administrators took in this era regarding the regional issues were in 
direct opposition to Western, particularly American interests. In all Arab-Israel confrontations 
Turkey extended her support to the Arabs. Following the outbreak of the Arab-Israel War of 
1967, the Turkish Foreign Minister announced that the American bases would not be used 
against the Arabs. Turkey also adopted a formal opposition against territorial gains by using 
force. As a sign of good intention she sent relief aid to Arab countries which suffered from the 
greatest losses during the War. Also during the 1973 conflicts Turkish government 
immediately declared its disapproval of forceful occupation of the Arab lands by Israel. It 
supplied relief aid for the war-hit Arab countries. While Turkey disapproved the use of 
military bases against Arab countries and declared her refusal concerning the USA’s refueling 
and reconnaissance facilities, she tolerated Soviet over flights in the Turkish airspace carrying 
arms to the Arab countries. This policy was also reflected in UN votings when Turkey was 
sided with Arab countries. The JP governments pursued this pro-Arab policy line despite the 
main opposition party’s call for a more neutralist policy line.749  
 
This pro-Arab policy line had immediate returns in the form of developed economic relations 
and support at international platforms. This was regarded as the success of the Turkish foreign 
policy as these two developments served the attainment of fundamental objectives of finding 
markets for the national industrial capital as well as support for the Cyprus issue. In the 
meantime Turkey developed economic relations with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and 
Libya. As a sign of satisfaction due to Turkey’s voting with the Arabs in the UN during and 
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after the wars, Turkey was among the countries exempted from the short-lived oil boycott 
imposed by the Arab oil producers following 1967 war.750 
 
Last but not least, this increasing Third Worldist stance assured support on Cyprus issue. In 
the Third Non-aligned Bloc Summit held in Lusaka in September 1970, the Cypriot Greek 
side leader tried to pass a decision that served their cause in Cyprus. By reacting to this 
initiative, the Arab nations, not only Morocco, Jordan or Kuwait but also countries known as 
progressive such as Algeria and Syria supported Turkish side in Cyprus.751   
 
Parallel to the shift in foreign policy, Turkey’s relations with the nonaligned countries also 
developed. When the concern was nonaligned countries, the consensus was on the increasing 
importance of the Third World countries in the world politics. But there were contradicting 
views regarding the nature of relations. While majority of the politicians supported a limited 
improvement covering existing relations, some supported that Turkey had to adopt a neutral 
policy line and associated with the movement that these countries pursued in foreign affairs. 
The majority rejected the latter view on grounds that Turkey had to preserve its stance in the 
Western Bloc. According to this point of view, a neutral policy line would endanger the 
Western system of Turkey and would end Turkey’s independence. They emphasized that a 
multilateral policy line did not necessitate departure from the Western Bloc; instead, the idea 
was a  redefinition of the relations with the Western Bloc on honest and equal basis and 
diversified the relations with other countries by remaining in the Western Bloc. According to 
this predominant view, the geostrategic and geopolitical position of the country necessitated, 
that it remained in the Western Bloc. Pointing out the possible negative impacts of Turkey’s 
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dissolution from the Western Bloc, of such as change in the balance of power, some even 
claimed that this would lead to revolutions in different parts of the world.752  
 
The other facet of multilateral relations was normalization of relations with the USSR. 
National priorities of Turkey and the USSR shaped the normalization process. While Turkey 
aimed to develop her economic relations with the USSR mainly with respect to her objective 
of establishing some basic heavy industrialization plants, for the USSR Turkish straits had an 
increasing importance owing to her naval presence in the Mediterranean and her growing 
influence in the Arab world.753 
 
Reversal of the USSR policy on Cyprus in 1964 as well as Turkey’s refusal of participating in 
the Multilateral Force in January 1965 represented two important milestones in this process. 
In the framework of this normalization, in addition to exchange of visits at high-level, two 
countries reached an agreement on the construction of several large-scale industrial projects 
and foreign aid with long repayment duration and low-interest rates. In the diplomatic field, a 
parallelism was observed during the Arab-Israel conflict. Both countries strongly supported 
the return of Arab lands lost to Israel in 1967 and stressed their desire to see the Near and 
Middle East as a land of peace. On this issue they agreed on bilateral contacts and exchange 
of opinions.754  
 
Despite these developments, however, the expected broadening of Turco-Soviet relations did 
not materialize. The bombing of the Greek positions in Cyprus by the Turkish air force 
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brought in severe Soviet protests. Though this led to frictions between the two, the real 
turning point in the USSR and Turkey relations was, however, the Czechoslovakia event and 
the Brezhnev Doctrine which claimed the right of intervention for the Soviets to uphold the 
Socialist regime in any country. These two were the events that led many neutralists into 
“strong apologists’ of NATO. The empowering position of the USSR in the Mediterranean 
and the claim that the Mediterranean was an extension of the Black Sea, which concerned the 
status of the Straits were the bone of contention between two countries. These made the future 
of the relations ambiguous and uncertain.755 
 
Yet in the second period, due to the new policy line in foreign affairs, Turkey was frequently 
at odds with the USA. The immediate impact of the trauma that the country underwent during 
the Cyprus crisis of mid-60s was the growing anti-Americanism that found its expression in 
anti-American slogans, aggression against American diplomats and similar acts.756 This anti-
Americanism shed light on the increasing sensitivity and questioning of the stance of the 
American personnel in the country,757 status of the bases758 as well as content of the bilateral 
agreements. In addition to this, Turkey and the USA confronted on various issues, such as the 
poppy question. As the last two issues turned out to lead to a serious confrontation between 
the superpower and Turkey they are  worth examining in this context. 
 
After becoming a member of the NATO Turkey concluded a series of bilateral agreements 
with the US either directly with reference to Article 3 of the Treaty or with reference to the 
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NATO Status of Forces Agreement signed between the member countries on 9 June 1951. 
This agreement contained provisions regarding the status of the forces of a member country 
during their being stationed on the territory of another member country. Turkey became a part 
of this agreement on March 10, 1954. Turkey and the USA concluded nearly a hundred of 
these agreements a majority of which remained secret.759 Yet regardless of their category, the 
common feature of the majority of these bilateral agreements was its design to serve mainly to 
the interests of the USA, more than the ally, owing to the latter’s weakness vis-a-vis the USA. 
They were arranged in a manner that the USA had the right of intervention whenever it liked 
by various formulas.760 
 
The question of the constitutionality of the bilateral agreements was raised frequently in the 
process. As an attempt to create a legal mechanism to prevent the arguments that these 
bilateral agreements were unconstitutional, after the Coup of 1960, an article was put in the 
1961 Constitution that obligated ratification of all sorts of international agreements and 
accords, still with the exception of several categories.761 
 
In the post-1964 era parallel to the increasing anti-American sentiments these bilateral 
agreements were brought under scrutiny. This thorough examination revealed that a great 
majority of these agreements were concluded not by a particular department of the 
government but by different departments. They were negotiated either with the Foreign 
Ministry, with a particular ministry involved or the Turkish General Staff.762 A factor that 
aggravated the situation was related to the type of the agreement or the deficiency in the 
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archiving system of the country. Some bilateral agreements were in oral forms. The oral ones 
were agreed either by telephone or tete-a-tete. The written agreements were also problematic 
due to their improper preservation. In late 60s the Foreign Affairs Minister complained that 
the original copies of these agreements were not kept in the archives of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry. Their endeavors to gather these agreements resulted in the collection of only half of 
them.763 
 
In 60s what fostered the debates on bilateral agreements was the behavior of the American 
personnel in the bases. Establishment of the military bases was an outcome of the USA’s 
global military strategy. By the establishment of NATO, establishment of these bases became 
easier as the NATO agreement recognized such a right. In Turkey these bases were 
established according to the 12 July 1947 agreement. The increase in the number of American 
personnel in the bases, on the other hand, was possible by a “secret” agreement dated June 23, 
1954, that was not ratified by the Parliament. Yet its secrecy was not due to its unknown 
nature but due to the artificial name labeled on it to avoid the supervision of the Parliament. 
As the agreement was signed as ‘execution agreement’ it was free from the checking 
mechanism of the Parliament. By arranging the status of the American personnel in Turkey in 
the framework of this agreement, huge concessions were recognized to the American 
personnel in Turkey.764 
 
While the Turkish public asked for the expiration of these agreements, the USA insisted, even 
“resisted” not to give up some privileges. As a result of considerable endeavor, a solution that 
reduced the tension in the Turkish public was found by the signing of the Basic Agreement in 
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late 60s. This was accompanied with a reduction in the number of American military 
personnel in Turkey. Besides Çığlı airport and radar bases at Trabzon and Samsun were 
transferred to Turkish armed forces. The remaining radar bases were adjusted to the principles 
of new agreements. These arrangements were made to ease the criticisms regarding the bases. 
The debate related to the American bases in Turkey was carried out in the framework of 
independence of the country. Critics of these bases point out that in their own country, 
Turkish officials, even the National Defense Ministry could not enter the bases without the 
permission of the American authorities.765 New arrangements following the increased 
criticisms were far from satisfying even the moderate or pro-Western people, particularly 
because of the special case of Incirlik Base, as the double key principle.766 
 
The poppy question stood as another irritating issue in 60s between the USA and Turkey. 
Although there was no widespread narcotics addiction in Turkey itself, the US administration 
identified Turkey as one of the major resources of illegal heroin supplies reaching the US in 
60s. Following this identification, the US administration asked for the total elimination of the 
poppy cultivation. This remained unsolved until the first technocrat government set up 
following the Memorandum of 12 March 1971. By 1972 this government under the Prime 
Ministry of Nihat Erim agreed on the total elimination of poppy cultivation. As compensation 
for the Anatolian producers, the US administration provided 35 million Dollars.767 
 
The US administration put the issue in this manner to prove her dominance over an aid 
recipient small ally. Due to this reason, the issue turned out to be one of the more bitter 
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confrontations between Turkey and the USA. Claims of the Foreign Affairs Minister of the 
era shed light o, this bitterness. In his memoirs, the Foreign Affairs Minister of the era 
claimed that the poppy question was the cause of ousting of the Demirel government. While 
explaining the process, Caglayangil stated that the American Ambassador brought the 
compensation issue first to him. As the Prime Minister of the era, Demirel rejected this 
proposal on the grounds that abrupt ceasing the poppy cultivation was impossible as more 
than twenty-five cities along with their provinces were earning money from poppy cultivation. 
Instead, Demirel suggested a process of restriction of area under cultivation at the end of 
which the cultivation would cease totally. This appropriate suggestion was repeated to the 
American Ambassador who did not welcome the idea. According to the claims of 
Caglayangil, American Ambassador said that it was a pity since some very bad results would 
emerge from this attitude of the Prime Minister. In a few months time these “very bad results” 
were understood since in three months time Demirel government was ousted.768 
 
To sum, in 60s parallel to the faced realities in the diplomatic field, Turkey developed her 
relations with the Arab countries, nonaligned world and the Socialist Bloc. In this policy line 
the diplomatic and economic considerations were at force. Turkish policymakers were aware 
of the fact that by assuring these countries’ support Turkey’s position would be reinforced 
both diplomatically and economically. In addition to the willingness of these policymakers, 
relaxation of the tensions between the blocs promoted the appropriate international 
environment which enabled the development of relations. As another dynamic, economic 
considerations were important for Turkey. In a short time, the policymakers as well as the 
national capitalists witnessed the early return of the improved relations. Without leaving their 
position in the Western Bloc, by adopting a pragmatic policy line Turkey pursued a nationalist 
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foreign policy, highest priority of which was national interests. Turkish policymakers 
supported multilateral foreign policy as the diversification of the relations existing in world 
conditions necessitated. Compared to the previous decade which was distinguished by a total 
conformity with the allies, Turkey entered a new stage where she put her national priorities to 
the fore forth.  
 
c. The USA & Turkey on Military Issues 
For the superpower of the Western bloc, Turkey was one of the components in the context of 
a global defense system against the Communist threat. In the process, she was incorporated 
into this defense system through various steps. While the first step of this incorporation was 
the Turkish-Greek Assistance Program of 1947, the main step was her membership to NATO 
in 1952. Between these two, Turkey grasped the opportunity to reveal her solidarity to the 
cause of the Western Bloc by the Korean War.  
 
The military dimension of the Turkish-American relations was based on a ‘win-win’ 
assumption. Improvement of the defense capacity of the small ally neighboring the 
superpower of the Socialist Bloc would serve to the national interests of the USA. Turkey, on 
the other hand, as the small ally welcomed this incorporation to the global defense plot of the 
“free world” bloc. Despite this compromise, however, the military relations of the allies were 
not free from tension. Confrontation of the allies on various military issues intensified in 60s 
parallel to the requestioning of relations with the USA in general. 
  
In late 40s, Turkey continued to spend a considerable amount of her budget for defense 
expenditures. This spending was done at the expense of the economic development. By 
current data Turkey was the country whose military spending exceeded that of any of the 
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Western European countries. The American officials pointed out that due to defense 
expenditures since 1938 there was no production program that served the economic 
development of the country.769 
 
In the aftermath of the WW2, Turkey received first military aid allocation by the Turkish-
Greek Assistance Program of 1947. The US administration designed the military aid program 
of Turkey as modernization of the Turkish military. The US administration defined this as a 
crucial program on the grounds that increase of Turkey’s defense ability reinforced the 
deterrence of the Western Bloc vis-à-vis the socialist bloc. Turkish military program was 
shaped by strategic and economic considerations. In justifying military aid to Turkey, the 
USA administration referred to the geographic position of the country, situated between 
Europe and Asia.  She was defined as a barrier to the Soviet expansion. Another factor that 
made Turkey an attraction point was her military and economic stability in comparison to the 
other countries of the region. In the appraisal of the aid, the US administration pointed out 
that unless Turkey received military aid from the USA, the defense allocations would have 
more devastating influence on her economy. For the future the US officials suggested the 
continuation of the military aid program since discontinuity of the military aid would have 
negative impacts on the Turkish economy.770 
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In addition to these strategic considerations, the other factor behind the military aid of the 
USA was related to the economicality of the Turkish military forces. Comparison of the 
annual cost of the American soldiers with the Turkish soldiers revealed the extreme difference 
between the two. While an American soldier cost $ 3511 annually, this was  reduced to $ 105 
for the Turkish soldier. Moving from this data, the American policymakers concluded that 
strengthening of the Turkish military in the Middle East as a bastion against the Soviet 
aggression led to a reduction in the cost of any military takeover to a great extent.771 
 
Other economical benefit that these countries expected from the program was related to the 
surplus arms that the USA and UK had in their hands. This was the reason why the USA 
provided second-hand and second-quality arms, at least in the initial years of the military aid 
program. As the USA and UK faced a storage burden related to these surplus arms, in the 
military aid programs of these years their transfer to the aid recipient countries was a high 
priority. Provision of second-quality arms was related to the American Missions’ commitment to the 
American Congress. According to this, the Congress asked for the Mission to enable the maximum 
possible usage of the lend-lease materials and surplus equipment. Officials of the American Aid Mission 
to Turkey pointed out that this was done automatically in every case.772 
 
In the Turkish context when the American diplomats faced criticisms due to the  provision of 
low-quality and used arms in the framework of the military aid program,773 they justified this 
by the weakness of the Turkish economy to bear the costs of high-quality arms. They 
supported the view that Turkey’s debt burden had to be kept at minimum and this could only 
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be possible by providing her second-hand arms. These arms could be provided to Turkey at 
“junk” prices. The American officials pointed out that this would not only serve the benefit of 
Turkey but also the US and UK as they faced a storage burden.774 
 
This view found supporters among the Turkish policymakers who concluded that a source-
scarce country like Turkey had to be rational in spending these resources. Therefore, supply 
of second hand, low-quality arms was preferable.775 
 
Ultimate objectives of the program were determined as reassurance of the Turkish public 
concerning USA’s full determination in supporting Turkey, improvement of the combat 
efficiency of the Turkish armed forces in order to deter the USSR or its satellites from 
aggression against Turkey and release manpower to alleviate the acute labor force shortage. 
As an outcome, these objectives were expected to increase the efficiency of Turkish military 
power, without aggravating the already heavy military budget of Turkey.776 
 
American missions determined these objectives after examining the prevailing conditions in 
Turkish armed forces. According to their diagnosis, the basic prevailing deficiency of the 
Turkish military was heterogeneity of the arms. These were the collection of German, French 
and British equipment and certain amount of American equipment which had been procured 
                                                 
774Secret Memo on Turkey’s Present Economic Position and Capacity to Survive Foreign Loans from Edward B. 
Lawson, Counselor of embassy for Economic Affairs to Secretary of the State,  December 10, 1946, RG 59, 
Department of State, Decimal File, 1945-49.  
775Özdağ, Menderes Dönemi Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali, p.51.  
776Secret Report entitled as “Analysis and Comparison of US Policies wt Regard to Aid to Greece, Turkey, Iran and 
Afghanistan”, prepared by American Embassy in Ankara, November 12, 1948, RG 59, General Records of the 
Department of State, Miscellaneous Lot Files, Subject Files relating to Turkey, 1947-58; 3rd Quartley USTAP 
Report entitled as Military Assistance to Turkey, 1948, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 
Miscellaneous Lot Files, Subject Files relating to Turkey, 1947-58; Confidential Statement regarding Turkey’s 
Financial Problem from George Wardsworth to Secretary of State, July 25, 1949, RG 59, Department of State, 
Decimal File, 1945-49. 
 410
by lend lease from Britain during WW2. Many of these arms were far from efficient 
functioning. Much of the heavy mechanized equipment was inoperative due to lack of 
complete spare parts and repair facilities. Another problem was related to the mobility of the 
arms equipment. This was extremely limited due to the shortage of suitable animals, 
particularly for pack and horse drawn artillery. These were defined as factors that impeded 
any initiative of the modernization of the army.777 
 
Moving from these facts, the American military officials concluded that a real modernization 
of the Turkish armed forces would cover a long period. As the best possible strategy, these 
officials suggested a two-dimensional strategy for Turkey. While one dimension of this 
strategy was the training of the Turkish military officials by the American military personnel, 
the other dimension was full equipment of the Turkish military forces with arms and 
equipment which they were familiar with.778 
 
This fact as well as determined strategy for Turkey with regard to the modernization of its 
army was related to both what the USA expected from the country in the Cold War context 
and the donor’s own economic considerations. A confidential communication of the 
Department of State revealed what the USA expected from Turkey in an armed conflict with 
the USSR.  Instead of long-term benefits, the US administration focused on short-term 
benefits that served the Western Bloc’s gaining of time in a possible armed conflict with the 
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Socialist Bloc. Moving from this understanding, the US administration designed the military 
aid of 1947 to increase Turkish resistance to a 1948 or 1950 model Russian attack.779 
 
Commenced by this rationale the military aid to Turkey continued by increasing amounts. As 
a Middle East country Turkey received the highest amount of military as well as economic 
aid.780 While the delivered military aid was $ 68.8 million in 1948, this reached $ 116.6 
million in 1970. This was consistent with the increasing militarized feature of the American 
foreign aid policy which was easily justified by the Cold War context.   
 
While the military aid programs comprised one aspect of the military relations between the 
USA and Turkey, the other aspect was collaboration through defense pacts or joint military 
expeditions. In the bipartisan foreign policy line, Turkey regarded taking part in these pacts or 
military expeditions as crucial as a “European” country and an important strategic ally of the 
Western Bloc. In the process, however, various developments revealed that her allies did not 
share the same enthusiasm as that of Turkey. First crucial confrontation of this sort occurred 
as early as 1949 on the question of membership to NATO.  
 
In the immediate post-WW2 era, the most important defense pact was the North Atlantic 
Organization (NATO) established on April 4, 1949 with the participation of the USA, UK, 
France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Italy, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Canada and 
Portugal. It was founded in the midst of increasingly tense relations between the USA and the 
USSR following the Berlin Crisis and the Coup in Czechoslovakia.  
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Turkey’s exclusion from the NATO was a great surprise for the Turkish policymakers.  
Anxiety of being left out from the Western defense pact and feeling of being alone vis-a-vis 
the USSR were the dominant feelings. According to Sander, the other aspect of this anxiety 
was related to the aid amount. Turkish policymakers were anxious that Turkey’s exclusion 
from NATO would decrease the amount of American aid.781 By these considerations Turkey 
applied to NATO and expressed her intention to become a member on the eighth day of its 
establishment. Until her acceptance into NATO in February 1952, she had to repeat these 
applications frequently.782 
 
In explaining Turkey’s exclusion from the NATO, the USA administration stated that the Pact 
was a geographic defense concept and was limited only with the North Atlantic countries. 
Therefore, it suggested Turkey to regard herself as a member of a Mediterranean Pact instead 
of NATO membership. Satisfied with this explanation, the Turkish policymakers commenced 
lobbying for the foundation of a possible Mediterranean defense pact. What disturbed 
Turkey’s acceptance of this explanation was invitation of Italy and French Algeria to NATO 
membership.  When the Turkish policymakers pointed out the inconsistency of these 
invitations to the previous explanations of the USA, the US administration justified these 
invitations on the grounds that USA’s security could not be defined by or limited to 
geographic boundaries.783 
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Turkey became more reactionary following Italy’s membership to NATO since this decision 
put Turkey into a secondary place. Turkish policymakers defined this as the insincerity of the 
Western powers. Informing his government, the American Ambassador referred to a press 
campaign for a neutralist policy line. He added that though the official circles did not share 
advocacy of this neutralist foreign policy line currently, as Turks were proud people, the 
increasing pressure on the official circles might lead them to pursue a neutralist foreign 
policy. Moving from these facts, the Ambassador suggested either including Turkey to NATO 
or forming a Mediterranean group including Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Iran 
and US.784 
 
One of the most debated issues in the country was what led Turkey’s exclusion from the 
NATO. Various factors were at force behind Turkey’s exclusion from the NATO up to 1952.  
In this exclusion, the small members of the Pact and Britain had an important part. Norway 
and Denmark expressed their anxiety on the expansion of NATO to cover a non-industrial 
country like Turkey. Some also seemed concerned that the effort to bring Turkey’s military 
equipment up to the standards set for Europe would lead to a reduction in the arms they were 
to receive. They shared the opinion that Turkey’s membership would weaken the Pact. 
Britain, on the other hand, opposed Turkey’s membership due to her own interests. The 
British politicians supported Turkey’s participation in a Mediterranean and/or Middle East 
defense pact. Bagci also points out that in addition to the anxieties of the individual countries, 
the general opinion among the members was the cultural heritage and traditions of the country 
which were regarded as obstacle for this membership.785 
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Despite these initial objections, in three years time Greece and Turkey became NATO 
members. Examination of the process revealed that more than initiatives of the member 
countries, developments in the Socialist Bloc determined the course of events.  Rapid 
armament of the pro-Soviet Balkan states, increasing pressure of the USSR on Yugoslavia, 
NATO Commander Eisenhower’s desire to strengthen the southeast flank of NATO mainly 
due to these factors, increased need of the USA for military bases in Turkey for any future air 
flows and increased importance of the Middle East were the main factors that prepared the 
environment for Turkey’s membership to NATO.786 Another factor raised by the politicians of 
the era and later by various researchers787 was Turkish soldiers’ successful contributions 
during the Korean War. 
 
Korean War was a milestone for Turkey’s acceptance as an important factor in military 
battlefields. In contrast to the idealist explanations of the Turkish policymakers that equated 
the cause of Korea with Turkey788, the American diplomats defined Turkey’s participation in 
this war as totally a political act. By this participation the Turkish policymakers expected to 
gain various advantages top among which was admission to NATO. The American officials, 
while pointing out Turkey’s loneliness “in this theatre”, also added that the USSR was 
preparing to pay a very big price for Turkey’s neutrality in the Cold War context.789 
 
Turkish public as well as policymakers were enthusiastic about the “high” performance of 
Turkish soldiers in the Korean War. Regarding Turkish soldiers performance in the Korean 
War the official papers referred to the importance of seeing that the Turkish soldiers had the 
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ability to participate in a multi-national defense organization and fight along with soldiers 
from other countries.790 The British Ambassador’s report while raising the same issue and 
emphasizing the increasing prestige of the Turkish soldiers, also revealed how the allies 
regarded this performance. According to the British Ambassador, still “1914 mentality” 
dominated the Turkish army.791 
 
Turkey’s entrance to NATO, in short, was one of the most interesting episodes between the 
small ally and the advanced big allies.  While her low industrialization level was an obstacle 
for her membership, later on parallel to the increasing importance of conventional forces and 
need for more military bases in the scope of the concept of “ringing of Russia by bases”792 
Turkey became an important component in the global defense system. Under the pressure of 
the Soviet threats, as well as the deep-rooted psychological feelings towards the USSR, the 
Turkish public and politicians welcomed NATO membership. This was regarded as a great 
victory. Turkey continued to share these views until mid-60s. But in the midst of 
requestioning the foreign policy and its objectives, a growing anti-NATO ferment 
commenced parallel to the increasing anti-Americanism.793 
 
As NATO membership brought new responsibilities in the course of alliance various 
criticisms were raised regarding the burden of the membership, nationality of the army, 
success of the aid with respect to dependency of the countries on foreign countries for defense 
equipment, appropriateness of the provided arms as well as accuracy of training of Turkish 
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soldiers by American officials.794 These sorts of criticisms were valid even in the initial years 
of the aid.  In the process, however, the increasing anti-Americanism parallel to an increased 
anti-NATO ferment was observed. The estranged public expressed its antipathy views 
regarding the USA and NATO around the concepts of dependency, loss of independence or 
“non-national army”. While until the Cyprus crisis of 1963 these concepts were mostly 
recognized as the terminology of the leftist circles, after this crisis they began to be expressed 
more widely by the public. Conflicting perspectives on the military issues could be 
categorized as those related to the US military program in general and NATO in particular.795 
 
What lied at the core of these conflicts was the incompatibility of the expectations of the 
Turkish policymakers and public with the role that the US determined for Turkey. In that 
respect, the discrepancy between the expectations of Turkish military and the training 
program that was provided in the framework of military aid turned to be a serious issue.  
 
According to the memoirs of the military officials, training of the Turkish military officials by 
the American personnel was an important issue that fostered feeling of antipathy towards the 
USA and the DP governments. The gap between the expectations of the Turkish military 
officials with the envisaged role for Turkey lied at the core of the confrontation. In the case of 
Turkey, training of the military officials by foreign officials represented continuity between 
the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic. The new aspect related to the NATO objective, 
however, was that in contrast to the past when the training was provided by the experts of 
different countries, in the post-WW2 era this was provided by the American experts.  
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Initially the program was regarded more as a supply of arms than training, though the latter 
was available also. Flow of the arms commenced in the following years, but as early as 1952, 
half of the supplied arms were broken and out of service.  American officials explained the 
reason for this as improper usage and maintenance. Facing this, the US officials decided to 
give more emphasis on the training of the military. In this training the US officials 
emphasized an extensive reform. New schools covering technological know-how opened for 
land, sea and air forces of the military. The military officials were sent abroad for training. 
Besides, in order to enable the promotion in ranks according to merit, not seniority, a 
personnel unit was established in the Chief-of –Arms and the higher ranks of the military 
commandship were modernized. Their number reduced to four under the Chief-in-Arms as 
Land, Air, Navigation and Gendarme. In the scope of these activities, military inspectorship 
was also eliminated.796 
 
Though these reform attempts were welcomed initially in the process, Turkish Armed Forces 
reacted to these as they regarded them the USA’s attempts to destroy the main traditions that 
the Turkish military relied on and to penetrate to the fundamental basis of the existing 
institutions. Particularly arrangements regarding the War Academy became a bone of conflict 
between two countries. Due to this, the military circles in Turkey increasingly began to equate 
the military aid program as a means to justify the interference of the USA into the Turkish 
Armed Forces.797 
 
The problem related to the War Academy, in fact, was the clash of the objectives of the two 
countries regarding the military aid program. The US attempted to reduce the education in the 
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War Academy to only one year and suggested a simple education program aiming to graduate 
only battalion commanders. This was against the expectations of the Turkish Armed Forces 
since they wanted at least a three-year education that would enable the graduation of high 
quality staff officers. This issue was the first crucial confrontation between the American and 
Turkish officials in the field. The importance of the issue is revealed from the fact that the 
American high-rank officials tended to define this one-year education arrangement as a 
condition of continuation of the military aid to Turkey. The insistence of the US 
administration on the issue was justified by the rationale that as the Turkish military would 
not get involved in an overseas expedition or a wide-scale guerrilla war and as it would be 
dispatched as battalion units, there was no need for a three-year education period. At the end 
of the bargains, terms of education were reduced from three to two years.798 
 
The US administration, while disregarding other criticisms, also concerned itself with the 
financial burden of the membership of Turkey parallel to the excessive indebtedness of the 
country in 50s. In addition to many other factors, the US administration questioned the impact 
of the on-going military program on Turkish economy.  Regarding the deterioration of the 
Turkish economy, the Secretary of the State asked whether Turkey was trying to carry out a 
“too big” military program that exceeded the capacity of her economy. American Ambassador 
in Turkey confirmed the accuracy of this view but this “bigness” was not due to the US 
military programs as the US was careful to carry out fairly modest programs in Turkey. He 
defined Turkey’s NATO membership as the reason that made the military expenditures a 
great burden in the Turkish budget. As a NATO member, an accelerated military build-up 
started with an attempt to bring Turkish forces quickly up to NATO standards. The 
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Ambassador criticized that there had never been any real study of the ability of Turkey’s 
economy to support an expanded military program of this size.799 
 
Though these criticisms refer to various aspects of the military aid, Turkey’s increased 
dependency on the superpower was not on the agenda until the President of the superpower 
reminded it. Provision of arms mainly from the USA as well as training of the Turkish 
military officials by the American technical personnel led to an increasing dependency. 
Johnson reminded the Turkish government of the scope of freedom that Turkey enjoyed as an 
aid recipient country.  The most traumatic aspect of Johnson letter was its reminding that 
Turkey could not use the arms that she provided by the US aid funds without the approval of 
the USA. As already mentioned, this warning of the President compelled the Turkish 
politicians and public to face the reality of excessive dependency on the big ally. Debates on 
the question of dependency as well as “nationality” of the military forces fused. 
 
Related to the dependency issue, critics emphasize that while the staff, food and cloth of the 
Turkish Armed Forces were provided domestically its rockets, telephones, wireless phones 
and plane apparatus were provided from abroad. In the criticism of dependency on the USA it 
was mentioned that the US administration reinforced its empowered stance vis-à-vis Turkey 
by the 4th article of the Aid Agreement, which assured the usage of arms by the approval of 
the US administration. Critics defined the most dangerous outcome of this relation as tying of 
Turkey’s future to the will of the USA since Turkey ceased all her endeavors to create a 
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national defense industry after becoming of an aid recipient country. This was defined as the 
concrete proof of neo-imperialism of the post-WW2 era.800 
 
These debates led to another debate regarding the nationality of the army. Moving from the 
above-mentioned dependency features, ‘non-nationality’ of the Turkish military began to be 
discussed. In refutation to the ruling party, who refused that Turkish army was a non-national 
army, advocates of the concept enumerated the main features of the national army. First 
condition of an army’s being a national one was defined as the freedom of usage of its arms 
whenever and wherever it desired without any conditions. As Turkey lacked such a freedom 
of action, these critics concluded that Turkish army’s persisting profile did not fit the 
definition of the national army.801 
 
While these were the debates related to the US military aid program, Turkey’s membership to 
NATO was highly debated in 60s also. In addition to the requestioning due to the Cyprus 
issue, the fact that by 1969 any member country that desired to withdraw could withdraw 
from NATO was an important factor in this intense questioning. Criticisms regarding 
Turkey’s NATO membership focused on obligations to be fulfilled as a NATO member, 
prevailing low standards of the Turkish military forces, ceasing of all endeavors to establish a 
national defense industry as well as disclosure of all national secrets to center countries.802 
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By NATO membership Turkey was obligated to coordinate her defense plans with the plans 
of the European armies under an international command. This obligation was soon severely 
criticized, as the exclusive planning for the country’s protection, functioning of Turkish forces 
and their deployment by the country itself became impossible by this obligation. Though 
Turkish units in peacetime were to remain under the national commanders, their armament, 
doctrine and organization had to be brought into harmony with her allies.803 Like the military 
forces of other member countries, as a result of these obligations, Turkish army lost its 
autonomous stance to a great extent. In its connection to NATO command mechanism, 
Turkish Armed Forces would be under the command of the European Commandership. This 
Commandership was under the command of the European High Joint Commander 
headquarters of which was in Paris.804 
 
The increasing criticisms about NATO were focused on the reason of Turkey’s tying of  her 
destiny to the NATO by putting all her military forces under the NATO commandership. 
Critics of this aspect reminded that this was an issue that was highly debated in 1953-4 and 
those who resisted these arrangements among the high-rank soldiers were purged from the 
military. The most important negative outcome of the NATO membership was total 
indifference to the establishment of national defense industry. In addition, the increased 
relations with the Western powers led to the disclosure of all national secrets.805 
 
Despite its negative impact on Turkish economy, the NATO programs did not attain the 
objective of increasing the level of Turkish Armed Forces’ standard to NATO standards 
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either. As the reason of this critics referred to the disproportion of allocations of various 
member countries. While the allocated amount for the military forces of other members was 
TL 65 905 in average, this was reduced to TL 6 770 for the Turkish Armed Forces. Criticisms 
focused on the outcomes of these disproportionate allocations. Due to these, the Turkish 
Armed forces could not reach even the minimum standards of NATO.806 
 
Debates regarding Turkey’s remaining as a NATO member or not intensified in the process. 
At the end, the predominant view was to remain as a NATO member but by improving 
conditions of the membership. Besides, a consensus was reached on the necessity of 
establishment of the national defense industry.807 Turkish policymakers also agreed on the 
elimination of all factors that endangered the national independence of the country, such as 
difficulty of entrance to the NATO bases in Turkey even by the high rank authorities.808 
 
As this brief analysis reveals the US and Turkey relations on military issues were not free from tensions 
either. While 50s witnessed a low-profile confrontation, in 60s frequency of the confrontations increased. 
Being a neighbor of the superpower of the Socialist Bloc, Turkish policymakers and public were very 
sensitive on the issue of defense and national security. Therefore, they were very enthusiastic and willing 
to receive military aid from the USA and to be a part of any of defense pact that the Western Bloc 
countries established. Both of these factors served their feeling of security. The country was not only a 
part of a strong “community” but also had the assurance to be “protected” against the Soviet aggression. 
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This was the dominating opinion regarding Turkey’s participation in the Western Bloc and being an aid 
recipient country. The illusionary aspect of the feeling of security or being a part of the strong 
community, however, was grasped during the Cyprus crisis of 1963. Turkey faced the reality that what 
she relied on military terms lacked a sound basis since she was denied of the right to use the arms 
provided by the US military aid. The Turkish politicians and public also faced the reality that all the 
sacrifices or obligations that they had to bear as a NATO member were also in vain as the Organization 
would not extend its support to its strategic member at any time. This support would only be extended 
when the allies of Turkey thought that it was crucial for their own interests.  
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II. India in World Affairs (1947-73) 
The post-WW2 era indicated new beginnings for both the USA and India. While the USA 
emerged from the WW2 as the superpower of the capitalist Western bloc, India gained her 
independence after a six-decade-long bloodless national movement.  Proud of their 
Independence which ended the colonial “yoke” of the British, the Indian policymakers 
announced their dedication to preserve the country’s political and economic independence. 
They began to mold India’s foreign relations accordingly, particularly with the West.  When 
the new world order presented the USA as the new superpower, India expressed its sympathy, 
as India and the USA had a common colonial background. Besides, the USA differed from 
other western countries, as she did not have colonies. This feature of the USA was highly 
appreciated by the Indian policymakers. Despite these sympathetic concerns, however, they 
had reservations as the USA belonged to the West and stood as the hegemonic Western power 
of the new world order.        
 
Time proved the appropriateness of these reservations. In a relatively short time the USA and 
India confronted concerning some strategic issues which were derived from their stance in the 
world order, role in international division of labor and national preferences in foreign affairs.  
While some of the confronted issues were time-free as they were related to the dichotomy 
between the center and periphery, others became meaningful and alarming in the post-WW2 
context when the Cold War was the international setting. The interaction between the USA as 
the superpower and India as the newly independent largest peripheral country is examined 
with special reference to these confrontations.     
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a. The USA-India Confrontation on Economic Issues 
 
Demands of the Superpower and Their Timing: 
The Indo-American confrontation on economic issues had various dimensions. The USA as 
the superpower had objections to the development strategy, mixed economic system, socialist 
rhetoric, arrangements regarding foreign private capital, foreign trade as well as import 
substitution policy. Nayar defines this as the hostility of the center against the rise of 
competing industries.809 Though in essence all of these were related to the dichotomy between 
the center and the periphery, some of them were irritating due to their ideological 
connotations in the Cold War context, such as attainment of socialist order through 
continuous expansion of the public sector.  
 
Except the initial few years, Indian policymakers adopted heavy industrialization led 
developmental strategy. Believing India’s positive differentiation among the LDCs by its 
relatively high industrialization level, Indian policymakers defined modernization through 
heavy industrialization as the ultimate national objective.  Their motto was ‘either 
industrialize or perish’.810 In addition the idea of self-sufficiency, they equated high 
industrialization level with strong defense basis. Besides, they shared the belief that only 
heavy industrialization could absorb the surplus labor force.  Referring to the abundance of 
labor force in the country, the policymakers claimed that agriculture had a limited absorption 
capacity. Moving from this rationale, Indian policymakers defined heavy industrialization as 
the security valve of the country.811  
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The USA, on the other hand, extended partial support to this objective. While the US 
administration agreed on the India’s objective of modernization, it objected to the means for 
this end. Without disregarding the industrial establishment of India, the US officials defined 
Indian policymakers’ belief about India’s industrial structure as overoptimistic. They referred 
to the WW2 time impetus in Indian industry as the main factor behind this overoptimism.  
According to the Indian policymakers, India was an emerging industrial nation of Western 
magnitude rather than supplier of agricultural raw materials. Relying on the predominant 
proportion of the agricultural materials in the exported items as well as comparative 
advantage principle, the US administration suggested agricultural-led strategy along with 
certain light industries, predominantly consumer goods industries.812  
 
This pro-agriculture and pro-consumer industry stance of the USA was revealed in the 
utilization of the American aid. In 50s the US aid allocations were largely devoted to 
agriculture, most directly to increase food production considerably.  Besides in every platform 
including country negotiations with the international agencies, private meetings, of policy 
documents, the US administration called for a more realistic interpretation of resources and 
shifted the locomotive sector from industry to agriculture. Parallel to this, consistent with the 
conditions of agreements, the American aid to India was mostly earmarked to consumer 
goods industries. Through this earmarking the US administration aimed not only at promotion 
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of consumer goods industries but also at a culture of consumerism. This preference of the 
superpower had important contributions to the pseudo-industrial structure that India had at the 
end of the process.813  
 
Disapproval of the USA of India’s heavy industrialization driven development strategy 
crystallized when the Western countries declined to finance the Second 5 Year Plan. Though 
the general idea was the center countries’ refusal to finance the Plan, some socialist leaders in 
India claimed that India withdrew its appeal when the capitalist center countries asked for 
military bases in India, as well as its participation at military pacts. In the face of negative 
developments regarding financing of the Plan India appealed to the USSR. The USSR 
supported the Plan and extended both financial aid and technical support to India. In the scope 
the first economic aid agreement between the USSR and India, signed on 2 February 1955, 
India constructed the first major plant in the public sector, namely the Bhilai Steel Plant. This 
first contribution to the public sector was, in fact, reflected the nature of the Soviet aid in the 
process. In contrast to the earmarking of the western aid mainly to consumer goods industries 
in private sector and infrastructure, the Soviet aid had considerable contributions in laying 
foundations of heavy industry in the public sector.814   
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The private sector orientation of the American aid reflected another confrontation with the 
superpower and the peripheral country. Expansion of the public sector was frequently defined 
as a factor that impeded economic development of the country. When India appealed to the 
USA or international agencies for foreign aid for the implementation of the development 
plans, the expanded nature of the public sector was criticized. Besides, in all policy 
documents for the improvement of the Indian economy, again the center countries expressed 
the expansion of public sector as a negative and unsound indicator. Defining their criticism of 
the public sector as the byproduct of conventional wisdom, the center countries asked for the 
downgrade of the public sector while creating an appropriate environment for the promotion 
of private capital. The US administration in its negotiations with the Indian policymakers until 
1959 underlined that no economic aid would be extended to state-owned industrial and 
mining enterprises regardless of the size of the economic crisis that India faced, except in rare 
cases.815 
 
The frequently raised demand for a pro-private sector environment was crucial on various 
grounds. First of all, the center countries identified the public sector expansion as a policy that 
created an environment modeled on the Soviet economy. This identification was enhanced by 
PM Nehru’s vision of attaining a socialist social order through the expansion of the public 
sector. In addition to this, the USA as the mouthpiece of the Western center countries asked 
for the creation of pro-private capital environment for not only the sake of Indian but also 
foreign private capital. Referring to the immense gap between the low standard of living and 
greatness of India’s economic potentials, the US administration regarded India as a promising 
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big market as well as a country offering vast employment opportunities for American 
technical and administrative staff.816  
 
Moving from this view, the US administration defined its task as creating a favorable 
environment in India for her capitalists to exploit the potentials at maximum levels. Her 
policies were shaped accordingly. When India appealed to the Aid Consortium which was set 
up at the initiative of the USA and the WB in 1958 and initially comprised the US, the UK, 
Germany, Canada Japan, the WB and the IMF for a considerable amount of aid, she faced 
assault concerning the public sector industries. While criticizing the Indian development plans 
as over-ambitious and unrealistic, the center countries expressed their displeasure over the 
high priority assigned to the public sector. They regarded this as neglect of private enterprise 
both Indian and foreign. During the 1966 negotiations the same displeasure was repeated and 
India was asked to provide ample scope for both indigenous private enterprise and private 
foreign investment.817            
 
Countries at the center exerted pressure for an appropriate environment to their private 
capitalists who were in pursuit of assured markets for their products. The peripheral countries, 
on the other hand, faced this demand with caution to preserve their interests. Though they 
adopted hostile rhetoric and protective policies against the foreign private capital, at the end, 
in the midst of structural problems of their economy such as low domestic saving, shortage of 
foreign exchange and urgent need for foreign exchange to meet their importation needs they 
left these hostile rhetoric while involving in arrangements with the foreign countries for easy 
functioning of the foreign private capital in their countries.  India was not a different case.      
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The radical rhetoric that Indian policymakers adopted against foreign private capital was 
shaped during the national movement. The basic theme of the national movement was the 
economic destruction of the colonial era’s exploitation. As the source of discontent, foreign 
private capital and their activities were theorized as the drain theory. Main premise of the 
drain theory was exploitation of the considerable part of the India’s national income and the 
material by the English to be used for the benefit of their people. The imperial interests of 
Britain that disregarded any Indian interests shaped this drain process. They hoped that by 
Independence a new era commenced in India which would end this drain process.818 
 
Yet, the Indian policymakers were realistic enough to accept that it was not easy to stop this 
process in India where foreign capital had deeply penetrated into every field of economy. By 
Independence, foreign capital’s share in Indian economy was very high. Petroleum (97 %), 
rubber factories (93 %), light railways (90 %), matches (90 %), jute (89 %), tea (86 %), coal 
(62 %), and other minerals including gold and magnesium (73 %) were nearly under total 
domination of foreign capital. Banks and financial institutions (46 %), electrical industries (43 
%), engineering industries (33 %), coffee plantations (37 %), food industry (32 %), paper and 
cardboard (28 %) were other fields where the foreign capital had considerable share.  In 
contrast to this, in industries such as sugar (24 %), cotton (21 %) and cement (5 %), which 
were consumed by domestic market, the domestic capital had a predominating position. 
Foreign capital also had a strong influence on financial, banking and commercial operations 
and exerted its influence via managing agencies.819  
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Comparison of the proportions of the foreign capital during Independence with pre-
Independence reveals that there was a decline in the total investment of foreign capital 
between 1947-74. The foreign capital focused on the most profitable consumer goods sector 
such as oil, drugs and pharmaceuticals, rubber goods, cigarettes, soaps and detergents, 
typewriters, batteries and bulbs, glycerine and explosives. The foreign capitalists had not 
entered capital goods industry, as it required huge investment and long duration for returning 
of profits. Besides, the decline in proportion did not lead to a decline in influence as the 
foreign capital enjoyed a high degree of concentration of production and capital, as well as 
technological superiority. Owing to these superiority fields some official documents of the 
Indian government reflected the importance of indirect control of the foreign capital through 
partnerships with the Indian capitalists. In its 1966 Report the Industrial Licensing Committee 
referred to the multinational corporations which directly controlled 18 % of the corporate 
assets. It warned that to assume that this proportion reflected all would be misleading since 
they reflected only the direct proportion. While this comprised one facet, the other facet was 
its indirect proportion in the Indian economy via its partnerships with the Indian capitalists. In 
a majority of these partnerships the foreign capital enjoyed dominance as the Indian capitalists 
dependent on its capital power, global connections as well as technological superiority.820     
 
Parallel to the decline in the direct proportion of the foreign capital, another change occurred 
in the nationality of foreign capital.  The Independence era witnessed the diversification of 
foreign capital with respect to nationalities. In the Indian context until late 50s foreign capital 
meant mainly the British capital.  Yet the capitalists of the superpower challenged this 
omnipotent position of British capital. While the proportion of the British capital was roughly 
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82 % in 1948 this fell to 42 % by mid-60s. In contrast to this, the US share increased from 4 
% to 25 % in the same period. The turning point for the USA capital was the Green 
Revolution of mid-60s by which the USA emerged as the most powerful component of 
foreign capital. The US capital’s proportion increased in the successive years through joint 
ventures established with the Indian capitalists. Berberoglu claims that as a result of these 
developments the US capital had a dominant and controlling power on the ‘commanding 
heights’ of the Indian economy.821   
 
In this field of competition the USA enjoyed its superpower position that enabled her to 
activate certain mechanisms more efficiently. Foreign aid and funds of the international 
agencies were top among these mechanisms. In order to enable the efficient functioning of 
these mechanisms for the interests of foreign capital, particularly American capital, the USA 
did not miss any opportunity. Examination of the process reveals an increasing vulnerability 
of India vis-à-vis the concession sort of demands of the center countries owing to the 
narrowing vicious circle that she felt in the midst of her economy’s structural problems. 
 
Before examining the interaction between India’s responsiveness to the demands of the center 
countries and economic crisis mainly aroused due to her economic structural problems, it is 
appropriate to refer to another confrontation between the center countries and the peripheral 
country regarding the other facet of foreign capital. While investments of foreign capitalists 
comprised one facet, the other was the foreign trade.  
 
The import-substitution industrialization of India, like many other developing countries of the 
era, was at odds with the center countries ultimate objective of multilateral trade which 
                                                 
821Berberoglu, “Class, State and Development in India in Historical Perspective” in Berberoglu, ed. Class, State 
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enabled the flow of goods free from restrictive policies.  The ISI was a common policy nearly 
in all LDCs as they all suffered from a main problem, namely low capital accumulation. The 
inadequacy of capital accumulation vis-à-vis the development objectives led the Indian 
policymakers to adopt import substitution. Through analyzing the unfavorable position of 
agricultural goods which comprised the majority of India’s export items vis-à-vis the 
industrial goods in the world market, the Indian policymakers concluded that by the 
exportation of traditional agricultural products such as jute, tea, and cotton textiles India could 
never manage to attain the envisioned big push. Sharing an export pessimism that resulted in 
neglect of exports, they decided that adopting the policy to save available foreign exchange 
would be more realistic in the Indian context.822This policy also fitted well to the expectations 
of the Indian capitalists who identified Independence as the exploitation of resources, as well 
as domestic market, by the nationalist capitalists.         
 
As ISI challenged one of the main premises of the capitalist system, namely multilateral trade, 
the US-led center countries opposed to its adoption by the LDCs.  The PT 4 program 
developed for the LDCs of Asia was aimed not only at development but, as stated by the US 
spokesmen, to fight all sorts of quotas that restricted free flow of goods. In the 1949 Indian-
American Technical Agreement the US administration expressed one of its objectives from 
the program as to fight  "import and export quotas of the Indian government.” The sensitivity 
of the center countries on the issue revealed itself from all the adjustment programs of the 
IMF as well “conditionalities” of the World Bank. One of the basic measures in these was the 
slow-down of import substitution.823 
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Examination of the process reveal that though the center countries expressed their 
disagreement with the ISI at every possible platform, their pressure regarding the issue 
intensified at the time of economic crises. In fact this was the unchanged strategy of the center 
countries on each confrontation.  The US administration claimed the necessity of change in 
the locomotive sector from industry to agriculture in the initial years. This was justified by the 
comparative advantage principle and rational usage of the available resources. The tone of the 
center countries became harsher parallel to India’s increased dependency on them in the midst 
of economic crises and severe foreign exchange shortages in 1958, 1964 and 1966. The heavy 
industrialization became the scapegoat that was defined as being responsible for the economic 
recession. 824  
 
Critics of this policy accused the Indian policymakers because of their neglect of agriculture 
in favor of industrialization.  On this issue, the mid-60s was the turning point as the center 
countries and their agencies preconditioned the foreign aid to the shift in the locomotive 
sector to a great extent. This demand was raised at one of the most vulnerable times of the 
country when it necessitated 1.6 billion USD per year for the implementation of the fourth 5 
Year Plan. While interpreting the failure of agricultural development policies with respect to 
the resistance of the rural elite, as donors of the Plan the center countries proposed adoption of 
modern inputs in agriculture, which as a policy served the attainment of food sufficiency, on 
the one hand, and did not challenge the interests of the rural elite.  This was also the policy 
that led to a new form of dependency on center countries due to the requirement of huge 
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amounts of imports, covering items such as high yielding seeds, chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides.825  
 
Concerns regarding the liberalization of foreign trade had the same fluctuating course. Their 
demands turned to be pressures during time of crisis by the justification that India’s problem 
was controls in foreign trade as well as uncompetitiveness of her exported goods. Related to 
this, in every structural adjustment program of the IMF and conditionalities of the WB center 
countries exerted pressure for devaluation of rupee on grounds that by such a devaluation 
Indian export goods became more competitive in the world market.826  
 
There were two devaluations in the period under study. First was in 1949, which was taken 
under the British influence as a part of the Commonwealth. The second was in 1966 when 
India faced the most important economic crisis after Independence, distinguished by the 
severest foreign exchange shortage and followed by economic recession. In addition to the 
natural disasters such as successive droughts, what aggravated the situation was the 
suspension of US aid during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. Under these circumstances the 
Indian government appealed to the center countries for foreign aid. Though in principle the 
countries did not have any objections, they conditioned the foreign aid to devaluation of 
rupee.  In June 1966 India devalued the rupee by 36.5 %.827  
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Among the confronted issues between the center and the periphery the stance of the 
superpower differed in dealing with the dichotomy between public and private sector. Until 
1959 the center countries frequently expressed their discontent with the expansion of the 
public sector in India. This expansion was more alarming in the Cold War context when 
Nehru defined expansion of the public sector as the ultimate means to attain a socialist social 
order in India. Regarding this expansion highly ideological, the center countries used every 
opportunity to express their disagreement with the Nehruvian ideal. They condemned the 
development plans as they endowed the public sector with the quality of being the 
locomotive.  In contrast to Indian policymakers appraisal of the public sector, the US 
administration defined the public sector as an impeding factor for economic development due 
to its inefficiency. Accordingly, they earmarked the foreign aid to the private sector.  During 
the foreign aid negotiations in September 1957 the US administration explicitly announced 
that the US had no economic aid for state-owned industrial and mining enterprises except in 
rare cases.828 
 
Yet an important shift occurred in 1959 when the US administration redefined the priorities in 
the foreign aid policy of the USA.  This indicated a shift from military to development 
priorities justified by the rationale that unless the USA filled the gap, the vacuum would be 
filled by the USSR. India stood as a peculiar case in this redefinition due to the striking 
achievements of China in economic development in contrast to the India’s increased 
economic problems.  As the USA considered India as a countervailing model in Asia, these 
increased problems challenged the basis of this formula. The theoretical basis of this 
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redefinition was provided by the economic thought of Rostow and Max Millikan, which also 
shed light on the evolving stance of the US on some basic issues.829  
 
In contrast to the early 50s when the economic thought of Rostow and Max Millikan was 
undermined by the US administration, in late 50s it was widely accepted by it. Developed as 
an international version of trickle down, Rostow-Millikan supported a diffusionist model for 
the Third World. In this scheme, Rostow endowed a special status for India, as it could be the 
best testing area for these principles. The comparative advantage of the country in this respect 
was its abundant natural resources, democratic system and political stability, despite all 
divergences. Attainment of successful outcomes regarding economic growth would make 
India a perfect non-Communists diffusionist model.830 In the Cold War context this was 
crucial as the increasing number of people in Asia, referring to the successes of the USSR and 
China, began to identify totalitarian regimes with welfare.  
 
The Rostowian thought also had some components that led to a moderation in the USA’s 
stance on various issues. In his definition of the public sector as the main preparatory factor 
for an environment for private sector, Rostow underlined the necessity of considering the 
local context. In this claim, Rostow did not assign priority to the public sector.  Instead it 
acted as a preparatory factor for the empowerment of the locomotive sector, namely the 
private sector. What he suggested was to take the initiative to support the public sector, which 
was otherwise funded by the “communist” bloc. While justifying aid to the public sector on 
this ground, Rostow also pointed out the private sector’s role in the foreign exchange crisis of 
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India. In order to enable an appropriate environment for the private sector that could enable it 
to lead the country to the take off stage, Rostow proposed filling the gap in foreign exchange 
reserves by providing funds.831  
 
As Rostow presented his model as a non-Communist Manifesto for economic development, 
he suggested a strategy to counterattack the Soviet strategy, which increased its credibility for 
the LDCs. Consistent with this model, the US began to allocate funds to the large-scale 
industrial infrastructure projects in India. The criterion in this was to support activities and 
units that served the empowerment of the private sector to fulfill its mission of being the 
locomotive sector.  The criterion of allocating funds to the public sector was whether it led to 
the empowerment of the private sector or not.832  
 
Parallel to this, the USA continued to allocate funds to mechanisms that served the 
reinforcement of the private sector such as establishment of the Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation of India in 1957. Modeled after the American Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation to channel loans to medium-sized private industries, this was a famous 
organization that channelized considerable amount of funds to Indian private industrial 
establishments. Besides, it used every means to create an appropriate environment for both 
indigenous and foreign private capital as revealed during the country negotiations for funds.833   
 
The most important impact of the Rostowian economic thought on the Indian policymakers 
was while leaving the redistributive justice rhetoric, they adopted the trickle down principle 
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on grounds that this led to the diffusion of wealth among the population. Though in the face 
of the danger of radicalization of the mass, Gandhi adopted a radical rhetoric emphasizing 
social justice, the political elite continued to shape their policies by the principle of trickle 
down. As Merill points out, both the American and Indian policymakers assumed that by 
shaping the development policies by this principle along with injecting few hundred millions 
dollars aid and technical expertise the envisioned development level would be attained and 
India would become a shining star for the Asian countries while counterbalancing the 
Communist China.834   
 
The honeymoon between the USA and India did not last long as revealed from the conditions 
of the aid allocations. The superpower never left the strategy to exert pressures on the 
peripheral country during economic crises. Besides, depending on the conjuncturel 
developments such as Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, it suspended or delayed aid allocations to 
India. This policy line of the USA also indicated the degree of the US administration’s 
devotion to the Rostowian economic thought. In contrast to the main premise of the 
Rostowian thought regarding timely injection of foreign capital, the US administration 
preferred to use the aid policy as a bargaining means. Analysis of the interaction from the 
perspective of donor-debtor reveals the frequent ups and downs depending on the 
confrontations on either diplomatic or economic issues. 
 
Responsiveness of Indian Policymakers: 
The important dimension in these confrontations was the degree of India’s responsiveness to 
the pressures and demands of the center countries and international fund agencies. 
Examination of the process shed light on the fact that India’s responsiveness to the demands 
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of the center countries increased in the midst-of economic crises. In other words, the center 
countries attained concrete results for their suggestions at the time of the weakest economic 
situation of the less developed country. In this respect it can be concluded that prevalence of 
the chronic structural problems was a necessary evil for the center countries. It was during 
these vulnerable times that the policy makers could be circumscribed by the center. Yet to 
allege that there was a total submission would be misleading as seen in the Indian case. When 
the policymakers faced criticisms of the ruling elite components, as well as an aggravation of 
problems, they withdrew these policies.   
 
The Indian policymakers faced criticisms regarding the locomotive sector of the development 
process from the very beginning.  Benefiting from the Soviet concerns related to the country’s 
development strategy, Indian policymakers undermined suggestions regarding a shift in the 
locomotive sector even when they faced the charge that the heavy industrialization was 
responsible for the low performance in economic development plans. Though they did not 
shift the locomotive sector, under the impact of the foreign exchange crisis of 1958 and the 
subsequent pressure from the World Bank, the proportion of the allocation for industry 
reduced in favor of agriculture. In contrast to the 19 % allocated for agriculture, community 
development and irrigation in the Second Plan, there was an increase in this figure, 23 %, in 
the Third Plan.835  
 
Indifference of the Indian political elite to these recommendations lasted until mid-60s when 
they agreed on more allocations to agriculture. Yet to interpret this agreement as stemming 
from the recommendations of the center countries would be inaccurate. The successive 
droughts, severe food constraints, abject poverty that hit the rural areas, country’s increasing 
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dependence on foreign countries on foodgrains importation, huge allocations for this 
importation as well as widespread humiliation of the Indian people due to this dependency   
were the main internal factors that led to this agreement. The impact of the center countries in 
this process was their lobbying for the so-called Green Revolution in India as a solution to 
attain self-sufficiency in foodgrains. The political elite welcomed this strategy, as it 
necessitated no arrangements that would raise the anxiety of the rural elite about their 
landholdings. In contrast, this new strategy created a favorable environment for them to 
reinforce their position through credits, subsidies and inputs. This was a strategy that stood as 
an example of the center country’s favoring of a component in the ruling elite coalition of the 
periphery. Commencing by this strategy, the commercialized farmers reinforced their position 
in the system, particularly in the resource allocation.  
 
An irony of this strategy, on the other hand, reflected that benefit of the center countries was 
at odds with that of the periphery. The Ford Foundation justified the strategy on grounds that 
India attained self-sufficiency in foodgrains. Leaving the relatively low level of increase in 
agricultural production aside, the so-called Green Revolution established a dependency link 
on the center countries in the modern inputs including pesticides, high variety seeds and 
fertilizers. This made Indian agriculture more vulnerable to the developments in the world 
economy. As Sau and Swamy point out, forces of the Green Revolution exhausted in a few 
years as the success of this policy depended on liberal imports of these modern inputs. When 
foreign aid was dried up in 1968-69 the regional spread of the new agricultural technology 
was halted and growth of foodgrains production reduced. Besides, its economic burden 
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increased immensely parallel to the radical rise in oil prices by 1973, which affected the 
prices of these inputs negatively.836               
 
Parallel to this policy recommendation, the Indian policymakers also faced constant criticisms 
regarding the expansion of the public sector. Until early 60s the USA was firm about not 
earmarking aid allocations to the public enterprises with the exception of infrastructure. When 
India appealed to the center countries for foreign aid in 1957, the US authorities informed 
them that allocations could not be earmarked to the public sector. Indian policymakers 
protested this policy suggestion of the USA and regarded it as a direct rebuff to India as the 
state-owed industrial production was the field precisely where aid was desired. India had a 
similar reaction when the WB asked for more incentives for the private capital.837 
 
Since the private sector was accepted as the impetus in the capitalist economic systems, 
enhancement of the private sector in the aid recipient countries through foreign aid strategy 
was among the ultimate objectives of donors. Yet this objective aimed at the enhancement of 
not only the indigenous but also foreign private capital. Priority of the latter was evident from 
the center countries’ objection to import substitution as it assured a protective market to the 
indigenous capitalists at the expense of the foreign private capital. The confrontation on 
foreign private capital and other related issues such as liberalization of foreign trade 
comprised an interesting episode between the center and the peripheral country.  
 
Sensitivity of the Indian leaders on the issue of foreign capital was revealed during the 
national movement. The leaders identified Independence as a turning point that would end the 
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drain of resources by foreign capitalists.  Until early 50s the Indian policymakers adopted a 
moderate tone regarding the foreign private capital. PM Nehru underlined that foreign firms 
should not expect ‘national treatment’ which meant equal privileges recognized to local firms. 
In addition to this, arrangements were made to prevent foreign control of any major sector in 
Indian industry. This moderate tone of the Indian policymakers was reflected in the Industrial 
Resolution of 1948. Though the foreign capital was regarded as a necessity for the rapid 
industrialization of the country, the government brought the obligation that every proposal for 
new enterprises that involved foreign capital and management would have to be scrutinized 
and approved by the central government. In the same period the Indian policymakers did not 
show interest in the American diplomats search for certain guarantees for foreign private 
capital.  In expressing their reluctance, the Indian policymakers mentioned that they preferred 
to seek foreign loans instead of foreign capital.838 
 
Yet as the course of events revealed this was a short-lived policy that was replaced by pro-
foreign capital policy. The sudden shift to a pro-foreign capital policy could be explained by 
the distinguished deficiency of the LDCs, namely low domestic savings. By the time of this 
statement, India faced a serious foreign exchange crisis. What aggravated the problem was the 
obligation to make huge amounts of foodgrains importation. In one of his pro-foreign capital 
statements Nehru referred to this deficiency and justified the necessity of foreign capital by its 
capital and technological superiority. By the recent decision of the GOI the foreign firms were 
allowed to earn and repatriate profits and be subject only to the same restrictions as Indian 
firms. Besides they would be subject to control only for a limited period. It was in the same 
period that Nehru mentioned about the “remote event of nationalization of certain industries" 
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to stop the anxieties of the foreign capitalists.839 Following this date, although there were 
some attempts to increase restrictions on the foreign private capital until late 60s, these were 
short-lived as India faced same sort of economic problems.   
 
The most challenging of these restrictive policies was the one in late 60s. In contrast to the 
expectations that the foreign capital would close the gap, due to high amount of remittances of 
dividends, profits, royalties and technical fees the foreign capital investments began to extract 
more foreign exchange than it brought to the country. This caused a serious drain in the 
investable resources of the country. Diagnosing this, GOI streamlined the procedure for 
foreign collaboration approvals and adopted a more restrictive policy covering limitation on 
the duration of licenses, exclusive use of the Indian technical expertise when available and 
high technology transfer. As the short-lived practice revealed, these precautions did not 
challenge the institutionalized interests of the foreign capitalists. So, in few years time the 
GOI abandoned these restrictions and adopted a liberal policy.840      
 
Parallel to the increased dependency of the country on center countries to finance the 
development plans, the GOI intensified its endeavors to attract foreign private capital. Under 
these circumstances the foreign capital began to be thought as a means to close the foreign 
exchange gap and led to adequate savings which could be earmarked for industrial 
development. As persuasion, the GOI widened the scope of incentives covering tax 
exemptions, concessions, full freedom for the repatriation not only of profits but also of the 
principal of foreign capital. In leading center countries the GOI set up the Indian Investment 
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Center Offices in 1961 to promote foreign investments in India. As revealed in statistics, the 
foreign capital was responsive to these endeavors. The proportion of foreign capital invested 
in India increased by time.841         
 
The apparent feature of the center on this issue was its demand for more concessions and its 
trying its best to get the most advantageous concessions for foreign private capital. Similar to 
other confrontations, timing of these demands concluded with the most vulnerable times for 
the peripheral country.  During the negotiations for foreign aid in the midst of the foreign 
exchange crisis of 1958, the Indian government had to abandon the 51 % rule that assured 
Indian ownership in joint ventures, accept new tax concessions and establishment of foreign 
capital dominating joint ventures, permitted a permanent World Bank Mission in New Delhi 
in addition to the convertibility agreement with the USA providing for payment of profits in 
dollars. It also removed restrictions on some of the most profitable industries originally 
reserved for the State and enabled foreign capital’s activity in these industries including 
drugs, aluminum, heavy electrical equipment, fertilizers and synthetic rubber.842  
 
While these were arrangements for an appropriate environment for investment, the other 
dimension related to the foreign capital was the liberalization of foreign trade for the creation 
of an appropriate environment for open trade. While the center countries criticized ISI as this 
impeded multilateral trade, the periphery regarded it as a security valve that prevented the 
country’s becoming an open market for foreign capitalists.  As Payer points out, until the first 
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foreign exchange crisis of late 50s, which indicated the wiping out of the available foreign 
exchange resources, the Indian policymakers paid very little attention to the saving of 
available resources. Though the system was import substitution industrialization, as a result of 
the GOI’s liberal policy in granting licenses the system was not able to save the savings. 
Instead it assured a protected domestic market to Indian capitalists.843  
 
Despite the center countries’ call for liberalization of foreign trade, the GOI never abandoned 
ISI until early 80s. The exception for the period under study was the short-lived liberalization 
at the time of 1966 devaluation to assure foreign aid from the center countries. Gandhi 
publicly supported this on grounds that liberalization of foreign trade led to the promotion of 
economic growth in the private sector. When the liberalized import system led to a rapid 
depletion of resources and aggravated the balance of payments problems the GOI abandoned 
it.844  
 
In addition to the aggravation of balance payments an important determinant effective on the 
decision was the discontent and pressure of the Indian industrial capitalists who enjoyed a 
protected domestic market. Reaction and pressure of the Indian industrialists was important 
and indicative of their position vis-à-vis the center countries. It implied that center countries’ 
demands could be undermined when it challenged the interests of the components in the 
ruling elite who were integrated to the world economy more than the others. The foreign 
private capital and demands for an appropriate environment for its activities such as 
liberalization of foreign trade, establishment of joint ventures, increase of incentives and ISI 
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were crucial in that respect as they were the issues on which the interests of the center and the 
indigenous industrial capitalists were sometimes at odds and sometimes in full conformity.  
 
Center countries endeavors for liberalization of foreign trade regime were challenged by the 
indigenous capitalists. The latter’s challenge was crucial as it led to the undermining of the 
concerns of the center countries to a great extents. On the other hand, there were various 
issues on which the indigenous and foreign capitalists were in full conformity such as 
expansion of incentives such as tax concessions, subsidized inputs as well as exerted pressure 
for the creation of an appropriate environment for the private capital. Issues of conformity 
were, in fact, invalidated the fears of the indigenous capital, which they initially expressed. 
Both Nayar and Tomlinson point out the protests of Indian capitalists at the removal of 
restrictive measures regarding foreign capital.845 Despite this initial protest, the process 
proved their ability to create a synergy on common grounds for their own interests.  
     
Ability of the foreign and indigenous capitalists to create synergy through establishing joint 
ventures as well as empowerment by the same expanded incentives had a very important 
strategic consequence with respect to the center- periphery dichotomy. Critics of foreign 
capital point out how successfully the foreign capital distorted the priorities of the Indian 
industrialization drive to a great extent. The GOI in the midst of foreign exchange crisis had 
to accept the conditions of the foreign capital and focused on industries that the foreign capital 
preferred to finance. In general they preferred consumer goods industries which ensured quick 
and high returns.846  
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As partners of the foreign capitalists in many industrial establishments, the Indian monopoly 
capitalists also served this end. Disregarding the idea of self-reliance and genuine 
industrialization, the Indian industrialists earmarked the resources to consumer goods which 
lacked any real productive value. In the memo submitted to the government during the 
preparation of Second Five Year Plan, similar to the center countries, the Indian monopoly 
capitalists criticized the Plan on grounds that  it was overambitious. Instead of heavy 
industrialization drive, they demanded to make consumer goods industry as the locomotive of 
the economy along with agriculture.847 
 
Acting by these priorities capitalists of the center countries as well as indigenous capital led to 
the establishment of pseudo-industrialization in India. This meant that, in the process, the type 
of the imported goods changed without reducing India’s dependence on imports. In contrast to 
the expectations, India’s dependency on imports increased considerably. This was an outcome 
related to the indigenous capitalists’ lack of vision and innovative thinking and revealed itself 
in the nature of the ISI. Sethi categorizes Indian ISI as “imported” import substitution which 
was “dependence on imported technologies almost totally and repeatedly, instead of 
accompanying imports by its indigenisation, adaptation, modernization and after a while, its 
complete replacement through domestic Research and Development.” 848  
 
The degree of influence that Indian industrialists enjoyed on the political elite about the 
continuation of protective foreign trade regime became more apparent by a development in 
mid-60s. This important development with respect to the foreign trade was due to the internal 
dynamics more than the pressure of the center countries. Until mid-60s Indian policymakers 
were insistent on ISI while neglecting exportation. The latter was mainly due to their export 
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pessimism. Yet they had to leave their pessimism under the existing circumstances in the 
country. In mid-60s the Indian industrialists faced the problem of stalemate in the protected 
domestic market that they enjoyed under ISI. This stalemate was not something conjuncturel 
but was due to the failure of the assumed trickle down of the wealth. As the majority lacked 
purchasing power to a great extent, they did not create a demand for products849as well as they 
lacking a consumerist pattern of behavior. This led to another important development in the 
periphery, namely India’s attempt to peripherize its neighbors through foreign aid. This was 
regarded as the fundamental policy to find markets for the Indian goods. The Indian 
policymakers adopted export promotion policy as the means to this end and the indigenous 
industrial capitalists were the main impetus in this new policy line.850 
 
In sum, confrontation of the USA and India on economic issues was shaped mainly by the 
center-periphery dichotomy and had a repetitive course as the structural problems of the 
Indian economy prevailed. Foreign exchange crisis and increased dependency on the center 
countries enabled the center countries and agencies of the capitalist world to exert pressure on 
the peripheral country for its strategic concerns including liberalization of foreign trade, 
creation of an appropriate environment for private capital, both indigenous and foreign, as 
well as the shift in the locomotive sector of the economy from industry to agriculture.  
 
The last concern of the center countries relied on the comparative advantage principle.  India 
with its vast lands and variety of crops was advantageous in agriculture if she successfully 
applied modern technologies in rural India to increase agricultural productivity. In this 
context, the scope of industrial sector was limited to consumer goods sector. While criticizing 
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heavy industrialization drive as being responsible for the widening gap in the balance of 
payments, center countries recommended intensive agricultural activities. Yet, the irony of the 
latter policy was that it increased the dependency of India on the center countries as well as 
making the Indian agriculture more vulnerable to fluctuations in the world economy. Besides, 
this strategy, while making India a market for modern agricultural inputs, excluded majority 
of the rural population.  
 
Recommendations regarding liberalization of foreign trade reflected the center’s strategic and 
ideological concerns since protective economic systems impeded attainment of multilateral 
trade which was regarded as the main premise of the capitalist economy.  The pro-private 
capital stance had the same notions, but it became more important due to the ideological 
connotations related to it in the Cold War context. Another demand, the devaluation of the 
currency was justified by the center as a policy that made the country’s exported goods more 
competitive in the world market.        
 
Political elite of the periphery, on the other hand,  was reactive to these demands on grounds 
that they were against the country’s interests. Though the political elite was mostly firm on 
these confronted issues, the narrowing vicious circle compelled the country to be responsive 
to the demands of the center countries.  Yet this responsiveness was not the byproduct of the 
pressures of the center countries; instead it was a byproduct of the interplay of various 
dynamics including natural phenomenon, and wide discontent of the mass due to prevailing 
conditions. Its responsiveness in many cases did not cover the expectations of the center. Or, 
in cases when it covered all aspects, the periphery acted pragmatically and following the 
receipt of foreign aid, withdrew the policy. The apparent tendency of the center on these 
issues was that while it was firm on promoting an appropriate environment for the private 
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capital and  activated mechanisms to institutionalize the interests of the foreign capital,  it had 
a relaxed attitude regarding the ISI  or the expansion of public sector as the system functioned 
in a manner of paving the way to the foreign private capital  through  partnerships and joint 
ventures to enjoy itself in the Indian market.   
 
An important fact was that political elite was not the sole determinant in this interaction. 
Aware of this, the center successfully manipulated the concerns of different components in 
the periphery. In its lobbying for the Green Revolution of mid-60s it acted as a mouthpiece of 
capitalist farmers in demanding incentives for their activities. As these incentives had 
inflationary effects, the center created a common ground for its and other component’s 
interests at the expense of the mass. Other component that created synergy with the center 
was the Indian monopolist capital. Enjoying the favorable environment the indigenous capital 
undermined the long-term development objectives of the country by focusing on consumer 
goods industrial sector due to its quick and high margin profits. Both the foreign and domestic 
capital assumed that through these consumer goods industries they promoted consumerist 
pattern of behavior among Indians.  
 
Unattainment of this objective was regarded as the failure of the development programs which 
were to function by the trickle down principle. At that juncture  Indian industrial capital drove 
the center of the periphery to another peripherization in its vicinity by relying on the same 
basic  means of the center countries, namely foreign aid.  
 
In shaping the post-WW2 era the main strategy of the superpower was foreign aid. Through 
this the US administration appealed to the basic deficiency of the LDCs, namely low domestic 
 452
savings. Justified foreign aid as an important factor for undertaking of development plans, the 
USA allocated aid resources mainly to the private sector, infrastructure and agricultural 
development. Though the US administration accepted the necessity of timely flow of  foreign 
aid it was not the case for India. There were various ups and downs in the foreign aid of the 
USA, which became more meaningful in the Cold War context. These ups and downs were 
crucial with respect to the confrontation of the superpower and the peripheral country on 
diplomacy, which is the concern of following section. 
 
b. The USA-India Confrontations on Diplomatic Issues 
In the official papers of the USA India’s importance was defined with respect to geopolitics, 
population and natural resources. India, which was the backbone of the  British colonial 
system for two centuries, preserved its attractiveness in the post-WW2 era owing to its 
immense amount of natural resources including strategic materials such as mica, graphite, 
jute, kyanite, shellac, beryl and monazite derivatives, manganese ore, all of which were most 
useful in the defense industry of the USA,851cheap and abundant labor force, strategic location 
and huge market potentials. The Cold War context, however, augmented this attractiveness as 
in the polarized world order neither of the blocs wanted to lose the strategically important 
India.     
 
Emergence of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 increased the strategic importance of 
India. Alarmed by this development, the US administration began to consider India as an 
alternative model for the Asian people with its democratic system.  After this emergence, the 
American officials defined the South Asia, particularly India, as a major battleground in the 
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Cold War as the leaders endeavored to satisfy the minimum basic needs within a democratic 
framework. The other dimension of this attractiveness was related to India’s being one of the 
richest countries in the world with respect to strategic materials to which the superpower’s 
need had increased. Referring to this, the US administration concluded that India was not a 
poor country but a country with poor people. For the “free world”, loss of India to the other 
bloc meant control of these strategic materials as well as half of the world’s population by the 
socialist bloc. In addition to these, the US administration had the anxiety that India’s loss to 
the other bloc might lead to serial of loses due to Indian leadership’s influence on the 
neighboring countries. Though it was a distant possibility, the US administration mentioned 
the possibility of India-led militant anti-white and anti-western ”crusade” in Asia. 852  
 
Parallel to these attractive aspects, there were other dynamics which could challenge the 
interests of the Western world in the medium- and long-run. The nationalist feelings shaped 
by anti-colonialism, the widespread poverty and growing communist tide in the country was 
top among these dynamics.  In expressing their anxiety the US administration referred 
particularly to anti-colonialism and widespread poverty. Regarding anti-colonialism, the US 
administration mentioned the possibility, though distant at that moment, that India might lead 
the Asian people into a militant anti-white and anti-western ”crusade.” The widespread 
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poverty, on the other hand, prepared an appropriate environment for ‘stomach communism’. It 
was more alarming in the Asian context due to the so-called ‘social revolution’ in Asia. In this 
respect India had a peculiar condition. The rural mass was highly mobilized owing to the 
‘promised land’ concept that was propogated by the national leaders during the National 
Movement.853 
 
Shaped by these considerations, the USA defined its inevitable task in the South Asia as 
taking the initiative in building a new order and stability in Asia, which was firmly oriented 
towards the West. This was an inevitable task for a country that was the leader of the free 
world. “Inevitability” of the task was explained with respect to the vulnerability of these 
newly freed countries, which were close to Western ideals, to the Soviet expansionism. To 
succeed in this inevitable task, the USA administration defined India as its fortress among the 
Asian countries. The main assumption beneath this was that the involvement of India with the 
“free world” bloc would lead to a positive impact on the other Asian countries to follow a pro-
“free world” policy line.854 
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By undermining the dynamics in India, the US administration presented this strategy as if 
India was in full conformity with the USA. Main rationale behind this approach was India’s 
acknowledgment with the Western political system as well as Indian leaders adherence to the 
democratic order.  Therefore, they assumed that India had no other options than that of 
participation in the US-led ‘free world’ bloc. This assumption was, however, invalidated by 
India’s adoption of non-alignment as her foreign policy.  
 
The Western countries while defining non-alignment as amoral, immoral, obsolete, 
shortsighted, inconsistent to the day’s realities and as a reflection of psychosis, blamed Nehru, 
the arch-architect of the non-alignment policy, as a political saboteur and a ‘spoiled child’ 
who could not understand the dynamics in the Cold War context.855  
 
These statements of the US Administration were, however, made at public to undermine the 
cause of non-alignment. As revealed in the official documents, for the US administration the 
main motive behind non-alignment was centuries-long anti-colonial feelings. As the leading 
figure, Nehru aimed to create a third force in the international politics by increasing the status 
of the newly independent LDCs.856 When these circles analyzed the non-alignment as the 
repudiation of the established power politics857 they, in fact, referred to the core of the issue, 
namely India‘s objective of becoming the center in the periphery. This challenging policy was 
shaped, in fact, mainly by the Indian policymakers’ belief in India’s differentiated status 
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among the newly independent countries by its industrial establishments as well as India’s high 
potential to become an advanced country owing to this differentiated feature. The challenging 
economic premise of the non-alignment is analyzed below with respect to India’s relation 
with the non-aligned countries.    
 
Facing these humiliating statements regarding non-alignment, Nehru defended the policy on 
various grounds including security, political independence as well as economic advantages. 
Nehru stated that non-alignment ensured India’s security as it rejected to establish military 
alliances with any of the countries. Non-alignment was also the security valve of political 
independence with respect to domestic and foreign affairs as it enabled the country to support 
what she believed in related to any peculiar policy since the country did not belong to any 
blocs. Instead she sought cooperation with all countries. Regarding the economic advantages, 
Nehru had the overoptimism that keeping the country away from blocs would enable her to 
benefit from the economic and technical aid programs of two blocs.858  
 
Rejecting the claim that he was a saboteur of the peace and security of the free world, Nehru 
supported the view that the greatest contribution to world peace and stability was rejection of 
membership in power blocs. He underlined that this rejection did not mean the non-aligned 
countries’ being neutral on world events. On the contrary, by their larger scope of freedom 
they could judge the events and be a substantial party by this unbiased judgment. An 
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important aspect of Nehru’s non-alignment was its pro-Asian feature, which led to a total 
adverse interpretation of the role of India in Asian and world politics. In contrast to the 
Western center countries’ formulation of China versus India in Asia, Indian policymakers 
formulated the power balance in Asia as India and China vis-à-vis superpowers.859This total 
difference regarding India’s role in South Asia and relations with China led to the immediate 
confrontation of the superpower and India. Ironically it was again China that shattered the 
main premises of India’s non-alignment policy in early 60s and compelled the Indian 
policymakers to redefine the policy lines. 
 
I. First Confrontation: Communist China 
The China episode in the interaction of the USA and India, which commenced by Communist 
China’s recognition by India in 1949, represented both confrontation and consensus between 
the USA and India. While India’s tense conformity with China until early 60s led to a 
confrontation between the USA and India, the confrontation of two Asian powers served the 
collaboration of the USA and India after this date. This lasted until early 70s when the US 
administration announced the USA-China dealings. Consensus of these two compelled India 
to enter into an open alliance with the USSR. Therefore, to conclude that China represented a 
milestone in the USA-India diplomatic interaction as well as in the non-alignment rhetoric 
would not be misleading.  
 
The US administration was alarmed by the emergence of People’s Republic of China on 
October 1, 1949. According to the US policymakers, this emergence proved their thesis 
regarding expansionism of the communism as well as free world’s obligation to meet this 
expansion by the containment policy.  In their call for countries to participate in the USA led 
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containment policy against Chinese  Communism, India was the focal point for the US 
policymakers to undermine China’s attractiveness for the majority of the people in Asia. In 
case that India attained a high level of development by its democratic system she would fill 
the power vacuum vis-à-vis the communist China.860  
India’s being among the first countries to recognize People’s Republic of China, on the other 
hand, disappointed the USA. Facing various criticisms, including being pro-communist, 
Nehru referred to the difference in interpretation. While rejecting China’s being an aggressive 
expansionist country, Nehru defined both the USSR and China as first nationalists, then 
communists. In contrast to the USA interpretation of Chinese revolution as evils of 
communist control, Nehru defined it as an agrarian revolution. By this rationale Nehru 
opposed the US policies regarding China on various grounds such as participation in a 
defense pact between India, Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan to countervail China’s 
expansionism, alternative suggestions for the development of olicies to improve the lots of the 
Asian people as well as the concept of ‘cautious friendship’ in dealing with communist 
countries. Regarding India’s role as a communicator between the Western world and China, 
Nehru lobbied for China’s membership to the UN despite USA’s opposition. In this lobbying 
Nehru referred to the quantitative representation of China. Its absence meant absence of 
nearly a quarter of the world in the UN.861  
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Various factors were at force in India’s recognition of Communist China only in two months 
in December 1949 such as his vision of powerful and influential Asia free from power politics 
under the leading position of India and China vis-à-vis superpowers and countries identified 
with colonialism,862 emotional commitment due to the colonial background863 and 
commitment to the joint declaration adopted between Indian and Chinese delegates during the 
1927 Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in Brussels which affirmed to revive the ancient 
ties between two countries and coordinate their freedom struggle to accelerate their path to 
victory.864   
    
Examination of China’s responsiveness to these endeavors, however, revealed that at least 
until the Korean War China was not responsive; on the contrary, Chinese policymakers 
adopted an aggressive policy line against independent India. When Nehru endeavored for 
China’s membership to the UN, the new administration of China intensified its humiliating 
tone against independent India. While Mao called Nehru an "imperialist dog", the Chinese 
Foreign Minister publicly stated that Communist China wanted to establish friendly relations 
with all the countries of the world, with the exception of India, which was a capitalist nation. 
They also denounced the Indian government as a ‘puppet’ regime under the dominance of 
imperialists. The level of this humiliation and aggressiveness was to such a degree that the 
Peking administration even declared India a base for counter-revolution in Asia and an 
obstacle to the national liberation movements of the Asian people.865The watershed that led 
China’s withdrawal of this aggressiveness was India’s stance during the Korean War. Thomas 
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also points out the Indian ambassador’s diplomatic efforts in Peking, which led a sort of 
rapprochement between China and India.866 
 
Commencing by the Korean War, the honeymoon between China and India lasted until early 
60s mainly due to India’s exceeding tolerance. But this period was also not free from 
tensions; instead there were some serious confrontations those paved the way for the break in 
relations in the sucessive years. When China occupied Tibet in early 50s, India protested this. 
While disregarding India’s protest as a foreign inspired one, China undermined any comment 
about its act since for the Chinese administration Tibet was a domestic issue.  Avoiding any 
direct confrontation on the issue, Indian policymakers continued to claim that Tibet was an 
autonomous region until the signing of the Pancsheel with China in which Tibet was defined 
as a region of China. In the following years, Nehru faced criticisms due to this passive policy. 
He rebuffed these criticisms on grounds that India had to act pragmatically in order to 
preserve the peace between China and India, which had long borders. He also referred to the 
possibility of Pakistan’s exploitation of such a tension between India and China.867  
 
Authorization of the Panchsheel, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence represented the 
heyday in Sino-Indian relations. In 1954 two countries agreed on the principles of peaceful 
coexistence, which comprised mutual respect for territorial integrity, non-aggression, 
noninterference in each others internal affairs, peaceful coexistence, equality and mutual 
benefit. For Nehru the Panchsheel was vital in international politics as it challenged the 
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destructive power of the atomic bomb,868which the majority of the Asian people identified the 
USA with. He also believed that this was an alternative to the hot and cold wars by its appeal 
to peace. In addition to these considerations regarding the Cold War, other consideration of 
India was related to China. PM Nehru thought that the Five Principles functioned as a means 
to measure and restrain China from adventures against India. In his Parliamentary statement 
he defined these Five Principles as the creation of conditions where the other party could not 
break its word.869   
   
Events following the Panchsheel proved that Nehru’s expectations regarding keeping China’s 
adventurous drive in foreign affairs under control by Panchsheel were baseless. In 1957 the 
Chinese administration recommenced its criticisms against India. This time the focus of the 
criticism was the national movement of India. China underlined the nature of the Indian 
national movement as a classical example of a bourgeoisie-nationalist movement. Then 
Chinese authorities blamed India for supporting anti-Chinese movements in Tibet through 
smuggling of arms and related supplies. When India gave political asylum to Dalai Lama,  the 
tone of hostility against India increased. Informed about the Chinese road construction 
activities in the Aksai Chin region of the Indo-China border, PM Nehru warned the nation that 
these small matters of debate hinted at bigger matters of the future. The tension between these 
two Asian countries emerged as vocal attack lasted until 1962. This year was crucial since 
China attacked India and commenced a short-lived war.870    
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China was the victor of this short-lived border war. This victory was not only with respect to 
military performance but also to China’s being the leading power, the mouthpiece of the 
Asian people. Without disregarding China’s aim to gain more lands in a strategic location of 
the  border,  it could easily be claimed that this attack was for the sake of  domination among 
the newly independent Third World countries. This was an episode in the Sino-Indian 
competition to be the center in the periphery. China’s grounds for justification confirmed the 
accuracy of this claim. Following the invasion of the border, China denied that this was an act 
of aggression or expansionism of China. Instead this was the self-defense of China against the 
ambitious and expansionist policy of Nehru.  Defining India as a country to preserve the 
interests of the colonial powers in Asia, Chinese administration referred to Indian ruling 
circles appeal to every means to interfere in the internal and external affairs of countries 
around India, to control their economy and trade as well as their demand of absolute 
obedience of these countries.  For the Chinese administration these were concrete proofs of 
India’s expansionist policy.871    
 
India, on the other hand, underwent a trauma, a national shock due to this war. This trauma 
was related to the ideological and psychological impact of the war more than the physical 
terms. This fact was reflected in the consensual view prevailing in India. Indians concluded 
that the war was not only an attack at India’s borders but at the Indian way of thinking and 
ideology. More than anybody else, Nehru was attacked due to this national humiliation. While 
one dimension of criticisms was related to the under-equipment and low performance of the 
army during the war as well as the policymakers’ undermining of the warnings of the army 
commanders, the other dimension was related to the non-alignment on grounds that it was 
utopian, excessively idealist and “ivory tower abstractionist”. Critics claimed that due to these 
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features, the foreign policy risked the vital interests of the country including national security. 
Nehru, rejecting any criticism regarding the overall concept and practice of non-alignment but 
accepted that he misread the relations with China and led India to live in “a fool’s paradise” as 
far as its China policy was concerned. He regretfully admitted that India was getting out of 
touch with reality in the modern world and lived in an artificial atmosphere of its own 
creation.  Nehru leamt that the reconciliation of different viewpoints and peaceful negotiation 
were sound principles, but in dealing with countries which profess friendship but have 
aggressive intentions, more than ordinary care was required in securing-the country's vital 
interests.872 
 
The border incidence with China was important as it compelled Nehru, who had a utopian 
interpretation of events, to face politic realities. In addition to personal learning during and 
after the attack, India made some modifications in her foreign policy as well as priorities. First 
of all after the Chinese humiliation India reformulated its defense strategy. In contrast to the 
past when the policymakers put high priority on development instead of defense, by this 
incidense the policymakers concluded that more allocations should be earmarked to defense 
by the objective of self-relaince in defense. The defense expenditure, mostly in foreign 
currency, had augmented from Rs 1,683 million in 1950-1 to Rs 9680 million in 1967-68.873                   
 
Besides, the Chinese border incidence of 1962 indicated the commence of military aid from 
the center countries whose response was swift and instant during the events. By the 
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humiliating outcome of these events, there was an increased domestic demand for military aid 
from any country without hampering India’s independence. The Indian administration signed 
a military agreement of 129 million USD in December 1963. In 1964 the Indian 
administration appealed to the USA for its five- year defense plan the implementation of 
which required at least 95 million USD annual military aid. The US administration faced a 
dilemma on this issue. On the one hand, it believed in the importance of a powerful Indian 
defense as it had 2500 km of border with expansionist China. On the other hand, it was 
hesitant to approve this aid package due to Pakistan as the USA did not want to endanger the 
“vitally important” Peshawar military base in Pakistan. Referring to this, the US officials 
asked India to have some concessions in the Kashmir problem. As Pakistan extended its open 
support to China during 1962 events at that juncture it was impossible for India to accept such 
a proposal.  Despite this refusal and opposition of the Defense Secretary and Secretary of 
State, Kennedy supported the military package to be given to India. However as he was 
assassinated in four days time before authorizing its delivery, this package was not realized. 
Facing this, India appealed to the USSR and received what she asked for.874    
 
This episode between the center countries and India was crucial as India faced the limitations 
shaped by the Cold War setting as well as strategic considerations of the center. First of all the 
center countries were unwilling to supply India with sophisticated arms, though they 
continued to supply such weapons to Pakistan. Yet, even the supply of these arms did not lead 
Pakistan to be self-sufficient in defense as it lacked the ability to produce these arms. 
Received them in the military aid packages Pakistan also faced serious limitations. In 
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addition, India faced with the fact that the US suspended its supply at the most crucial times. 
Moving from these, India concluded that the superpower of the capitalist center did in no way 
assist India in its efforts to acquire a position of self-reliance in the field of defense or any 
other one. Its anti-Indian role at the time of the Bangladesh War of 1971 further estranged the 
two.875  
 
This new dimension in the US-India relation also led to a serious questioning of the non-
alignment and the assumed leading role that India endowed itself with among the non-aligned 
countries. Even though some argued that this aid was a departure from non-alignment as 
Nehru defined non-alignment as avoidance of military alliance with any country, the Indian 
policymakers neglected this argument on grounds that the conjuncture necessitated dynamic 
interpretation of non-alignment. In addition, they pointed out that India was firm upon the 
principle of not giving military bases to any country. Despite this interpretation of the Indian 
policymakers, an undeniable fact was the serious hindarence  of India’s position in the non-
aligned bloc following the Sino-Indian border incidents.  While the maneuvering ability of 
China was one factor, India’s joint military acts with the  USA and the UK against China had 
their part. Most of the non-aligned countries reacted to these acts as they enabled the US 
forces to familiarize themselves with the operational conditions on the India-China border. 
Additionally the US 7th Fleet extended its operations in the Indian Ocean. Besides, India 
signed the Voice of America agreement on 13 July 1963 which enabled the USA intelligence 
activities in the region. Though later on the Government repudiated these, it was not forgotten 
by these countries.876 
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The era in the Sino-Indian relations commencing by the border incidents increased the anxiety 
of India. This era was distinguished by developments such as Sino-Pakistan alliance, Sino-
American rapprochement, China’s development of nuclear weapons challenging India’s 
security as well as for position in the world politics to a great extent. While the first alliance 
made the northern border of India very sensitive and insecure which resulted in lasting 
mobilization of the Indian army in that part, the rapprochement between the USA and China 
proved the USA’s withdrawal of the power formula in Asia regarding India’s being a 
countervailing force against Communist China. Regarding this as an important step, India 
signed an Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1971 to counterbalance the new US-China-Pak 
line-up. Against the claims that this agreement was India’s departure from non-alignment 
Gandhi stated that the treaty was a defensive response of India to the newly emerging 
conjuncture.877Regarding China’s development of nuclear weapons, India not only lobbied at 
all international platforms for disarmament but also accelerated its endeavors to develop 
nuclear weapons.878 In contrast to the unpromising outcomes of lobbying, as a result of the 
acceleration of studies in 1974 India became one of the nuclear powers.  
 
These developments led to shifts in power politics in South Asia. The era ended by the failure 
of Nehru’s dream of a strong and influential Asia vis-à-vis superpowers under the leading role 
of democratic India and Communist China. Instead the process shattered India’s position in 
the nonaligned world and India had to withdraw its vision of being the center in the periphery. 
This was the failure of an important premise of the non-alignment policy. The Indian dilemma 
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was facing a challenge from the periphery while she dreamed to lead the challenge of the 
superpowers, particularly the capitalist center countries.   
 
II. The USA and Nonaligned Bloc 
The interaction between the superpower and the nonaligned bloc was crucial as the latter 
challenged the existing power blocs, particularly the capitalist “free world” bloc on 
ideological, strategic and economic grounds. Nehru expressed this rebuff by declaring that the 
Asian people had no sympathy for either American or Soviet expansionism.879 This was the 
most rebellious call of India against the existing power politics since it rebuffed the status quo 
while seeking a sound position to the Third World countries those refused to be part of this 
status quo.  Accordingly, premises of the nonaligned movement were at odds with the power 
blocs, particularly the capitalist ones. In their Asia-centric and anti-colonial stance the 
nonaligned countries reflected their hypersensitivity, which was a result of centuries-long 
colonial background.  While by anti-colonialism they contradicted ideologically, by their 
Asia-centricism these countries were at odds with the center countries strategically. The 
economic dimension of the challenge was related to their vision of a more egalitarian new 
world order as well as reaction to the strategies and mechanisms of the center to keep these 
countries in order in the international division of labor.      
  
As the first premise, anti-colonialism in the framework of nonalignment meant active support 
of people in Asia and Africa who struggled to eliminate the remnants of the foreign rule. In 
their anti-colonial appeal, the nonaligned countries denied western forces who adopted 
classical colonialism and neo-classical colonialism. As early as 1949, these countries came 
together at Delhi to consider the question of Indonesia's freedom from Denmark. Strategic 
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dimension of the challenge, on the other hand, was mostly related to Asia-centricism of the 
nonalignment. The nonalignment rhetoric was distinguished by its pro-Asian tone. The main 
assumption behind this was that the Asian people should take important decisions regarding 
Asia. Accordingly, by challenging the existing power blocs, the nonaligned countries claimed 
Asia’s emergence as a new vital force in the world affairs. In contrast to the past when it had 
to conform to the setting determined by the power blocs, in the new era Asia became a 
separate force to influence the course of events in the international arena. Defining Asian 
people as members of the same family, proponents of nonalignment underlined that as 
members the Asian people had many interests in common as well as various bonds.880    
 
According to American officials what fostered both anti-colonialism and Asia-centricism of 
the nonaligned countries in 50s was the usage of the atomic bomb against the Asian people. 
This was an important factor that estranged the Asian public opinion against the USA 
regardless of its non-involvement in classical colonialism. For the nonaligned countries the 
event revealed the USA’s victimization of the ‘colored people’ of Asia in order to prove its 
scientific imperialism despite Japan’s declaration of submission.881 Most probably mainly due 
to this last aspect, the USA was extremely irritated by the pro-Asian feature of nonalignment. 
In the communications and policy papers the US officials discussed about the possibility of a 
militant anti-white and anti-western ”crusade” of the Asian people under the leadership of 
India. Though it was regarded as a distant possibility by early 50s, this was an issue that 
shaped the opinions against nonalignment.882   
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The last premise of the nonalignment was related to economic order in which these countries 
took part as less developed Third World countries. Defining the cause of their being less 
developed with respect to the exploitation of the colonial powers, the nonaligned countries 
adopted a radical rhetoric aiming at structural changes in the economic order. The challenging 
economic stance of the nonaligned countries can be examined from the nonaligned 
conferences.  First seeds of the idea of a nonaligned economic bloc emerged in the Bandung 
Conference of 1955. Participating countries decided to provide technical assistance to one 
another and make prior consultation at international forums to further their mutual economic 
interests.883  
 
Following this first step, as an unseparable component of the nonaligned conferences the 
nature and scope of the nonalignment’s economic challenges was crystallized. First of these 
serial conferences was realized at Brussels in 1961. Following this date, five more nonaligned 
conferences were held with increasing number of participants.  In the period under study the 
first four conferences were held successively. While the first was in 1961, the second was at 
Cairo in 1964, third at Lusaka in 1970 and fourth at Algiers in 1973. As  the resolutions of 
these conferences, nonaligned countries reflected their desire for a new international order 
based on equality and justice. Commencing from the first conference onwards, the 
prerequisite for the attainment of the new economic development was defined as acceleration 
of economic development of the developing countries rather than an economic confrontation 
with the industrialized states. As a first step to this end, the nonaligned countries asked for 
collaboration among all LDCs.884 This was a suggestion that was at odds with that of the 
strategies of the center countries developed for their own ends. They developed mechanisms 
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such as foreign aid, international agency aid to enable a lasting dependency relation while 
keeping the LDCs at their ranks in the international division of labor.  
 
Criticisms of these countries identified the failure of the existing system from the perspective 
of the LDCs. At the  Cairo Conference of 1964 it was noted that the structure of world 
economy and the existing international institutions of international trade and development 
failed to reduce the disparity in the per capita income of the people in developing and 
developed countries. Instead it paved the way to serious and growing imbalances between 
developed and developing countries. It also called all countries to work and collaborate for the 
rapid evolution of a new and just economic order.885  
 
In their analysis of the reason for less development at Lusaka Conference of 1970 the 
nonaligned countries pointed out the structural global reasons. While defining the widening 
gulf between the developing and developed countries as a major threat to world peace and 
security, they also noted the decline in the share of developing countries in the world export 
trade from one-third in 1950 to one-sixth in 1969. They pointed out the trend which worked 
against the interest of the LDCs. While financial flows to developing countries decreased, the 
flow from the latter to the developed ones increased. They also urged the UN to employ 
international machinery for a rapid transformation of the world economic system, particularly 
in the fields of trade, finance and technology.886  
 
Algiers Conference of 1973 was in conformity with the previous ones. There was a general 
condemnation of the neocolonialist exploitation of developing countries. While reaffirming 
the determination of the nonaligned countries to build up greater collective self-reliance 
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through mutual cooperation, the Conference asked for a special UN Fund for the economic 
development of the developing countries. Some scholars define the adopted resolution on the 
UN New International Economic Order in 1974 as the proof of the effectiveness of the 
nonaligned bloc.887  
 
Due to these premises the power blocs and the nonaligned countries had confronted on 
various grounds. In this confrontation for the US administration India had a peculiar place 
owing to its hugeness, American schemes to use her as a countervailing force against 
Communist China in the South Asia as well as the assumed leadership of the nonaligned 
countries that Indian policymakers played in the initial years vis-à-vis the superpowers. Nehru 
had great contributions in determining the policy line of the nonaligned movement. It was he 
who before Independence announced the objective of creating a separate bloc under the 
leadership of India, along with China vis-à-vis the superpowers. In 1944, in addition to the 
USA and the USSR, Nehru identified India-China as forces who were potentially capable of 
leading power blocs. Again in 1946 he announced that in the framework of nonalignment 
India endeavored for independence from big-power alignments and self-determination for all 
Asians relying on the self-determination principle. He justified his behavior in drawing the 
policy line by referring to his conception of India. According to Nehru, India was the natural 
leader of the Afro-Asian world and as the powerful leader of India, he had the right to act as 
the mouthpiece of the Asian world.888     
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The vision of a powerful Asia influential on power politics highlighted the first confrontations 
with the superpowers, particularly with the USA due to nonaligned countries’ direct attack on 
her. As the leading figure of the movement in the initial years, Nehru was firm up on the issue 
that important decisions regarding Asia should be taken by the Asian people. He announced 
that in any confrontation between the Asian and non-Asian powers India sided with the Asian 
power whatever the issue might be. In the rejection of power politics for Asian people to 
preserve their independent stance Nehru referred to Japan’s case. According to Nehru, Japan 
was a  ‘dead force’ since she had allowed herself to become a US satellite.  Regarding the 
future of Asia, Nehru defined China and India as the two powers in the continent whose joint 
act should be encouraged and this could lead to a Delhi-Peking axis that had to exercise 
control over the rest of Asia.889 
 
Nehru successfully used every opportunity to propagate these views regarding Asia’s role in 
power politics.  In order to assure an efficient lobbying for the cause of a powerful Asia, by its 
assumed leadership, India led the arrangement of various conferences.  First of these 
conferences was held in March 1947 at Delhi by the participation of more than 22 nations. In 
his appeal to the Asian nations, Nehru stressed that Asian people required a political 
renaissance to stop being used by other powers and had to develop their own policies in world 
affairs. He denied that this appeal had pan-Asiatic notions; instead, it was reminding the 
Asian people of their roles.890  
 
Among these international platforms, the Bandung Conference of 1955 held in Indonesia by 
the participation of 29 Afro-Asian states was the milestone. Defined as an attempt to keep 
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nonaligned countries out of the Cold War, the Bandung Conference had symbolic meaning 
with respect to power politics. It stood for the unity of Africa and Asia in the anti-colonial and 
anti-imperialist struggle. In his address at the Conference Nehru criticized the Western center 
countries, particularly the superpower due to their failure to understand the burning 
aspirations of the Asian people who constituted one-sixth of the world population. The 
imperative of establishing a free Asian bloc was defined by the claim that there was an Asian 
way of looking at the world. Moving from this claim Nehru challenged the propagated ideas 
that the newly independent nations had to be “camp followers” of the USSR, the USA or any 
other country in Europe on grounds that these ideas were not credible to the prevailing 
dignity, independence and spirit of these newly independent nations. 891  
 
Contempt of the USA concerning this Conference was revealed in the manners of the pro-
Western countries such as Turkey, Pakistan and Ceylon during the Conference. They had 
impeding tactics to sabotage the Conference not to discuss the crucial issues. Nehru tried his 
best to minimize controversies, as he wanted Bandung to be the platform of expression for the 
international conduct of Asia. The proclamation of the Bandung Conference indicated 
satisfying outcomes with respect to the overall views of the nonaligned countries. At the end 
of the Conference Asia was proclaimed as a separate force in world affairs, consisting of 
about half the world's population whose existence could not be denied by the superpowers.892 
This proclamation was at odds with the prevailing power blocs those accepted a bipolar world 
order as the main dynamic in the international affairs.  
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Not only this Asia-centric but also the anti-colonial rhetoric of Nehru aimed at the USA. In 
the process, the anti-colonialism was converted to anti-Americanism mainly due to the USA’s 
dual standard with respect to some basic principles such as self-determination.  In protesting 
Denmark’s use of military forces in Indonesia to suppress the nationalist forces in late 1948 
and early 1949, Nehru condemned this act as the last concrete act of old version of 
colonialism. He also criticized the US for failing to restrain its European ally. When he called 
leaders of Asian nations to Delhi, the US feared that he launched an anti-western Asiatic 
Association.  When this anxiety of the superpower was forwarded to Nehru he assured the 
American Ambassador that he was protesting only the remnants of colonialism and this was 
not something against the USA. The outcomes of the Conference were so modest that the US 
once more concluded Nehru’s rhetoric was more powerful than his actions.893  
 
The successive years, however, revealed that Nehru’s assurance regarding the objective of his 
protest was not limited to that particular event. In the process, Nehru adopted an increasingly 
anti-American rhetoric. While claiming the supremacy of India in peaceful dealing of the 
international affairs in March 1949, Nehru compared the symbol of India and West. While the 
wheel that represented peace was the symbol of India, this was  the destructive atom bomb for 
the West, particularly its superpower, the USA. Nehru accused the superpower for this 
destructive means as it forced frightened nations to devote their energies to have more 
destructive weapons instead of earmarking their resources to the wellbeing of humanity. 
These words of Nehru not only shocked but also increased the anxiety of American diplomats 
who pointed out the “tremendous influence” of Nehru on the people of Asia during their 
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conversations with people closed to Nehru.894 In another address after his return from the 
USA, Nehru stated that despite all their great achievements, Americans impressed him less 
and less with respect to their human quality. He defined the approach of the USA as 
democratic in theory but tended more and more to encourage reactionary and military 
elements in various countries especially in those of Asia. By the logic of events, the USA 
supported the relics of colonial rule.895 
 
In the process India supported all resolutions in the UN, which stood against old and neo 
version of colonialism which appeared in Palestine, Algeria, Tunisia, Indo-China, even in 
India. Existence of Portugal on Indian soil in Goa remained to be an unsolved problem for 
India. Its annexation to India by a military act in 1961 led to another confrontation between 
India and the USA. Annexation of Goa by force challenged the USA’s view regarding the 
discrepancy between Nehru’s rhetoric and actions. Standing as a good example that revealed 
the limitations of the power of the superpower in the Cold War context, Goa also, as an act 
against colonialism increased the prestige of India among the non-aligned countries since it 
was regarded as the greatest dilemma of India. While she extended support to all national 
liberation movements all over the world and was firm in her opposition to colonialism and 
imperialism, these sounded hollow as far as Portugal's rule in Goa was tolerated within its 
boundaries.896  
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Nehru tolerated this hope that the problem was solved through peaceful means. But by the 
lapse of time instead of showing any signs of withdrawal from Goa, Portugal sought support 
in the international arena for her presence in Indian soil. Ironically in mid-50s the USA 
supported Portugal’s appeal by raising the possibility of defending Goa as part of its NATO 
obligation. Though this supportive tone was abandoned and the US administration began to 
express the rightness of India on the issue during JFK’s presidency, it opposed the military 
intervention as this undermined the existence of the UN and relevance of peaceful negotiation 
means.897   
    
The USA developed various counteracting strategies in coping with India, which aimed to 
weaken the position of India in its endeavor to have a dominant stance among the nonaligned 
countries. India’s assumed leadership of the nonaligned world was an important factor that 
caused tensions in the US-India relations. In policy papers of the US this assumed leadership 
and India’s exertion of a growing influence in world affairs relying on this assumed 
leadership was pointed out. As a policy line, the US officials were warned to avoid actions 
which appear to support India as the leader of the free Asian countries.  It was stressed that 
there should be a balance in dealing with the Indian leaders as the USA regarded India as a 
countervailing model against totalitarian China.898  
 
There were various events between the USA and India that led to tensions between the two in 
the immediate aftermath of independence. One of the first events that hurt the relations 
between two countries was the USA administration’s insensitivity to discuss with the Indian 
government the peace treaty with Japan. The Truman administration charged Dulles to have a 
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worldwide support for the treaty particularly in Asia. Dulles conferred with leaders in every 
Asian nation with the sole exception of India.899 
  
Via these countervailing strategies, the US administration was, in essence, intervening into 
another challenging mechanism among the nonaligned countries. This represented the other 
facet of the dual challenge with respect to center-periphery interaction. While the first was 
related to the nonaligned countries’ challenge against superpowers, the other facet was related 
to the inner interaction of the nonaligned countries. Distinguished by its competitive nature, 
this interaction reflected the endeavors of China and India to be the center in the peripheral 
third world.  This indicated that the assumed leadership of India was not free from challenge. 
Instead the process ended by her falling behind China in this competition of becoming the 
center in the periphery.  
 
India had to face this reality during the 1962 border invasions of China. The reaction of the 
nonaligned countries was as shocking as the invasion itself.  The Indian public had the 
confidence that nonaligned countries would support India and that by this support China 
would be pushed to a tight corner in world politics due to her aggressive policies. However, 
countries in the nonaligned world did not extend their support to India. This lack of support of 
the nonaligned countries was regarded as the confirmation of the Chinese justification of this 
border incidence.  China claimed that this was a defensive act against the ambitious and 
expansionist policy of India shaped by Nehru. Identifying the Indian policymakers with the 
British colonial rulers, Chinese administration claimed that until her Independence Indian 
ruling circles had used every means to interfere with the internal and external affairs of 
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countries around India, to control their economy and trade and demand their absolute 
obedience.900           
 
This course of events was very frustrating for Indian policymakers who based their policies 
on to the assumption that India was a potential major power in world affairs due to her 
relatively advance industrial structure. Besides, they also referred to Gandhian teachings 
regarding India’s having a certain mission in the world to work for peace and friendship. 
Nehru added that this mission was not a novelty, but was the legacy of India's religious and 
philosophical tradition. According to him, the concrete proof of this was the bloodless 
peaceful national movement of India. However, in this assumed leadership, Indian 
policymakers were cautious to avoid any confrontation within the nonaligned movement and 
proposed a Delhi-Peking axis for nonaligned bloc.901  
 
In contrast to the formula of the USA as democratic India versus communist China, India’s 
equation was Asian India and China vis-à-vis superpowers. In line with this consideration 
Nehru took the initiative to create opportunities for the Chinese delegation to express and 
familiarize themselves with the nonaligned countries. This appeal of Chinese led to an 
unexpected result which was undermined by Indian policymakers. Though aware of the 
diplomatic gains of China in the Bandung where she became the leading spokesman for Asian 
aspirations,902Nehru preserved his overoptimism regarding the center role of India.  
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In addition to taking the initiative to act as a spokesman of the nonaligned movement, India 
developed various means to reinforce its stance vis-à-vis challenging factors. Similar to the 
superpowers of the power politics India extended technical, military and financial aid to 
nonaligned countries, particularly her neighbors including Burma, and Nepal. Though not in 
considerable amounts903, through this aid she aimed to create a dependence link as well as 
assuring new markets for Indian industrial goods. Yet the limited impact of this was revealed 
in the process parallel to China’s growing influence on the nonaligned countries. While 
criticizing the government due to its failure to countermove China’s making new friendships 
in Africa and in the periphery of India MPs pointed out the impact of this development. 
China’s growing influence not only left India isolated in the nonaligned world but also 
affected its trade volume. Critics refer to the direct proportion between China’s growing 
influence and decrease in the trade volume of India with these countries.904 
   
Highly disappointed by this fact, the pursued policies were questioned. More than any issue, 
these critics emphasize the Arab policy of Nehru. For many Nehru’s policy towards Arab 
could be defined as Arabophilia as Nehru exerted India’s support at every occasion. Through 
this Nehru aimed to challenge Pakistan’s appeal to the Islamic world against India as well as 
India’s Muslim population, assure markets for Indian products as well as providing cheap and 
secure oil from the cheapest source. In contrast to the expectations of the Indian 
policymakers, however, during the China border invasion none of the Arab countries adopted 
a pro-Indian position. Instead they either remained abstained or adopted a pro-China policy 
line. Besides, when they needed assistance they appealed directly to China undermining 
India.905 
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This attitude of the Arab world continued in other occasions such as India’s confrontation 
with Pakistan. In the period from 1948 to 1965 in resolutions for the Kashmir issue the Arab 
countries supported Pakistan in 71 % and backed Indian interests in only 8.3 %. Despite the 
open violations of Pakistan none of them stated anything against Pakistan. What is more, 
during the war in 1971 Kuwait called for a holy war against India. Critics claimed that if such 
violations were done by India the Arab world would never hesitate to condemn India. These 
critics conclude that the prestige that China enjoyed since Bandung increased and she exerted 
much influence on the nonaligned countries, including Arabs.906  
 
In short, emergence of nonaligned force or “bloc” in the world politics was important with 
respect to ideology and meaning. Yet to claim that  they had a successful challenge that led to 
structural changes would be misleading. Though the mechanisms and strategies that center 
countries developed for their own  interests were diagnosed, the nonaligned countries failed to 
eliminate them. An important factor behind this was the chronic domestic problems which 
impeded development. While India emerged in the world scene as the mouthpiece of this 
challenging appeal, time proved that  this was not lasting. Related to the struggle within the 
nonaligned movement to become the center of the periphery, India had to adapt itself to her 
falling behind China. The course of events developed in a manner that it shattered what Nehru 
envisioned for the future of Asia under the leadership of India-China. Instead of such a dual 
leadership, developments led to China’s dominating position vis-à-vis India. Policymakers of 
India had to face the limitations of their influence on the Afro-Asian countries.  
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The above analysis reveal the USA’s interference into this inner interaction via some 
strategies aiming to undermine the influence of India. Nehru’s independent personality, some 
aggressive appeals at public and necessity to keep India under control were among the factors 
that led the USA to interfere. In addition to these, the USA concentrated its efforts to create an 
ally in the South Asia that fitted to its Cold War objectives. The outcome was the USA-
Pakistan alliance. 
 
III. US-Pakistan-India Triangle 
As the first armed clash between the “free world” and Communist bloc, the Korean War was 
highly important in the Cold War context. Due to this reason, the US administration decided 
to get the support of not only her allies but also of the nonaligned countries.  In this 
framework, India had a distinguished place due to its political system, population and 
influence on her neighbors. The US administration pointed out the vitality of getting the 
support of world’s largest democracy during this confrontation by referring to India’s 
immense influence on the nonaligned countries at that time. India supported the US initially 
by hinting at the possibility of her support for a defensive war. But when the US led the cross 
of the 38th parallel and Truman declared the US’ active consideration of using the atomic 
bomb, along with many other countries, India reacted sharply. Relations between the two 
countries nearly collapsed when the Indian policymakers conceived the Korean War as a 
scheme of the US administration to reopen the Chinese Civil War.907 
  
The anti-US manner of India was disappointing for the US administration due to the meaning 
it avowed to the Korean War. Parallel to India’s criticisms of the USA, Pakistan successfully 
gave the impression that she was a reliable friend and a possible ally of the Western world in 
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South Asia. Pakistan’s pro-Western stance was extremely valuable for the USA in the general 
context of the Cold War. The US began to consider Pakistan as an important link in its 
containment policy.908 Relations of the two countries developed following the Korean War 
episode. This was an important development for India as the USA was collaborating with a 
country that posed serious problems to India since partition.     
 
Indo-Pakistan confrontation was not only due to the partition but also Pakistan’s being a 
theocratic Islam state. The second was a serious consideration for the Indian policymakers 
owing to India’s considerable Muslim population and anxiety concerning expansion of 
Pakistan’s influence to the Middle East countries.909 The situation was aggravated by 
Pakistan’s unwillingness to sell various raw materials to India whose industry necessitated 
these extremely.  
 
Yet,the turning point in the relation of India and Pakistan was the latter’s alliance with the 
superpower of the capitalist Western bloc. Policies following this alliance upset the balance of 
power between two countries in the South Asia. First of all, Pakistan, which was regarded as a 
chain in the containment policy became a part of the military strategy of the US by providing 
military bases and participation in US-led military pacts such as the Baghdad Pact and 
SEATO. In addition to these, in 1954 the USA began to arm Pakistan with various sorts of 
weaponry. The last was a serious blow in Indo-American-Pakistan triangle.          
 
Parallel to the development of relations between Pakistan and the USA, the latter increasingly 
adopted a pro-Pakistani stance in the international platforms, top among which was the UN 
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regarding the Kashmir issue. Kashmir was not an ordinary land dispute between two countries 
due to the strategic importance of Kashmir. It was a convergence point between Afghanistan, 
China, India, Pakistan and the USSR. By the time of Independence the majority of the 
Kashmir population was Muslims with a Hindu ruler.910 
 
The Kashmir problem began during the interim Government era when Pakistani guerilla 
forces invaded Kashmir from its northwest frontier. Following this Kashmir’s Hindu ruler 
decided Kashmir’s mergeing to India. When the British Viceroy officially approved this 
decision, the Indian troops flew into Kashmir to push out the Pakistani invaders.  As one of 
the genuine supporters of the UN who had faith in its functionality, Nehru stopped the 
successful pushing and called upon the UN Security Council to brand Pakistan as an 
aggressor. As India believed its rightness on the issue the Council’s decline of this appeal was 
a great disappointment for India. The Council’s rationale was that such a branding would lead 
to Pakistan’s more militarization on the issue, which failed to satisfy the Indian policymakers 
and public in general. The issue remained as an impasse while Pakistan occupied 40 % of 
Kashmir.911 
 
Following this setting the USA continued to support Pakistan actively until 1954. During this 
period it forwarded several suggestions favorable to Pakistan in the name of conflict 
resolution. One of these suggestions was a referandum that relied on the concept of self-
determination. This support of referandum was in fact supporting of Pakistan in a disguised 
manner since majority of the population in Kashmir was Muslims. The USA’s denial of right 
of self-determination in some parts of Europe was referred to as a proof of equivocal 
interpretation of this right and indicator of this support. The pro-Pakistan stance of the USA 
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was interpreted with respect to its strategic considerations against the nonaligned India as well 
as the Socialist bloc.912   
 
The event that ended the USA’s active intervention into the issue in 1954 was rejection of its 
appeal regarding sending American soldiers to Kashmir, by the Indian policymakers. India 
rejected this on grounds that presence of foreign soldiers on a strategic area would mean an 
increase in the US influence and would confirm American interests in the region.  This 
decision of India received wide support from the Soviet bloc as they also believed that via this 
act the USA would convert Kashmir into an Anglo-American colony and a military base. 
Parallel to its displeasure regarding India’s rejection of American troops in Kashmir the USA, 
on the other hand, led to the preparation of a resolution that nearly denied the rightness of 
India. Criticizing this Nehru also expressed his suspicion about the neutrality of UN as it 
drifted from its original idea. This criticism of Nehru was very meaningful since he was the 
one who brought the issue to the UN. In fact the Kashmir issue was an important episode for 
Nehru as he abandoned his firm faith in the UN. In contrast to his appeal to the UN for this 
issue in late 40s, during the last years of his tenure Nehru announced the UN’s irrelevance to 
Kashmir issue. This announcement was not only due to the prevailing belief among the Indian 
public that the UN sacrificed justice to diplomacy but also due to India’s charge with 
genocide and ill-treatment of minorities in the UN debates.913   
 
The Kashmir issue remained as a stalemate between two neighbors. Nehru opposed any 
resolution that proposed the debate of Kashmir issue in the UN as he was convinced that these 
resolutions would serve against the interests of India and exert unfair pressure on India. 
                                                 
912Mudumbai, United States Foreign Policy Towards India 1947-1954, p.99-100. 
913Lok Sabha Debates, Volume XLIII, Debates on External Affairs, 10 November 1962; Dube, Jawaharlal 
Nehru: A Study in Ideology and Social Change, p.247-8; Mudumbai, United States Foreign Policy Towards 
India 1947-1954, p.97, 99.    
 485
However, when the Indian policymakers appealed to the USA and UK during 1962 China 
border invasion, the Indian policymakers had to agree on the resume of bilateral talks between 
India and Pakistan. These had no concrete outcomes. In 1964, the Indian government decided 
to withdraw the special status given to Jammu and Kashmir and to integrate the area fully into 
the Indian Union. They considered this as the solution since by this decision there was 
nothing left to discuss on Kashmir.914   
 
Except this pressure during the vulnerable time of the country, the US ceased its active 
interference into the issue. Yet by extending military aid to Pakistan she managed to distort 
the whole balance of power in the region. This was an outcome that had an impact on every 
issue including Kashmir. The US military aid to Pakistan commenced in 1954. Regarding the 
issue as a great challenge to the security of India and the region, the Indian policymakers 
immediately reacted to the news of US’ massive arms aid to Pakistan. In his address regarding 
the issue Nehru pointed out that the American military aid to Pakistan created a grave 
situation for Asia and India.  Referring to the increased tensions in the region Nehru 
expressed his anxiety about the high possibility of using these arms against the newly freed 
countries under the justification of “communist threats.” He pointed out the explanations of 
Pakistani policymakers as a proof of this high possibility. In contrast to the US justification of 
aid as a defense precaution against the USA and China, Pakistan policymakers stated that 
Pakistan’s sole enemy was India and country’s armament was against the enemy.  They added 
that this aid contributed to the solution of Kashmir solution. The Pakistani policymakers 
claimed that this aid served the strengthening of not only Pakistan but also the Muslim world. 
Anxious due to these explanations Indian policymakers defined these developments as 
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dangerous, abnormal and as a new type of intervention. Abnormality that upset normality was 
due to the importation of advanced level military weapons and technology.915  
 
Facing severe criticisms and protests in Indian Parliament, media and public the US President 
Eisenhower sent a message to Nehru and assured that Pakistan could not use the US-provided 
arms on its initiative. In other words, Pakistan could not use arms provided by the US in the 
scope of military aid.  He underlined that in case that Pakistan attempted to use these arms 
against India, the USA would undertake immediately appropriate action to prevent such an 
aggression. Rejecting Nehru’s claims, Eisenhower defined what India felt as “widespread and 
unfounded speculation”. While some circles were relaxed by this assurance, the majority 
regarded it as unrealistic referring to France’s use of NATO arms against Algeria despite  the 
measure in NATO agreement that prevented the usage of arms and resources other than  
NATO purposes. Validity of these concerns were proven in a decade time during the Indo-
Pakistan War of 1965 when the US did not take any action to prevent the usage of arms 
provided by US military aid.916   
 
Anxiety of the Indian policymakers increased parallel to Pakistan’s participation in military 
pacts.  Following the Baghdad Pact, in 1954 Pakistan joined the South-East Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) the establishment of which was justified as a precaution against the 
expansionist policies of the USSR. In rejecting this, Nehru stated that there was not any 
visible signs of the USSR’s expansionist acts and referred to the debates in the Pakistan 
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Parliament to grasp the real nature of this sort of military pacts. Replying the questions, 
Foreign Minister of Pakistan justified military alignments on grounds that they served the 
defense of the country and preservation of internal security. Nehru claimed that this was not 
something peculiar to  SEATO, instead in all military pacts Pakistan aimed at India.917  
 
This claim was related to Indian policymakers belief about the military pacts.  As revealed by 
their statements, Indian policymakers refused all the military pacts including NATO, MEDO 
and the Baghdad Pact as these pacts brought Cold War to the borders of India. Defining any 
military pact like SEATO and the Baghdad Pact as a “vile chain” of conspirational acts 
against the prevailing peace and freedom in Asia, Indian policymakers claimed that problems 
with Pakistan such as Kashmir were artificial ones created by these sorts of intervention. 
Nehru stated that by their “wrong, dangerous and harmful” approach these pacts promoted 
wrong tendencies while impeding development of accurate tendencies. Therefore, countries 
which joined in these pacts had in common. The idea that they were taking the world into a 
wrong direction. The national dimension of this mistake was related to the country’s human 
resources also. Critical MPs had the belief that by these military pacts the US provided cheap 
soldiers for the defense of US as the American soldiers were very costly in comparison to 
member countries’ soldiers.918  
 
Evaluation of the military aid, military pacts as well as armed conflicts with respect to their 
outcomes reveal that they obliged India to earmark considerable amount of its productive 
resources into armaments in order to keep up with Pakistan. Critics of the USA point out that 
this was an important factor in the balance deficit in India. They blamed the USA since by 
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arming the Pakistan and creating an armed-powerful neighbor, the USA led India to spend 
more money on defense expenditures by diverting resources from development activities. 
This policy line indicated a departure from the conventional policy line of India. The Indian 
policymakers always put high priority to development, instead of defense. Yet in the face of 
lasting arming of Pakistan they had to abandon this policy and increased the amount of 
allocations to defense.  
 
While continuing its armament Indian policymakers called for a stop of armament at every 
possible platform. Though Nehru was regarded as a proponent of disarmament he was not 
optimistic about the impact of this call for disarmament. In one of his addresses, Nehru stated 
that in many cases reality which prevailed in the world determined the course of events. When 
the reality of the world was destructive arms, hydrogen bombs with a tremendous power 
behind them, any call for disarmament probably would not be so efficient as history 
revealed.919   
 
Following the Chinese victory in 1962 in the border incidents, however, Indian government 
began to realize the low amount of budget allocations that they earmarked for defense. 
Particularly following the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, the country began to question why they 
earmarked low budget allocations for defense needs of the country. In contrast to the previous 
years, when Indian policymakers believed that they had to spend less money for defense since 
the scarce resources should be earmarked to productive fields, the government agreed that the 
defense and economic planning could not be separated from each other and also could not be 
                                                 
919Demands for Grants, 29 March 1956, p.3727; Views of Hans J. Morgenthau, Proceedings of the Conference “ 
India and the USA” held on 4-5 May 1959, Mayflower Hotel, Washington D.C.; Thomas, The Defense of India: 
A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics, p.57; Nageshwar Pandey, “An Appraisal of Western and 
Soviet Aid” in Sharma, ed., Indo-Soviet Cooperation and India’s Economic Development,  p.43 
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conducted independently of each other. After that date onwards defense contingency planning 
of the country had to be taken into account between two hostile neighbors.920  
 
These developments falsified the premises of Nehruvian vision regarding the peaceful world 
order. In a sort of romanticism he propagated that by good intentions and good neighborhood 
peaceful world order could be attained. In the face of uncontrollable factors India faced 
various dynamics that compelled her to accelerate her armament. For India to conclude that 
important policy changes occurred under emerging new external circumstances would not be 
misleading. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
In the post-WW2 era with respect to their stance in the world affairs Turkey and India had 
considerable differences. While Turkey preferred to be an ally of the superpower of the “free 
world” bloc, India preferred to play the role of the leading country of the non-aligned 
countries. This difference in the diplomatic preferences, however, did not make a considerable 
change in their dealings with the center countries as both faced the same sort of demands and 
sanctions regardless of the degree of their ‘closeness’ to the center countries. The shared 
demands from the center were not coincidental as they were shaped by the strategic 
considerations of the center, in our context, the superpower, to preserve and institutionalize 
her dominance on the peripheral countries.  
   
Alliance of the USA and Turkey represents one of the many that the superpower entangled in 
the Cold War context. In contrast to the previous indifference to the plight of the peripheral 
                                                 
920Thomas, The Defense of India: A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics, p.48.  
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underdeveloped countries through the foreign aid regime the superpower began to 
institutionalize her relations with the LDCs as its national and center interests necessitated so.  
 
Like the majority of the peripheral countries which were entangled in sort of an alliance with 
the USA, for Turkey the new means of the superpower, whose main assumption was to 
contribute to the development or recovery of countries which suffered from low domestic 
savings though  flow of huge sums of foreign exchange, and offered opportunities to attain the 
envisioned economic development. Policymakers of the country expressed their high 
expectations regarding the foreign aid through which the country attained her industrialization 
drive. In a short while, however, they had to withdrew from this ideal as the superpower, 
relying on comparative advantage principle, conditioned Turkey’s involvement in foreign aid 
program to a shift in the locomotive sector of the development policy of the country from 
industry to agriculture along with liberalization of foreign trade regime and favorable 
environment for private capital, both domestic and foreign. 
By accepting to fulfill these conditions Turkey involved in the US foreign aid policy as well 
as “free world” bloc. This involvement indicated a dilemma for the country. On the one hand, 
at least in appearance, Turkey was incorporated to the West, which symbolized the centuries 
long dream of the western-oriented intelligentsia. On the other hand, she had to abandon the 
development policy that she enthusiastically supported as the sole policy for a country’s 
economic and political independence. The mixed feelings of the Turkish policymakers 
crystallized in the process when it became clear that conditions of involvement did not lead to 
the ultimate national objective of self-reliance. This crystallization indicated intensification of 
tensions and contradictions between the allies on economic issues. In contrast to the naïve 
optimism of the Turkish policymakers regarding the advantages of the superpower’s 
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recommendations, the superpower did not miss any opportunity to reinforce her center-related 
interests.  
The question of what would have happened unless Turkey faced land demands of the USSR  
could lead to interesting scenarios. Regardless of these scenarios the apparent fact related to 
Turkey’s involvement was that one of the fundamental, may be the most fundamental, factors 
that led Turkey to entangle into alliance with the superpower was her security and national 
integrity concerns vis-à-vis her centuries-long hostile neighbor. Through participation into all 
military and regional defense pacts Turkish policymakers concluded that they assured the 
country’s security vis-à-vis any armed aggression against the country. This feeling motivated 
them to pursue an US-centric foreign policy.  
Enjoying this until early 60s Turkish policymakers were compelled to face realities regarding 
Turkey’s ‘meaning’ in the context of the Cold War and degree of (in)security that she assured 
through  military entanglements with the Western bloc when they faced two significant 
events. First of these was the Cuban missile crisis during which Turkish policymakers faced 
the reality that in the Cold War context Turkey was regarded as one of the minor battlefields 
that could be sacrificed. By a successive event, however, not only the policymakers but the 
public at large underwent a trauma. By the letter of the US President Turkey faced the 
limitations in using the arms provided by the US military aid as well as the country’s 
exclusion from the security shield of the NATO vis-à-vis the Soviet threats depending on the 
superpower’s interpretation of the events. In the midst of these developments, Turkish 
policymakers grasped the degree of Turkey’s loneliness during the UN resolutions for Cyprus. 
These two developments led the Turkish policymakers to reshape the foreign policy from a 
US-centric unidimensional one to a multilateral foreign policy. 60s were distinguished by 
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Turkey’s endeavors to improve relations with Arab nations, nonaligned countries and the 
Socialist Bloc to gain “friendship” in the international arena.  
Though these endeavors had satisfying outcomes, as a country that was highly dependent on 
the foreign and military aid of the center countries, in the midst of the narrowing vicious 
circle Turkey lacked the degree of freedom that her policymakers envisioned for the country. 
Owing to the mechanisms established by the center as well as pragmatism and 
shortsightedness of her capitalists, Turkey did not attain the envisioned development level that 
was equated with self-reliance. Though Turkey was one of the countries that received the 
highest amount of foreign aid this was not enough for her to attain her ultimate objective in 
contrast to the assumption of the foreign aid policy. 
 
In contrast to the Turkish-American relations, the tension of which increased in the process, 
Indo-American relations were distinguished by its tense nature. Like Turkey, confrontations 
of the USA and India on economic issues were shaped mainly by the center-periphery 
dichotomy and had a repetitive course as the structural problems of the Indian economy 
prevailed. In the midst of foreign exchange crisis and increased dependency on the center 
countries in foreign exchange, center countries and agencies of the capitalist world were able 
to exert pressure on the peripheral country for policies which served their strategic concerns 
including liberalization of foreign trade, creation of an appropriate environment for private 
capital, both domestic and foreign as well as a shift in the locomotive sector of the economy 
from industry to agriculture.  
 
Political elite of the periphery, on the other hand, was reactive to these demands on grounds 
that they were against the country’s interests. Though the political elite was mostly firm on 
these confronted issues, the narrowing vicious circle compelled them to be responsive to the 
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demands of the center. Its responsiveness in many cases, however, did not cover the 
expectations of the center. Or, in cases when it covered all aspects, the periphery acted 
pragmatically and following the receipt of foreign aid withdrew the recommended policy.  
 
The revealing tendency of the center on these issues was that while it was firm on promoting 
an appropriate environment for the private capital and activated mechanisms to 
institutionalize the interests of the foreign capital,  it had a relaxed attitude regarding the 
expansion of public sector as the system functioned in a manner that the foreign private 
capital enjoyed the Indian market through partnerships and joint ventures set up by domestic 
capital.    
 
An important fact was that political elite was not the sole determinant in this interaction. 
Aware of this, the center was successful in manipulating concerns of different components in 
the periphery. In its lobbying for the Green Revolution of mid-60s it acted as a mouthpiece of 
capitalist farmers in demanding incentives for their activities. As these incentives had 
inflationary effects, the center created a common ground for its and other component’s 
interests at the expense of the mass. 
 
The other component that created synergy with the center was the domestic capital. Enjoying 
the favorable environment enabled by the political elite parallel to the envisioned 
development process of the country as well as the center in its endeavors to create a favorable 
environment for private capital in general, foreign capital in particular the domestic capital 
undermined the long-term development objectives of the country regarding industrialization 
by focusing on consumer goods. While domestic and foreign industrial sector preferred it due 
 494
to its quick and high margin profits, the center propagated for consumer goods industries to 
impede the country’s drive for heavy industrialization that might reduce the periphery’s 
dependence on center countries considerably in the long-run. In the process, the superpower 
also relaxed her opposition to heavy-industrialization drive of India as far as she preserved her 
dominance over the periphery by keeping and avoiding the transfer of recent technological 
developments to the periphery, including India. In any case, the alliance with the domestic 
industrial capital empowered the center, as it was able to manipulate and distort the economic 
development priorities of the periphery. By this stance in the periphery the foreign capital 
made great contributions to the creation of pseudo-industrialization in India.    
 
What lied at the core of confrontation on diplomatic issues was again related to India’s vision 
to be self-reliant and also become a world power influential on world politics as well as 
economics. By leading the challenge against the superpowers, one of the ultimate objective of 
India was to enjoy a secure market among the Third World countries. Attainment of this 
economic dimension of nonalignment was crucial for India as she regarded herself a potential 
leader, the center among these countries, owing to her relatively advanced industrial structure. 
Assumption of the Indian policymakers was to become the center of the periphery by 
completely exploiting the industrial capacity of the country.         
 
The bipolar international setting enabled an appropriate environment for this economic 
challenge through foreign policy. Rejecting to be a part of power politics because she did 
want to contribute to the existing tensions, India was influential in drawing the guidelines of 
the nonalignment.  Against the USA’s definition of international order with respect to 
bipolarity, Nehru acted as the mouthpiece of nonaligned bloc rejecting this and highlighted 
the possibility of a Third Bloc free from the expansionist policies, particularly in the 
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economic field, of the superpowers. This critical stance vis-à-vis the superpowers shed light 
on the USSR’s reaction to the nonalignment, particularly in the initial years. Like the USA, 
for the USSR if one country did not belong to one bloc then it automatically belonged to the 
other one. Therefore until the death of Stalin the USSR denounced the nonalignment and 
regarded India as the leading force among the nonaligned countries as a country that belonged 
to the “enemy camp” a “semi-colony” of the British capital referring to strong political and 
commercial ties.921  
 
In contrast to the USSR, the USA regarded nonalignment more challenging as the nonaligned 
countries challenged not only the USA’s concerns regarding its being the superpower but also 
the ideology that it represented. The socialist rhetoric of Nehru regardless of its high 
pragmatic notions intensified the discontent of the USA. As a result it developed various 
mechanisms such as creation of countervailing forces in the region and exclusion of India 
from important regional decisions to undermine India’s position among the nonaligned 
countries. This policy line of the USA was crucial as it aimed to sabotage India’s endeavors to 
become the center of the periphery. In comparison to the above-mentioned mechanisms, the 
foreign aid was efficient in impeding India’s endeavors. Depending on the center countries to 
a great extent with respect to foreign exchange supply India had a vulnerable position vis-à-
vis the superpower. Diagnosing this, the USA efficiently used foreign aid against India. 
Examination of the process reveals the ups and downs of foreign aid parallel to the 
confrontations in economic, diplomatic and military fields.       
 
                                                 
921Secret Memo of Conversation between Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General of the Ministry of External 
Affairs and Commonwealth Relations and American Ambassador in India Loy Henderson, 16 March 1949, RG 
84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, New Delhi Embassy, Confidential Files 1949; Bhatia, 
Jawaharlal Nehru: A Study in Indo-Soviet Relations, p.97, 99; Merrill, Bread and the Ballot: the US and India’s 
Economic Development, 1947-63, p.27; Raju G C Thomas, The Defense of India: A Budgetary Perspective of 
Strategy and Politics, Meerut: McMillian Publications, 1978, p.39.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In the post-WW2 era, foreign aid policy was justified as the fundamental means to break the 
“vicious circle of poverty” distinguished by low domestic savings, inefficiency of 
governments to increase domestic savings and hindrance of development policies due to these 
low savings.  In this context, foreign aid was assumed to act as an impetus to fill the gap 
between savings and required capital for development endeavors of the country. According to 
this assumption when the countries attained a certain level of development and capital 
accumulation, they would no longer necessitate foreign aid allocations. This assumption led to 
an overoptimism among the policymakers of the LDCs who began to believe that in a 
relatively short time they could attain self-sufficiency identified with economic and political 
independence. Policymakers of Turkey and India were not exceptions in this overoptimism. 
They shared the belief that in early 70s their countries would attain full development the 
fundamental indicator of which was self-sufficiency.  
 
Though Turkey and India received huge amounts of foreign aid, by 1973, neither of them had 
attained self-reliance. Instead, their dependence on the center countries and international 
donor agencies increased with respect to foreign exchange and technology.  This outcome 
invalidated the above-mentioned main assumption of foreign aid policy, dominated by the 
USA for nearly two decades. The crucial point regarding foreign aid policy was the failure of 
its public justification advocated by the US administration and the aid recipient countries. 
However, this did not mean that this policy failed when the interests and expectations of the 
USA were concerned. Instead it perfectly fulfilled its mission serving directly to the 
superpower concerns of the USA. It institutionalized the LDCs’ integration to the capitalist 
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system, particularly to its new superpower, as aid recipients, markets and provider of strategic 
materials.  
 
This was the main function of foreign aid for donor countries in Turkey and India whose 
integration to the world economy was completed. While Turkey’s integration to the world 
economy commenced in the sixteenth century, which resulted in her predecessor’s semi-
colonization, India’s integration to the world economy resulted in her colonization by the 
superpower of the era, the United Kingdom. Being in the periphery of the world economy 
through the US foreign aid both Turkey and India institutionalized their dependency on the 
superpower.           
 
Regarding the outcomes of the development endeavors, in addition to the unattainment of 
self-reliance the process also led to some other failures with respect to social justice and 
intensified dualities in social and economic spheres. As the other side of the coin, the process 
also had some success from the perspective of policymakers and donors, such as higher 
growth rates, accumulation of capital, expansion of infrastructure as well as the 
modern/capitalist sectors respectively.  
 
Consequently, what Turkey and India attained by 1973 was not an independent development 
but a dependent development distinguished by capitalist capital accumulation. In contrast to 
the assumed trickle down mechanism the capital concentrated into few hands. This led to 
increased inequality in income distribution, intensified duality in society and prevailing low 
life standards for the majority parallel to the high unemployment and underemployment. 
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Remaining unresolved in successive years, these features represented the symptoms of the 
crisis in the political economy of Turkey and India.  
 
Comparison of development policies and outcomes of these policies reveals similarities and 
common deficiencies owing to the structural problems of the less developed countries as well 
as differences related to countries’ inner dynamics. In this conclusion part, first, Turkey and 
India are compared with respect to outcomes of the development policies, the impact of the 
inner and external dynamics on the process regarding resource allocation and capital 
accumulation. Then the pursued development policies and their outcomes are analyzed 
according to the dominating development paradigms of the era to underline the theoretical 
basis of the evolution in the recommendations of the center countries and reorientation of the 
development policies of the LDCs. This last part of the analysis sheds light on the scope of 
the circumscription of national policymakers by the theoreticians as well.   
 
a. Comparison of Turkish and Indian Development Policies 
Comparison of Turkey and India with respect to development policies reveals the difference 
on the locomotive sector. While the development policies of Turkey were in full conformity 
with policy recommendations of the center countries, India stood as the ‘dissenter’ against the 
center’s strategic considerations until early 60s.  In the pre-WW2 era until the inclusion of the 
US foreign aid policy, among LDCs, Turkey was one of the ‘dissenters’ that rebuffed the 
recommendations of the center countries to participate in the international division of labor as 
an agricultural country. Instead, in 30s Turkish policymakers pursued an industrialization-led 
development policy that was prepared by the belief that industrialization was the sole means 
that enabled the country’s self-reliance, which meant a genuine political and economic 
independence.    
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This resistance to the center countries lasted until post-WW2. Parallel to its inclusion to the 
US foreign aid policy, Turkey adopted agriculture-led development policy. The American 
experts and diplomats justified this by the comparative advantage principle and conditioned 
Turkey’s participation in the American foreign aid programs to this adoption.  Without much 
option, Turkish policymakers reoriented the development policy that lasted until early 60s. In 
the framework of this policy, Turkey commenced agricultural mechanization program. The 
focus of this program was big landowners that comprised the minority in Turkish rural 
structure excluding the majority. This big landowner orientation was also valid for the 
agricultural development strategy of 60s. Adopted as an imperative policy owing to reaching 
the natural borders in cultivable lands, via intensive agriculture techniques, Turkish 
policymakers aimed to attain high agricultural outputs regardless of the social implication of 
these techniques. 
 
60s indicated reorientation of the Turkish development policy. By this date Turkey adopted 
import substitution industrialization. This was not against the recommendations of the center 
countries; it was it was in fact in total conformity with their recommendations. Turkish 
policymakers assumed that by this reorientation, Turkey would attain her self-reliance as they 
never abandoned equation of industrialization with genuine development. 
 
In contrast to the expectations, however, commencing by mid-60s Turkey faced serious 
problems with respect to industrial production and provision of the imported industrial inputs. 
The process led to a reinforced dependency on the center countries, instead of self-reliance.  
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In contrast to the Turkish policymakers who were denied of an option of being out of power 
politics under the land demands of the USSR, Indian policymakers enjoyed freedom from 
threats of neither of the superpowers. This freedom was crucial in shaping their firmness on 
the locomotive-sector of the development policy. Except the few initial years, until mid-60s, 
the locomotive sector of the development policy was heavy industrialization. Though under 
the prevailing circumstances the adoption of the agriculture-led development strategy was an 
imperative, following the production boom of these years owing to the favorable weather 
conditions they settled the development policy to the direction that they desired. Following 
these initial years, similar to the majority of the LDCs Indian policymakers adopted 
industrialization-led development strategy. Equating industrialization with self-sufficiency, 
the basic premise of this policy was heavy industry.  
 
Though this equation, shared by the majority of the LDCs was an important determinant, in 
the Indian context another important determinant was the attitude of the Indian industrial 
capitalists. Concerning the stance, even existence of powerful industrial capital was 
something peculiar to India that other LDCs, including Turkey lacked. Indian industrial 
capitalists, on the other hand, regarded Independence as a new era of opportunities for 
national capitalists to dominate the domestic market.  Shaped by this understanding, Indian 
industrial capitalists had a considerable influence in this reorientation. As a result of these 
determinants, using the advantage of her non-aligned foreign policy, India was able to 
implement her heavy industrialization-led development policies by receiving aid from the 
USSR in contrast to the USA refusal to raise funds for these projects.   
 
In mid-60s, however, following successive droughts, chronic foodgrains shortage and 
increased dependency on foreign countries in foodgrains importation, Indian policymakers 
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reoriented their development policy and adopted agriculture as the locomotive sector.  In the 
framework of this policy, India adopted intensive agriculture techniques to get maximum 
outputs from agriculture. Representing the second stage in the agricultural development 
strategies, the intensive agriculture techniques differed from the first stage.  The latter 
distinguished by its redistributive justice rhetoric and societal approach. Strategies of the 
second stage, however, lacked this societal aspect. Instead they focused on the big landowners 
consistent with the objective defined in quantitative terms such as self-sufficiency in 
agriculture and high agricultural outputs and incomes regardless of the social outcomes.   
 
In that respect the second stage of agricultural development strategy of India had common 
features with Turkey’s, as the latter focused on the qualitative outcomes, regardless of the 
social impact. Like Turkey, in the second stage of agricultural development strategies, Indian 
policymakers focused on the minority while excluding the majority of the rural population. 
On the other hand, in contrast to the Indian policymakers, Turkish policymakers did not adopt 
redistributive justice rhetoric in these policies.  
 
Regardless of the rhetoric, however, both Turkish and Indian policymakers aimed to develop 
and accelerate capitalist production relations in rural Turkey and India.  Even in the most 
socialistic rhetoric stage this was the ultimate objective for the Indian policymakers as they 
regarded capitalist production relations as a precondition for the high agricultural 
productivity. The irony of both countries with respect to agriculture was their failure to attain 
self-sufficiency. While they had considerable improvements in agricultural, production 
policies to this end created new dependency links with the center countries concerning 
modern agricultural inputs. This meant a more expensive ‘dependency’ compared to 
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foodgrains as the price of the latter was more appropriate than the modern agricultural inputs 
and their appliances. 
 
As a result of this approach and exclusion of the majority in both countries, the dual structure 
in the society was intensified. While resources were concentrated into few hands, the majority 
was either untouched or negatively affected by the process. While underemployment and 
unemployment in rural areas increased, this led to extensive migration from rural to urban 
areas. The untouched or negatively affected segment began to migrate to urban areas and 
abroad in increasing numbers where they worked in services sector to a great extent.  
 
In industrialization, in contrast to India, by the time of Independence in 1923, Turkey barely 
had industrial establishments. India was the eightieth most industrialized country in the world 
and, excluding the USSR, second in Asia following Japan. Though they represented different 
industrialization levels, the outcomes of their industrialization drive did not differ much, at 
least for the period under study. Though they managed to reach a certain level of growth that 
was fluctuating, at the end neither of them attained self-reliance. Instead they had a reinforced 
dependency on the foreign countries with respect to foreign exchange and technology. By 
these features instead of a genuine industrialization both Turkey and India had pseudo-
industrialization regardless of the diversification in industrial production.   
 
While center countries contributed to this pseudo-industrialization by avoiding transferring 
recent technology and participated in the deviation of the priority sectors, contribution of the 
national industrial capitalists was through concentrating in sectors which easy and quick profit 
returns. Though the available relatively scarce resources can be regarded as an important 
determinant for this concentration in sectors with easy and quick profit returns at least for the 
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initial stages, the protected domestic market as well as shortsightedness of the national 
capitalists led them to undermine the importance of developing technologies and equipment 
from the imported ones. Moving from this bi-faceted contribution, the key hypothesis of the 
dissertation is that the unsatisfying outcomes of the development endeavors were due to the 
interplay of inner and external dynamics. As the problematic aspect of this contribution was 
related to resource allocation and capital accumulation, inner dynamics are limited to ruling 
elite coalition and external dynamics are to center countries, particularly the superpower of 
the capitalist bloc. Inner and external dynamics of Turkey and India are compared according 
to this definition.                 
 
b. Comparison of Turkish and Indian Inner Dynamics (Ruling Elite Coalition) 
 
In the period under study, the ruling elite coalition of both countries underwent various 
changes both in terms of preponderance and composition. In the Turkish case, first of these 
changes occurred in the composition of the political elite. By ending the one party rule that 
commenced by the foundation of the Republic the general elections of 1950 led to the 
recomposition of the political elite. Despite two military interventions in the following 
decades, the 1950 Election commenced the process of democratic system in the country. 
Following each military intervention the country returned to the Parliamentary regime by 
elections, which meant recomposition of the political elite.  
 
In India, the change in the political elite by Independence indicated a shift from the foreign to 
national rule. Those who were imprisoned and punished by the British rule became the 
political elite of the Indian Federal Republic. In contrast to the Turkish Parliament, from the 
very beginning Indian Parliament included opposition parties. The system that was 
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democratic in appearance, however, had its limitations, particularly with respect to leadership 
that symbolized a close knit. While the charismatic national leader Nehru remained as PM for 
seventeen years, after a one year tenure of Shastri, Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi ruled the 
country for a long time.  
 
The comparison of Turkey and India regarding the ‘autonomy’ of political elite vis-à-vis other 
elite groups indicates the initial more advantageous position of the Turkish political elite. In 
contrast to the Indian political elite that had to deal with organized and highly conscious 
national capitalists regarding their group interests, commencing by Independence the Turkish 
political elite enjoyed the absence of such conscious national capitalists. Instead complaining 
of the lack of class dynamics that had to be in a society, Turkish political elite defined the 
creation of national capitalists by state support as an important national objective. Consistent 
with this, the process witnessed the emergence of national capitalists as a separate elite group.  
 
Another important feature of this process was the recomposition of the national capitalists 
among themselves. This recomposition was with respect to change in the preponderance of 
the trade and industrial capitalists. In the Turkish case, in contrast to the predominating 
position of the trade capital until early-60s the preponderance among the national capitalists 
shifted to the industrial capital following this date. Relying on the favorable conjuncture, the 
majority of the big trade capitalists converted into industrial capitalists. This conversion 
process commenced in mid-50s and lasted in 60s. It was in this empowerment and conversion 
era that the industrial capitalists preferred to pursue a conciliatory relation with the political 
elite. However after this date, parallel to their empowerment the industrial capitalists declared 
their ‘autonomy’ against the political elite. It was in late-60s and early 70s Turkish industrial 
capitalists attained the level of Indian industrial capitalists of 1947. As a relatively new 
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phenomenon for the Turkish policymakers, the challenge of the industrial capitalists was the 
expression of their group consciousness.  
 
With respect to organized behavior, group consciousness and differentiation Indian capitalists 
had a considerably advanced position by Independence. In contrast to Turkey, nationalist 
capitalists of India had already differed as trade and industrial capitalists. Owing to the 
favorable conjuncture regarding the importance of industrialization as well as their 
monopolist character, the industrial capitalists had preponderance among the Indian 
capitalists. They reinforced their advantageous position through establishing their 
organization that acted as the mouthpiece of the big industrial capitalists. This was a level that 
Turkish industrial capitalists managed to attain in late 60s and early 70s.  
 
The industrial capital was an important component of the National Movement, in contrast to 
other elite groups. Excluding the minority, majority of the industrial capitalists supported the 
national movement. Preferring to be a silent force in the national movement, some leading 
names top among which was G.D. Birla financed the national movement as they regarded the 
foreign rule as the greatest challenge for their interests. They were aware of the fact that they 
would be denied of the right to exploit the domestic market freely while the British capitalists 
had a dominating and powerful position. 
 
The process confirmed this belief of the national capitalists, yet the national rule did not 
assure a tension-free relation between the political elite and industrial capitalists. Facing 
various policy arrangements of the political elite which attempted to curb the influence of 
monopolist capitalists, the latter was successful in emasculating these policies. While 
adopting a conciliatory tone and establishing relations network with the high echelons of the 
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bureaucracy, the industrial capitalists rebuffed the demands of the political elite through 
manipulating the most sensitive issue of reducing the production outputs. Similar to the 
Turkish case, Indian policymakers failed to ‘discipline’ the dominating national capitalist 
group even in their wasting of resources and distortion of the national objectives with respect 
to industrialization.      
 
Briefly, regarding the recomposition of the political elite and national capitalists, Turkey and 
India had common features. In both countries the change in the political elite was regarded in 
personas, yet in the Indian case this change also indicated a shift from foreigners to Indian 
nationalists. The recomposition in the case of national capitalists, on the other hand, was 
related to the preponderance of the differentiated capitalists.  Different from India, Turkey by 
Independence lacked industrial capitalists and had trivial trade capitalists. By time, consistent 
with the national objective of creating capitalists by the state support and the conjuncture 
favoring industrialization, industrial capitalists emerged and had the preponderance among the 
Turkish capitalists. This was same with the Indian capitalists’ composition patterns.   
 
Another resemblance between Turkey and India was related to the civilian bureaucracy’s 
position in the established regimes as well as their stance in the ruling elite coalition. 
Representing the continuity with the past, both state systems endowed increasingly crucial 
roles to the civilian bureaucracy, particularly with respect to resource allocation. In the 
Turkish case the recomposition of the political elite in 1950 indicated a new beginning in the 
relations of the political elite and the civilian bureaucracy. In contrast to the political elite of 
the one party rule, who established their rule on the civilian bureaucracy, the new political 
elite of Turkey commenced an anti-bureaucracy rally. Defining their term as the public rule, 
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the new political elite manipulated the estrangement of the mass from the bureaucracy. In the 
eyes of the mass, bureaucracy represented authoritarianism of the one party rule.  
 
Despite its anti-bureaucracy rally, however, the new political elite had limited scope of action 
vis-à-vis bureaucracy, as the latter was the indispensable means for the state administration. 
Consequently, the anti-bureaucracy rally limited to the purge of the high echelons of the 
bureaucracy as well as restriction of vast incentives rather than restricting their role in the 
system. Parallel to this purge the new political elite created a “committed’ bureaucracy who 
supported the new rule. De-influencing and purge of the pro-RPP and creation of pro-DP 
bureaucrats among the high echelons of bureaucracy distinguished the process.  
 
This lasted until the military coup of 1960 when the military administration made 
arrangements to improve and reinforce the position of the civilian bureaucracy in the ruling 
elite coalition. It not only empowered the civilian bureaucracy through endowing resource 
allocation decision-making but also attempted to institutionalize the provided advantages via 
establishing the planning organization. This attempt of empowerment, however, did not lead 
to lasting influence. Commencing in mid-60s following the JP’s ascension to power as the 
‘inheritor of the DP’, civilian bureaucracy considerably lost its advantageous position. 
Through various strategies the JP successfully emasculated arrangements which empowered 
the civilian bureaucracy as the decision-making body for resource allocation. In addition, like 
its predecessors the JP created pro-JP bureaucrat cadres among the high echelons of 
bureaucracy.       
 
Not only the political elite but also other elite groups had the same policy line regarding the 
civilian bureaucracy. Though they criticized the role and expansion of the civilian 
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bureaucracy, due to the latter’s ability in executing the procedures and legislation, these elite 
groups adopted a conciliatory approach.   
 
Similar to the Turkish case, Indian civilian bureaucracy faced jealousy of other elite groups. 
Their identification with the foreign rule led to the development of an anti-bureaucrat rally 
during the national movement. Despite the humiliating approach, however, independence 
represented a new beginning for the Indian civilian bureaucracy since for the first time they 
held the administrative posts.  In contrast to the British rule when the Indian civil servants 
were denied taking initiatives but only executing the decisions of the British administrators, 
by Independence they replaced these administrators and held administrative posts.  
 
Besides, as the state ruling was impossible without these civilian bureaucrats in a short while 
after independence the political elite compromised with the civilian bureaucracy. Even in this 
compromise, however, the charismatic political leader Nehru underlined the superiority of the 
executive vis-à-vis the civilian bureaucracy. Similar to the British administrators, Nehru 
attempted to develop an administrative system that left minor initiative taking opportunity for 
the civilian bureaucracy. In this attempt, however, he had serious limitations owing to the 
federal administrative structure. Furthermore, the adopted planned economy as well as 
expanding public sector reinforced the position of the civilian bureaucrats.  
 
The turning point in the political elite-civilian bureaucracy interaction was, however, the 
death of Nehru. His successors pursued policies which empowered the stance of civilian 
bureaucracy. While Shastri commenced the process arbitrarily, it was Gandhi who laid the 
basis for the institutionalization of this reinforced stance. PM Shastri regarded the setting up 
of a ‘shadow cabinet’ comprised of civilian bureaucrats as obligatory owing to his limited 
 509
knowledge on administrative affairs. Gandhi, on the other hand, left the administrative issues 
to the civilian bureaucrats who were ‘committed’ to her while she was coping with her 
opponents. Consequently, in the process, the civilian bureaucracy enjoyed a reinforced 
position at the center.  
 
At state level, on the other hand, there were various cases which circumscribed the power of 
the civilian bureaucracy. However, as the system endowed the civilian bureaucrats with 
various powers including resource allocation, in fact, the challenge against them was much 
limited than it was assumed. Due to their powerful stance that could be used for the efficient 
implementation or emasculation of policies, the civilian bureaucrats were regarded as the 
indispensable partners by the elite groups who aimed to emasculate the policies. Not only the 
capitalists but also the rural elite regarded conciliation with these bureaucrats as crucial for 
the preservation of their vested interests. This factor lied at the core of the criticism of the 
civilian bureaucracy regarding the unsuccessful and unsatisfying implementation of the 
development policies.  
 
In sum, the civilian bureaucracies of Turkey and India had an important role in the systems, 
particularly with respect to the allocation of resources to various programs and policies. 
Though inaccurate use, even waste, of these resources was debated frequently and the 
contribution of bureaucrats to the unsuccessful implementation of policies was accepted in 
each country, these remained only as diagnoses without initiative to improve the situation. 
Failure to prevent the negative influence of the civilian bureaucracy on the development 
process in Turkey and India was related to their being the backbone of the execution as well 
as ineptness and reluctance of the political elite to undertake an overall administrative reform.  
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With respect to the components of the ruling elite coalition, the most striking difference 
between Turkey and India is the military bureaucracy. Because of the inherited British 
administrative system the Indian political elite was oversensitive to keep the military 
bureaucracy as a subordinate to the political elite and civilian bureaucracy. Though there was 
a general belief in the impossibility of a military intervention in such a huge geography like 
India parallel to the military interventions and political instability in Pakistan, anxiety of the 
Indian political elite’s regarding the military bureaucracy increased. Frequent shifts in the 
upper ranks and disregard of the recommendations of the high rank military bureaucrats were 
among the most favorite strategies of the political elite, developed to keep the military 
bureaucrats in a subordinate position.  
 
In this respect Turkey differed from India, with a difference that could be explained on state 
tradition basis. Though the Founding Fathers attempted to keep the military bureaucracy away 
from the ruling elite coalition and made it subordinate to the political elite and civilian 
bureaucracy, success of these arrangements was not permanent. This subordinate position 
lasted only for three decades. Relying on the economic problems as well as Turkish political 
elite’s increased loneliness in the Western bloc, the military intervened to the democratic 
process. By the Military Coup of 1960, military bureaucracy successfully established 
mechanisms which served to the institutionalization of its interests. By these mechanisms it 
reinforced its position in the elite coalition vis-à-vis other components. Because of the 
military bureaucracy’s participation to the highest administrative body and its influence on 
every policy decisions, different circles defined Turkish democracy as a quasi-democracy.    
 
Owing to its empowered position within the ruling elite coalition the military bureaucracy has 
been an important determinant in politics and resource allocation, which is not the case in 
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India. By its immediate announcement following the Military Coup of 1960 concerning 
Turkey’s foreign policy the military bureaucracy underlined its pro-Western policy line. 
Occurred in a short while after the Iraqi revolution of 1958, Turkish military coup represented 
just a contrary case in comparison to the first. In 1971, though its impact was not evident, it 
should be noted that the so-called reform government set up following the military 
memorandum of 1971 was responsive to the demands of the US administration regarding the 
ban of poppy cultivation.  
 
As mentioned previously, through establishing mechanisms the military bureaucracy achieved 
the institutionalization of its interests. The National Security Council (NSC) enabled the 
military bureaucracy’s continuous participation in the decision-making process on the most 
strategic national issues. Its establishment indicated new balances in state administration. The 
political elite who represented the national will had to share its decision-making power with 
the military bureaucracy. Ironically, the political elite was used in the justification of the NSC. 
Referring to previous years, the military bureaucracy defined the NSC as a precautionary 
mechanism to prevent political elite’s indifference to its views.  
    
The empowered position of the military bureaucracy also influenced its role in resource 
allocation. As revealed in the memoirs of one of the most important industrialists of the 
country, by establishing OYAK the military bureaucracy aimed to become an important 
economic force in the country. Though they became competitive rivals in the domestic 
market, in the process interests of the industrial capital and military bureaucracy began to be 
identified on economic issues due to OYAK’s increasing economic power. In early 70s, 
OYAK turned to be one of the greatest monopolies in the country that had many economic 
enterprises in various sectors such as construction, tourism, insurance, automotive industry as 
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well as intermediary industry such as refrigerator, cement, petro-chemistry, food processing. 
In the diversification of the activities, it also established partnership with the foreign capital. 
 
Concerning this identification of interests, some scholars point out the pro-capitalists 
arrangements that military memo of 1971 provided. For the capitalists the military 
intervention of 1971 was like a saving mechanism since they had difficulty in coping with a 
highly politicized society. The increasingly differentiated society with its dynamism, activism 
and militancy began to pose serious challenges to the ruling elite coalition, particularly to the 
industrial capitalists. Parallel to a strong trade union movement, the wave of strikes 
challenged the interests of capitalists, both national and foreign. Arrangements those purged 
the liberal elements of the 1961 Constitution that was prepared under the surveillance of the 
military administration of 1960 aimed to eliminate these challenges. In essence, these 
arrangements not only eliminated the challenges but also served the big capitalists’ 
consolidation of power. This consolidation was possible through various economic policies 
such as expansion of bank credits and provision of various incentives including cheap money 
to the capitalist circles and arrangements regarding labor market such as proscription of 
strikes, restriction of right of association.922 Consequently, unlike the Indian military 
bureaucracy, in Turkey the military bureaucracy began to shape the policies of the country at 
macro level since 1960 through the establishment of the NSC and OYAK.  
                                                 
922The relevant literature includes Vehbi Koç, Hayat Hikayem, İstanbul:[yay.yer],1973; George S. Harris, 
Turkey: Coping with Crisis, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985; Caglar Keyder, “The Political Economy of 
Turkish Democracy” in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak, ed. Turkey In Transition: New Perspectives, 
New York Oxford: Oxford University Press,1987; Huseyin Ramazanoglu “The Politics of Industrialization in A 
Closed Economy and the IMF Intervention of 1979” and Feroz Ahmad, “Military Intervention and The Crisis in 
Turkey” in Huseyin Ramazanoglu, ed. Turkey in the World Capitalist System, Aldershot: Avebury,1985; Engin 
Eroğlu, Sınıflar Açısından 12 Mart: 12 Mart Devam Ediyor Mu?, İstanbul: Soyut Yayınları, 1975; C.H.Dodd, 
The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, 2nd Edition, Cambs: The Eothen Press, 1990; Metin Heper, The State 
Tradition in Turkey, Northgate: The Eothen Press, 1985; Suat Parlar, Silahlı Bürokrasinin Ekonomi Politiği, 
İstanbul: Bibliotek Publications, 1997; William Hale, Turkiye’de Ordu ve Siyaset: 1789’dan Günümüze, 
İstanbul: Hil Yayınları,1996; Kemal Karpat, Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical 
Analysis, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973; Stefanos Yerasimos, Azgelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye, İstanbul: Gözlem 
Yayınları, 1976; Ümit Özdağ, Menderes Dönemi Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali, İstanbul: Boyut 
Yayıncılık, 1997  
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As another component of the ruling elite coalition, rural elite of Turkey and India reflected the 
ability to preserve its position within the coalition owing to its success in emasculating 
policies which challenged its interests and political power at national and local levels. The 
latter sheds light on the reluctance of the political elite to adopt a firm stance vis-à-vis the 
rural elite.  
 
In the Turkish case, rural elite was a novel component. Their emergence in the imperial 
structure was possible by the deterioration of the imperial administrative system and 
population mobility during war years. Though they got important concessions from the 
imperial administration, the rural elite was never regarded as a component in the imperial elite 
coalition. Their rise to this coalition was possible by the Anatolian Revolution when the 
Turkish nationalists had to rely on them during the national movement. Despite this reliance 
on landed interests, however, in the aftermath of Independence Turkish political elite was 
cautious to preserve its dominating position vis-à-vis other components. This lasted until late 
40s when they began to challenge this dominating stance owing to the autonomy they had 
parallel to the accumulated capital during the war years. By the shift in the locomotive sector 
heyday of the Turkish rural elite commenced and lasted until 60s. Though later on during the 
military interventions, power of the rural elite was attempted to be challenged, these were not 
successful attempts.  The rural elite successfully rebuffed them owing to its influence in 
politics and its consciousness to have an important role in the Turkish economy. 
 
In India, on the other hand, the rural elite represented continuity with the past. During the 
British rule, the rural elite was a component that the central administration relied on. It acted 
as a means for the expropriation of the land revenue. Identifying their interests with the 
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continuation of the British rule the rural elite did not support the national movement. Their 
anxiety regarding the national administration proved to be  true in the aftermath of the  
Independence. Consistent with the promised land vision, political elite adopted a pro-tiller and 
anti-feudal policy line that aimed to attain structural changes in rural India.  
 
Though creation of a more egalitarian social order with respect to equality of opportunity in 
rural India represented one facet of the objectives, the ultimate objective of these policies was 
the acceleration of capitalist production relations in rural India. Capitalist production mode 
was regarded as an antithesis for subsistence agriculture distinguished by low productivity. In 
contrast to the expectations, however, these policies were successfully emasculated and 
prevented by the rural elite. At the end, their interests remained untouched or reinforced.  
 
While the above-mentioned policies represented the first stage of the agricultural development 
policies, the second stage commenced in mid-60s. By this date Indian political elite adopted 
an agriculture-oriented policy line. This adoption served to the empowerment of the capitalist 
farmers within the elite coalition and the rural structure, owing to the mechanisms, 
successfully promoted the flow of public resources to the rural elite. Similar to the industrial 
capitalists, by manipulating the anxieties of the political elite regarding production output 
level, the rural elite enjoyed huge concessions. Instead of the trickle down of accumulated 
capital and benefits, however, concentration of resources as well as intensified dual structure 
observed as a result of these policies.                
 
The intensification of dual structure and concentration of resources in few hands were not 
peculiar for India. These were the same outcomes observed in Turkey. Empowered the stance 
of the rural elite vis-à-vis the rural mass these policies also resulted in the diversification of 
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the rural elite as semi-feudal landlords as well as capitalist farmers. In most cases the big 
landlords those preferred absentee landlordism, successfully adapted themselves to the 
prevailing circumstances and converted into capitalist farmers.  This ended mono component 
structure of the rural elite but did not lead to a considerable weakening of the absentee 
landlords owing to the latter’s influence and power in politics.                
 
Interaction between the components of the ruling elite coalition was distinguished by various 
confrontations, tensions as well as alliances. In these interactions each elite group endeavored 
to reinforce its preponderance within the coalition, which was crucial in shaping (or 
distorting) policies and allocation of resources. Discontent of the political elite of Turkey and 
India from the increased autonomy of the civilian bureaucracy was one of these 
confrontations. As the resource allocation power in the system empowered the related group’s 
influence, the political elite grew envious to be the sole group regarding resource allocation.  
 
Another example was the confrontation of industrial capitalists’ of both Turkey and India with 
the rural elite. On the land reform and agricultural income tax issues both Turkish and Indian 
industrial capitalists exerted pressure on the political elite parallel to the stalemate in domestic 
markets, prevailing low agricultural level and their increased autonomy vis-à-vis other elite 
groups. The demand for land reform was totally adverse to the initial reaction of Turkish and 
Indian capitalists as initially they totally opposed land reform and supported the rural elite of 
their countries.  This opposition was due to their anxiety that land reform would be the first 
step for the abolition of private property.  This was an anxiety fed by the intense Cold War 
years of 40s, which was not the case in 60s. 
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Yet the interaction between the components of the ruling elite coalition represented one facet, 
as the other facet was related to the ruling elite coalition and the mass.  Whatever the change 
in the composition of the ruling elite coalition, there were some concepts and policies adverse 
to the interests of the coalition and led them to develop a “common language” to preserve 
their interests and concessions. Distinguished by their low domestic capital accumulation like 
other LDCs there were various attempts in Turkey and India to increase the level of domestic 
capital. Yet these attempts were successfully rebuffed by the elite group coalition. Instead, by 
successfully manipulating the prevailing conditions they developed mechanisms which served 
to the continuous flow of the public resources such as bank credits, nationalization policies 
and vast incentives top among of which was subsidies.    
 
In both countries the ruling elite coalition did not tolerate the policies that aimed at structural 
changes in rural Turkey and India. While emasculation of the Village Institutes in Turkey was 
justified by the communist phobia of the majority, in India, Community Development 
Programs were emasculated through the rural elite’s domination of the grassroots level 
organizations and absorption of the funds earmarked to these organizations.  
 
Another policy issue aiming at structural changes in rural Turkey and India was the land 
reform issue. In the Turkish context, land reform remained mostly untouched despite long 
debates regarding its social justice implications. In the Indian context, there were various land 
reform policies justified by social justice and agricultural productivity. Outcomes of these 
policies were, however, far behind the objectives caused by the successful interference of the 
rural elite in emasculating and preventing these policies.      
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Tax reform issue was another example. Development of a just tax system was defined as a 
fundamental solution to low domestic savings. Yet in both countries political elite failed to 
develop tax systems particularly due to the group consciousness of the capitalists and rural 
elite. In this process, the proportion of the direct and indirect taxes was distorted in favor of 
the first, which indicated the injustice of the tax systems. Though there were various attempts 
to develop just tax systems, these attempts were either prevented during the bill debates or 
abolished after brief enactment. In this prevention, both capitalists and rural elite manipulated 
the production outputs issue on which the political elite was oversensitive.       
 
There were also policies such as bank credits, subsidies of various kinds those enabled the 
flow of public resources to the elite groups. Capitalists and rural elite were the main 
beneficiaries of the bank credits and various exclusive credit schemes which were justified by 
referring to petty entrepreneurs or small landholders. Subsidies, on the other hand, comprised 
the most important mechanism that enabled the lasting flow of public sector resources to the 
hands of the few. As a result of broadening subsidies, both Turkey and India had to apply 
deficit financing that led to high inflation rates in both countries. As the minority absorbed the 
public resources, scarce capital of Turkey and India was not used for priority fields defined by 
the political elite and planners of the countries.  
 
These policies were crucial as they reflected the vicious circle of these countries. Though 
suffering from low domestic capital due to the political elite’s failure to ‘discipline’ these elite 
groups the available resources, including the foreign aid, were wasted to satisfy the 
expectations of these elite groups. Through their successful interference, the process turned 
out to be a capitalist capital accumulation, instead of a broad based development. This 
outcome invalidated the claim that underdevelopment was due to low domestic capitals. 
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Though this was an important determinant, it was not the only one. Even when there was 
considerable amount of capital accumulation, owing to the pragmatism, group-centricism and 
shortsightedness of the elite groups the accumulated amount was not efficiently used. Elite 
groups of Turkey and India lacked not only innovative but also rational thinking.    
 
c. Comparison of Turkey and India in Terms of External Dynamics 
The ruling elite coalition of Turkey and India, however, represented only one dynamic in this 
process. As countries got integrated into the world economy, external dynamics were crucial 
for Turkey and India.  The external dynamics, which indicated center countries, were crucial 
due to their impact on the development policies and resource allocation. For the era under 
study, as the new superpower of the western capitalist world the USA was crucial as it 
developed and implemented the basic means, namely foreign aid policy. This institutionalized 
the dependence of the LDCs on the superpower.  
 
Examination of the process, however, reveals that the role of the center countries in the 
process was not limited to the supply of foreign exchange. Through various interventions and 
sanctions, the center countries contributed to the unattained ultimate objective of self-reliance.  
Representing various levels of interaction between the center and peripheral Turkey & India, 
there were various economic, military and diplomatic issues all of which had important 
economic implications which influenced the capital accumulation and resource allocation of 
Turkey and India. 
 
In the initial years, as the main donor of Turkey and India, the USA and US-led international 
organizations recommended agriculture-led development policy by relying on comparative 
advantage principle. In their affirmative response to this recommendation, Turkish 
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policymakers reoriented the development policy of the country. In contrast to industry-led 
policy of 30s and early 40s, in the post-WW2 era agriculture became the locomotive sector of 
the Turkish development policy. While the scope of the consensus among the Turkish 
political elite on the accuracy of this reorientation remained unknown, despite the dominating 
pro-agriculture rhetoric among policymakers, an important determinant in this reorientation 
was  its being  the precondition for  Turkey’s inclusion to the US foreign aid policy. This 
reorientation reinforced Turkey’s role in the international division of labor as an agricultural 
country that exported primary goods while importing manufactured goods. The process 
proved to the disadvantage of Turkey with respect to the disproportion in prices among the 
primary and manufactured goods.   
 
India’s adoption of the agriculture-led development policy for a short time, on the other hand, 
did not represent its responsiveness to the recommendations of the center countries. Instead, 
the prevailing conditions in the country compelled the policymakers to adopt this policy for a 
short time span. Following the attainment of high production outputs in agriculture, India 
adopted heavy industrialization-led development policy that was highly criticized by the US 
administration. As an indicator of this disapproval, the US administrations refused to finance 
the Second 5 Year Development Plan distinguished by its reorientation to heavy 
industrialization drive. Tough this refusal was disappointing for India, owing to her non-
aligned foreign policy she managed to raise funds from the USSR to implement the Plan.  
 
Criticisms of the center countries regarding industrialization except the primary light 
industries lasted until late 50s. By this date, a shift occurred in the policy recommendations of 
the center countries. In contrast to the agriculture that was regarded as the best economic 
activity for the LDCs, the same circles began to recommend industrialization. Though they 
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preserved their reservations on the appropriateness of heavy industrialization, the US began to 
allocate resources for industrialization schemes. By this shift India began to receive 
considerable amount of aid allocations.  
 
The impact of this shift was observed in the Turkish case when the US and US-led 
organizations recommended import substitution industrialization for Turkey. Though the new 
policy line was in conformity with the national objectives of the LDCs, including Turkey and 
India, in contrast to the expectations, the policy did not lead to self-reliance. Instead it resulted 
in a more reinforced dependency between the LDCs and center countries as the latter avoided 
transferring the recent technology to the LDCs to preserve their dominance.  
 
India reoriented its development policy in mid-60s parallel to successive droughts, increased 
foodgrains deficiency and increased importation in the country. Shaped by the 
recommendations of the center countries India adopted intensive agriculture techniques 
distinguished by its region-wise and big landholder features. This was a policy suggested not 
only to India but also to other LDCs, including Turkey whose agricultural production outputs 
were far behind the defined objectives. Parallel to India’s adoption of intensive agriculture 
techniques, Turkey also adopted these techniques. Similar to the recommended agriculture 
development policy of 50s, the intensive agriculture techniques excluded the majority of the 
rural population. Other outcomes of the policy had similarities with the previous policy, such 
as acceleration of capitalist production relations in rural areas, intensification of the dual 
structure as well as unequal income distribution.                 
 
Another impact of the center countries on the development process of the LDCs was related to 
the demand for promotion of a favorable environment for the private capital, both domestic 
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and foreign. First of all, this demand had ideological connotations as private entrepreneurship 
was identified with capitalism. Another determinant beneath this demand was, however, 
related to the preference of the private capital as investment fields. In contrast to the priority 
sectors that the LDCs defined as crucial for development and self-reliance of the country, 
private capital in general preferred sectors that had quick and high profits. This preference 
resulted in the distortion of priorities of the LDCs to a great extent as the available resources 
had to be earmarked for unproductive luxury consumer goods.   
 
This was a common ground for domestic and foreign private capital, which acted as an 
impetus for the establishment of joint enterprises. This preference also indicated the 
semblance of the outcomes in Turkey and India, which differed considerably regarding the 
proportion of foreign capital. In contrast to India, Turkey had relatively small proportion of 
foreign capital. Yet, this did not change the earmarking of resources to unproductive ends, 
particularly to consumer goods sector as the domestic private capital had the same tendency.  
This preference was crucial particularly with respect to its contribution to the emergence of 
pseudo-industrialization.   
 
Liberalization of foreign trade as well as devaluation of national currencies were among the 
main economic issues between the center and periphery representing the other dimension of 
the center’s strategies which influenced the development process of the aid recipient 
countries. As liberalized foreign trade regime was defined as the basis of the multilateral trade 
regime it had ideological connotations. This was the reason why both center countries and 
center-led international agencies raised this issue at every occasion, particularly at the 
vulnerable times of the aid recipient countries. Responsive to recommendations of the center 
countries, both Turkey and India liberalized their foreign trade regime. This did not last long 
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due to the increased balance of payments problem. However, even those short liberalized 
periods had devastating impacts on the economies of both Turkey and India.       
 
Devaluation of the national currencies, on the other hand, was brought to the agenda at the 
very vulnerable times of the aid recipient countries, mainly in the midst of foreign exchange 
crisis. Conditioned as the foreign aid packages that these countries urgently asked for, the 
devalued currency aggravated the loan burden and served to the benefit of foreign firms who 
made payments to Turkish public institutions in national currency. In contrast to the 
assumption, devalued currency’s impact on expansion of markets for the primary export 
goods was limited.  
 
Not only the economic issues but also every aspect of the center-periphery interaction had 
various negative impacts on the economy of the peripheral countries. Military issues were 
among these issues. The Cold War context promoted an international atmosphere that justified 
increased defense expenses. It also accelerated the armament of many countries. As a factor 
armament not only served to the depletion of available resources but also increased the 
dependency of peripheral countries to the center regarding military equipment and armament.  
 
In the Cold War context, Turkey’s membership to NATO was welcomed as it reinforced 
Turkey’s integration to the West. This membership spontaneously led to an increase in the 
defense expenditures of the country which meant a great burden on the Turkish budget.  In 
other words, it indicated earmarking of available resources to military instead of development. 
In a consensual manner the increased defense expenses were justified by the increased 
defense ability of the country. Illusionary aspect of this justification was, however, revealed 
during the Cyprus crisis of early 60s. Turkey, like other aid recipient countries, bound itself to 
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the permission of the US administration for the usage of the US-provided arms. This feature 
shed light on the fact that despite huge expenditures, Turkey lacked a sound defense system.   
 
Regarding this issue, India represented another case. Refusing military alignments and pacts, 
India criticized the USA for the rapid armament of countries via these pacts. This was the 
reason why Indian policymakers harshly reacted to Pakistan’s armament by the USA as by 
this act the latter brought the Cold War to the borders of India. Until that time the motto of the 
Indian policymakers was to spend the possible minimum amount for defense and earmark the 
possible maximum available resources for development. By the new factor of armed Pakistan, 
however, India had to increase the defense allocations and commenced rapid armament. As 
frequently aroused by the Indian policymakers the artificially created armed Pakistan led to 
the increased amount of allocations for defense instead of development.           
 
Comparison of the interaction between the USA and Turkey & India on diplomatic issues 
reflected another dimension of the center’s impact on resource allocation process. The US 
policy regarding Turkey and the Middle East countries aimed to create a controlled  ‘center’ 
in the periphery. While Arab countries were regarded as the periphery of the periphery, 
Turkey was endowed with the role of the center in this periphery. Realization of this scheme 
would enable the USA to keep a very strategic geography under control via ‘center’ Turkey. 
When this strategy was backfired, however, Turkey had to pay a high cost, namely loneliness 
in the international arena as she was regarded as the frontier force of the USA.  This 
loneliness found its expression in the voting of UN resolutions and loss of markets. The latter 
indicated loss of possible foreign exchange earnings for the country.  
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Interaction of the USA and India represented a contrary example. In opposing India’s non-
aligned foreign policy and assumed leadership among the non-aligned countries, the USA, in 
essence, opposed India’s attempt to become the center of its periphery as it was adverse to the 
interests of the USA. Realization of this would lead to an ‘uncontrolled’ center that had an 
influence on a huge geography important with respect to natural and strategic resources.  
Though the US policies aiming to prevent this centralization of India were failed, owing to the 
China factor India could not attain her objectives to a great extent.   
 
In sum, as the above-mentioned analyses indicated failure of Turkey and India in attaining 
self-reliance by early 70s was not due to only one particular dynamic. Instead it was due to 
the interplay of inner (ruling elite coalition) and external (center countries) dynamics. While 
the elite groups of both countries interfered to the process to enable the divertion of the 
resources for their benefits as well as emasculate or prevent any arrangements which 
challenged their interests, the center countries interfered with the process to preserve their 
dominance in the center-periphery dichotomy. Center’s most favorable means in attaining this 
objective was policy recommendations that prevented the peripheral countries’ attainment of 
self-reliance mainly due to waste of available resources.  
 
The question whether this interplay was a vicious circle led to another question whether the 
inner or external dynamics had more contribution to the unattained self-reliance. The last 
question was so crucial and controversial that it led to the emergence of conflicting 
development paradigms which explained the cause of less development from different 
perspectives and recommended policies accordingly.  Categorized as orthodox that defined 
underdevelopment with respect to prevailing domestic factors and heterodox that 
development thinking explained it in the framework of center-periphery dichotomy, these 
 525
development paradigms provided theoretical setting for the development policies and 
priorities of the peripheral as well as policy recommendations of the center countries.  
 
While orthodox development thinking provided the theoretical setting both for the donors and 
policymakers of the LDCs until early 60s, heterodox development thinking emerged as a 
challenge to the orthodox development thinking. In the following pages impact of 
development paradigms of the post-WW2 on the preparation and implementation of 
development policies as well as policy recommendations of the center countries are analyzed 
to reveal the contribution of theoreticians to the failure of development process of the LDCs, 
including Turkey and India.           
 
d. Analysis of policy recommendations, development policies and outcomes with respect to 
development paradigms 
 
Examination of the Turkish and Indian development policies reveals their conformity with the 
theoretical setting of development. Impact of the growth orientation of the orthodox 
development thinking is observable in the policies of Turkey and India. Ignoring the 
qualitative dimension extensively, both the Turkish and Indian policymakers focused on the 
quantitative dimensions. Success of the policies was defined with respect to the sectoral and 
overall growth rates, which in most cases satisfied the policymakers.    
 
However, there were various issues whose undermined this ‘success’. Concentration on the 
growth orientation indicated the policymakers’ lack of concern on the question of distribution 
aspect of the growth. This was another conformity with assumptions of the orthodox 
development paradigm. Policies which concentrated on certain segments of the population 
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while excluding the majority were shaped according to the trickle down principle. 
Industrialization policies as well as big landholder-oriented agricultural policies were 
developed according to this principle. Though the policymakers of Turkey and India were 
successful in pouring the resources to the elite groups, they did not repeat the same success in 
the diffusion of these resources. This was mainly due to the preferences of these upper 
segments. More than diffusion, these segments spent the resources into materials which could 
not be diverted to the lower segments such as luxury items, or education at prestigious 
schools.  
 
Accepting the assumption that the development process did not promise happiness to all, the 
intensified dual structure and increased inequality in income distribution did not alarm the 
policymakers.  Instead it was regarded as an imperative ‘bitter pill’ that had to be taken for 
that stage but that led to future wellbeing of the all. Consistent with this principle they 
developed policies/mechanisms such as tax arrangements, credits and subsidies that served 
the concentration of capital into few hands.   
 
This duality, in fact, shed light on the partial attainment of another premise of the 
development paradigms, namely modernization according to which development process led 
to structural changes in the LDCs, which is distinguished by the predominance of traditional 
sectors. Interpreted from the dual economy model, prevalence of the dual society proved the 
failure of development endeavors as it did not result in vanishing of the traditional sector.     
 
In line with the classical economic thought that relied on comparative advantage principle 
Turkey adopted agriculture-led development policy in 50s. However, consistent with the 
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change in the recommendations of the center countries, Turkish policymakers redefined the 
locomotive sector of economy as industry to attain self-sufficiency. This was consistent with 
modernization the main argument of which was industrialization’s being the fundamental 
means for development. India, on the other hand, despite all criticisms of the center adopted 
heavy industrialization-led development policy. Critics of this development policy define it as 
an original Nehruvian development policy that lacked western traces. Yet this did not reflect 
the facts, as the Indian development policy was prepared according to Rosenstein-Rodan’s big 
push idea and Hirschman’s unbalanced growth theory.  
 
Another criticism of the center countries in the initial years of Indian development policy was 
planned economic model. Though this was again in line with the big push theory, center 
countries criticized planned economy until they concluded the necessity of planning in mid-
50s when they diagnosed waste of resources in the LDCs.  When they recommended planned 
economy for Turkey, however, initially they faced the rejection of this idea by the Turkish 
policymakers. This lasted until early 60s.  After the military coup of 1960 Turkey adopted 
planned economic development that was in conformity with the center’s recommendations.    
 
In mid-60s both Turkey and India adopted intensive agricultural techniques for agricultural 
development. This adoption was not shaped by comparative advantage principle; instead it 
was in accordance with the dual economies model. Without neglecting industry, in both 
countries considerable amount of allocations was earmarked for agricultural development. 
Outcomes of these techniques, however, invalidated the model’s assumption. In contrast to 
the assumption that expansion of modern/capitalist sector absorbs surplus labor force, in 
practice due to the capital-intensity of the techniques, this sector’s labor force absorption 
capacity remained low. What aggravated the problem in Turkish and Indian context was the 
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capitalist/modern sectors failure to generate employment. The majority of the rural population 
continued to survive in the traditional sector while those who migrated to urban areas was 
mostly absorbed by the service sector.           
Wide use of technology particularly in agriculture was not a particular component of dual 
economies model but orthodox development thinking in general. According to this, 
modernization and development lead to an increase in the use of science and technology 
regardless of the suitability and additional costs of these technologies on LDCs. Turkish and 
Indian examples confirmed this assumption. In the process, both of these countries increased 
the level of technology use. However, as these technologies were imported they posed high 
financial burden on the economies of Turkey and India. Not developed or domestically 
produced technology became the fundamental means for the center to preserve its dominance 
vis-à-vis the LDCs, including Turkey and India. 
 
Commencing in mid-60s the pursued policies began to be criticized in Turkey and India. This 
was due to the existing dualities in the society, increased inequality in income distribution and 
concentration of resources in few hands all of which proved the failure of the trickle down 
mechanism of development.  Critics in Turkey and India pointed out the untouched majority 
despite the acceleration of capitalist relations in the society. Like many other LDCs, criticisms 
not only remained in rhetoric but also found its expressions in various mass movements. For 
the sake of preservation of the order, policymakers of LDCs adopted either military 
interventions or other sorts of authoritarian regimes.923  
 
                                                 
923Quoted by Frankel, “Modernization and Dependency Theories :Is a Social Science of Development Possible?” 
p.95  
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This was valid both for Turkey and India. While in Turkey military intervention of 1971 
justified by the increased anarchy in the society owing to the people’s politicization and 
frustration, in India anxiety of widespread mass movement led Gandhi to declare emergency 
rule in mid-70s. However, before these authoritarian rule preferences, policymakers of both 
countries adopted rhetoric sensitive to the concerns of social justice. This rhetoric was again 
in conformity with the development paradigm when its emphasis shifted to growth with 
equity. In Turkey while there was more emphasis on the necessity of social justice despite 
lack of agreement on the definition of this concept, the main opposition party referred to the 
prevailing injustice in rural Turkey by adopting the rhetoric of  ‘land to the tiller’. In India the 
adopted garibi horatio rhetoric was in line with this development paradigm. 
 
While the growth with equity concept was novel for Turkey, it was not the case for India. 
They differed on rhetoric in the initial years. In contrast to the Turkish policymakers who 
complained that Turkey lacked the social dynamics due to lack of classes, Indian 
policymakers aware of the existing dynamics as well as rising expectations of the mass 
adopted redistributive justice rhetoric in justifying and preparing their policies. Though this 
principle was never practiced owing to the successful intervention of the elite groups to 
emasculate them, Indian policymakers, withdrew this notion by mid-60s when they faced the 
gradual returns of the outcomes of these policies. Therefore, Gandhi’s garibi horatio was in 
fact a return to the rhetoric of Nehru era.       
 
This brief analysis of the policies and outcomes with respect to the orthodox development 
paradigm indicates that policymakers of Turkey and India acted according to the premises of 
orthodox development thinking on basic issues including concentration of resources in the 
upper segments as they were believed to spend their savings for new investments, developed 
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policies which resulted in this concentration of resources such as subsidies, tax arrangements 
and credits as well as their ignorance of the deteriorating plight of the mass.  
 
This conformity with the paradigm, on the other hand, brings another question regarding the 
autonomy of the policymakers in determining the policies vis-à-vis theoreticians. In other 
words, while the policymakers of the LDCs were criticized, those who provided the 
theoretical setting remained silent observers of the process when billions of people were 
subjected to their theories.    
 
The question of autonomy could not be limited to the policymakers of the LDCs, including 
Turkey and India as the orthodox development paradigm also provided the theoretical setting 
for donors. They relied on the premises of the paradigm when they extended loans to the 
LDCs. The modernization appeal of the paradigm was used for the justification of the foreign 
aid to LDCs since contribution of the advanced industrialized countries is defined as to guide 
the LDCs by sharing their capital and know-how to bring these countries into the modern age 
of capitalism and liberal democracy. In this framework, free flow of foreign capital as well as 
aid are defined as imperative means since the LDCs were mostly distinguished by their low 
capital accumulation that impeded their development endeavors.  
 
Moreover, modernization appeal correlated with the expectations of the LDCs as both the 
paradigm and policymakers of the LDCs agreed that industrialization is the fundamental 
means for development. While policymakers of the LDCs defined industrialization as the sole 
means to attain self-reliance, the development economists had a consensual view that 
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industrialization was the most prominent feature of capitalist development, economic growth 
and alleviation of poverty.   
 
Yet the donors were not all the time in full conformity with the theoreticians.  While they 
adopted comparative advantage principle and influenced the policies of LDCs, the leading 
trend within the development paradigm referred to the essentiality of industrialization for 
economic growth. Later on, when center countries concluded that industrialization of the 
LDCs would not challenge their dominance on condition that the center preserved the recent 
technology in their hands, industrialization attempts of the LDCs received less criticism. 
 
The autonomy of the policymakers of Turkey and India was under question by the critics of 
the development policies and their outcomes. In their criticisms, they referred not only to the 
deficiencies of polices but contribution of the center to the process which was regarded as a 
failure from the perspective of self-reliance and social justice. Consistent with the dependency 
theory, these critics referred to the disadvantageous position of the latecomers’ vis-à-vis the 
advanced countries.   
 
As the conclusion of this dissertation, the researcher had full agreement with the criticisms of 
the orthodox development paradigm. Through the analysis of Turkish and Indian development 
policies and their implementation it can be concluded that basic argument of the dependency 
theory related to the close interplay of the center and peripheral countries is valid. Yet to 
adopt a mechanical interpretation of dependency theory is not convincing. Attainment of self-
reliance by some latecomer peripheral country leads to an optimistic view that what LDCs 
faced was not a vicious circle. More than the strategies of the center countries, success of 
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these latecomers has been explained with respect to the political elite’s ability to discipline 
other components of the ruling elite coalition, particularly capitalists who have been obliged 
to make exportation. 
The degree of the peripheral countries’ freedom from the center, however, is an important 
determinant regarding the question of self-reliance. Policymakers of the countries whose 
geopolitics, available resources and market potentialities make them so valuable for the center 
could not enjoy vast freedom vis-a-vis the center as the latter could not risk their being 
uncontrolled self-reliant powers. Consequently, failure of each country in the unattainment of 
self-reliance has to be analyzed separately.   
 
In the case of Turkey and India, during the era under study the interplay between the inner 
and external dynamics was crucial. It gave the impression that both the inner and external 
dynamics contributed to this outcome equally. While the political elite failed to ‘discipline’ 
other components the distinguished feature of which was the obsession with high profits and 
preservation of their power, the center countries regarded Turkey and India as crucial with 
respect to geopolitics, available resources and market potentialities. This obsession of high 
profits can be interpreted with respect to their relatively scarce resources, lack of vision 
regarding the possible negative outcomes of excessive dependency to foreign countries for the 
country was another important factor that shaped the course of events. Last but not least, an 
important ‘undisciplined’ component in these countries that also served the dependent 
development was the masses, which were tempted by the consumption goods and proved to 
be good imitators of the consumption patterns of the developed countries. This was a fact that 
confirmed Nurkse’s argument924 related to the waste of resources in LDCs.  
                                                 
924Nurke’s major concern is with the problem of generating savings. Without attaching much value to foreign 
aid, Nurkse defines imitation of the consumption patterns of the advanced countries by the less developed 
countries as the possible detrimental effect on development efforts. Nurkse argues that despite large differences 
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in income levels between developed and underdeveloped countries consumers in the latter often seek to imitate 
consumption standards in the rich countries. The result of this is lower marginal propensities to save in today’s 
underdeveloped countries than was historically the case when the advanced countries were at similar income 
levels. As a proof of the scope of this detrimental impact he refers to the successful industrialization process of 
Japan and the USSR. While the first imitated every aspect of the West in production, except consumption 
patterns, the latter isolated itself from the West and escape from these consumption trends.  
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